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Abstract 
 
Recent years have seen widespread efforts to develop restorative justice 
(RJ) in domestic criminal justice processes. Yet, as RJ has been implemented 
within existing systems, institutional priorities, goals and ways of working have 
shaped its interpretation and use – a phenomenon to which theoretical and 
empirical research has been insufficiently attentive.  
This thesis explores the use of RJ by two English police forces, namely 
Durham and Gloucestershire Constabularies. Official documents, descriptive 
statistics and qualitative interviews conducted with policymakers, managers and 
frontline practitioners from each area were used to investigate these forces’ RJ 
strategies, policies and practices. The findings indicate that, although RJ was 
understood and utilised somewhat differently between the forces, it was framed 
and enacted in both principally as a mechanism with which to satisfy victims and 
manage demand. At the same time, the flexibility of organisational policies and 
the low visibility of RJ delivery left frontline officers with considerable discretion 
to determine how to balance the needs and interests of all those with a stake in 
their work, and how to navigate the various restrictions, incentives and pressures 
which they faced when using RJ. The data suggest that this led to heterogeneous 
approaches to RJ delivery in practice, as police officers were largely enabled to 
determine, on a case-by-case basis, the extent to which they would use the RJ 
process to empower its participants. 
This research seeks to advance the nascent field of restorative policing by 
exploring its relationship with the institutional context in which it takes place. It 
examines the practice of ‘street RJ’ which is widely used within English forces, 
but about which little has been written. Finally, it ascertains the implications of the 
institutionalisation of RJ for participants in police-led practices and foregrounds 
the (under-researched) experiences of those involved in its implementation.  
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 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Introducing the thesis 
 
Proponents of restorative justice (RJ) often claim that, by employing 
restorative principles and processes, we might remedy certain salient limitations 
of Anglo-American approaches to criminal justice. Some of its advocates present 
RJ as more empowering, inclusive and responsive than conventional justice 
mechanisms, enabling those who hold a stake in a crime or conflict to participate 
in the official response, and to address and ‘repair’ any harm done (Braithwaite, 
2002). Some note that, under certain conditions, RJ processes can assist with 
victim recovery and reduce reoffending (Shapland, et al., 2011; Strang, et al., 
2013; Sherman, et al., 2015), while others assert that a broad application of a 
normative restorative framework could transform societal approaches to crime, 
harm and justice altogether (Zehr, 1990; Gavrielides, 2007; Wright, 2008).  
This thesis argues that RJ may be shaped and moulded by the institutional 
context within which it is implemented, in ways that affect the extent to which 
these ambitions for RJ can be realised. RJ neither exists in a vacuum, nor is it 
used by robots. Rather, mainstreaming RJ within criminal justice typically involves 
the state, via its representative agencies, making and implementing RJ policies, 
and funding and overseeing its use (O’Mahony and Doak, 2017). Moreover, in 
many jurisdictions, including England and Wales,1 the responsibility to deliver RJ 
often falls upon criminal justice professionals, many of whom do so as an add-on 
to their existing roles (Dignan, 2007; Zinsstag, et al., 2011).  
As a result, RJ tends to be interpreted and used in a manner which reflects 
entrenched rationales and ways of working, and which prioritises system-focused 
rather than restorative goals (Daly, 2003; Aertsen, et al., 2006; Crawford, 2006). 
As Blad (2006: 108) argued, RJ is ‘received and perceived by highly developed 
agencies with strongly institutionalised other rationalities’. The resulting practices 
and narratives often hybridise the values of criminal and restorative justice, and 
deviate from many of the restorative principles that have been found to act as 
                                            
1 Both research sites are located in England, and thus the term ‘England’ is used hereinafter to 
refer to the legal jurisdiction of England and Wales. 
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safeguards for participants or explain the effectiveness of RJ processes (Hoyle, 
et al., 2002; Newburn, et al., 2002; Daly, 2003; Crawford, 2010; Barnes, 2015; 
Cutress, 2015; Strang and Sherman, 2015). Far from empowering stakeholders 
to make decisions collectively and autonomously, RJ, when co-opted by existing 
rationales, may provide only a limited challenge to the state’s authority and 
control (Crawford, 2006; Clamp and Paterson, 2017), or even allow justice 
agencies to consolidate their power or impose their will on citizens (Karstedt, 
2011; Richards, 2011). This helps to explain why RJ tends to achieve more 
modest results than its advocates might hope (Hoyle, 2011) or than its ‘nirvana 
story’ (Daly, 2003: 234) might suggest.  
Despite the state’s central role in ‘making it happen’ (Wright, 2015: 119) and 
the disjuncture between the aims and values of restorative and criminal justice 
(Johnstone, 2008), researchers regularly hesitate to examine precisely the ways 
in which institutional contexts affect how RJ is understood and used. Indeed, 
some of the most rehearsed theoretical frameworks exclude public agencies and 
professionals altogether (e.g. Christie, 1977; Zehr, 1990), ignoring their role in RJ 
and their stake in the incidents to which they respond (Weitekamp, et al., 2003; 
Pavlich, 2005; Walters, 2014). As a result, the nature of any relationship between 
institutional goals and priorities, practitioner discretion and responsibilities, and 
the meaning and use of RJ in practice, is not always explicated (Daly, 2003). As 
Crawford (2006: 131) noted: 
 
Restorative justice literature all too often evades a detailed exploration or 
analysis of the organisational, legal, political and cultural contexts in which 
different interventions are implanted and the social practices that influence 
the manner in which they are received and implemented.  
 
This research seeks to address some of the gaps which Crawford identified in the 
literature, by investigating empirically the extent to which efforts to develop RJ in 
the police resulted in its shaping by the institutional context in which it was 
implemented. Specifically, the thesis examines the strategies, policies and 
practices of two English forces – Durham and Gloucestershire Constabularies – 
which have made notable attempts to implement RJ, in one form or another, 
within operational policing in recent years. The study’s findings indicate that, in 
both forces, RJ had been institutionalised, in that it had been mainstreamed in 
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ways which reflected the institutional context in which operational policing took 
place. This had a variety of implications for those who participated in police-led 
RJ, and for the development of restorative policing more broadly. 
This chapter introduces the current study. It starts by exploring the various 
meanings which RJ can have in criminal justice, before providing a brief history 
of RJ within the English police. Subsequently, the research aims, questions and 
approach are stated, as is the reasoning behind the researcher’s selection of this 
topic. This chapter ends by outlining the structure of the thesis. 
 
 
1.2 What is restorative justice? 
 
RJ is commonly said to be a ‘contested’ concept (Johnstone and Van Ness, 
2007; Clamp and Paterson, 2017) with ‘no clear-cut definition’ (Dünkel, et al., 
2015: 4). Indeed, since the term was coined by Eglash (1977), there has been 
considerable debate within academia, policy and practice regarding the most 
useful and accurate way to define it (Johnstone, 2008). 
Attempts to operationalise RJ for the purpose of research can be typified as 
either practical or theoretical. The practical tradition attempts to expound the 
‘restorative’ way of responding to a specific harmful act and can be subdivided 
into two approaches. The first is a dialogic conceptualisation of RJ, in which it is 
a process which aims to achieve justice by enabling those with a stake in an 
offence to address the harm caused through communication and determine 
outcomes collectively (McCold, 2000; Hoyle, 2010; Restorative Justice Council, 
2011). Daly, for example, argued that RJ is best defined as a ‘justice mechanism’ 
and characterised, like mediation, by ‘a meeting (or several meetings) of affected 
individuals, facilitated by one or more impartial people’ (2016: 14, emphasis in 
original). Similarly, Marshall defined RJ as ‘a process whereby parties with a 
stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of 
the offence and its implications for the future’ (1999: 5). This is also referred to 
as the ‘purist’ definition (McCold, 2000: 401) or the ‘encounter conception’ 
(Johnstone, 2007: 611) of RJ. In theory, dialogic processes empower participants 
by enabling them to express their needs and feelings, and play an active role in 
decision-making (Braithwaite, 2002; Richards, 2011). 
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This approach is prevalent within the policies and practices of many 
jurisdictions which use RJ. Dialogic practices were first utilised systematically 
within state-led criminal justice processes in Canada in the 1970s, under the title 
‘victim-offender reconciliation programs’ (Daly and Immarigeon, 1998). Similar 
models have since been used in the justice processes of various common and 
civil law jurisdictions. For example, ‘victim-offender mediation’ is often used in 
European countries such as Belgium, Norway and Austria (Dünkel, et al., 2015), 
while ‘family group conferencing’ has become an integral part of New Zealand’s 
youth and adult justice processes (Murray, 2012). 
In England, dialogic processes in which the parties meet face-to-face are 
typically referred to as ‘restorative conferences’ (Zinsstag, et al., 2011). This 
usually denotes a scripted process – the ‘Wagga Wagga’ model – which was 
designed by an Australian police officer and imported to the UK and elsewhere in 
the 1990s (O’Connell, et al., 1999; Hoyle, et al., 2002). Restorative conferences 
are administered by one or two facilitators who may be generalist criminal justice 
practitioners (such as police or prison officers), specialists or volunteer 
facilitators, usually based either in a criminal justice agency or an independent 
RJ service (ICPR, 2016). The facilitator guides a dialogue between the victim, 
offender2 and, potentially, other indirectly affected or relevant parties, in which 
they discuss the nature and impact of the offence, before devising an outcome 
agreement (Walker, 2002). Some services also offer indirect dialogues, typically 
referred to as ‘shuttle mediation’, though this can also denote more limited 
dialogues in which the parties ask and respond to a small number of questions in 
writing or through the facilitator (Mullane, et al., 2014). 
The second practical definition sees RJ as defined by its intended outcome: 
to ‘repair the individual, relational and social harm’ caused by crime (Walgrave, 
2008: 21). This has been referred to as the ‘maximalist’ (Walgrave, 2000: 418) or 
‘expansionist’ (Clamp and Paterson, 2017: 27) interpretation of RJ. It includes 
‘every action that is primarily oriented towards doing justice by repairing the harm 
that has been caused by a crime’ (Bazemore and Walgrave, 1999: 48). Within 
the policies of Western countries, this definition of RJ seems to be less prevalent 
than the dialogic definition (Dünkel, et al., 2015), although it perhaps better 
                                            
2 While the victim-offender dichotomy is insufficiently nuanced to describe the phenomenon of 
offending precisely (Cuneen and Goldson, 2015; Jones and Creaney, 2015), these terms are 
used herein to refer to participants in RJ for practical purposes. 
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reflects the array of practices which justice agencies deliver under the guise of 
RJ. Many agencies which deliver dialogic processes, also deliver a variety of 
other practices which do not satisfy the procedural criteria of dialogic processes, 
but which are labelled as ‘restorative’ on the basis that they attempt to repair harm 
in other ways (Wigzell and Hough, 2015). This can include compensation, direct 
and indirect reparation and the provision of victim support, as well as offender-
focused work which aims to instil in offenders an awareness of the impact of their 
actions on others (McCold, 2000). 
In contrast, the more theoretical school of thought comprises philsophical 
approaches to defining RJ as a ‘type of justice’ (Daly, 2016: 6) rather than as an 
identifiable group of practices. Commentators who take this position typically see 
RJ as referring to a normative framework which can transform the criminal justice 
system as a whole, or any of its composite features (Zehr, 1990; Zehr and Mika, 
1998; Wright, 2007, 2008; Sawatsky, 2008; Pali, 2014). Under this approach, RJ 
comprises a series of ‘principles’ or ‘values’ which are said to constitute the 
restorative ‘ethos’ (Gavrielides, 2007). These principles refer either to the process 
through which justice is done or the outcomes which it should aim to achieve. 
While there is no fixed or comprehensive list of principles (Pavlich, 2007), many 
are commonly cited, including voluntariness, stakeholder empowerment, non-
domination, and a focus on repairing harm, reintegration and reconciliation as 
outcomes (Braithwaite, 2002; Stahlkopf, 2009; Vanfraechem, 2009). 
All three of these definitional approaches are relevant to this thesis because 
understandings and manifestations of RJ in the police context vary substantially 
(Clamp and Paterson, 2017). Purist and maximalist definitions reflect the police’s 
involvement in enabling dialogic practices and non-dialogic practices aimed at 
repairing harm, respectively, while some commentators argue that restorative 
principles should be used to underpin a broader transformation of police 
organisations and policework (O’Connell, 2000; Lofty, 2002; McLeod, 2003). It is 
also difficult to separate the definitional approaches in practice, due to the degree 
of overlap between them. Hoyle (2010) explained that a normative framework is 
explicit or implicit in most discussions of dialogic practices, while others have 
attempted to reframe restorative principles as standards for those practices (see, 
for example, Braithwaite, 2002; Mackay, 2006). Similarly, authors who see RJ as 
transformative, often make reference to dialogic practices as a method of 
implementing its principles (Zehr, 1990; Wright, 2015). Ultimately, each approach 
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expects that restorative principles and processes can be used to drive change 
within policework in some way. 
The third chapter examines the idea of ‘restorative policing’ in more detail. 
For now, it is important to add two further points about RJ as a concept. Firstly, 
its definitions tend to have in common two central themes: the empowerment of 
stakeholders and the repairing of harm (Stahlkopf, 2009). While the latter notion 
of ‘repairing harm’ is doubtlessly an important theoretical foundation of RJ (Zehr, 
1990), this thesis and its author fall primarily within a tradition which is generally 
most concerned with the concept of empowerment (Christie, 1977; Barton, 2000, 
2003; Aertsen, et al., 2011; Richards, 2011; O’Mahony and Doak, 2017).  
The decision to focus on empowerment emerged partially from the inductive 
nature of this research, and partially from the author’s preference for a procedural 
(i.e. dialogic) rather than outcome-focused approach to defining RJ. The dialogic 
definition represents the most concrete basis on which to operationalise and 
study RJ, delineating clear boundaries to the concept, which enable its 
comparison with other conventional and innovative justice mechanisms (Daly, 
2016). It also encourages a more detached approach to empirical work, allowing 
RJ to be distinguished from other practices based on its observable 
characteristics, rather than its perceived desirability (Daly, 2016). This helps to 
prevent researchers from extending the term to any practice which they believe 
‘seek[s] to respond to crime in a more constructive way than conventional forms 
of punishment’ (Dignan and Marsh, 2003: 85).  
A focus on empowerment necessarily follows from a dialogic understanding 
of RJ, because of the close relationship between the two concepts. Within the 
theoretical and practical RJ literature, empowerment tends to be operationalised 
as stakeholder participation; ‘to be “empowered”’, as Richards (2011: 97) argued, 
‘is to act’ (emphasis in original; see also Barton, 2000; Aertsen, et al., 2011). 
Likewise, the dialogic definition of RJ proposes a more active role for citizens in 
justice processes, requiring state agencies to enable stakeholder participation in 
deliberation and decision-making. This relates to what Zimmerman (1995: 590) 
referred to as the ‘behavioural component’ of empowerment, insofar as to be 
empowered means that ‘actions [are] taken to directly influence outcomes’. This 
has led some to suggest that the core purpose of the dialogic RJ process is to 
empower its participants (Barton, 2003; Stahlkopf, 2009; Richards, 2011). 
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This relates to the second reason to focus on empowerment in the context 
of restorative policing, namely the tension between the need for the police to use 
RJ to empower stakeholders on one hand, and the tendency for the police to 
maintain control and use authority – often, with a view to achieving police-defined 
goals (McConville, et al., 1991; Choongh, 1998) – on the other. One issue is that 
the police may be resistant to relinquishing their own closely guarded decision-
making power. This might create a tension when the police attempt to deliver RJ: 
whereas the police are used to being and staying in control, the facilitation role 
requires them to devolve control over processes and outcomes to citizens. As 
Clamp and Paterson (2013: 300) argued: 
 
Restorative justice alters the roles and responsibilities of individuals within 
the process. […] Officers [must] act as facilitators and silent stakeholders 
rather than as decision-makers, a process which requires police officers to 
interpret and undertake their role in innovative ways.  
 
In Chapter 8, it is argued that this tension may exist, to different degrees, across 
all efforts by state agencies to deprofessionalise decision-making (Davey, 2015). 
However, as is shown in Chapter 2, it may be particularly acute in the operational 
policing role, which is unique in terms of the extent to which it concentrates and 
legitimises the power and authority of the state (Goldstein, 1977). 
This is not to say that facilitator control and participant empowerment are 
necessarily inversely related within RJ processes. Facilitators may need to exert 
some level of control over RJ processes (by, for example, delineating rules and 
imposing structure on the process) in order to ensure that it is experienced as 
empowering by its participants. For this reason, Barton (2000: 2) has argued that 
empowerment in RJ is ‘directed’, as processes are administered in a way which 
is conducive to achieving the goals of the restorative philosophy.  
However, this balance between control and empowerment may be upset 
when RJ is delivered by persons whose goals are not limited to achieving the 
aims of the restorative philosophy. Inherent in operational policing are a series of 
pre-existing goals, priorities and rationales (McConville, et al., 1991; Reiner, 
2010). These are defined and shaped by the institutional context in which the 
police exist, and they act to structure police officers’ decision-making processes 
and behaviours. Some of these goals may be more or less enduring, dynamic or 
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malleable than others (Blad, 2006). Nonetheless, given the discretion which 
officers are afforded to determine what to prioritise (Wilson, 1968), they may 
exercise their control over RJ processes not to empower citizens, but to achieve 
other, police-defined goals, including to dominate certain groups (Choongh, 
1998) or to maximise efficiency (Crawford, 2000; Vynckier, 2009). It is necessary, 
therefore, that empirical research on restorative policing assists in establishing 
whether, when and how the police might use RJ in an empowering, exploitative 
or repressive manner (Aertsen, et al., 2011; Richards, 2011). 
The second point to make about RJ is that it is conceptually elastic, 
potentially meaning ‘all things to all people’ (McCold, 2000: 357). Its ambiguity 
permits justice agencies and professionals to prioritise or sacrifice restorative 
principles, depending on whether they perceive those principles to be in tension 
with the goals, priorities and ways of working which exist within their institution at 
that time. This means that the concept of RJ can be stretched in ways which 
result in its dilution (Gavrielides, 2016) and which fail to account for research 
evidence relating to the conditions under which RJ is most effective (Strang and 
Sherman, 2015). As Laxminarayan (2014: 43) has argued, ‘the mainstreaming of 
restorative justice may lead to a clash between safeguarding the quality of 
restorative justice and institutionalising these programmes’.  
To study this mainstreaming process effectively, one must be conscious of 
the institutional context in which RJ is implemented, because the way(s) in which 
it is interpreted and used, and the accompanying risks and implications, are likely 
to vary according to the qualities of different settings (Edwards, 2015). Observed 
variations in the meaning and use of RJ in different contexts, suggest that it is 
‘characterised by malleability by its environments’ (Gavrielides, 2007: 238). The 
police exist within a unique operational environment, characterised by specific 
pressures and powers which distinguish it from other public services (Bittner, 
1990), which are resistant to attempts at reform (Stout and Salm, 2011), and 
which influence the way that new ideas are interpreted and integrated into the 
police (Innes, 2006). Thus, police forces and officers may be incentivised or 
inclined to interpret and use RJ in ways that conflict with restorative principles 
and evidence-based processes (Moor, et al., 2009).  
This concern has led some commentators to question whether it is 
appropriate for the police to deliver RJ (Vanfraechem, 2009; Walgrave, 2012), or 
whether certain restorative policing tactics may do more harm than good (Strang 
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and Sherman, 2015). Others have concluded that the police may be well placed 
to use RJ, if well-trained and supervised (Hipple and McGarrell, 2008, Shapland, 
et al., 2011; Larsen, 2014). Others still seem to believe that RJ could provide a 
coherent moral and methodological framework with which to realise community 
and problem-solving police goals (Weitekamp, et al., 2003) or establish a new, 
progressive police objective (Clamp and Paterson, 2017). That there is such 
disagreement over the meaning and merits of restorative policing, means that 
more clarity on its exact nature is required. Given the lack of research on ‘street 
RJ’ and other recent developments (Strang and Sherman, 2015), there is a need 
to obtain further empirical insight into the meaning and implications of restorative 
policing in the contemporary English criminal justice system. This requires, first 
of all, an understanding of the history of RJ within the English police. 
 
 
1.3 Restorative justice and the English police: A brief history 
 
According to Marshall (1996), restorative justice was first used formally in 
England in 1979. In that year, the Exeter Youth Support Team began to offer 
victim-offender mediation, receiving referrals from, among others, the local police 
force. However, it was not until the mid-to-late 1990s that RJ was implemented 
systematically within an English force, when Sir Charles Pollard, Thames Valley 
Police’s Chief Constable, imported the idea of scripted, police-led restorative 
conferencing from Australia. This coincided with a broader shift in English police 
forces towards using the cautioning process to deliver additional (usually 
rehabilitative) interventions, known as ‘caution plus’ (Young, 2000). Officers in 
Thames Valley were trained in ‘restorative cautioning’ and, from April 1998, ‘all 
police cautions were meant to be restorative in nature’ (Hoyle, et al., 2002: 6). 
Over the following three years, however, the evaluation found that only around 
10% of cautions involved a restorative conference, with the remainder omitting 
the victim or reflecting the traditional cautioning approach (Hoyle, et al., 2002). It 
also raised concerns regarding the treatment of participants by some officers who 
failed to devolve decision-making power to the parties, treat them equally or focus 
on their needs. Nonetheless, the evaluation indicated that some changes in 
practice and culture were evident, and that the cautioning process was improving. 
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Despite the scheme’s endorsement by the Home Office in 2000 (Dignan, 
2007), restorative cautioning fell into decline in Thames Valley following a change 
in leadership shortly thereafter. Nor was it introduced nationally, as new police 
targets disincentivised frontline officers from engaging in more substantive work 
with offenders and victims (Hoyle, 2009). In Australia, officers were also stripped 
of their facilitation duties (Richards, 2010), despite relatively positive research 
findings (Sherman, et al., 1998; Strang, et al., 1999). Likewise, in Canada and 
the US, many police-led RJ schemes from that era are no longer operational or 
use volunteer facilitators instead (Clamp and Paterson, 2017). 
It was not until later in the 2000s that RJ re-emerged as an explicit policy 
within English police forces3 in the form of the Youth Restorative Disposal (YRD) 
and other, mostly informal, ‘on-street’ disposals (Baxter, et al., 2011). The YRD 
was piloted in eight forces and delivered 4,335 times between April 2008 and 
September 2009 (Rix, et al., 2011). These developments were in response to the 
marked growth of first-time entrants in the justice process in the 2000s, following 
the introduction of strict performance targets which reduced police discretion and 
disincentivised informal resolution (Bateman, 2008, 2012). Across England, the 
term ‘restorative’ became widely applied to informal police disposals (Shewan, 
2010; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012). Yet, early studies found that few 
victims and offenders were enabled to engage in harm-focused dialogue or to 
make decisions collectively (Rix, et al., 2011; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 
2011, 2012; Meadows, et al., 2012). These practices, according to Hoyle (2010: 
28), were usually ‘far removed from the theory and philosophy of restorative 
justice’ (see also Cutress, 2015; Strang and Sherman, 2015). 
Nonetheless, in the 2010s, the term ‘restorative’ became widely used to 
describe informal disposals across English police forces. This ensued from three 
important developments. Firstly, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
published national guidelines on the police’s use of RJ. This document outlined 
the minimum requirements for a practice to be considered restorative and 
suggested limitations to its use (ACPO, 2011; see also ACPO, 2012). It 
distinguished between three different ‘levels’ of RJ, a typology which has since 
been widely adopted within the police (Clamp and Paterson, 2017). Broadly 
                                            
3 Officers from a small number of English forces facilitated restorative conferences in the early 
and mid-2000s, but these activities were undertaken as part of external projects, rather than as 
part of broader efforts to implement RJ within these forces (Shapland, et al., 2011). 
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speaking, ‘Level 2 RJ’ referred to the use of dialogic practices with low-level 
crime, non-crime incidents and conflicts, while ‘Level 3 RJ’ described their use in 
serious cases, typically at the post-sentence stage.  
The most important concept introduced in the ACPO document, however, 
was the notion of ‘Level 1 RJ’ (or ‘street RJ’). This was defined as ‘an instant or 
on-street disposal where police officers or Police Community Support Officers 
[PCSOs] use restorative skills to resolve conflict in the course of their duties’ 
(ACPO, 2011: 7). As Chapter 3 further explains, street RJ, introduced alongside 
a broad, non-dialogic definition of RJ, provided the police with the discretion to 
resolve many types of cases instantly, informally and without enabling dialogue, 
and encouraged them to record, understand and describe these practices as 
restorative in nature. The latest indications are that street RJ is the most common 
process used by the English police under the guise of RJ, even though it enables 
the police to retain control and to prioritise speed over dialogue and relational 
outcomes (Walters, 2014; Cutress, 2015; Strang and Sherman, 2015; Shapland, 
et al., 2017; Westmarland, et al., 2017). 
The second important development involved various changes to the police’s 
recording and escalation frameworks. In 2013, an informal disposal known as the 
community resolution was introduced nationally as a non-statutory, out-of-court 
disposal (OOCD) (Home Office, 2013). Additionally, government targets which 
had incentivised the formal processing of low-level offenders were abolished, as 
was the mandatory escalation which had characterised youth justice for 15 years 
(Smith, 2014). These changes increased the police’s discretion to resolve cases 
informally and to engage in more proactive work with offenders. They also 
required all English forces to formulate local policies on the use of informal 
disposals (Home Office, 2013). This further enabled forces which were attracted 
to the concept of RJ, to integrate it into their disposals frameworks. 
The third development related to the introduction of a broader governmental 
strategy around RJ. Relative to previous years, the period since 2012 has seen 
significant resources invested in expanding RJ in England, in what has (perhaps 
hyperbolically) been referred to as the ‘RJ revolution’ (Pollard, 2014: 7). Following 
the European Union’s (EU) Victims’ Directive (European Parliament, 2012), the 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) released several Action Plans (2012, 2013, 2014, 2017) 
stating its intent to make RJ a generally available service. These documents, 
alongside the Victims’ Code (Ministry of Justice, 2015), and the inclusion of RJ 
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service provision within the remit of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) as 
part of their responsibility for the procurement of victims’ services, positioned RJ 
as a service for victims (Gavrielides, 2017). English forces are now required to 
share victims’ information with local RJ services (hereinafter: RJ Hubs) (Ministry 
of Justice, 2015) which are funded mostly by PCCs (ICPR, 2016). Meanwhile, the 
Crime and Courts Act 2012 and the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 authorised 
the use of RJ at the pre-sentence stage and by probation, respectively. Finally, 
the MoJ financed RJ training for Youth Offending Teams (YOTs), prisons and 
probation services, and funded the Restorative Justice Council to develop 
service-level accreditation for RJ delivery (Meadows, et al., 2014; Wigzell and 
Hough, 2015). These developments helped to normalise the concept of RJ 
among English justice agencies (Wright, 2015), albeit while enabling them to 
interpret it according to their own institutional needs and existing practices. 
While RJ appears in the policies of a growing number of forces (Clamp and 
Paterson, 2017), recent studies indicate that police practices continue to deviate 
from the processes and principles which differentiate RJ from other interventions 
and help explain its effectiveness (Meadows, et al., 2012; Walters, 2014; Cutress, 
2015; Strang and Sherman, 2015; Shapland, et al., 2017; Westmarland, et al., 
2017). They suggest that restorative conferences are rare, while street RJ is 
common and often involves coercive exercises in quick, police-dominated, 
informal dispute resolution with little, if any, contact between the parties. These 
findings raise concerns regarding, inter alia, practice variability, effectiveness, 
safeguards, low visibility and, perhaps most importantly, the police’s involvement 
in determining or imposing outcomes.  
What is more, there has been a dearth of independent analyses to 
accompany street RJ’s extraordinary growth. At the time of writing, external 
research has not been published on most forces which have instituted street RJ. 
Even in areas where the police’s use of RJ has been studied, forces have 
subsequently modified their policies and practices in response to budgetary 
pressures, national policy changes, internal assessments, external criticism 
and/or the introduction of RJ Hubs (Shapland, et al., 2017). Thus, the current 
study, described in the next section, complements and builds on previous and 
ongoing efforts to investigate the vast experimentation which is taking place 
within police forces across England. 
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1.4 Research aim, questions and approach 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the use of RJ by two English police 
forces. This is achieved through the collection and analysis of primary and 
secondary data, which are employed to address the following research questions: 
 
- How do the police explain their use of RJ? 
- To what extent do the forces’ RJ strategies, policies and practices reflect 
the goals, rationales and priorities of the police institution? 
- What are the implications of these findings for those with a stake in the 
police’s use of RJ, and for restorative policing in general? 
 
The study mostly took place within Durham and Gloucestershire Constabularies. 
These police forces were selected as case studies for this research because of 
their relatively well-developed RJ programs: both had recently attempted to 
mainstream RJ within operational policing by training officers in its principles and 
use, and by requiring all informal disposals to be delivered as RJ (although this 
was interpreted somewhat differently in the two areas). This meant that these 
forces were critical cases for the purpose of this study (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Their 
selection was also pragmatic, in the sense that scoping exercises with several 
forces indicated that Durham and Gloucestershire Constabularies were among 
the most likely to provide high-quality access. 
Written policies, statistics and other relevant documents were collected from 
the forces, as well as from the RJ Hubs and PCC offices in Durham and 
Gloucestershire. Seventy-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
individuals who had personal experience of RJ policymaking, implementation or 
delivery within those organisations. Most of the data, including all the interview 
data, were collected in May and June 2015. Where appropriate, the thesis draws 
comparisons between the meaning and use of RJ at each research site, although 
differences between the interview samples mean that these data do not allow for 
a systematically comparative analysis. 
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1.5 Personal rationale for the research 
 
My interest in restorative policing began as a criminology undergraduate, 
when I thought to study the tensions between police culture and RJ facilitation for 
my dissertation (although I ultimately focused on the broader conflict between 
populist punitiveness and RJ). I then worked as a researcher for Restorative 
Solutions, for whom I studied victims’ experiences of police-led, post-sentence 
RJ in burglary cases, and as a project manager for the Restorative Justice 
Council, during which time I trained as an RJ facilitator and studied practitioners’ 
experiences of using RJ with young adults. These experiences led me to believe 
that my Ph.D. should focus on practitioners. Although some recent studies in 
restorative policing have taken this approach (e.g. Cutress, 2015; Stockdale, 
2015; Shapland, et al., 2017), RJ research as a whole tends to concentrate 
mostly on theoretical debates or on the impact of RJ on its participants. The 
current study therefore helps to narrow a gap in the literature by exploring the 
experiences of those who make policies and deliver practices in this area. 
Initially, my Ph.D. proposal was to study court actors’ attitudes towards 
nascent legislation on deferring sentencing for RJ. Several months into my first 
year, however, research teams from other universities were awarded contracts 
to conduct similar projects, as the policy was piloted in the Crown Court and in 
magistrates’ courts. Conversations with those involved and with other court 
researchers led me to conclude that my (already low) probability of being granted 
access to judges and court staff was drastically reduced. Attempts to broaden the 
scope of the research to include judicial attitudes towards the use of RJ in 
sentencing proved fruitless, as the scope for judicial input in post-sentence RJ 
was largely removed by the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014. In March 2014, six 
months into my Ph.D., I was required to rethink my research subject entirely.  
Following an investigation of gaps in the literature and conversations on 
access with others in academia and practice, I decided to move into the police 
realm (with which my supervisors were also familiar). My reading suggested that 
the gap between theory and practice in RJ was likely to be especially wide in the 
police context. Thus, the decision to study this area was made partially on the 
basis of my belief that researchers should study the nature and implications of 
any gaps between policy, theory and rhetoric on one hand, and practice on the 
other. Through this, we can identify which aspects of policy and practice most 
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require attention and reform, and consider for whom and in what situations 
practices may or may not ‘work’ (Abel, 1980; Nelken, 1981; Gavrielides, 2007). 
As Rosenblatt (2014, 2015) noted in relation to community involvement in RJ, I 
felt that many assumptions were being made about restorative policing – by both 
academics and the police themselves – which had not been empirically verified. 
Moreover, RJ was, at that time, being implemented by police forces countrywide, 
although most of their operations were not being studied. I felt that further 
empirical work might be useful in mitigating the possible risks and maximising the 
potential benefits of restorative policing. 
 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
 
In addition to its introductory (Chapter 1) and concluding (Chapter 9) 
chapters, this thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 review 
different aspects of the relevant literature, contextualising the empirical work. The 
former explores salient features of the police institution, focusing primarily on the 
discretion afforded police officers at the operational and strategic levels, and the 
factors which inform and structure how they exercise their discretion. The latter 
discusses the theoretical and empirical sources which indicate how the concept 
of ‘restorative policing’ has been interpreted and applied in theory, policy and 
practice in recent years. Chapter 4 then delineates, explains and reflects on the 
methodological choices made during this study. 
Chapters 5 through 8 seek to address the research questions by presenting, 
interpreting and discussing the study’s empirical findings. Chapter 5 compares 
and analyses the strategies and usage of RJ in Durham and Gloucestershire 
Constabularies. It draws parallels and distinctions between each force’s goals for 
RJ, as expressed in policy documents and by policymakers and managers. 
Chapter 6 then analyses each force’s policies in relation to RJ delivery, 
considering both their flexibility and the difficulty in structuring officers’ discretion 
given the low visibility of RJ delivery. Chapter 7 utilises interview data from police 
officers to explore their explanations of how and why they used RJ in practice. 
Chapter 8 then expands on three central themes which were identified within the 
model of restorative policing implied by the data, namely: that restorative policing 
16 
 
was framed and seen as ‘victim-focused’; that it was used to manage the demand 
on the police’s time; and that officers managed participants’ empowerment when 
delivering RJ, in an effort to balance the competing goals, needs and interests of 
those with a stake in their use of RJ – including themselves and their organisation. 
Throughout, the relationship between the meaning and use of RJ on one hand, 
and the institutional context on the other, is discussed. Finally, the concluding 
chapter summarises and reflects on the key findings, reflects further on the 
research process, and considers the implications of the study for policy, practice 
and the future direction of theoretical and empirical research in this field. 
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Chapter 2 – The police institution in contemporary England 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The police are distinct from other public servants. The role played by 
frontline officers is characterised by several unique features, including the ability 
to determine how and when to utilise coercive force in response to the wide array 
of situations in which they are expected to intervene (Bittner, 1990). Moreover, 
several factors – such as the flexibility of the legal framework and the low visibility 
of policework – mean that strategic and, in particular, operational police decisions 
tend to be highly discretionary (Wilson, 1968). These and other features of the 
police’s role combine to shape new ideas and practices as they are implemented 
within police organisations (Oliver, 2000; Clamp and Paterson, 2017). 
This chapter situates the current study within the broader policing literature, 
primarily by investigating the police’s discretion and the factors which inform and 
structure its use. It examines the nature of the operational police role, before 
assessing the significance of police culture, organisational culture, and strategic 
discretion and decision-making, in shaping frontline police behaviour. It then 
considers whether officers may exercise their discretion in accordance with their 
personal values, attitudes and skills. Finally, it explores attempts to shape the 
police’s use of discretion through the imposition of legal and non-legal rules, 
performance management and policing philosophies. Each topic is studied in 
relation to the patterns and variations it may generate in police practice, and its 
potential role in shaping RJ as it is implemented in the police. 
 
 
2.2 The operational police role 
 
Frontline police officers occupy a unique role in society. Lipsky (2010) 
argued that, like many other public servants, they exert power and allocate 
benefits and sanctions on behalf of the state, and have considerable discretion 
when doing so. However, three factors combine to differentiate the police from 
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other public servants: the breadth of the tasks they are expected to undertake; 
the urgency with which they are required to act; and the coercive force which they 
are legally entitled (or, in some cases, required) to use (Bittner, 1990). The 
police’s ability to arrest, search and detain, inter alia, means that their function is 
‘an anomaly in a free society’ (Goldstein, 1977: 1). However, the sociological 
literature also illustrates how the uniqueness of the role lies partially in the 
pressures placed upon it and the array of services which the police are called 
upon to provide (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; Wilson, 1968, 1968b). In England 
and Wales, recent estimates indicate that crime accounts for only 22% of the 
emergency and priority incidents to which the police respond (National Audit 
Office, 2015). This is indicative of the high expectations which society places on 
the police to guarantee public safety and security, including, but not limited to, 
law enforcement (Reiner, 2010). 
With reference to these elements of operational policing, Bittner (1990: 131) 
defined the role as ‘a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiably coercive 
force employed in accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational 
exigencies’. Later, he also described police officers as responsible for intervening 
in many situations ‘that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-
had-better-do-something-now’ (Bittner, 1990: 249). Bittner’s insights, and those 
of other police sociologists, serve to highlight the scale of the authority and 
responsibility invested in operational policing. To an extent, these features of the 
role flow from the police’s legal duties and prerogatives, and the legitimacy of 
their endeavours in the eyes of (at least, parts of) the public (Reiner, 2010). 
However, they also emerge from the nature of the task itself. 
Empirical police researchers have long noted that frontline officers have two 
distinct responsibilities. Wilson (1968b: 407) distinguished between their roles in 
‘law enforcement’, which involves invoking the criminal law and applying legal 
sanctions, and ‘order maintenance’ which involves intervening in an assortment 
of problems and disputes among citizens. To achieve these objectives, the police 
have a wide spectrum of coercive and legal tools at their disposal. Yet, research 
has consistently found policework not to be characterised primarily by the use of 
force or the invocation of criminal law. Rather, as Banton (1964: 127) explained, 
police officers are mostly ‘peace officers’, insofar as much of their time is spent 
maintaining order (or ‘keeping the peace’), without recourse to their legal powers. 
In other words, the police typically respond to disorder more often than to crime 
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and are more likely to use persuasion than force when doing so (see also Wilson, 
1968; Bittner, 1967, 1990; Muir, 1977; Kemp, et al., 1992).  
Ultimately, the police resolve most issues informally through negotiation and 
implicit or explicit threats of coercion, allowing them to ration their use of force 
and employ it only as a last resort. ‘The craft of effective policing’, Reiner (2010: 
144) argued, ‘is to use the background possibility of legitimate coercion so skilfully 
that it never needs to be foregrounded’. Sykes and Brent (1983: 29) similarly 
found that ‘mediation and arbitration [are] less dramatic but more important 
aspects of police activity’. Still, various ‘myths’ mean that the reality of the police’s 
role is largely absent from media, political and societal representations and 
understandings of their work (Reiner, 2010). This is even a problem within police 
forces: a recent study found that 33 out of 43 English and Welsh forces lacked a 
sophisticated understanding of the broad demand for their service (National Audit 
Office, 2015), while police officers themselves have often resisted efforts to focus 
on these ‘softer’ policing activities (McCarthy, 2014). 
Nonetheless, it is important to grasp the true nature of the frontline police 
role because of the way that it shapes and informs the discretion it affords its 
holders. ‘Discretion’, as the Scarman Report explained, ‘lies at the heart of the 
police function. […] It is the policeman’s [sic] daily task’ (Scarman, 1981, in 
Richards, 2003: 73). Operational discretion is important because it allows 
frontline police officers to decide when and how to enforce the law and maintain 
order (Reiner, 2010). Moreover, as Lipsky (2010) argued, their ability to make 
decisions on a case-by-case basis means that frontline officers are ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’, insofar as the choices they make when exercising their discretion 
ultimately determine how citizens experience government policy. 
In England, operational police discretion arises from law: the doctrine of 
‘constabulary independence’ means that each officer has ‘a legal right and duty 
to enforce the law as she sees fit’ (McConville, et al., 1991: 2). Yet, this discretion 
also results from the setting in which the police’s work takes place, that is, from 
the responsibilities, pressures, tensions and conflicting goals of policework 
(Wilson, 1968). Officers must use professional judgement when navigating their 
workloads and interpreting the complex human situations to which they respond 
(Lipsky, 2010). Their autonomy in this regard is augmented by the flexibility and 
ambiguity of the laws and rules which regulate their legal powers (Reiner, 2010), 
by the breadth of the laws which they are required to enforce (Klockars, 1985), 
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by the limited direction they receive in relation to their peacekeeping activities 
(Bittner, 1967), and by the low-visibility and low-scrutiny environment in which the 
police operate, especially in relation to police-citizen interactions ‘on the street’ 
(Goldstein, 1960; McConville, et al., 1991). 
All of this is relevant to restorative policing because, as argued in Chapter 
1, the way that RJ is interpreted and used may depend on the setting in which it 
is implemented. The discretion afforded police officers requires them to decide, 
on a case-by-case basis, which goals and whose needs and interests to prioritise. 
As the following sections explain, this enables the police to act according to 
police-defined goals and entrenched ways of working (McConville, et al., 1991; 
Choongh, 1998). Yet, delivering RJ – a process known as ‘facilitation’ (Chapman, 
2012) – requires practitioners to be responsive to the needs and interests of 
victim(s), offender(s) and other affected parties (Braithwaite, 2002, 2002b), and 
to prioritise certain restorative values when doing so (Barton, 2000). Given the 
discretionary nature of both facilitation and frontline policing, it is necessary to 
consider the factors which inform and structure police discretion generally, as 
they may also help shape the police’s involvement in delivering RJ. 
 
 
2.3 Operational police culture(s) 
 
Frontline policework is characterised by risk and uncertainty, by 
concentrated, legal and legitimate authority and power, and by political, 
organisational and public pressure to be efficient in maintaining order and 
responding to crime (Skolnick, 1966). These and other attributes of ‘street’ 
policework transcend jurisdictions and organisational boundaries (Worden, 1989) 
and have been found to (re)produce certain practices, unwritten rules and 
principles of conduct within the profession, known collectively as ‘police culture’ 
(Chan, 1996). It has long been argued that the norms and ways of working which 
constitute police cultures, lead to observable patterns in police behaviour and 
may help explain much of that behaviour more cogently than the restrictions and 
rules contained within law, policy and management (McConville, et al., 1991). It 
is necessary, therefore, to explicate the central tenets of police culture(s) and to 
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consider the extent to which their features may be consistent or in tension with 
restorative principles and processes. 
Reiner (2010) outlined several of the traits which the empirical research 
suggests are most prevalent among the police. He explained that, first and 
foremost, the police tend to see a moral imperative in their work. To the police, 
he suggested, their role is a ‘vocation’ and a ‘mission’ in which they are the ‘good 
guys’, the indispensable ‘thin blue line’ which performs ‘an essential role in 
safeguarding social order’ (Reiner, 2010: 120). He also noted that the perceived 
legitimacy of this mission among officers helps explain some of the most common 
breaches of law and policy, as the constraints therein – including, for example, 
suspects’ due process rights – are sometimes perceived to be incompatible with 
the execution of their ‘mission’. Policework can also breed cynicism, pessimism, 
suspiciousness and a tendency to stereotype, in addition to an ‘anti-theoretical 
[…] conceptual conservatism’ (Reiner, 2010: 131). These qualities, he asserts, 
tend to incentivise pragmatic approaches and short-term ways of thinking which, 
in turn, propagate a hostility to innovation, evidence, experimentation, long-term 
planning and philosophically-informed change (Reiner, 2010). 
McConville, et al. (1991) argued that these dynamics interact with 
organisational conditions and situational factors to create cultural traits which can 
be observed in patterns of police behaviour. That is, police cultures consist of 
‘working rules’ which are applied widely (though not always) across situations 
that are believed to be similar (McConville, et al., 1991: 22). Shearing and Ericson 
(1991) noted that these working rules are consolidated and reproduced through 
‘stories’ and ‘scripts’ which contain embedded assumptions about how to 
interpret and respond to certain commonly reoccurring situations, and which are 
passed down to new recruits through training and socialisation, as well as being 
developed naturally during one’s working life. 
These working rules often manifest in officers submitting members of the 
public to differential treatment on the basis of prejudicial assumptions. For 
example, persons who are already known to the police as offenders or are 
perceived to characterise certain stereotypes (including young, working class 
males and ethnic minorities), are more likely to be seen and treated with suspicion 
(Smith and Alpert, 2007; Reiner, 2010). The police may also see members of 
some groups as more or less deserving of assistance or compassion than others 
(Klinger, 1997). Victims may be perceived as ‘rubbish’ if they or their complaint 
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fall under certain categories (Reiner, 2010: 124); the police’s application of the 
‘victim’ label may depend on the extent to which complainants are deemed to be 
‘influential’ (McConville, et al., 1991: 32-5) or ‘ideal’ (Christie, 1986) with respect 
to their social group and the nature of their complaint. This also has repercussions 
for the police’s application of the ‘offender’ label, exemplified by the tendency to 
interpret domestic abuse as disorder rather than crime, resulting, over several 
decades, in low levels of arrests and charges (Reiner, 2010; Westmarland, et al., 
2017). Meanwhile, police powers may be used as much to impose authority, as 
they are to enforce the criminal law: arrests may be used to achieve distinctly 
police (rather than legal) goals of ‘reproducing social control, maintaining 
authority by extracting deference and inflicting summary punishment’ (Choongh, 
1998: 625-6, see also McConville, et al., 1991), while stop and search may be 
used to deter, control, humiliate or impose the police’s authority on individuals 
from certain groups (Bowling and Phillips, 2007; Murray, 2014). 
These cultural traits may be in tension with the facilitation role. For example, 
whereas RJ facilitators are expected to act impartially (Mackay, 2006), victims 
and offenders who are perceived to be ‘low status’ are at times treated unfairly 
by the police (McConville, et al., 1991). In addition, the tendency for police officers 
to act in accordance with police-defined goals, may not always align with the 
requirement that RJ facilitators focus on empowering and satisfying the needs 
and interests of victims, offenders and relevant communities (Schiff, 2007). For 
example, the police’s propensity for pragmatism and the concordant desire to 
process cases quickly, might discourage officers from delivering sensitive, 
dialogic and inclusive RJ processes, if they believe there to be an ‘easier’ way to 
dispose of the case. As in most professions, the police are generally concerned 
with managing their workloads (Collins and Gibbs, 2003) and avoiding the 
paperwork and other activities which act as barriers to ‘real’ policework (Singer, 
2001). Reiner expressed this sentiment by stating that many officers are primarily 
concerned with ‘getting from here to tomorrow (or the next hour) safely and with 
the least fuss and paperwork’ (2010: 132). 
This links to a tension which Garland (1997) has identified across criminal 
justice work, between moral and normative considerations on one hand, and 
instrumental and managerial imperatives on the other. In the police context, this 
tension means that rules and principles of due process are not always followed, 
when these are perceived to be in tension with conflicting pressures to ‘get the 
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job done’. As Skolnick’s work showed, there is an exacting ‘pressure put on the 
police to “produce” – to be efficient rather than legal when the two norms are in 
conflict’ (1966: 231). In recent years, the advent of managerialism and the rhetoric 
and impact of austerity may have contributed to the rising prominence afforded 
instrumental imperatives, potentially circumscribing efforts to structure police 
discretion according to normative philosophies (Crawford, 2006; Jones and 
Creaney, 2015; Clamp and Paterson, 2017). Studies often find that, as RJ is 
mainstreamed, its ideals come to be constrained by organisational routines and 
managerial pressures, with efficiency and task completion prioritised over the 
restorativeness of practices delivered by justice agencies (Newburn, et al., 2002; 
Daly, 2003; Barnes, 2015; Rosenblatt, 2014, 2015; Wigzell and Hough, 2015). 
Preparing and delivering dialogic practices and achieving relational outcomes, 
can be time- and resource-intensive, and thus may be in tension with pressures 
to process cases quickly. The point is that there are aspects of police culture – 
some of which may be present across criminal justice – which can discourage the 
realisation of restorative principles and processes when they conflict with existing 
goals, such as efficiency and repression. 
That being said, the literature increasingly recognises the complexity of 
police culture. Indeed, researchers have found multiple, fluid cultures within the 
police, aspects of which may be more enduring than others (Loftus, 2009; 
Cockcroft, 2014). Chan (1996) explained this divergence, noting that officers 
make discretionary decisions at the confluence of the different types of 
‘knowledge’ they hold in relation to the police’s role, objective(s) and aim(s) (the 
‘habitus’ of policing), and the social and political context in which policework takes 
place (the ‘field’ of policing). Citing Wacquant (1992), Chan (1996: 114) argued 
that this interaction produces multiple police cultures which are liable to change, 
are accommodated or resisted to different degrees by individual officers, and 
produce behaviour that is often situationally determined.  
The prevalence and prominence of certain cultural traits may also differ 
across police roles. In England, the powers, functions and training of PCSOs may 
mean that they are more inclined than police officers towards community 
engagement and other proactive and ‘soft’ policing activities (O’Neill, 2014; 
Cutress, 2015). Similarly, cultures may differ between response officers and 
community officers, with the latter typically more inclined towards consensus-
based and ‘softer’ policing activities than the former (Chan, 1997). Consequently, 
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frontline officers might interpret and use RJ differently, depending on the 
characteristics of their role, the extent to which its ways of working are in tension 
with restorative principles and processes, and the extent to which they identify 
with the more stereotypical features of police culture. 
It may be significant, therefore, that the advent of austerity has led to a 
decline in community policing across much of England. Clamp and Paterson 
(2017) highlighted PCSOs and community officers as possible drivers of 
restorative policing, as they may be the most likely officers to have the time, 
contacts, local knowledge and legitimacy required to involve citizens successfully 
in addressing and repairing harm. After 2010, however, forces ‘put in place a 
number of short-term savings measures focused on reducing workforce numbers’ 
(HMIC, 2014: 3), and the ring-fencing of funding for neighbourhood policing was 
lifted in 2012 (Longstaff, et al., 2015). A survey of police officers and PCSOs by 
UNISON (2016) subsequently found that 86% of Neighbourhood Policing Teams 
(NPTs) had fewer PCSOs in 2015 than in 2010, with the most dramatic force-
wide decrease – 62% – coming in the Metropolitan Police.  
Meanwhile, many forces closed stations and ‘reorganised neighbourhood 
policing teams to consolidate officer resources’ (National Audit Office, 2015: 22). 
Community officers were increasingly delegated investigation and response 
work, and required to neglect their ‘regular community duties’ (HMIC, 2012: 7), 
including citizen engagement and problem-solving. Recent research by Shapland, 
et al. (2017) similarly found that, while neighbourhood and schools’ officers were 
less concerned with processing speed and more inclined towards consensual 
problem-solving than response officers, their community activities had been 
reduced because of budgetary constraints. This may be relevant to RJ if the decline 
of community policing is accompanied by a decrease in the inclination or capacity 
among officers to engage in substantive, ‘soft’ or proactive work with victims and 
offenders (Bazemore and Griffiths, 2003).  
Police officers are not inherently or universally averse to restorative 
principles and processes. Not only is police culture heterogeneous between 
functions, but police officers have agency and discretion which they may exercise 
in accordance with their personal attributes (Reiner, 2010). Before exploring the 
literature on police officers as individuals, however, it is important to consider how 
different cultures may exist and be perpetuated at the organisational level, and the 
role which senior leaders can play in shaping their forces. 
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2.4 Organisational cultures 
 
Whereas the operational police culture reflects the setting and features of 
policework which exist more or less across the police institution, organisational 
cultures represent the unique environment and ethos which exists in each force 
(Reiner, 2010). Accordingly, studies have identified notable variations in cultures 
between forces. These differences can inform the use of discretion at the 
operational level, manifesting in certain norms and ways of working which may 
be more or less in tension with restorative principles and processes. 
Wilson (1968) identified three predominant force cultures. The ‘watchman’ 
culture refers to a force in which police officers are afforded a high level of 
discretion, and in which the police ‘use the law more as a means of maintaining 
order than of regulating conduct’ (Wilson, 1968: 140). Officers are expected to 
deal informally with some low-level and juvenile offending, if it ceases upon their 
arrival and does not reoccur. By contrast, forces with a ‘legalistic’ culture are 
heavily bureaucratised. They structure their officers’ discretion to standardise 
behaviour and maximise law enforcement activities, resulting in high rates of 
arrests and formal processing. The final culture is that of the ‘service’ in which the 
police take a more consensual approach and ‘intervene frequently but not 
formally’ (Wilson, 1968: 200). This is more common in middle-class communities 
in which social divides and serious crime are both relatively low.  
Each culture might differently favour (or reject) the various forms of RJ which 
have been used by the English police in recent years. For example, the ‘legalistic’ 
culture may be the most state- or police-centric, and thus the least inclined 
towards responsive outcomes and empowering processes. It seems broadly 
analogous to the more recent idea of a ‘performance culture’ in which forces 
encourage officers to achieve measured outcomes, potentially overlooking the 
fairness of the processes they utilise and any alternative outcomes which may 
have been more useful to citizens (Loveday, 2006; Cockcroft and Beattie, 2009). 
In contrast, forces with a ‘service’ culture may be most likely to use conferencing, 
given their closer relationship with the local community and the additional time 
which they are able to invest in proactive activities. 
Each force type may be attracted to street RJ, albeit for different reasons. 
‘Service’ and ‘watchman’ forces might be enticed by its discretionary and informal 
nature, enabling the consensual diversion of low-level cases without recourse to 
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legal powers. In contrast, ‘legalistic’ forces may have been deterred from using 
street RJ before it was integrated into the national recording framework. Indeed, 
a Criminal Justice Joint Inspection (2011) report found that forces which had 
developed a performance culture were less likely to have introduced informal 
disposals before this happened (see Section 3.3 for more on this change). Even 
after informal disposals were recognised nationally by the Home Office, forces 
with entrenched performance cultures created local detection targets which 
discouraged their use (Kemp, 2014). As informal disposals are gradually more 
accepted within English police forces (Neyroud and Slothower, 2015), ‘legalistic’ 
forces may be more inclined to use street RJ, given the speed with which it can 
be used to process cases. This highlights the role that recording requirements 
might play in determining if and how the police use RJ. 
Research also suggests that leadership styles and local contexts can affect 
organisational cultures. Jones and Levi (1983) observed that organisational 
cultures largely mirrored the rhetoric and preferences of senior leaders. As 
Section 2.5 later illustrates, senior leaders retain considerable influence over the 
narratives which inform policework in a given area. Jones and Levi (1983) also 
found that, both within and between forces, it was easier to implement community 
policing in rural areas than in urban areas, further indicating a relationship 
between force cultures and approaches on one hand, and the setting in which 
policework takes place on the other (see also Falcone, et al., 2002). Reiner 
agreed with this latter point, stating that: 
 
The political economy, social structures and political cultures of different 
areas seem to be the driving forces behind variations in police practices, 
rather than freely chosen organisational policies. (2010: 135) 
 
This is consistent with Chan’s (1996) application of the concepts of ‘field’ and 
‘habitus’ to policework, insofar as it suggests that discretion is exercised as police 
cultures interact with social settings. Different types of crime and conflict, and 
different norms and forms of ‘community’, tend to be more or less prevalent in 
rural and urban areas (Crawford, 1997), potentially affecting the ‘field’ in which 
policework takes place. For example, Carrington and Schulenberg (2003) found 
that higher rates of police diversion in rural areas, as compared to urban areas, 
stemmed primarily from differences in the types of crime and incidents and police-
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community relationships. By implication, the different settings in which policework 
takes place – both between and within forces – may be more or less favourable 
to different forms of RJ (Cutress, 2015). This also accords with the suggestion 
that police behaviour is heavily influenced by situational factors (e.g. Bittner, 
1990; Hoggett and Stott, 2010), although Worden (1989) found this to be more 
relevant in arrest decisions than in informal actions. 
Organisational culture may also shape the police’s use of RJ, if it acts to 
ingrain certain skills and attitudes in officers who are socialised under different 
modes of policing. Van Maanen (1975) noted that the culture within a police 
organisation at the beginning of one’s career may be particularly influential in this 
regard. For example, while police training and policework in general may tend to 
develop in officers a disposition towards coercion and risk-aversion, officers may 
be more likely to adopt or resist these traits, depending on the prominence 
afforded zero-tolerance policing within the force in which they are socialised 
(Burke, 1998; Mallon, 2002; Innes, 2005). Officers may also be socialised 
differently according to their forces’ orientations towards evidence-based policing 
(Sherman, 2013), partnership working (Crawford and Cunningham, 2015), victim 
engagement (Clamp and Paterson, 2017), and community and problem-solving 
policing (Weitekamp, et al., 2003). In addition, Wigzell and Hough found that, in 
prisons and probation organisations, ‘a culture in favour of RJ principles’ was one 
of the main conditions for ‘effective RJ implementation’ (2015: xii). Again, the 
point is that RJ may be interpreted and used differently by different organisations, 
depending on their unique internal cultures.  
Aside from the aforementioned national guidelines (ACPO, 2011, 2012) and 
the Victims’ Code (Ministry of Justice, 2015), there have been few visible attempts 
to standardise the police’s use of RJ between forces (Neyroud and Slothower, 
2015). In fact, forces were explicitly required to develop their own policies on the 
use of informal disposals alongside which RJ could be used (Home Office, 2013). 
In 2013, the MoJ appointed a National RJ Manager for Policing, whose role it was 
to work ‘with both the police and PCCs to ensure effective delivery of RJ services’ 
(Ministry of Justice, 2014: 3). However, it has not been possible to identify the 
precise impact of this role. Thus, in recent years, differences between force 
strategies and policies on RJ have emerged, as senior leaders have exercised 
their own discretion to determine whether and how their force would adopt RJ. 
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2.5 Senior leaders and strategic discretion 
 
Police forces are hierarchical organisations (Mead, 2002). In England, Chief 
Constables and other senior leaders have control (or, at least, influence) over 
many aspects of strategy setting and policymaking (Reiner, 1991). The doctrine 
of constabulary independence also exists at the strategic level, although Chief 
Constables’ discretion to set local strategies has been eroded in recent years by 
the Home Office, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and PCCs 
(Reiner, 2010, 2013; Lister, 2013). Nonetheless, they can still propose, resist, 
champion or authorise reforms to strategies and policies within their forces. They 
can also decide how to frame and communicate the fundamental purpose or 
rationale of their organisation: in Chan’s words (1996: 113), they develop and 
reinforce their force’s ‘axiomatic knowledge, which represents the fundamental 
assumptions about “why things are done the way they are”’ (emphasis in original). 
Consequently, the ways in which senior leaders elect to exercise their discretion 
can inform the use of operational discretion by the frontline. 
National policy frameworks often afford police forces the autonomy to set 
local strategies when responding to national pressures. This enables senior 
leaders to approach reforms differently. For example, HMIC found that some 
responded to austerity primarily with short-term cost reductions, while others 
redesigned their workforces or implemented ‘transformational change’ (HMIC, 
2014: 5). Similarly, prior to the national introduction of neighbourhood policing 
under New Labour, several Chief Constables had already instituted some form of 
community policing in their forces (Jones and Levi, 1983; see also Bayley, 1994, 
on the role of senior leaders’ attitudes in determining whether community and 
zero-tolerance policing are adopted in a force). This illustrates how senior leaders 
may differ with respect to their politics, their resistance to change and their 
willingness to countenance new ideas and approaches. 
National guidelines on the police’s use of RJ provide forces with the 
discretion to determine whether and how to adopt it (ACPO, 2011). Consequently, 
these decisions may be informed by senior leaders’ values and attitudes (Clamp 
and Paterson, 2013). They may be more or less likely to prioritise, support and 
invest in the development and use of different forms of RJ, depending on their 
understanding of, and level of attraction to, the concept. Indeed, one recent report 
found that differences in the use of RJ across England largely mirrored local 
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policymakers’ attitudes towards it (Justice Committee, 2016). Investments and 
other strategic decisions may depend on the extent to which senior leaders value 
the potential benefits of conferencing or street RJ. In fact, senior leaders’ attitudes 
and values might be more likely to affect decisions at the strategic level than 
those of frontline officers are to affect operational decisions: strategic decisions 
are slower and more deliberative, while operational decisions are quicker, and 
thus may be more likely to be informed by intuition and situational factors 
(Kahneman, 2011; Willis and Mastrofski, 2016).  
Senior police leaders may therefore be crucial in instigating or driving RJ 
locally. Often, a single individual with a normative attraction to RJ is responsible 
for initiating RJ projects within forces (Moore and Forsythe, 1995; Hoyle, 2009; 
Baxter, et al., 2011). These ‘moral entrepreneurs’ may be more or less successful 
in developing and sustaining the project, depending on the power and social 
capital they hold within their organisation (Becker, 1995; Clairmont, 2011; Coyle, 
2013). Research on the implementation of community policing has found that the 
extent to which the hierarchy was committed to the project, was the main 
determinant of its success or failure (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Foster, 1989). 
Additionally, literature from the field of organisational development argues that 
resistance to reform within an organisation correlates negatively with visible 
support for change among senior leaders (Bass, 1990; Watkins, 2001; Kotter, 
2012). This suggests that the degree of senior leader buy-in is important, as is 
whether their support is active or passive. As Wilkinson and Rosenbaum put it: 
‘The chief of police and the leadership he or she demonstrates play a critical role 
in changing both the culture and the organisation’ (1994: 125). Thus, as is true of 
police reform more broadly (Skogan, 2008), efforts to implement RJ may stand 
the best chance of success if moral entrepreneurs occupy a leadership position, 
allowing them to legitimise, drive and divert funds towards change. 
This is exemplified by Sir Charles Pollard who, as Chief Constable, 
implemented restorative cautioning in Thames Valley Police in the late 1990s. 
According to one of the scheme’s evaluators, there was a strong normative 
reasoning behind his transformative aims which were ‘audacious to the point of 
utopianism’ (Hoyle, 2011: 798). Pollard’s actions seem to qualify him as one of 
what Reiner calls the ‘growing number of exceptions’ to the ‘conceptual 
conservatism’ (2010: 131) which often characterises his rank. Hoyle (2009: 197) 
argued that Pollard’s role in the project was so instrumental that: 
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Once [Pollard] left the police service Thames Valley struggled to nurture 
[RJ]. […] It fell into ‘benign neglect’. [Interviewees] felt that without a strong 
drive from the senior command team, and the Chief Constable in particular 
[…] it is unlikely to be revived to full health. 
 
Restorative policing commentators have since placed considerable emphasis on 
the importance of leaders who are willing to champion the use of RJ across their 
forces (McLeod, 2003; Alarid and Montemayor, 2012). This is consistent with 
Skogan’s (2008) assessment of his own findings over years of police research. 
Senior leaders, he believes, are so central to reform that, upon moving away, 
their projects often fail to withstand the uncertainty of transition and the desire of 
new chiefs to ‘make their own mark’ (Skogan, 2008: 32).  
That being said, there is often a gap between strategies and their enactment 
through policy. This is partially because Chief Constables’ jurisdiction over the 
setting of strategies tends to exceed that of their role in making and executing the 
policies which are required for strategy implementation (Reiner, 1991). To a 
greater degree than high-level strategy setting, policymaking is a contested and 
ongoing process (Colebatch, 2009). Specific policies are designed at ‘the 
intersection of a wide range of participants with differing agendas’ (Colebatch, 
2006: 312), while individual decisions, such as that to train a certain number of 
officers in RJ, are likely to represent ‘markers in a continuing process, rather than 
the end of an exercise in decision-making’ (Colebatch, 2006: 311). Ultimately, the 
policymaking process can involve a variety of different people at different times, 
inherently resulting in some level of negotiation and strategy dilution as policies 
are written, communicated and implemented (Tenbensel, 2006).  
The negotiated quality of policymaking is exemplified by a previous study of 
restorative policing in Durham, which highlighted the role of an internal steering 
group in this process. It observed that, while the overall strategy came from the 
Chief Constable, many policies were designed and championed by the steering 
group, on which the chief did not sit. The group was ‘comprised of officers 
representing all commands and including specialist units […] across all ranks 
from Sergeant to Superintendent’ (Stockdale, 2015b: 180). As hypothesised 
elsewhere (McLeod, 2003; Toch, 2008; Clamp and Paterson, 2013), Stockdale 
found that the diversity and breadth of the group helped to enhance the project’s 
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legitimacy within the force. However, it also meant that the Chief Constable, who 
instigated the project, had to delegate control over policymaking to other persons. 
This resulted in disparities between the Chief’s strategic intentions, and the 
content and execution of RJ policies (Stockdale, 2015b).  
The ongoing character of policy implementation, meanwhile, means that 
police reform efforts can be frustrated by pockets of resistance, by internal politics 
and power dynamics, and by actors with a predilection for traditional ways of 
working. Skogan (2008) contended that specialist units, middle managers and 
line managers can all disrupt implementation efforts. Sergeants, for example, can 
resist or enable RJ implementation by virtue of their (relatively low visibility) roles 
in managing frontline performance, authorising certain activities and setting local 
priorities (Butterfield, et al., 2004; Clamp and Paterson, 2013). Their approaches 
to management and reform may be more or less laissez-faire (Loo, 2004). 
Furthermore, their own values and attitudes may make them more or less 
accepting of different forms and framings of RJ. This, in turn, may influence the 
behaviour of frontline officers under their management: Engel and Worden (2003) 
suggested that the amount of time spent by officers on problem-solving and 
community policing, is more closely related to their supervisors’ attitudes towards 
these activities, than it is to their own. The point is that the outcomes of reform 
efforts are dependent on an ongoing negotiation among various parties with 
different priorities, preferences and levels of authority. 
In recent years, Chief Constables’ discretion has also been constrained by 
PCCs. Though the police remain operationally independent, PCCs now play a 
central role in setting local budgets and strategies, not least by writing ‘Police and 
Crime Plans’ against which they are entitled to assess police performance (Lister, 
2013; Strickland, 2013). As with senior police leaders and middle managers, the 
values and attitudes of each PCC (and, perhaps, of their staff and advisors) might 
guide their general approach, as might any assumptions they make about the 
priorities and preferences of their electorate (Wood, 2016). This could affect the 
police’s use of RJ if, for example, the presence or absence of RJ and related or 
conflicting themes (such as community and zero-tolerance policing) within PCCs’ 
manifestos or Police and Crime Plans, swayed Chief Constables’ decision-
making with respect to their force’s RJ investments and approaches. 
The structure and responsibilities of the PCC role – which combined the risk 
of politicising policework with the power to appoint or remove Chief Constables – 
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may enable, or even incentivise, their intervention in operational policing matters 
(Lister, 2013). Researchers have identified evidence of attempts by PCCs to use 
their power and influence to intervene in operational decisions (Caless and 
Owens, 2016), with Wells (2015) arguing that this is most likely to happen when 
members of the public complain to the PCC about operational matters. In 
addition, the quality of relationships between PCCs and senior police leaders can 
vary and may affect the extent and nature of the formers’ interventions (Caless 
and Owens, 2016). In turn, Chief Constables will likely respond differently to 
attempts at external interventions (Reiner, 1991). These factors will create unique 
balances of power between PCCs and force leaders in each area, with myriad 
potential implications for restorative policing. 
In recent years, as most police-led RJ has taken place alongside informal 
disposals (Shapland, et al., 2017; Westmarland, et al., 2017), the police have 
come under scrutiny for using informal disposals to divert more serious and 
repeat offenders (Full Fact, 2013; Westmarland, et al., 2017). In this context, 
some PCCs have publicly criticised their force’s use of RJ and informal disposals. 
For example, the PCC for Suffolk stated that, while he was ‘not opposed to 
restorative justice’, he wanted the police to scrutinise its use to ensure that they 
‘provide the appropriate retribution that the public and the victims expect’ (Hirst, 
2014). Meanwhile, the PCC for Staffordshire set up a panel of local residents, 
councillors and magistrates to ‘examine the impact of community resolutions and 
restorative justice’, and to influence strategic decisions on when they should be 
used (Staffordshire Newsletter, 2014). Thus, a given PCC’s approach to RJ may 
depend on, inter alia, the value which they place (or which they believe their 
electorate places) on retribution, whether they understand RJ as synonymous 
with informal disposals, and how susceptible they are to being influenced by 
media reports and public complaints. This, in turn, may inform force strategies. 
Each force’s RJ strategies might also be informed by PCC decisions in 
relation to commissioning RJ services. Between 2013-16, the MoJ provided 
PCCs with £23m earmarked for RJ as part of their budget for procuring victims’ 
services (Ministry of Justice, 2014). In some areas, PCCs provided direct grants 
to the police in order to build their own RJ delivery capacity. For example, Devon 
and Cornwall Police were reportedly given £300,000 (North Devon Journal, 2013) 
and West Midlands Police were given £500,000 (BBC News, 2013) for this 
purpose. Elsewhere, PCCs created or funded specialist services – RJ Hubs – 
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which varied in their relationship with local forces. For example, in some areas, 
(e.g. Lancashire, Gloucestershire), RJ Hubs were based within the police (ICPR, 
2016). Others (e.g. Humberside, West Yorkshire) were independent of local 
forces and diverged in terms of the proportion of their referrals which were 
provided by the police (ICPR, 2016; Shapland, et al., 2017). In some areas (e.g. 
South Yorkshire), officers who were previously trained in conferencing had 
moved away from this task with the advent of RJ Hubs, without making an 
equivalent number of referrals (Shapland, et al. 2017). Ultimately, PCCs only 
spent £10.5m on RJ between 2013-16 (Collins, 2016), with a recent report by the 
Victims’ Commissioner (2016) finding that their variable commitment to RJ helped 
explain a lack of provision in some areas. Again, the decisions made by the PCC 
in this regard may influence their local force’s use of RJ. 
So far, this chapter has considered features of the police institution which 
operate either across operational policing or at the organisational level. As noted 
in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, however, individual officers retain considerable discretion 
to determine how to execute their role. This means that it is necessary also to 
consider whether variations in frontline officers’ personal characteristics might 
inform their exercising of discretion in practice. 
 
 
2.6 Police officers as individuals 
 
The idea of a generic ‘police culture’ masks substantial variations between 
officers’ personal approaches to their work. ‘While the [police] culture may be 
powerful’, Chan explained, ‘it is up to individuals to accommodate or resist its 
influence’ (1996: 111). Viewed in this light, police culture ‘disappears into a near-
infinity of multiple sub-cultures’ (Waddington, 1999: 290). This section considers 
how certain characteristics of individual officers – specifically, their values, 
attitudes and skills – might inform their exercising of discretion. 
Rutherford (1994) outlined how criminal justice practitioners can use their 
discretion to act in accordance with their personal values, or ‘working credos’. He 
found that professionals’ approaches to their work were characterised primarily 
by their moral condemnation of offenders (the punishment credo), their desire to 
dispose of tasks efficiently (the efficiency credo), or their empathy with victims 
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and offenders and optimism relating to the prospects of constructive work (the 
care/humanity credo) (see also Liebling, 2004; Hucklesby, 2011). In the police 
context, this means that individual officers may be more or less compassionate 
or retributive, more or less likely to assume that constructive work with offenders 
is possible and desirable, and more or less inclined towards managerial or 
formulaic approaches. Similarly, Reiner (2010: Chapter 4), citing Muir (1977), 
argued that officers vary with respect to their outlook on society and their feelings 
towards the use of coercion to achieve justice. This may inform their policing 
‘orientation’ or ‘style’ (Reiner, 2010: 132), that is, their ideological understanding 
of their role, their personal priorities for their work, and their beliefs regarding the 
methods which can legitimately be used to achieve certain objectives. 
These values and orientations may affect the extent to which each officer 
identifies with the police’s ‘working rules’, as outlined in Section 2.3. For example, 
officers may be more or less inclined to empathise with marginalised groups, and 
thus more or less likely to subject citizens to differential treatment on the basis of 
their ethnicity or social background (Wasserman, 1996; Cikara, et al., 2011). 
Officers who prioritise efficiency or retribution, might be less inclined to deliver RJ 
than those who believe that offender rehabilitation and victim recovery are within 
their remit. Additionally, an officer’s feelings towards the use of coercion might 
affect the importance they place on voluntariness within the RJ process, or their 
inclination to engage with RJ in the first place. One study found that ‘officers who 
subscribe to traditional notions of culture relied on coercion more readily than 
those who do not […] irrespective of the style of policing promoted by the top 
leadership’ (Terrill, et al., 2003: 1029). This illustrates how officers retain the 
discretion to resist strategies set by senior leaders.  
While Rutherford noted that ‘the relationship between ideology and practice 
is both complex and unpredictable’ (1994: 6), evidence from social psychology 
suggests that values influence actions (Feather, 1992). Sykes and Brent (1983) 
argued that police behaviour is inherently related to their values, as they are 
required to interpret situations before and while responding to them. Therefore, it 
may be that police officers differ in the extent to which they have a ‘restorative 
justice ideology’ (Roland, et al., 2012: 436), and that their orientation in this regard 
might affect their attraction to, or involvement in, RJ.  
The same may be true of certain attitudes. For example, one’s attitudes 
towards partnership working or volunteers, might affect the likelihood that one 
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refers cases to RJ Hubs. Similarly, attitudes towards innovation and change may 
vary among officers, inspiring different levels of resistance to RJ and other ideas 
which are portrayed as ‘new’ or ‘evidence-based’. Skogan (2008: 23) argued that 
‘street officers do not want to be plagued by out-of-touch programs that add to 
their workload and give them tasks that lie outside their comfort zone’. In a study 
of police attitudes towards community policing, however, Mastrofski, et al. (2002), 
found that around one-fifth of officers were strongly inclined to implement it. 
These ‘professionals’ felt that they were ‘a concerned, specially empowered 
partner’ of the community, and believed themselves to have ‘a personal stake in 
[its] welfare’ (Mastrofski, et al., 2002: 89). In contrast, ‘tough cops’, who made up 
27% of the sample, felt alientated from the communities they policed, were ‘quick 
to impose their authority’, and were resistant to partnership working (Mastrofski, 
et al., 2002: 99). Officers have also been found to vary in their feelings towards 
problem-solving approaches (Sykes and Brent, 1983). The implication is that an 
officer’s attitudes towards the principles underpinning a given reform might affect 
their inclination to use it, while their discretion allows them to determine whether 
and how to implement force strategies and policies (Wilson, 1968).  
There is disagreement about whether (expressed) attitudes are necessarily 
a causal factor in determining practitioner behaviour (Reiner, 2010). Callens 
(2014), for example, stated that it is difficult to tell when practitioners act 
pragmatically and then apply their attitudes to their actions retrospectively, giving 
the illusion of causation. Worden (1989) found that attitudinal differences were 
unlikely to play a substantial role in explaining variations in police behaviour, while 
Bittner (1967) argued that the purpose of police ‘craft’ is to disregard one’s own 
attitudes and respond only according to the needs of different situations. Still, 
several police researchers claim to have observed that police behaviour at least 
partly mirrors attitudes (e.g. Fielding and Fielding, 1991; Bailey, et al., 2001), 
while some RJ researchers also contend that there is likely to be a relationship 
between facilitators’ attitudes and their practices (Murray, 2012; Paul and Borton, 
2013; Paul and Dunlop, 2014). Overall, it seems plausible that the police’s use of 
RJ could be affected by various police attitudes, including those towards diversion 
(Carrington and Schulenberg, 2003; Wortley, 2003), compensation (Shapland, et 
al., 2017), victim assistance (Vukadin and Matić, 2011), ‘softer’ policing practices 
(Shaw, 2004), conflict resolution (Cooper, 1997), and the legitimacy of using 
violence or threats to obtain compliance (Willis and Mastrofski, 2016). 
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Finally, variations in officers’ skills may also shape the way in which they 
exercise their discretion. RJ facilitation is said to require a series of ‘core skills’ 
(Restorative Justice Council, 2011: 9) which some officers might not possess. 
For example, the police have been found to differ in their ability to empathise with 
victims (Westmarland, 2011) and undertake community engagement (Lister, 
2015). Similarly, listening skills, patience and empathy might vary across a force, 
affecting how officers treat victims and offenders (Turley, et al., 2014).  
Communication and reflection skills might also determine a facilitator’s 
ability to demonstrate impartiality and to refrain from being overtly judgemental 
(Restorative Justice Council, 2011). Yet, as Section 2.3 described, policework 
and police culture may make officers prone to suspicion and stereotyping, 
resulting in their differential treatment of ethnic and social groups. Moreover, as 
the next chapter discusses, citizens with preconceptions about the police may 
perceive officers to be partial, irrespective of their actual behaviour; officers, in 
turn, may be more or less able to recognise this and to modify their behaviour 
accordingly, depending on their emotional literacy and communication skills. 
Whereas training and experience of RJ delivery may help build officers’ skills and 
moderate their attitudes (Hoyle, et al., 2002; Shapland, et al., 2011), most receive 
little training before being expected to facilitate (Gavrielides, 2013). In fact, 
Sherman, et al. (2015) controlled for training and found that innate skills were 
linked to differences in participants’ perceptions of fair treatment (see also Turley, 
et al., 2014). Thus, it also seems plausible that, as with values and attitudes, 
variations in officers’ skills might inform how they interpret and use RJ. 
 
 
2.7 Structuring operational police discretion 
 
The question remains as to the extent to which operational police discretion 
may be moderated by internal and external attempts to structure it. Indeed, most 
police reforms ultimately aim to negate or change one or more features of police 
behaviour mentioned in this chapter, albeit with varying success in doing so. This 
final section explores some of the foremost attempts to structure police discretion, 
namely through the use of legal and non-legal rules, targets and performance 
management regimes, and new policing philosophies. 
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Empirical research and national inquiries into the English police in the 
1960s, 70s and 80s revealed the dangers of unfettered police discretion. These 
decades were characterised by ‘a babble of scandalous revelation [and] 
controversy’ (Reiner, 2010: 78), emanating from a litany of police abuses, 
including violence, corruption and racism. By the 1980s, public trust in the police 
was at historic lows, and it was widely believed – at least, outside of the police 
profession – that the police’s culture and discretion were insufficiently restricted 
(Reiner, 2010). This ushered in a new era of calls and attempts to constrain, 
codify and clarify the limits of police discretion. 
By the early 1980s, there was substantial pressure on the government to 
introduce new legal rules to prevent police abuses. McBarnet (1981) noted that 
many procedural rights which were widely assumed to exist, were not actually 
codified in law. Rather, they existed within non-statutory guidance (known as the 
Judges’ Rules), helping to explain the failure to realise them in practice. ‘Police 
and court officials’, she argued, ‘need not abuse the law to subvert the principles 
of justice; they need only use it’ (McBarnet, 1981: 156). Following a series of 
proposals for statutory reform, the government eventually passed the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), Code C of which directly replaced the 
Judges’ Rules. PACE both regulated and legitimised police powers in relation to 
the investigation of offences and suspects’ detention, inter alia, in an attempt to 
balance and unify communal and individual rights (Reiner, 2010).  
Since PACE, the efficacy of legal rules in structuring police behaviour has 
been widely debated. Dixon (1997) argued that law is neither a panacea, nor is it 
irrelevant. Rather, he believed that legal rules act to structure policework to 
different extents, depending on the nature of the rule, its implementation, and the 
type of behaviour which it seeks to change. This view seems to reflect the 
research evidence on PACE’s implementation, which Reiner (2010) summarised 
as having had an uneven impact on the police’s treatment of suspects. In 
reference to booking-in procedures, for example, Reiner (2010: 218) argued that, 
following PACE, ‘suspects are almost invariably informed of their rights on 
reception at the police station’, but only because those procedures are ‘precise[ly 
codified], relatively visible to supervisors and clearly enjoined in training’. 
Moreover, Reiner (2010) noted that, in some cases, this process was ritualised 
to the point of futility, while other studies have suggested that the police may use 
‘ploys’ to coerce or convince suspects not to exercise their rights (McConville, et 
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al., 1991), or even withhold this information altogether (Sanders and Young, 
2012). These findings illustrate the potentially limited impact of legal rules, leading 
Reiner (2010: 210) to presume a ‘law of inevitable increment: whatever powers 
the police have they will exceed by a given margin’. 
Overall, the research suggests that, following PACE, the police reserved a 
level of discretion which provided ‘extensive scope for their actions to deviate 
from the law or organisational policy’ (Reiner, 2010: 115). McConville, et al. 
(1991) argued that the low visibility of policework and the flexibility of certain laws 
(such as public order offences), still enabled the police to make arrests and 
charging decisions in accordance with their own principles and preferred ways of 
working, before fitting retrospectively their legal powers around these decisions 
when writing case records. A review of the stop and search literature similarly 
found that the low visibility of the process and the absence of legal remedies and 
penalties for misconduct, allowed the police systematically to deviate from legal 
rules, resulting in the discriminatory use of that power against ethnic minorities 
(Bowling and Phillips, 2007). PACE and other laws seem to have only partially 
dampened the police’s ability to prioritise ‘crime control’ values – and, indeed, 
their own extra-legal goals (Choongh, 1998; Bowling and Phillips, 2007) – over 
citizens’ rights to due process and non-discrimination. Ultimately, the police’s 
adherence to legal rules remains contingent on low visibility decisions made by 
officers with entrenched priorities, goals and ways of working. 
Similar points may be made in relation to the many non-legal rules which 
encourage or discourage certain police behaviours. For example, the cautioning 
process is governed by non-statutory guidelines from which police practices have 
often been found to deviate. In their review of the literature in this area, Sanders, 
et al. (2010) explained that cautions are frequently used as inducements to 
confess or are offered in cases without enough evidence to charge, despite these 
practices being banned in policy. ‘The preconditions to cautioning, reprimanding 
and warning’, argued Sanders, et al. (2010: 398-9), ‘are largely presentational 
rules, giving the appearance of due process, but having little effect on the police’. 
In Scotland, meanwhile, stop and search is regulated by statute, and can only 
take place if officers have reasonable suspicion. However, Police Scotland policy 
allows for a ‘non-statutory’ stop and search in cases where there is insufficient 
suspicion to justify a legislative search, but where the person being searched 
provides consent (Murray, 2014). Despite this policy stating that refusal to 
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consent to a non-statutory stop cannot be used to justify a statutory stop, 
research has found that this regularly takes place (Murray, 2014). Factors 
including the low visibility of these activities, the public’s lack of knowledge 
pertaining to police rules and legal rights, and the absence of simple mechanisms 
to obtain remedies for malpractice, combine to enable the police to deviate from 
both legal and non-legal rules (Sanders, et al., 2010).  
Efforts to structure police discretion also took the form of performance 
management regimes, most notably through centrally-imposed restrictions and 
targets, and local supervision by police managers. With respect to the former, the 
decades following PACE saw drastic growth in efforts to regulate the police and 
other public services through centralised targets. This reflected a shift towards 
New Public Management (or ‘managerialism’) which sought to increase the 
police’s efficiency and effectiveness by measuring their activities (Butterfield, et 
al., 2004; Loveday, 2006; Cockcroft and Beattie, 2009). Importantly, these 
changes took place alongside a drift towards the politicisation and increasing 
retributiveness of criminal justice policies – what Bottoms (1995) called ‘populist 
punitiveness’. This led to the police’s discretion being restricted in various ways 
which enhanced the punitiveness of the system. For example, the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 introduced compulsory escalation for young offenders who, 
from that point, could no longer receive multiple cautions. Instead, the police 
could give a young offender a single ‘reprimand’ and, in virtually all cases, a single 
‘final warning’, before being compelled to lay charges (Tonry, 2004). 
Similarly, centralised forms of management were used to structure police 
discretion in ways which encouraged officers to utilise their formal powers in 
enforcing the criminal law. For example, the Police Reform Act 2002 enhanced 
the Home Secretary’s ability to introduce national priorities for policing. These 
tended to focus on law enforcement, reducing the strategic discretion of Chief 
Constables to encourage informal resolution locally (Loveday, 2006). The police’s 
operational discretion became further restricted when, in 2002, the Home Office 
introduced the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS). This included a 
target whereby the police were required to increase the number of ‘offences 
brought to justice’ (OBTJ) from 1.025m to 1.25m over five years (Bateman, 2008). 
For an offence to qualify as having been ‘brought to justice’, it had to attract a 
‘sanction detection’. In other words, the offender had to be formally processed 
and either receive an OOCD, or be charged or summonsed. 
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That the OBTJ framework did not allow informally resolved cases to be 
included as measured outcomes (Smith, 2014), created a perverse incentive to 
arrest and process ‘easy hits’ (Kemp, 2014: 279). Low-level offences which 
previously would not have attracted police attention or would have been resolved 
informally, were now being formally processed – what Cohen (1979) called net-
widening and mesh-thinning, respectively. Ultimately, the police increased their 
‘detections’ to over 1.4m offences in the year to June 2007 (Bateman, 2008) 
primarily by targeting young offenders, which resulted in a dramatic increase in 
the number of people who received a criminal record for the first time (Hart, 2012). 
In other words, the introduction of targets had led to their ‘gaming’: officers acted 
to meet targets in the easiest way possible, rather than in ways which produced 
socially useful outcomes (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Loveday, 2006). OBTJ targets 
and other such performance indicators were credited with the failure of restorative 
cautioning to take hold, as they incentivised the police to process offenders 
quickly. More time consuming ‘quality work’ was duly ‘diluted or eliminated’ 
(Hoyle, 2011: 813) in favour of increasing the number of directly measured 
activities (see also Fielding and Innes, 2006; Hoyle, 2009). 
With respect to police supervision locally, emphasis is often placed on the 
role of line managers (such as Sergeants and Inspectors) in overseeing the 
activities of frontline officers (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2011). Police 
managers are required, argued Shearing and Powditch (1992: 5), ‘to create a 
particular organizational order; in other words, to guarantee a particular way of 
doing things’. In practice, however, their ability to restrict operational discretion is 
limited by the distance at which any supervision takes place (Brown, 1988). The 
low visibility of operational policing extends to the ability of frontline officers to 
make most of their day-to-day decisions without informing their superiors in 
advance. Any supervision tends to be retrospective and is therefore reliant on the 
claims and written records of frontline officers, who can argue that departures 
from policy were unavoidable, or (deceptively) frame their actions as being 
consistent with police policies (McConville, et al., 1991). Indeed, some managers 
may themselves believe that such deviations are an inevitable and necessary 
feature of policing, and show reluctance to overrule or reprimand their officers 
accordingly (Reiner, 2010). While the influence of managers may be somewhat 
limited in relation to individual decisions, however, they can still determine local 
priorities and influence the general approach to policing which takes place in their 
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areas (Engel and Worden, 2003). Thus, as with law and policy, the extent to 
which police managers act to shape the discretion of frontline officers, is perhaps 
best examined on a case-by-case basis. 
Finally, there have been attempts to use policing philosophies to structure 
operational discretion in ways which encourage the realisation of certain goals 
(Bayley, 1994). Most prominently, efforts have been made to integrate notions of 
community policing, problem-solving policing and evidence-based policing into 
police strategies, policies and practices. Each of these frameworks has pervaded 
academic and policy discourses on policing in recent years (Sherman, 2013). 
However, they represent vague, abstract concepts with little consensus on their 
meaning, and have proven susceptible to being co-opted by existing rationales 
as they are implemented within the police. 
This can be exemplified by tracing the development of community policing. 
Community policing has been operationalised as a decentralised style of policing 
which encourages officers to engage local citizens on their priorities, promote 
police-community cooperation, and make use of mechanisms of informal social 
control (Tilley, 2003; Skogan, 2006). Often, it is ambiguously and imprecisely 
formulated and understood, enabling the police to interpret it in ways which do 
not reflect the most nuanced or evidence-based frameworks (Kennedy, 2006; 
Hughes and Rowe, 2007). Furthermore, the ‘softer’ role it envisages for the 
police, clashes with aspects of police training and culture (Innes, 2005), while 
many of its central tenets – such as promoting co-operation and building social 
capital – are not conducive to being measured by (traditionally quantitative) 
performance management frameworks (Fielding and Innes, 2006). 
As a result, community policing tends to be implemented in accordance with 
existing institutional preferences, goals and approaches. In the US, for example, 
early moves towards community policing often resulted in more visible, but still 
coercive and reactive, policing practices (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988). This 
reflected the ‘tough on crime’ approach of the era, the funding available to forces 
for implementation, and the police’s desire to be seen to provide a more visible 
service (Oliver, 2000; McLeod, 2003). In England, ‘neighbourhood policing’ policy 
focused more on the symbolic importance of signal crimes, the reassurance of 
key citizen groups and improving confidence in the police, than on building social 
capital, citizen mobilisation and other more relational activities (McLeod, 2003; 
Fielding and Innes, 2006; Innes, 2006; Crawford, 2007); the indicators on which 
42 
 
performance was measured were set accordingly (HMIC, 2008). In the 2000s, 
PCSOs and NPTs were introduced across England to foreground community 
policing approaches (Home Office, 2004, 2010). By 2008, there were over 3600 
NPTs, numbering 13,000 police officers and 16,000 PCSOs (HMIC, 2008). Yet, 
reducing fear of crime was widely perceived to be easier to measure and achieve, 
and politically more valuable, than (longer-term) efforts to increase collective 
efficacy among citizens (Longstaff, et al., 2015). In both the US and the UK, 
politicians and the police seemed to believe that the limited potential for resident 
mobilisation (particularly among the socially excluded), justified the prioritisation 
of other tenets of community policing (Bullock and Leeney, 2013). As a result, 
enhanced police accountability and police-citizen partnerships have been largely 
neglected in favour of visible patrols. 
New policing philosophies may have only a limited impact on changing 
police behaviour, as their application comes to reflect existing police priorities. 
Features of community policing which were perceived to be more difficult to 
achieve or were otherwise seen as less desirable, were mostly disregarded. Still, 
it represented an important attempt to structure strategic and operational police 
discretion so that police resources were redirected towards achieving different 
outcomes (Clamp and Paterson, 2017). Problem-solving policing approaches 
similarly encouraged the police to undertake more proactive and constructive 
work (Tilley, 2003). In practice, however, its implementation had been strongly 
informed by the existing goal of closing cases efficiently, resulting primarily in 
enhanced reactive approaches (Ikerd, 2007; Boba and Crank, 2008). More 
recently, evidence-based policing has benefited from the advent of austerity, 
which has encouraged some senior leaders to turn to empirical research to 
underpin reforms (Sherman, 2013). Yet, this, too, has been shaped by existing 
police goals, as research pertaining to ‘value for money’ and the development of 
technology have been promoted at the expense of more normative, theoretical or 
rights-based approaches (Greene, 2014). As the next chapter illustrates, the 
ways in which community, problem-solving and evidence-based approaches 
have been integrated into policework are significant, as RJ, a similarly elusive 
concept, has often been promoted in this context through appeals to all three 
(Weitekamp, et al., 2003; Bazemore and Boba, 2010; Shewan, 2010). 
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2.8 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter analysed several key features of the police institution. It 
delineated the unique and enduring characteristics of the operational policing 
function, and explored the pre-eminence of discretion at both the strategic and 
operational levels. Theoretical and empirical literature was used to illustrate how 
frontline police discretion can be shaped by, inter alia, the demands of the role, 
the institutional and organisational cultures which emerge from that role, the 
preferences and personal approaches of senior leaders and individual officers, 
and the various pressures, rules, philosophies, management structures and 
instrumental concerns which contextualise English policing. It was shown that 
these factors can create resistance to change within the police, which presents 
difficulties when attempting to structure or constrain police discretion in order to 
achieve normative goals. Despite the hierarchical and legally-bounded character 
of the police, the low visibility, high pressure environment in which policework 
takes place, means that frontline officers largely retain the ability to respond to 
situations and to implement (or not) policies and rules as they see fit.  
As each of the variables described in this chapter can act to influence the 
police in general, so might they shape how RJ is interpreted and used as it is 
implemented in policework. The police are used to reproducing situations which 
allow them to maintain control and act according to personal, professional and 
organisational rationales and priorities (McConville, et al., 1991; Choongh, 1998). 
In this sense, restorative policing, like community policing before it, represents a 
somewhat nebulous policing philosophy which may be susceptible to being 
reinterpreted according to existing rationales. The next chapter explores the 
theory, policy and practice of restorative policing with this possibility in mind. 
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Chapter 3 – Restorative policing in theory, policy and practice 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A growing body of theoretical work delineates various interpretations of 
restorative policing, considering its qualities and, sometimes, the mechanisms 
which may enable its realisation. In contrast, the empirical research usually 
illustrates the divergence between theoretical approaches on one hand, and the 
use of RJ by the police in practice on the other. This chapter explores some of 
the salient themes therein, drawing together these literatures to operationalise 
restorative policing and examine some of the gaps between its theory, policy and 
practice. It also begins to consider whether and how the meaning and use of RJ 
in the police context might be shaped by features of that institution.  
This chapter begins by arguing that restorative policing either represents an 
overarching philosophy for systemic police reform, or refers to the police’s 
involvement in delivering specific processes. Each approach attempts to direct 
the police’s use of discretion towards empowering citizens and repairing harm, 
albeit to different extents. Next, the chapter analyses how restorative policing is 
presented in national policies, noting that it is portrayed flexibly and practically, 
having been shaped by political and institutional priorities, goals and rationales. 
Finally, it reviews the empirical literature on the appearance of restorative policing 
in practice, considering the extent to which restorative principles are realised 
when the police are called upon to facilitate RJ processes. 
 
 
3.2 Restorative policing in theory 
 
Like community policing, restorative policing is an abstract philosophy which 
is said to encompass various ideas, depending on the speaker’s beliefs regarding 
the most appropriate or useful way to apply the concept of RJ to policing. That 
being said, competing definitions of restorative policing largely mirror those of RJ 
itself: restorative policing has been conceptualised both as a fundamental shift in 
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the police’s mission (the ‘systemic reform’ approach), and as a discrete group of 
practices (whether process- or outcome-focused) which the police can use when 
responding to specific incidents (the ‘programmatic reform’ approach) (Bazemore 
and Griffiths, 2003: 340). Whereas the former necessitates a fundamental shift in 
the way the police understand their purpose, the latter requires only that they use 
certain RJ processes within their day-to-day work (Clamp and Paterson, 2017). 
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, formulations of both 
typically allude to each other and represent attempts to structure police discretion 
so that it is exercised to empower citizens and repair harm (Bazemore and 
Griffiths, 2003). Still, they reflect important differences in how academics and 
reformers believe RJ can be applied within the police institution. 
The ‘systemic reform’ approach is said to ‘conceptualise a response to all 
incidents of crime based on restorative principles’, and is intended to ‘change the 
way [the police] think about and perform all police functions’ (Bazemore and 
Griffiths, 2003: 340, emphasis in original). Rather than being ‘based on one 
particular practice or method’, Lofty (2002: 1), invoking Zehr (1990), suggested 
that restorative policing is about ‘looking at crime through a different lens’. This 
vision of restorative policing is broadly akin to the notion that RJ is an ‘ethos’ 
(Gavrielides, 2007), a ‘type of justice’ (Daly, 2016: 6) or a ‘normative discourse 
on how justice should be done in the context of a democratic state’ (Pali, 2014). 
In a ‘restorative force’ (Stockdale, 2015b: 102), all activities, goals and structures 
would be underpinned by restorative principles. 
Many theoreticians have attempted to delineate these principles, that is, the 
‘core normative values’ (Gavrielides, 2007: 139) which represent the ‘ethical 
basis of the restorative approach’ (Reggio, 2013: 317). None, however, have 
succeeded in creating a universally agreed list (Pavlich, 2007), leaving empirical 
researchers to identify, ad hoc, the principles which are most relevant to their 
work (Vanfraechem, 2009). While some writers identify concepts as abstract as 
‘generosity’, ‘understanding’ and ‘moral and spiritual guidance’ as restorative 
principles (Van Ness and Strong, 2014: Chapters 6 and 7), others adopt 
principles based on their utility as standards for dialogic practices (Braithwaite, 
2002; Vanfraechem, 2009). The latter approach is also used within various 
international policies and practice guidelines (e.g. Council of Europe, 2000; 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2002; United Nations Office on 
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Drugs and Crime, 2006; New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2011; Restorative 
Justice Council, 2011; European Parliament, 2012). 
In a framework which is adopted herein, Stahlkopf (2009) distinguished 
between procedural principles relating to stakeholder empowerment, and 
outcome principles relating to the repairing of harm. This dichotomy usefully 
differentiates between the process through which (restorative) justice should be 
done, and the goals which it should aim to achieve. It can also be subdivided into 
more specific principles. As stated in Chapter 1, some of the most regularly cited 
procedural principles include voluntariness, stakeholder participation in dialogue 
and decision-making, non-domination and an equal focus on all parties’ needs 
(Braithwaite, 2002; Gavrielides, 2007; Vanfraechem, 2009). These correspond 
closely to the idea of ‘procedural fairness’, in which participation and the 
perception of fair treatment are seen as key determinants of how a decision is 
received by those it concerns (Tyler, 2006, 2006b). With regard to restorative 
outcomes, reparation, reconciliation and reintegration are usually identified as the 
ways to ‘repair the individual, relational and social harm’ caused by crime 
(Walgrave, 2008: 21; see also Johnstone, 2008). 
The notion of stakeholder empowerment tends to figure centrally in systemic 
reform models of restorative policing. For example, according to the ‘restorative 
problem-solving police prevention programme’ developed by Weitekamp, et al. 
(2003: 314-21), the police, victims, offenders and communities are all recognised 
as stakeholders to crime prevention, with the right to play an active role in 
maintaining peace and community safety. They argue that the police’s role in this 
is to facilitate the participation of the other stakeholder groups in deliberation and 
decision-making (see Figure 3.1): 
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Figure 3.1: Restorative problem-solving police prevention programme 
(Weitekamp, et al., 2003: 319) 
 
This model of policing is restorative, argued Weitekamp, et al. (2003), because it 
proposes a move away from the imposition of crime prevention strategies by the 
state, in favour of enabling everyone with a stake in crime prevention to 
participate in decision-making. Weitekamp, et al. (2003) also suggested that the 
police should adopt RJ principles as a policing framework, and RJ processes as 
a tactic, as this would enable officers to be proactive and dynamic in identifying 
local objectives, evaluating needs and responses, solving problems and, most 
importantly, decentralising decision-making. These aims, they argued, are mostly 
central tenets of community policing and/or problem-solving policing which can 
be realised by applying restorative principles. 
More recently, Clamp and Paterson formulated a similarly transformative 
approach to restorative policing, stating that it represents a single, new policing 
objective: to ‘promote beneficial forms of social capital’ (2017: 119, emphasis in 
original). Restorative policing, they stipulated, involves moving away from the 
‘traditional police use of force paradigm’ (2017: 119) and towards a participatory 
approach to policework, particularly that located at the ‘shallow-end’ of criminal 
justice. Like Weitekamp, et al. (2003), they believed that RJ processes and 
principles can be used to achieve the aims of both community policing and 
problem-solving policing, and that ‘a true integration of restorative justice requires 
a fundamental evolution in agency missions’ (Clamp and Paterson, 2017: 139). 
They emphasised the relational dimension of RJ, remarking that the police can 
reduce the need to use coercion by helping citizens to (re)organise and (re)build 
49 
 
strong ties within local communities. This new model of policing, Clamp and 
Paterson (2017) wrote, would allow the police to delegate decision-making to 
citizens, take advantage of the informal control capabilities residing in social 
networks, and develop the latent capacity among populations to manage, resolve 
and prevent crime and conflict with lower levels of state intervention. 
Given the research outlined in Chapter 2, it seems unlikely that either model 
could be fully realised in English policing. Both represent reasonably coherent 
narratives about what the police might strive to achieve. However, neither 
Weitekamp, et al. (2003) nor Clamp and Paterson (2017) indicate how they might 
alleviate the pressures or change the expectations and rationales which result in 
the police playing a largely reactive function. Nor do they reflect on the level or 
distribution of resources which would enable additional tasks to be undertaken 
alongside existing policework. Furthermore, neither resolves the fundamental 
tension underpinning RJ in criminal justice in general, and restorative policing in 
particular: when there is a disagreement, who is ultimately in control? 
As Chapter 2 explained, the barriers to inclusive, proactive and procedurally 
fair policing approaches have not dissipated. Though somewhat malleable, they 
are mostly reproduced, as an entrenched body of knowledge about what policing 
should achieve and look like, interacts with the social and political conditions in 
which it takes place (Chan, 1996). This renders systemic reform models difficult 
to achieve, as aspects of RJ which do not fit neatly within the parameters of the 
current system, are likely to be rejected in favour of those which preserve or are 
compatible with existing rationales (Blad, 2006). As O’Mahony and Doak (2017: 
39) said: ‘The restorative capacity of state-led programmes is inherently limited 
by the overarching role that continues to be exercised by the state.’ 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the empirical literature tends 
to adopt a programmatic approach to defining restorative policing. In practice, 
researchers have had few opportunities to measure change efforts against a 
systemic reform approach to restorative policing, because forces almost always 
implement RJ on the understanding that it represents one or more practices 
which their officers can opt to utilise in response to specific cases. As Chapter 1 
explained, the history of restorative policing in England involves the police using 
restorative conferencing (and other, usually less-dialogic, approaches) under the 
guise of RJ. Unlike the holistic approaches outlined by Weitekamp, et al. (2003) 
and Clamp and Paterson (2017), restorative conferencing is designed to accord 
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with deep-rooted police rationales. For example, it individualises crime by 
imposing a victim-offender dichotomy and ‘prioritis[ing] the rectification of past 
wrongs by one party’ (O’Malley, 2006: 229). This contrasts with systemic 
approaches to restorative policing, which assume that RJ should also address 
societal-level harms and harms done to those who most recently occupied the 
role of ‘offender’ (Zellerer, 2016). Conferencing enables the police to control 
outcome decisions, neglect the social context in which crime occurs, inhibit 
broader community involvement and direct processes to achieve police-defined 
goals (Karstedt, 2011; Richards, 2011).  
The scripted model of restorative conferencing – and, to an even greater 
degree, street RJ (Stockdale, 2015b) – represents a pragmatic effort to integrate 
some restorative values and processes into police practices. It illustrates how the 
adoption of restorative principles is dependent on the extent to which they accord 
with existing priorities and ways of working (Aertsen, et al., 2006; Mackay, 2006). 
This level of pragmatism has been encouraged in England, as national policies 
and police forces have interpreted the concept of RJ in an increasingly flexible 
manner (Clamp and Paterson, 2013, 2017).  
 
 
3.3 Restorative policing in policy 
 
RJ in general, and restorative policing in particular, tend to be articulated 
programmatically within national and organisational policies (Clamp and 
Paterson, 2017). In its recent RJ Action Plans, for example, the MoJ (2017: 3; 
see also, Ministry of Justice, 2012, 2013, 2014) defined RJ as: 
 
The process that brings those harmed by crime or conflict, and those 
responsible for the harm, into communication, enabling everyone affected 
by a particular incident to play a part in repairing the harm and finding a 
positive way forward. 
 
This definition was adopted from the Restorative Justice Council (2011), and has 
been embraced by other governmental bodies (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 
2012; Justice Committee, 2016; Victims’ Commissioner 2016). As an essentially 
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programmatic definition, it does not frame RJ as a fundamental challenge to the 
structures of the justice system. However, it does provide clear boundaries to the 
concept (Daly, 2016), integrates both process and outcome principles, and 
encourages a dialogic (and therefore evidence-based) approach to delivery 
(Strang, et al., 2013; Sherman, et al., 2015). 
In any case, a much broader understanding of RJ has developed in the 
English police of late. Towards the end of the 2000s, several forces introduced 
new police disposals, framed or labelled as restorative in nature, which allowed 
officers to resolve cases instantly and informally (Wachtel, 2009; Shewan, 2010). 
This was largely in response to the strict OBTJ targets which had discouraged 
the police from resolving cases informally, resulting in a drastic increase in the 
formal processing of young, first-time offenders (Rix, et al., 2011). 
 Around the same time, OBTJ targets were criticised in an independent 
review of the police (Flanagan, 2008). This stated that targets should be removed, 
and that other aspects of the performance management regime should be rolled 
back. It was claimed that this could both reduce police bureaucracy and enable 
officers to respond more proportionately to low-level offending. The report 
recognised that targets had ‘encouraged [officers] to criminalise people for 
behaviour which may have caused offence, but the underlying behaviour would 
be better dealt with in a different way’ (Flanagan, 2008: 57), and argued that 
performance frameworks should be more flexible, enabling officers to make use 
of ‘citizen-focused resolutions’ (Flanagan, 2008: 56). 
This report informed a series of national policy changes which enhanced, 
constrained or directed police discretion in ways which discouraged the formal 
processing of low-level offenders. In 2008, the Home Office released a Youth 
Justice Action Plan which explicitly aimed to reduce the number of young people 
given criminal records (Hart, 2012). In the same year, the OBTJ target was 
revised to focus only on more serious offences, before being withdrawn entirely 
in 2010 (Kemp, 2014). In 2012, reprimands and final warnings were replaced with 
youth cautions, formally returning to officers the discretion to de-escalate young 
offenders who already had criminal records (Smith, 2014). Code G of PACE was 
also revised, increasing the threshold needed to justify arrests (ACPO, 2012b). 
Some of these later policies were also informed by austerity. As Creaney and 
Smith noted, this reversion to minimal intervention was ‘consistent with a spirit of 
pragmatic retrenchment associated with pressures for cost saving’ (2014: 85). 
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ACPO (2012b) also cited austerity as a significant factor in the consolidation of 
the trend away from formal processing, noting that arrests and detention centres 
were especially resource intensive.  
In the years following the Flanagan Report, the use of informal disposals by 
the police grew rapidly. Nationally, their usage with violent offences rose from 
2,204 in 2008, to 33,673 in 2012 (Full Fact, 2013), while their usage in six forces 
grew from 0.5% of all resolved cases in 2008, to 12% in 2012 (Criminal Justice 
Joint Inspection, 2012). These disposals were often labelled as ‘restorative’, and 
their use was examined in a landmark report which looked at RJ throughout the 
justice process (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012). However, this report, 
like other studies which took place around the same time, showed that these 
disposals mostly deviated from restorative principles and research evidence on 
the effectiveness of RJ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2011, 2012; Rix, et al., 
2011; Meadows, et al., 2012). Disposals were typically characterised by quick 
exercises in indirect negotiation, in which officers retained control over processes 
and outcomes and seldom invited victims, offenders or other stakeholders to 
participate in dialogue or decision-making. Nonetheless, these disposals were 
increasingly recorded and understood within the police as restorative in nature 
(Shewan, 2010; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012).  
That some forces did not introduce these disposals, led to concerns of a 
‘postcode lottery’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2011: 19) with respect to their 
availability. Around the same time, austerity measures incentivised a greater 
focus on demand management among the police (HMIC, 2011, 2012), and 
another national report recommended the nationwide adoption of informal 
disposals in order to reduce police bureaucracy (Berry, 2010). 
In 2010, the MoJ presented plans to encourage the use of ‘restorative’ 
OOCDs. They stated that they would reform police disposals in order to: 
 
Promote diversionary restorative justice approaches [which will] return 
discretion to police officers and encourage offenders to make swift 
reparation to victims and the wider community. (2010: 64) 
 
Three years later, the government added a ‘community resolution’ category into 
its recording framework (Home Office, 2013). This formally introduced, into 
national policy, victim participation in decisions relating to informal disposals. In 
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2015 – the first year for which national statistics were published – around 119,300 
community resolutions were delivered by the police, making up around 7% of total 
criminal outcomes imposed by the police or courts that year (Ministry of Justice, 
2017b). These figures did not include the use of community resolutions with non-
crime incidents, which was explicitly enabled, but for which national figures do 
not seem to be published. They also did not state the proportion of community 
resolutions which were nominally ‘restorative’ in nature: the Home Office (2013), 
while recognising that community resolutions could be delivered restoratively or 
not, did not require forces to record this distinction.  
In its explanation of the updated disposals framework, the Home Office 
defined the community resolution as: 
 
The resolution of a less serious offence or anti-social behaviour incident 
where an offender has been identified, through informal agreement between 
the parties involved as opposed to progression through the traditional 
criminal justice system. (2013: 6).  
 
This document also stated that the purpose of the disposal was to allow the police 
to resolve cases quickly, cheaply and proportionately, while enhancing victims’ 
involvement in the process. It seemingly represented an attempt to balance these 
competing aims and to integrate (at least, quasi-) restorative ideas into police 
disposals, by enabling victim participation and negotiated agreement. The 
document also stated that the Home Office did not intend to produce specific 
rules on community resolutions, and that guidance on their use should be 
developed locally by forces. At the time of writing, the most detailed national 
guidance on community resolutions remains that which had already been 
released by ACPO (2012), some provisions of which were mirrored in updated 
MoJ guidance on OOCDs (2013b). 
Importantly, none of these documents specified the relative importance of 
the disposal’s competing aims. Instead, they provided flexible suggestions on 
how it could be used. For example, ACPO’s guidelines stated that community 
resolutions should only be used when ‘the victim has been consulted and [their] 
consent sought’, but that ‘in certain cases, [they] may be appropriate without 
victim consent’ (ACPO, 2012: 5, emphasis in original). These situations were not 
specified, though the same page ‘recommended’ that officers should consult their 
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supervisors and record their reasoning if using community resolutions without the 
victim’s consent. Similarly, while the guidance stated that ‘outcomes should 
always be focused on the offender making good the harm done’, outcomes did 
not have to be determined by the parties, and the only restriction was that they 
must be ‘appropriate’ (ACPO, 2012: 6). Thus, while the disposal theoretically 
increased the scope for victim involvement in OOCDs, it also enabled the police 
to overrule or neglect victims and control decision-making. 
Notwithstanding stricter regulation by forces, officers were left to exercise 
their professional judgement to impose disposals and select their conditions. This 
contradicts the suggestion by some advocates that community resolutions were 
‘instinctively restorative’ and that they would necessarily ‘achieve the benefits 
associated with the use of restorative justice’ (Shewan, 2010: 4). Rather, they 
were potentially restorative, depending on how officers used them in practice 
(Westmarland, et al., 2017). As Sanders, et al. (2010) explained, guidelines which 
list competing priorities without specifying their relative importance are mostly 
presentational, affording officers the discretion to determine what to prioritise in 
a given case. Thus, it should be expected that police rationales and working rules 
are reflected in how this disposal is used, especially given that it is delivered in 
the low-visibility environment of the street (Cutress, 2015).  
Around the same time, ACPO released additional guidance on the police’s 
use of RJ. This defined RJ as: 
 
A victim-focused resolution to a crime or a non-crime incident. RJ holds 
offenders, either young people or adults, directly accountable to their victims 
and can bring them together in a facilitated meeting. (2011: 4) 
 
This definition is considerably vaguer than that posited by the MoJ. It essentially 
suggests that RJ can be anything which is ‘victim-focused’ – a concept which it 
does not define, but which clearly does not require practices to involve dialogue 
between stakeholders, to be considered restorative.  
The guidance then lists a series of ‘minimum standards’, stating: ‘It is 
essential that for a disposal to be considered restorative it must have the following 
key elements’ (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: RJ minimum standards (ACPO, 2011: 4) 
 
In a sense, these standards reflect a procedural and harm-focused understanding 
of RJ, mentioning the need for ‘a structured process’ and the aim of ‘putting right 
the harm’. However, they still neglect to oblige the police to utilise participatory 
approaches. Although they state that at least one ‘affected party’ should have 
‘involvement’ in the process, this does not have to be the direct victim, nor does 
their involvement necessarily include communicating with the offender or giving 
input into outcome decisions. Similarly, these standards do not entitle offenders 
to provide input in decision-making processes. This framing of RJ is consistent 
with the ambiguity which typically characterises police guidance (McBarnet, 
1980, 1981; McConville, et al., 1991; Sanders, et al., 2010). Despite the UK 
government adopting a dialogic definition of RJ, ACPO has promulgated a more 
flexible approach which ultimately enables the police to define as ‘restorative’ a 
variety of processes over which they retain control (Cutress, 2015). 
This interpretation is further enabled by the distinction drawn between ‘Level 
1’, ‘Level 2’ and ‘Level 3’ RJ. Levels 2 and 3, as explained in Chapter 1, refer to 
the use of dialogic approaches pre- and post-court, respectively. Level 1 (or 
‘street RJ’), in contrast, is defined as an ‘instant or on-street disposal where police 
officers or PCSOs use restorative skills to resolve conflict in the course of their 
duties’ (ACPO, 2011: 7). By failing to define ‘restorative skills’, the guidance 
enables a further departure from the idea that RJ requires dialogue and collective 
decision-making among victims and offenders. Like the idea of practices being 
‘victim-focused’, the concept of street RJ is ambiguous and empowers the police 
to determine whether or how to apply restorative principles on a case-by-case 
basis (Gavrielides, 2016). As with cautioning, street RJ is governed in a way 
which is susceptible to its practices being shaped by the police’s working rules. 
This led Stockdale (2015b: 194) to characterise street RJ as a model which ‘has 
been packaged to fit within the criminal justice system, to fit with police force 
policies and to be understood by frontline officers’. 
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The concept of street RJ – further criticised by Strang and Sherman as an 
‘evidence-free innovation’ (2015: 19) – seems to have consolidated the conflation 
of RJ and informal resolutions within the English police. Many forces already 
equated the two by 2010, when at least 33 forces claimed to use RJ in some 
form, having reportedly trained almost 18,000 officers and PCSOs to deliver RJ 
(Shewan, 2010). As noted previously, however, most of the RJ processes which 
the police delivered at that time, involved little in the way of dialogue and 
stakeholder involvement in decision-making (Shewan, 2010; Rix, et al., 2011; 
Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012).  
More recent studies have found that street RJ has continued to omit the 
features of restorative conferencing which are most closely associated with its 
observed effectiveness. In the overwhelming majority of street practices, parties 
are mostly precluded from engaging in dialogue or from providing input into 
decision-making processes (Meadows, et al., 2012; Walters, 2014; Cutress, 
2015; Strang and Sherman, 2015; Shapland, et al., 2017; Westmarland, et al., 
2017). Instead, Cutress (2015: 178) observed, many officers ‘us[e] a RJ disposal 
for the reasons of speed and ease instead of any restorative factor’. This 
suggests that informal resolutions might have been labelled as RJ, without 
necessarily being strongly informed by RJ principles and processes. That more 
comprehensively restorative approaches might be sacrificed in favour of speed, 
is consistent with the research outlined in Section 2.3 on the propensity to 
prioritse efficiency across modern criminal justice work.   
ACPO’s guidelines exemplified how the conceptual flexibility of RJ affords 
policymakers the discretion to interpret it in accordance with the perceived needs 
of their institution. For one, advocates of RJ often frame it in ways which they 
believe will minimise resistance to its use among the target population (Aertsen, 
et al., 2006; Mackay, 2006). In this case, RJ has been portrayed and defined as 
quick, practical and discretionary, and as a way for the police to retain or 
relinquish control to the extent that they see fit. This may appeal to frontline 
officers who seek quick and easy mechanisms with which to respond to low-level 
cases, while circumventing any aversion to innovation, theory and ‘softer’ 
approaches which may be labelled ‘pink and fluffy’ (McCarthy, 2013: 271). 
However, it risks the dilution of the concept, as street RJ enables officers (and, 
indeed, politicians and the public) to define, record and understand these informal 
practices as reflecting the concept of RJ (Gavrielides, 2016). 
57 
 
ACPO’s guidance also showed how RJ can be co-opted by the wider 
rationales of the system within which it is implemented. For example, it 
emphasised individual responsibility and offender accountability, which are 
among the neoliberal ideals that have permeated the implementation of RJ within 
Western justice processes in recent decades (Karstedt, 2011). The guidelines 
also suggested that criminal (and, indeed, non-criminal) acts necessarily involve 
a clear ‘victim’ and ‘offender’, a dichotomy which, while often false (Drake and 
Henley, 2014), is a central assumption of the criminal law. By stating that RJ can 
only take place if an ‘offender’ takes responsibility, ACPO’s framework implicitly 
assumed that these labels can and should be imposed on situations to which the 
police are required to respond. This may preclude restorative approaches to 
cases where they may be useful, but where responsibility for harm is shared or 
unclear (Young, 2000; Stuart and Pranis, 2006). 
Moreover, the document’s emphasis on victims represented a politicised 
interpretation of RJ to suit the modern police institution. Recent years have seen 
a growth in the police’s responsibilities towards victims (Hoyle, 2011), alongside 
the proliferation of a ‘service culture’ (Reiner, 2010: 248) and a ‘victim-focused’ 
agenda (Duggan and Heap, 2014) within the police and other justice agencies. 
Victims are now among the system’s ‘customers’ (O'Malley, 2004), though their 
needs are often neglected in practice as resources are invested in more closely 
measured priorities (Payne, 2009). The marketing of RJ as a service for victims 
may have made it more politically palatable to policymakers in the context of 
populist punitiveness (Acton, 2015). Yet, this also illustrates how, as an abstract 
concept is mainstreamed, some of its features can be stressed or downplayed in 
accordance with institutional preferences and priorities (Oliver, 2000). In this 
case, efficiency, flexibility and victims were emphasised over dialogue, equality 
and inclusivity, with possible implications for the position of offenders within RJ, 
and for how it might be understood and implemented at the force- and officer-
level more broadly (Gavrielides, 2016). 
The police’s use of RJ in England is non-statutory, and ACPO’s guidelines 
state that their purpose is merely to ‘assist police forces in the introduction and 
management of RJ processes’, with forces expected to ‘develop their own 
specific local procedures’ (2011: 4). Consequently, the flexibility afforded force-
level policymakers to (re)interpret RJ and set their own policies locally, has 
allowed for heterogeneous approaches to be taken at the organisational level. 
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The most recent research suggests that forces differ greatly with respect to the 
training they provide, the nature of any quality assurance processes, the way that 
they frame the meaning, role and purpose of RJ, the amount of discretion their 
officers have to make decisions on its use, and the emphasis that they place on 
dialogue and repairing harm (Acton, 2015; Cutress, 2015; Stockdale, 2015b; 
Clamp and Paterson, 2017; Shapland, et al., 2017; Westmarland, et al., 2017). 
Many forces, argued Westmarland, et al. (2017: 11) interpret RJ in a way which 
is ‘so porous as to be unhelpful [and] as an umbrella term for a multitude of street-
level practices’. While some have been found to use conferencing and/or to 
participate in multi-agency RJ partnerships, others mostly or exclusively use 
street RJ, while some seldom, if ever, apply the term ‘restorative’ to their practices 
(Cutress, 2015; Strang and Sherman, 2015; ICPR, 2016; Shapland, et al., 2017; 
Westmarland, et al., 2017). The following section considers what the police’s use 
of RJ looks like in practice, in cases where their practices are labelled as such.  
 
 
3.4 Restorative policing in practice 
 
As Section 3.2 explained, restorative policing typically involves police 
officers facilitating practices which they understand to qualify as ‘restorative’. This 
requires officers to determine when and how to offer RJ, the extent and nature of 
any preparative or follow-up work, whether to enable the parties to communicate 
or determine outcomes, and how to behave and treat participants during these 
processes (Chapman, 2012; Laxminarayan, 2014). Research suggests that RJ 
is most likely to be effective if it involves dialogue and collective decision-making 
among victims and offenders, and if it is offered and delivered in a sensitive and 
procedurally fair manner (Crawford, 2010; Strang, et al., 2013; Sherman, et al., 
2015). In other words, the impact of an RJ process may depend on its facilitator’s 
ability and inclination to engage in ‘principled facilitation’ (Chapman, 2012: 80). 
Facilitators can be seen as ‘the custodian[s] of procedural and restorative justice 
values’ (Dignan, et al., 2007: 14): they are expected to exercise their discretion 
in empowering, creative and supportive ways to maximise the chances of 
participants’ needs being met (Schiff, 2007). 
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Given the discretionary environment in which restorative policing takes 
place, there is a risk of police-led RJ being shaped by the police’s working rules, 
or being used to achieve police-defined goals. As Chapter 2 explained, many of 
these rules and goals may conflict with, or may even be antithetical to, restorative 
principles and processes. Research on the police and police culture suggests 
that it is characterised by ‘habitual action’ (Chan, 1996: 113; see also Sackmann, 
1991), raising the prospect that coercion, prejudice and other police tendencies 
might shape police-led RJ processes.  
This section assesses the evidence as to whether ‘police facilitators’ adhere 
to restorative principles in practice. Four key principles are considered, namely 
voluntariness, stakeholder participation in dialogue, stakeholder participation in 
outcome determination, and repairing harm.  
 
 
3.4.1 Voluntariness 
 
That stakeholders must not be forced or pressured to participate in RJ or to 
accept any specific outcomes, is widely seen as a key safeguard for those who 
engage in an RJ process (Braithwaite, 2002). In theory, the principle of 
voluntariness ensures that victims, some of whom may be traumatised or 
vulnerable, must not be required to face their offenders (and vice versa) 
(Marshall, 1999). It also allows offenders to opt for a formal justice process, the 
protections of which may be important if the offender is vulnerable or denies guilt, 
or if disproportionate outcomes are proposed in RJ (Delgado, 2000; Daly, 2005). 
Voluntary participation can also enhance the legitimacy of the process, making 
compliance with outcomes more likely (Sherman, 1993; Tyler, 2006). 
In practice, however, voluntariness may be difficult – or even impossible – 
to achieve. This is for three main reasons: firstly, it can be difficult to articulate 
the appearance and boundaries of voluntariness in practice; secondly, much of 
the pressure under which the parties might find themselves may be unintentional 
or implicit; and thirdly, police officers might have a cultural disposition towards 
(and a vested interest in) applying pressure on one or both parties to participate 
or to accept certain outcomes. 
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RJ policies typically include provisions relating to voluntariness, although 
they may set qualitatively different standards. For example, the EU’s Victims’ 
Directive, to which England is (perhaps temporarily) bound, requires parties to 
provide ‘free and informed consent’ (European Parliament, 2012: 13) in order for 
RJ to take place. This is a higher standard than exists in domestic policies: the 
Victims’ Code says that ‘Restorative justice is voluntary – you [the victim] do not 
have to take part, and both you and the offender must agree to it before it can 
happen’ (Ministry of Justice, 2015: 35). Equating voluntariness with ‘agreement’ 
does not, to the same extent as the concept of ‘free and informed consent’, rule 
out the use of pressure, coercion, suggestion and misinformation to obtain 
consent. Similarly, ACPO’s guidelines do not require the parties to provide free 
and informed consent, stating instead that offenders ‘must be willing to undertake 
the RJ process’, while victims ‘must not be coerced into face-to-face or shuttle 
RJ’ (2011: 8). This suggests a higher standard for victims than for offenders, 
consistent with the framing of RJ as ‘victim-focused’. 
Still, each approach seems to imply that the facilitator must take some steps 
to obtain participants’ consent (and, perhaps, to minimise coercion when doing 
so) before delivering RJ. Typically, this role is operationalised as explaining the 
process fully, clearly and impartially, and taking care not to put pressure on any 
party to participate (Chapman, 2012; Van Ness and Strong, 2013). The object of 
the exercise is to communicate clearly that participation in the process and 
agreement on outcomes are free choices for all concerned. This means that the 
facilitator must have the skills and the inclination to inform the parties about the 
process in a way that is accessible and accurate, without implying to any party 
that they are required to engage. Facilitators should also allow for dissent and 
participant withdrawal throughout the process, including the point at which 
outcomes are discussed or agreed (Zinsstag, et al., 2011).  
In the police context, however, it may be unavoidable that prospective 
participants feel under some form of implicit pressure to engage in RJ processes 
or to accept certain outcomes. Generally speaking, victims and offenders may 
feel a moral obligation to participate, if they believe that they may help the other 
party by doing so (Zernova, 2007), or if a family member puts pressure on them 
to do so (McCold and Wachtel, 1998). In policing in particular, there may be forms 
of pressure which may be impossible to alleviate, as they derive not from a 
facilitator’s actions, but from the use of RJ (at least, in theory) as a diversion from 
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a higher criminal sanction or civil injunction (Clamp and Paterson, 2017). For 
example, when RJ is used as a diversion from arrest, the offender’s decision to 
participate is made under threat of formal processing if they object (Walgrave, 
2015). In such cases, offenders must choose whether or not to engage, without 
necessarily knowing which course of action would be worse for them (Braithwaite, 
1999; Mackay, 2006; Sherman and Strang, 2007). On the other side, victims may 
feel under pressure to participate, as to refuse might be to condemn the offender, 
whom they may know personally, to a harsher outcome. 
One or both parties could also feel under pressure to participate due to the 
authoritative nature of the officer’s position. Police officers carry a symbolic and 
legal authority which underpins all police-citizen interactions (Reiner, 2010). This 
may mean that citizens interpret police requests as orders, or agree to ostensibly 
voluntary invitations out of fear that there may be negative consequences if they 
decline (Delsol and Shiner, 2006; Vanfraechem, 2009; Nadler and Trout, 2012; 
Murray, 2014). ‘People consent to police officers’, argued Delsol (2006: 116), ‘not 
because they make a free choice to grant consent but because that is how people 
respond to the authority of the police’. 
Tensions may also arise between the principle of voluntariness and the 
police’s capacity for coercion. Even when the police achieve compliance through 
negotiation, their persuasion tactics can be aggressive and reinforced by more or 
less explicit threats of force (Dick, 2005; Walgrave, 2015). Thus, police officers 
may (intentionally or unintentionally) put pressure on one or both parties as a 
result of engaging in ‘habitual actions’ (Chan, 1996). Officers may even be 
incentivised to coerce participation, if they perceive that RJ can be used to 
achieve a personal or institutional goal (such as obtaining compensation for 
victims, or closing cases quickly). This incentive may be especially prominent in 
the small number of forces where all informal resolutions must be conducted 
restoratively (Stockdale, 2015b). As noted in Chapter 2, the low visibility in which 
policework (including RJ) takes place, means that there is little to prevent police 
officers from manipulating or pressuring any party to admit responsibility or guilt, 
to agree to a disposal, to participate in RJ, or to accept certain outcomes (Reiner, 
2010; Padfield, et al., 2012; Laxminarayan, 2014). 
Whether or not the police apply pressure, and whether or not the parties 
feel pressure, are ultimately empirical questions, and studies on police-led RJ 
have varied in their findings on these subjects. In Northern Ireland, for example, 
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a significant minority of victims and offenders reportedly felt coerced into 
participating in police-led RJ (O’Mahony and Doak, 2004). In North America, 
figures for perceptions of voluntariness among offenders stood at around 67% 
and 71% in two of eight pilot areas, although they were higher than 85% in four 
others, and close to 100% in one (McCold, 1998). Victim-perceived voluntariness 
was measured at 96% in the Bethlehem police experiment (McCold, 1998) and 
at 90% in Thames Valley, although only 24% of offenders in the latter felt that 
they had been given an entirely free choice to participate (Hoyle, et al., 2002).  
More recently, English studies by Meadows, et al. (2012), Walters (2014) 
and Cutress (2015) found either that many victims (around half in Walters’ 
research) felt pressured into participating, or that some officers decided to use 
RJ before or without consulting the victim. The Association of Convenience 
Stores similarly reported that their members ‘often report that police attempt to 
use RJ without consent of the retailer’ (2016: 2). Another study found that, in eight 
out of 66 cases, the police used RJ even though ‘the victim had not consented or 
had refused to co-operate’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012: 28).  
That these studies mostly examined street RJ is significant, as many cases 
did not involve dialogue between the parties, reducing the risk that the victim 
might be confronted with an offender who was not participating voluntarily. 
Nonetheless, victims may still have been pressured into accepting outcomes 
which they did not want, while suspects may have been coerced into accepting 
responsibility for offences which they did not commit or for which they had a legal 
defence. Therefore, the issues relating to coercion in street RJ are at least as 
significant as for other OOCDs (Bui, 2015). That these issues are especially 
prominent with respect to Penalty Notices for Disorder, which take place on the 
street, may not bode well for adherence to the principle of voluntariness within 
street RJ (Kraina and Carroll, 2006; Morgan, 2009; Gilling, 2010). 
Even in cases where consent is obtained without overt or unintentional 
pressure, participants may not be well informed of their rights or of the nature of 
the process. Hoyle, et al. (2002) and Parker (2013) found that some offenders 
believed their participation to be mandatory because the police had failed to 
emphasise the voluntary nature of the process. This is consistent with 
observations that the police often explain suspects’ rights quickly or in an 
incomplete way, without checking for understanding (Bucke and Brown, 1997); 
McConville, et al. (1991) noted that this is a technique which the police use to 
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expedite case processing. Similarly, the police might be incentivised not to 
explain the voluntary nature of the RJ process, if they wish to encourage the 
parties to agree quickly to an informal resolution.  
The quality of the information provided by officers may vary in other ways. 
Some officers neglect to describe all of the available types of RJ and other 
disposal options to prospective participants, meaning that the parties do not have 
all the necessary information when they make their decisions (Meadows, et al., 
2012; Cutress, 2015; Justice Committee, 2016). Equally, some officers may elect 
to undertake little or no preparation before dialogic practices (Hoyle, et al., 2002; 
Meadows, et al., 2012; Gavrielides, 2013; Strang, et al., 2013). This may reduce 
the likelihood that the parties are fully aware of what the process entails and what 
is expected of them (Daly, 2003), and may potentially increase the chances of 
one party being psychologically unprepared to engage (Schmid, 2001). It also 
means that officers have fewer opportunities to manage participants’ 
expectations, to identify potential risks, and to assess the likely dynamics of any 
meeting (Van Ness and Schiff, 2001; Miers, 2004; Van Camp, 2015).  
Some authors have questioned whether voluntariness is always strictly 
necessary in RJ. Newburn, et al. (2002) found that, despite offenders being 
required to participate in Youth Offender Panels, successful conferencing could 
still take place. Gavrielides (2007) observed a tendency to overestimate the 
likelihood that victims might be revictimised by reluctant offenders. Others have 
argued that offenders have a moral obligation to repair the harm they caused, 
and thus ‘may be required to accept their obligations if they do not do so 
voluntarily’ (Zehr and Mika, 1998: 51). The latter attitude in particular may 
proliferate as RJ is increasingly framed as a service for victims.  
The principle of voluntariness is ridden with complications which, like the 
related notion of free will, means that it cannot be measured in binary terms 
(Zernova, 2007). The officer’s position of authority and the design of the legal 
system may create an unavoidable, underlying threat of coercion, irrespective of 
the facilitator’s behaviour. Still, it seems reasonable to conclude that facilitators 
have a role to play in ensuring that participation and outcomes are agreed to as 
freely as possible, and that participants are fully informed before they decide to 
engage – especially if they are to meet as part of the process. 
 
 
64 
 
3.4.2 Stakeholder participation in dialogue 
 
In theory, RJ is supposed to enable participants to engage in ‘harm-focused’ 
discussions pertaining to the nature, causes and impact of the offence (Zinsstag, 
et al., 2011). This gives participants the opportunity to ‘tell their side of the story’ 
and to express how the incident has impacted them (Chapman, 2012). Moreover, 
this dialogue should be delivered in a way which is procedurally fair: the facilitator 
must be seen to be impartial, ensuring that participants are treated equally and 
respectfully (Braithwaite, 2002; Crawford, 2010). 
This form of active participation is central to the concept of stakeholder 
empowerment in RJ theory and practice, as described in Section 1.2. Dialogue 
enables the parties ‘to speak in their own voice, rather than through legal 
mouthpieces’ and to ‘reveal whatever sense of injustice they wish to see repaired’ 
(Braithwaite, 2002: 566-9). This may increase the likelihood that the parties 
experience the process as procedurally fair and legitimate (Tyler, 2006, 2006b). 
For victims, the ability to express their feelings is linked to high levels of 
satisfaction and perceptions of fair treatment (McCold and Wachtel, 2002; 
Shapland, et al., 2011); for offenders, the sense of being listened to and treated 
fairly can enhance the legitimacy of the system and the process in their eyes, and 
thus encourage self-regulation and compliance with outcomes and with the law 
(Crawford and Newburn, 2003; Tyler, 2006, 2006b; Crawford, 2010).  
Research tends to support the use of dialogic (particularly face-to-face) 
models of RJ (Shapland, et al., 2011; Strang, et al., 2013; Sherman, et al., 2015; 
Bouffard, et al., 2017). Some have found that victim satisfaction with RJ is linked 
to the desire to be active in responding to one’s own victimisation (Van Camp and 
Wemmers, 2013; Hagemann, 2015). Beven et al. (2005) reported that dialogue 
is more important to victims than tangible outcomes. Even when the exchanges 
themselves are not positive, both parties can be satisfied with their participation 
(Daly, 2001). Other studies also indicated a relationship between participation in 
dialogue, levels of victim and offender satisfaction, and perceptions of fair 
treatment (McCold and Wachtel, 2002; Strang, 2002; Poulson, 2003; Daly, 2006; 
Shapland, et al., 2011). Furthermore, emotional expression may be cathartic for 
victims, while the ability to ‘get answers’ and to speak directly to the offender may 
enable them to ‘move on’ from the incident (Daly, 2006; Strang, et al., 2006) and 
reduce post-traumatic stress symptoms (Angel, et al., 2006, 2014). For offenders, 
65 
 
hearing the impact of their actions may motivate them to apologise and even to 
desist from offending (Robinson and Shapland, 2008; Crawford, 2010; Lauwaert 
and Aertsen, 2015).  
It is significant, therefore, that victims are often precluded from participating 
in police-led RJ. When facilitating RJ, the police must decide whom to invite to 
participate, and what role each person should play. However, the pressure to be 
efficient and to operate according to the parameters of the criminal law, may 
disincentivise officers from inviting a wide range of stakeholders, enabling 
dialogue between the parties, or deviating from the presumption of a victim-
offender dichotomy (O’Mahony and Doak, 2017). 
There is evidence to suggest that police-led RJ seldom enables victims and 
offenders to communicate. For example, restorative cautioning programmes 
usually do not require officers to invite the victim to participate at all (Moore and 
O’Connell, 1994; Hoyle, et al., 2002; O’Mahony and Doak, 2013). Consequently, 
victims were not involved in most restorative cautions during pilots in Northern 
Ireland, although surrogate victims were used in shoplifting cases at one site 
(O’Mahony, et al., 2002). Similarly, victims participated in one seventh of the 
cautions which were recorded as ‘restorative’ in Thames Valley (Hoyle, et al., 
2002). In both areas, it was assumed that practices could still be ‘carried out using 
the restorative philosophy’ (O’Mahony and Doak, 2013: 139) without victim 
involvement, if the police used reintegrative shaming techniques to encourage 
the offender to understand their impact on the victim. 
A different logic has precluded dialogue in England in recent years, as street 
RJ has replaced restorative cautioning as the most common form of restorative 
policing. In theory, virtually all victims are now supposed to be at least offered 
information about RJ. This right is contained within the Victims’ Code (Ministry of 
Justice, 2015) which was updated in 2015 to reflect the EU’s Victims’ Directive 
(Hoyle and Rosenblatt, 2016). While stopping short of codifying a right to access 
RJ, it creates a specific, ‘unequivocal’ (Shapland, et al., 2017: 69) obligation on 
the police either to inform victims about RJ, or to provide another service provider 
with the victim’s details. It states that: 
 
The police must pass the victim’s contact details to the organisation that is 
to deliver Restorative Justice services for victims to enable the victim to 
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participate in Restorative Justice, unless asked not to do so by the victim. 
(Ministry of Justice, 2015: 54) 
 
However, recent reports indicate that the police’s obligations under the Victims’ 
Code are rarely adhered to in practice (Justice Committee, 2016; Shapland, et 
al., 2017). Like other obligations which the police have towards victims, it conflicts 
with incentves and pressures to process cases quickly. Consequently, the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales reported that, in the twelve months to March 2016, 
only 4.2% of victims with known offenders recalled being offered the chance to 
meet them – down from 7.2% a year earlier (ONS, 2016). 
Research suggests that the police remain much more likely to use quick, 
informal and non-dialogic resolutions under the guise of RJ. In one study, only 
one of 14 cases involved direct dialogue (Walters, 2014). Other studies have also 
found that street RJ made up the overwhelming majority of police-led RJ, and 
that the parties were usually not enabled to speak (Meadows, et al., 2012; 
Cutress, 2015; Shapland, et al., 2017). From a sample of almost 1200 records of 
community resolution-level RJ from 12 forces, Westmarland, et al. (2017) found 
that around 76% were at Level 1, and that even some cases which were recorded 
as Level 2 did not involve dialogue. 
Furthermore, in most practices observed by Cutress (2015: 143), ‘there 
would be no direct contact or discussion between victim and offender […] the 
officer would act as a go-between or shuttle’, primarily for the purpose of agreeing 
a settlement. She also found that if ‘the victim did not wish to participate, officers 
believed that this was a minor detail, and they could further proceed in the 
delivery of RJ without the victim’s presence’ (Cutress, 2015: 172-3). In her study, 
the police often coerced participants in street RJ to accept (usually symbolic) 
reparation as ‘a “quick fix” solution’ (2015: 175). Officers’ belief that this negated 
the need for dialogic approaches or relational outcomes, reflects the police’s 
cultural biases towards quick, pragmatic approaches. Overall, if ‘restorativeness 
[is] a function of victim participation’ (Bazemore and Elis, 2007: 400), then 
restorative cautions and street RJ may seldom qualify as such. 
In many cases, indirect stakeholders – collectively termed ‘the community’ 
– are also excluded from police-led processes. In this context, ‘the community’ 
can be defined in various ways. Van Ness takes a broad approach, including any 
‘non-governmental actors who respond to crime, to victims and to offenders.’ 
67 
 
(2002: 138). Others define it geographically (as a place) or socially (as a network), 
or refer to the ‘community of care’, meaning ‘anyone who feels connected, either 
directly or indirectly, to the persons involved in the crime or the event itself’ (Schiff, 
2007: 235). In practice, ‘the community’ can include neighbours, family members 
or other persons local to the offence or known to the offender or victim. It can also 
include relevant professionals (such as teachers, social workers, police officers 
or drug workers) or volunteers who represent the ‘wider’ community (Rosenblatt, 
2015; Rossner and Bruce, 2016). 
Some theorists argue that ‘community’ inclusion in RJ is critical. For 
example, Dzur and Olson (2004) stated that these persons can help reintegrate 
offenders (see also McKeown, 2000; Van Pagée, 2014), sympathise with victims, 
and communicate disapproval more effectively than professionals. Rossner and 
Bruce (2016) suggested that there is a symbolic significance to their participation, 
in that it legitimises the process and reduces the state’s control. However, 
Rosenblatt (2014, 2015) argued that many of these assertions have not been 
empirically verified, and that they ‘largely overlook the limitations upon realising 
community involvement on the ground’ (Rosenblatt, 2014: 285). Similarly, 
Crawford (1997, 2002) argued that ‘the community’ is not necessarily benevolent 
(either in terms of its intent, or how it may be experienced), and that theoreticians 
tend to overemphasise its coherence and reintegrative capacities. 
Still, there is some evidence to support the involvement of certain indirect 
stakeholders. McCold and Wachtel (2002) found that the presence of families 
and friends was associated with an increase in victims and offenders rating RJ 
as satisfying and fair. Crawford and Newburn (2003) found that the involvement 
of community volunteers could increase the emotion involved in the process, 
while reducing the influence of managerialist pressures (see also Crawford, 
2006). Finally, Rossner and Bruce (2016) observed that community members can 
contribute ideas, elicit information from the parties, and build social capital with 
the offender, though they can also threaten the process by being aggressive or 
making the conversation about themselves. 
Some models of RJ are designed to involve members of the community, 
either as core participants (e.g. family group conferencing in New Zealand), as 
community representatives (e.g. Youth Offender Panels in England), or as 
facilitators (e.g. some English RJ Hubs and Norwegian practices) (Weitekamp, 
2010; Dünkel, et al., 2015: Rosenblatt, 2015; ICPR, 2016). Most restorative 
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cautions and street RJ processes, however, tend to involve only one or both the 
victim and offender (Young, 2000; Meadows, et al., 2012; O’Mahony and Doak, 
2013; Cutress, 2015), although some studies of these practices found that 
supporters of victims or offenders participated relatively frequently (Hoyle, et al., 
2002). In one restorative cautioning project, police facilitators were encouraged 
to discuss indirect harms which the offence might have caused to persons who 
were not present (Young, 2000). Indeed, it seems that police facilitators usually 
act, whether intentionally or not, to represent both the community (in all its forms) 
and the public interest (Vynckier, 2009). Even in Durham (which, as later chapters 
show, took an unusually holistic approach to implementing RJ), Stockdale noticed 
a general ‘lack of importance placed on the role of community’ (2015b: 98). 
Overall, the evidence suggests that contemporary police-led practices neglect to 
involve this stakeholder group. 
Even in cases which do involve dialogue between various stakeholders, 
there is evidence that police facilitators may disempower participants by 
dominating, acting in a partial manner or otherwise failing to treat the parties 
equally and with respect. Braithwaite (2002) argues that domination by the 
facilitator or by another party can be damaging to the RJ process. Yet, the many 
cases which do not involve dialogue between the parties are inherently police 
dominated. Many restorative cautions (Hoyle, et al., 2002) and street RJ 
processes (Cutress, 2015) were found to involve the officer speaking 
independently to the offender (and, in some cases, to the victim) without 
necessarily giving either party a chance to express themselves or provide input 
into outcome decisions. It follows that these practices are less likely to be 
experienced as empowering than practices in which victims and offenders could 
speak directly and resolve cases collectively. 
Police officers have also been found to dominate the dialogic practices 
which they deliver. Some officers exercised their discretion to determine the 
extent and nature of their interventions, to treat restorative cautions as an 
opportunity to ‘pursue their own deterrent agenda or sideline the interests of the 
victim’ (Hoyle, et al., 2002: 17). Similarly, Kenney and Clairmont found that police 
facilitators may dominate discussions in cases where they feel the need to ‘draw 
out uncooperative offenders’ (2009: 299). This may be problematic, as Shapland, 
et al. found that practices ‘which emphasise non-verbal encouragement by the 
facilitator [and] discourage over-dominance or talkativeness by facilitators’ (2011: 
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122) are most likely to be effective. Other studies found that participant 
satisfaction levels were negatively correlated with facilitator domination (Hoyle, 
et al., 2002; Daly, 2003). While facilitators may need to intervene in conversations 
‘if the process becomes physically or emotionally dangerous for anyone’ (Van 
Ness and Strong, 2013: 90), the evidence suggests that some of the police’s 
interventions may exceed this limited requirement. 
The final issue with stakeholder participation in dialogue relates to the way 
each party is treated. Authors have differently operationalised the need for 
facilitators to avoid demonstrating bias and treat participants equally and fairly. 
Vanfraechem (2009), for one, argued that facilitators should be ‘neutral’, but that 
this may be impossible for police officers. Mackay, in contrast, said that facilitators 
need only be ‘impartial’, defining this as ‘not taking sides on the basis of irrelevant 
criteria’ (2006: 207). Braithwaite (2002) stated that facilitators must show equal 
concern for each party’s needs, while Karp argued that facilitators’ interest in 
achieving just outcomes makes them ‘multipartial’: they should ‘actively support 
all participants without preference or taking sides’ (2015: 54).  
That facilitators are perceived to be unbiased is important for participants’ 
perceptions of procedural fairness, which may relate as much to perceptions of 
respect and bias as it does to their opportunity to express themselves (Van Camp, 
2015). Some suggest that there is a relationship between compliance with the 
law and the perception that legal authorities act fairly and respectfully (Tyler, 
2006, 2006b; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Additionally, Rossner found that 
‘situational dynamics’ (2013: 7-8) are the best predictors of the perceived success 
of a restorative encounter, underlying the importance of participant treatment by 
facilitators (see also Presser and Van Voorhis, 2002). 
Yet, the low visibility of RJ means that facilitators have considerable 
discretion regarding their language and behaviour. For example, they can 
participate in or allow degrading treatment, which may affect whether processes 
and outcomes are experienced as fair (Sherman, et al., 1998; Hoyle, et al., 2002; 
Tyler, et al., 2007). Although conference scripts are typically designed to include 
non-judgemental language, police facilitators may deviate from the script and use 
investigative questioning, or pejorative, disparaging or otherwise disrespectful 
language against one or both parties (Young, 2001; Hoyle, et al., 2002; Walters, 
2014). Gray (2005) found that some officers use their facilitation role to focus on 
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blaming or shaming offenders in ways which might be experienced as degrading 
(see also Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994). 
Many factors can affect an officer’s ability to be (and to be seen as) impartial. 
For one, the ability to demonstrate impartiality is a skill which may not be shared 
by all officers. Given that restorative policing often involves virtually all officers 
within a force facilitating RJ in some form (e.g. Hoyle, et al., 2002; Meadows, et 
al., 2012; Cutress, 2015; Stockdale, 2015b), the police’s cultural and attitudinal 
traits described in Chapter 2 may be reflected in their practices. For example, 
some officers may be perceptibly prejudiced against persons of certain races or 
belonging to certain social groups, victims with certain types of complaints, or 
offenders in general. Again, the positioning of RJ as a victims’ service may mean 
that offenders are not seen as unworthy of having their needs met, or used 
instrumentally to achieve victim satisfaction. Some officers may also develop and 
demonstrate biases against participants – whether victim or offenders – with 
whom they have interacted previously as suspects or complainants. Equally, 
officers may be differently able to empathise with victims. Myers (2011: 411) 
argued that ‘most officers are simply not trained to understand the views of the 
victim on a moral plane, on an emotional level or in terms of [an offence’s] ongoing 
consequences’. (see also Hill, 2002; Hall, 2009). 
In addition, some offenders may enter into police-led RJ assuming that they 
will be treated unfairly, based on either their previous experiences of interacting 
with the police, their attitudes towards the police, or their presumptions relating 
to how the police will see and treat them (Bowling and Phillips, 2002; Reiner, 
2010). This might make it difficult for the police to facilitate without their behaviour 
being perceived to reflect a bias. In contrast, some victims have expressed feeling 
secure because of the police’s presence in RJ (Armstrong, 2014), illustrating one 
possible tension between participants’ needs and experiences. 
Finally, the police’s (im)partiality extends also to their own interest in the 
cases they deliver. Van Pagée argued that facilitators ‘should not have any 
interest in the result [of the practice]. […] This possibility undermines the family’s 
faith in reaching an honest and adequate decision’ (2014: 3). In practice, 
however, officers deliver RJ in cases which they investigate and with participants 
whom they already know through their work; their facilitation decisions may also 
be informed by organisational pressures (Crawford, 2006; Vanfraechem, 2009). 
In turn, participants may discern the prioritisation of the police’s needs and 
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agendas above their own. For Parker (2013: 142), the question is whether officers 
can ‘“switch hats” from law enforcer to neutral mediator’. This, she argued, might 
be particularly difficult in street RJ, in which there may be little time between the 
officer arriving at the scene and delivering RJ in some form.  
Empirical findings on this question are mixed. One study ascertained that 
perceptions of legitimacy among participants in volunteer-led RJ practices, were 
strongly linked to the independence of the process from the police (Turley, et al., 
2014). Others, meanwhile, have found that the majority of participants in police-
led RJ believed that their facilitators were impartial and that the process was 
conducted fairly (McCold and Wachtel, 1998; Sherman, et al., 1998; Hoyle, et al., 
2002; Larsen, 2014). Studies by Shapland, et al. (2011) and Hipple and McGarrell 
(2008) found no significant differences between victims’ and offenders’ views of 
police and non-police facilitators. What these data represent is not entirely clear. 
It may be that some stakeholders appreciated the chance to participate and gave 
positive reports of practices which were not objectively procedurally fair, or that 
police facilitators used the guise of a fair process to manipulate participants into 
agreeing with officers’ preferred outcomes (Richards, 2011). Alternatively, it may 
be that many officers were able to deliver the process fairly. Thus, questions 
remain regarding the circumstances under which police officers can be – and can 
be perceived to be – fair and impartial when delivering RJ processes. 
 
 
3.4.3 Stakeholder participation in outcome determination 
 
RJ is also intended to empower stakeholders by enabling their participation 
in outcome decisions (Barton, 2000, 2003; Aertsen, et al., 2011; Richards, 2011). 
It contrasts with court and other state-led processes by changing the ‘role of the 
citizen, from service recipient to decision-maker’ (Bazemore, 1998: 334). 
‘Facilitators’, noted Van Ness and Strong, ‘do not decide what will happen. [They] 
create a safe environment in which the parties can make their own decisions.’ 
(2013: 90). Similarly, restorative policing is said to ‘provide at the case level a 
decision-making role for citizens in informal sanctioning’ (Bazemore and Griffiths, 
2003: 337). That facilitation requires the police to devolve control to participants 
over decision-making, is one of the central tensions in restorative policing. While 
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it exists in almost any situation where RJ is delivered by state agencies (Wachtel, 
2014), it may be particularly acute in this context as the police often prefer to 
exercise their authority and powers to achieve police-defined objectives, rather 
than to relinquish their control (Choongh, 1998; Bowling and Phillips, 2007). As 
D’Enbeau and Kunkel (2013) argued, organisational efforts to empower citizens 
may be resisted by practitioners, as this tends to undermine their own agency to 
use professional judgement and achieve other measured goals. 
Stakeholder involvement in decision-making is rationalised on the grounds of 
procedural fairness and responsiveness. Regarding the former, some say that 
participants may be more likely to comply and to be satisfied with outcomes, and 
to see them as legitimate, if they feel that they are enabled to participate in the 
process through which they are determined (Sherman, 1993; Bottoms, 2003; 
Tyler, 2006; Crawford, 2010). As previously, this requires the process to be seen 
by each party as fair and respectful. Regarding responsiveness, outcomes which 
are determined by professionals might reflect their own rationales and priorities, 
or those of the organisation for which they work (Crawford, 2006). Outcomes may 
be more likely to reflect the parties’ needs, if they are afforded input into in the 
process by which outcomes are determined (Braithwaite, 2002b; Schiff, 2007). 
Research suggests, however, that outcome determination processes in 
police-led RJ may often be dominated by officers. Studies have found that the 
police often dominate or intervene in decision-making processes in order to 
pursue their own agendas. This may result in reparative or punitive outcomes 
being imposed on participants, as officers aim to deter or punish the offender, or 
to resolve cases quickly (Hoyle, et al., 2002; Matthews, 2006; Cutress, 2015). As 
Section 3.3 explained, ACPO’s guidelines (2011) implicitly enable the police to 
exclude the offender and victim from the decision-making process. They state 
that outcomes ‘might’ include provisions which are ‘requested by the victim’ 
before being ‘agreed by the offender’, and that outcomes must be ‘considered 
appropriate by the facilitator’ (2011: 7). This authorises officers to select or reject 
outcomes without consulting the parties, or otherwise to dominate, influence, or 
exclude victims or offenders from the decision-making process.  
Recent studies suggest that, when delivering street RJ, police facilitators 
often exercise their discretion to impose outcomes (Walters, 2014; Cutress, 
2015). This can have repercussions for both parties. Firstly, outcomes may be 
imposed which the parties do not necessarily need or want, as they accept 
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suggestions or fail to challenge impositions because of the police’s authoritative 
position (Zinsstag, et al., 2011). Some argue that facilitators should avoid making 
suggestions altogether to avoid this possibility (e.g. Zellerer, 2016). Secondly, 
officers might prioritise generic, punitive or reparative outcomes over relational, 
creative or personalised approaches (Jones and Creaney, 2015; Hoyle and 
Rosenblatt, 2016). Thirdly, domination by the officer could result in up-tariffing or 
disproportionate or punitive agreements, particularly if they elected to side with 
punitively-minded victims against the offender (O’Mahony and Doak, 2004). 
Although legal safeguards could limit the severity of outcomes (von Hirsch, et al., 
2003), low visibility might mean that limits are difficult to enforce, as with other 
legal requirements in relation to OOCDs (Padfield, et al., 2012). 
Ultimately, the facilitation role provides the police with significant powers to 
‘judge and punish without legal safeguards’ (Hoyle, et al., 2002: 63). At least in 
theory, court sentencing is transparent and impartial, preventing excessive, 
inconsistent or prejudicial outcomes (Ashworth, 2002; Daly, 2005; Pina-Sanchez 
and Linacre, 2016). In contrast, officers’ ability to influence or direct outcome 
decisions through RJ, places a substantial amount of control in their hands, with 
almost no transparency and few safeguards and remedies (Young, 2001). It 
enables officers to select, block, enforce or neglect to enforce outcomes, if they 
elect to exercise their discretion in these ways (Cutress, 2015). 
In theory, offenders who participate in RJ should be protected from 
excessive sanctioning in three ways. Firstly, their participation is supposed to be 
voluntary, meaning that they can withdraw from the process at any time or veto 
outcomes (Zinsstag, et al., 2011). Secondly, their dialogue with the victim may 
invoke empathy and compassion within the latter, reducing victims’ retributive 
desires (Strang, et al., 2006). Thirdly, the facilitator can play a limited role – both 
in preparation and during the event – in ensuring that outcomes are proportionate 
and realistic (Restorative Justice Council, 2011).  
As previous sections illustrated, however, offenders are often put under 
pressure or forced to participate or accept certain outcomes, while many 
practices which are ostensibly restorative do not involve direct or harm-focused 
dialogue between the parties. Offenders may have little scope to challenge or 
decline outcomes suggested by facilitators or victims, particularly if the offender 
is young or vulnerable (Newburn, et al., 2002; Rosenblatt, 2015). Moreover, 
facilitators may have different views regarding what constitutes an appropriate 
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outcome in each situation, resulting in some offenders being given more onerous 
obligations than others (Murray, 2012; Paul and Borton, 2013; Paul and Dunlop, 
2014). Thus, restorative policing could have the opposite effect intended by its 
theorists, putting offenders’ rights at risk without the harm to the victim necessarily 
being ‘repaired’ (Ashworth, 2002, 2004; Smith, 2007). As in many other areas of 
policing, the risk in restorative policing is that officers may exercise their discretion 
to pursue their own agendas and ignore safeguards. 
 
 
3.4.4 Focus on repairing harm 
 
Aside from stakeholder empowerment, RJ is characterised by its emphasis 
on repairing harm. Crime causes material, physical and psychological harm to 
individuals, damages relationships and causes fear, indignation and uncertainty 
in society (Walgrave, 2003, 2008). Yet, Anglo-American justice processes are 
said to prioritise deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and, at least in youth 
justice, rehabilitation, at the expense of helping harmed parties to recover (Zehr, 
1990; Schiff, 2007). The harm done to victims by crime may even be exacerbated 
by conventional justice processes (Christie, 1977). 
In contrast, RJ aims to determine what harm has been done and to whom, 
how that harm might be ‘repaired’, and who is morally obligated to undertake 
activities to that end (Strang, 2002; Wright, 2007, 2008). The restorative ‘lens’ 
(Zehr, 1990) requires the offender to play an active role in providing the victim 
with ‘a sense of security, dignity and control’ (Stahlkopf, 2009: 235) – that is, in 
repairing the harm caused by their actions. Consequently, advocates of RJ tend 
to suggest that its focus can either complement or provide a more constructive 
alternative to existing processes. 
By implication, the facilitator is responsible for administering the process in 
a manner which is conducive to achieving this outcome. This is difficult, 
suggested von Hirsch, et al. (2003), as ‘repairing harm’ is a vaguely formulated 
aim which specifies neither priorities, nor measures of success. They proposed 
a ‘making amends’ model of RJ which, recognising that RJ cannot ‘literally heal 
or “take back” the wrong’ (von Hirsch, et al., 2003: 26), requires offenders to 
acknowledge fault and to undertake reparation to demonstrate remorse. ACPO’s 
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guidance largely mirrors this model, stating that offenders must take responsibility 
for the offence as a condition of participation, and that the ‘RJ “outcome” should 
allow offenders to make amends for the harm caused’ (ACPO, 2011: 7) through 
assurances of future behaviour, apologies and/or other forms of reparation.  
Implicit in this approach is the idea that reparation is the best and/or most 
realistic mechanism through which harm can be repaired. Reparation can be 
direct (to the victim) or indirect (to the community), and can involve material (e.g. 
financial or physical) and symbolic (e.g. apologies) actions (Stahlkopf, 2009). 
Research suggests that police-led practices tend to result in reparative outcomes, 
with several studies finding that (usually symbolic) reparation constituted the 
primary outcome (Hoyle, et al., 2002; O’Mahony, et al., 2002; Wundersitz and 
Hunter, 2005; Cutress, 2015). In one, 62 out of 66 cases involved either symbolic 
or material reparation (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012). Meadows, et al. 
(2012) similarly found that symbolic reparation and financial reparation were the 
main outcomes in around 85% and 12% of police-led cases, respectively. This 
might reflect police pragmatism, insofar as (particularly symbolic) reparation can 
be quick and straightforward to achieve. Material reparation, meanwhile, might 
be attractive to some officers because it is a tangible way for victim to benefit at 
the direct expense of offenders. That a possible bias towards material reparation 
may exist among some officers, is supported by Shapland, et al. (2017: 72), who 
reported that many interviewees expressed an ‘undue focus on compensation or 
restitution’, especially in relation to adult offenders.  
Plausibly, less tangible outcomes (such as reconciliation) may take place in 
police-led RJ without being formally recorded, while the prevalence of symbolic 
and material reparation within RJ outcomes may be indicative of these outcomes’ 
ability to satisfy many victims’ needs (Liebmann, 2007; Gavrielides, 2017). The 
risk in the police context, however, is that street RJ may enable and encourage 
the police to understand and use reparation as a substitute for dialogue, which 
itself can play a significant role in repairing harm (Walgrave, 2015). For victims, 
the ability to express oneself, to confront and humanise the offender and to 
discover why the offence happened, can contribute to satisfaction and catharsis, 
while reducing post-traumatic stress symptoms (Angel, et al., 2006, 2014; Strang, 
et al., 2013). Van Camp (2015) found that victims may get more from the 
therapeutic effects of dialogue than from reparation, while Shapland, et al. (2007) 
suggested that the ability to ask questions during conferences was, in victims’ 
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views, one of the most important factors in ‘repairing harm’. Dialogue, argued 
Doak, provides victims with ‘emotional redress’ (2011: 439) and allows them to 
obtain symbolic reparation directly. This is important because indirect or written 
apologies may less likely be interpreted as genuine by victims, compared with 
direct, verbal apologies (Walters, 2014). Additionally, relational outcomes (such 
as reintegration and reconciliation) can contribute to repairing harm and building 
social capital, but may not be achievable without the emotional expression and 
connection which dialogue enables (Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994; Braithwaite 
and Braithwaite, 2001; Rossner, 2013). Finally, the relationship between offender 
desistance and RJ may relate partially to the encounter with the victim, which can 
provide offenders with the motivation to desist or break down their ‘techniques of 
neutralisation’ (Sykes and Matza, 1957), that is, their internal justifications for 
committing harmful or criminal acts (Robinson and Shapland, 2008; Crawford, 
2010; Lauwaert and Aertsen, 2015). 
As noted, however, street RJ typically involves the officer negotiating some 
form of reparation indirectly between the parties, in the belief that this negates the 
need for dialogue (Meadows, et al., 2012; Walters, 2014; Cutress, 2015; Shapland, 
et al., 2017). In this sense, there may be parallels with their use of negotiation and 
persuasion to ‘keep the peace’ (Banton, 1964), which are discussed further later. 
Still, the use of reparation as a ‘quick fix’ may mean that relational outcomes are 
correspondingly neglected (Cutress, 2015; Clamp and Paterson, 2017). This would 
mirror other state-led processes (such as Youth Offender Panels) which are 
ostensibly restorative, but which rarely involve dialogue and relational outcomes 
between direct stakeholders (Crawford, 2006; Rosenblatt, 2015).  
This is not to suggest that conferencing is universally applicable – indeed, it 
may have no effect, or even a negative effect, in certain cases (Strang and 
Sherman, 2015). Many of the police’s activities involve responding to very low-level 
incidents and offences committed by young people, and youth justice research 
typically supports reducing, rather than increasing, police intervention (Pitts, 2003; 
Smith, 2005; McAra and McVie, 2007). Yet, the research provides little indication 
that the police take a strategic or evidence-based approach to the (non-)utilisation 
of dialogic practices, suggesting that they may fail to maximise the effectiveness of 
their use of RJ (Strang and Sherman, 2015). In fact, the evidence presented in this 
chapter brings into question whether many police activities should be labelled 
‘restorative’ at all. If the police are simply resolving low-level cases informally and 
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indirectly through negotiated agreement, then it may be that many of their existing 
activities have been relabelled as RJ, rather than that their practices closely or 
increasingly reflect restorative principles and processes. Whether the police’s 
activities are appropriate, proportionate, fair or useful is one question; whether they 
are necessarily restorative is another question altogether. 
 
 
3.5 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter analysed various interpretations of RJ in the police context. It 
established that modern theorists have attempted to delineate new ‘restorative’ 
policing philosophies, but that governments and police forces have tended to be 
much less ambitious by comparison. It investigated English restorative policing 
policies and the empirical research on the police’s use of RJ, all of which indicated 
that RJ is often interpreted and delivered much more flexibly, and in ways which 
more closely reflect the rationales and priorities of the existing system, than its 
advocates would perhaps hope. Accordingly, the literature suggests that the 
police’s RJ policies and practices often deviate notably from justice ideals, with 
potentially deleterious implications for participants. 
Ultimately, one of the core aims of RJ – to empower citizens by enabling 
them to participate and to shape the response to offending behaviour in which 
they hold a stake – is in tension with the police institution, which concentrates 
power, control and authority in the hands of state representatives. This is why it 
is necessary to study directly the relationship between the police institution and 
how RJ is interpreted and used in that context in practice. The next chapter 
explains how the empirical research which was conducted for this thesis, sought 
to undertake this task. 
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Chapter 4 – Research design and methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: firstly, to explain, justify and reflect 
critically on the study’s underpinning assumptions and design; secondly, to 
situate, in the wider methodological literature, each of the decisions made in the 
process of planning and conducting the research. These are important tasks 
because of the need for researchers to be reflexive and to identify accurately and 
precisely the purpose, strengths and limitations of the methods they select. 
The chapter starts by restating the study’s aim and the research questions 
it seeks to address. It then summarises the ontological and epistemological 
positions on which the study is based, explaining the consequent adoption of a 
primarily qualitative strategy. Next, it outlines the reasoning behind the use of 
multiple case studies and describes the selected police forces. The following 
sections discuss access negotiation, documentary and statistical evidence 
collection, respondent sampling and interview schedule design. The chapter then 
explains why certain sources of data were omitted, rationalises the process 
through which the data were analysed, and details the management of ethical 
considerations. Finally, it offers a reflection on key aspects of the research 
process, and discusses the dissemination of the findings. 
 
 
4.2 Aim, research questions and summary of data collected 
 
As set out in Chapter 1, the aim of this research is to investigate the use of 
RJ by two English police forces. This is achieved through the collection and 
analysis of primary and secondary data, which are employed to address the 
following research questions: 
 
- How do the police explain their use of RJ? 
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- To what extent do the forces’ RJ strategies, policies and practices reflect 
the goals, rationales and priorities of the police institution? 
- What are the implications of these findings for those with a stake in the 
police’s use of RJ, and for restorative policing in general? 
 
The study took place at Durham and Gloucestershire Constabularies, two of the 
43 geographical police forces in England and Wales. It also involved the local RJ 
Hubs which could receive referrals from the police, and the local PCCs which 
funded the RJ Hubs and engaged with the police on the use of RJ in their areas. 
At the time of the research, Durham’s RJ Hub served only the Darlington area, 
and was called Darlington Neighbourhood Resolution (DNR). Its counterpart, 
Restorative Gloucestershire, served the entire force area. 
The researcher conducted 71 interviews (36 in Durham, 35 in 
Gloucestershire), including: 32 with police officers who reported facilitating RJ at 
least once in the previous twelve months; twelve with senior police leaders and 
managers with some form of direct involvement in RJ (hereinafter: police 
policymakers/managers); 20 with RJ Hub staff, volunteer facilitators and partners 
from other agencies; and seven with PCC staff with some involvement in RJ. The 
researcher also collected 94 policy documents, forms, leaflets and other relevant 
texts (42 from Durham; 52 from Gloucestershire), and descriptive statistics on the 
training and usage of RJ by the forces and RJ Hubs. The interviews were 
conducted, and most of the other data were collected, in May and June 2015 
(hereinafter: the period of data collection), although some documentary and 
statistical data were collected shortly before or after these dates.  
The decision to undertake the research in this manner was underpinned by 
a variety of assumptions, which are now explained. 
 
 
4.3 Ontology, epistemology and methodological strategy 
 
Social phenomena are produced by the interaction between structures and 
agents. These cannot easily be disentangled: existing structures combine with 
agents’ collective decisions to change or create new structures which, in turn, 
shape and constrain the decisions of agents in the future (Berger and Luckmann, 
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1991). This fusion generates, reproduces and modifies the systems and 
organisations which exist within a society, providing the framework within which 
agents exercise their discretion (Giddens, 1984). 
Henry (1983) and McConville, et al. (1991) contended that researchers who 
study the operations of justice agencies can best explore the interaction between 
structures and agents by drawing on varied epistemologies. In their view, 
researchers must combine the analysis of written rules (structuralism) with that 
of practitioners’ ability and inclination to meet formal and informal standards 
(positivism), and agents’ interpretations of policies and personal experiences of 
work (interactionism). This integrated approach enables researchers to develop 
a holistic appreciation of how practitioners experience and understand structures, 
construct meaning and make decisions in practice (McConvile, et al., 1991). 
All of these approaches are relevant, as this study aims to connect the 
organisational structures within which policework takes place, to the experiences 
and actions of those who engage in it (Mills, 2000). McBarnet (1981) and Dixon 
(1997) argued that formal rules likely play a role in structuring police behaviour. 
For example, their actions can be shaped by changes to recording requirements 
(Collier, 2001) or to other forms of monitoring (Westling and Waye, 1998; Oliver, 
2005). Additionally, the police often act according to working rules and situational 
incentives, before retrospectively reframing their actions to correspond with law, 
policy and bureaucratic requirements (McConville, et al., 1991). This means that 
it is necessary to consider both formal policies and informal norms in order fully 
to understand police behaviour (Sanders, 1977). This combined approach is 
regularly absent from RJ research which, by focusing on either policies and 
standards or practices, often neglects ‘to examine the dissonance between the 
two’ (Crawford and Newburn, 2003: 234).  
At the same time, the fact that RJ can mean ‘all things to all people’ (McCold, 
2000: 357) requires an interpretivist approach to its study. In organisational 
research, interpretivism assumes that individuals’ actions are best understood by 
studying their subjective experiences of work (DiChristina, 1995; Ferrell, 1997; 
Smith, 2000). This is apposite in police research which must consider ‘the 
perspective of those studied before stepping back to make a more detached 
assessment’ (Fielding, 2006: 277) of their actions. In the study of RJ specifically, 
Shapland, et al. (2007: 7) contended that the methods used ‘are necessarily 
interpretative: looking at what is happening, what people feel’. Other empirical 
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researchers also assert that the complexity of the interactional dynamics involved 
in restorative encounters, necessitates a focus on how they were experienced 
(Kenney and Clairmont, 2009; Rossner, 2011). 
Accordingly, this study explores both the detail of force policies and the 
experiences of various actors who were involved in restorative policing in different 
capacities. The conceptual ambiguity of RJ requires those who make, implement 
or apply policies to devise their own understanding of the subject as they put it 
into practice. As Garland (2001) noted, RJ sits among the many recent justice 
developments which do not clearly fall within a discrete ideological category. This 
can be confusing for policymakers and practitioners who attempt to interpret and 
locate RJ within their existing traditions and understandings (Boutellier, 2006). 
When a force implements RJ, senior leaders, managers and officers are required 
to engage in a hermeneutical process, in which they determine, for themselves, 
what RJ means, who it is for and what they consider to be its purpose. Their 
answers to these questions will necessarily reflect, to varying degrees, the 
organisational structures in which they work, the situational factors which 
contextualise their work and their individual values and attitudes (Murray, 2012). 
Thus, a methodological strategy which focuses on these actors’ ‘perceptions, 
feelings, and lived experiences’ (Guest, et al., 2012: 13) is appropriate for 
understanding how and why decisions pertaining to RJ are made, and assessing 
how these decisions may be affected by the institutional context. 
This study combines structuralist, positivist and interpretivist rationales into 
a methodological strategy which is primarily qualitative in nature. Qualitative 
research methods, and semi-structured interviews in particular, can be used to 
explore actors’ subjective experiences (Schutz, 1970). In practical terms, their 
flexibility and directness result in semi-structured interviews being widely used in 
organisational studies (Lawrence, 1988; Turner, 1988; Marshall and Rossman, 
1999) and in the study of criminal justice agencies and practitioners (Hogarth, 
1971; Rutherford, 1994; Innes, 2003; Crewe, et al., 2011; Hucklesby, 2011; 
Mawby and Worrall, 2011). Semi-structured interviews allow researchers to 
capture, explore and clarify ambivalence and uncertainty (Bryman, 2012), which 
is useful given the broad way that RJ is typically understood by the police and 
formulated in their policies (Stockdale, 2015, 2015b). They enable the researcher 
to study, alongside respondents, the relationship between contexts, construals 
and judgements (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Guest, et al., 2012). In this 
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study, semi-structured interviews are used to explore how and why strategies and 
policies were created, interpreted and applied in practice. From this, it is possible 
to infer the ways in which the institutional context structured and informed the 
exercising of strategic and operational discretion with respect to RJ. 
Put simply, interviews with policymakers, managers and practitioners are 
useful because these individuals have first-hand knowledge of their own work. 
Police actors who make, implement and apply RJ policies can offer a unique and 
valid insight regarding the factors which shape restorative policing. These ‘expert 
interviews’ (Froschauer and Lueger, 2009; Beyers, et al., 2014) allow researchers 
to examine the knowledge held by actors when seeking to explain a phenomenon 
with which they are intimately familiar. In addition, RJ research more often 
focuses on victims and offenders than on policymakers and practitioners (Souza 
and Dhami, 2008). Although some recent studies have consisted of interviews 
with police facilitators, policymakers, or both (Meadows, et al., 2012; Cutress, 
2015; Stockdale, 2015b; Shapland, et al., 2017), their first-hand experiences are 
still under-researched. This is a burgeoning field to which additional contributions 
are needed, as the concept of RJ becomes increasingly popular within the police 
and other justice agencies. 
This is not to say that interviews can necessarily discover ‘the truth’. They 
require inferences to be made from patterns which may be coincidental, or from 
justifications and intentions which may in fact have been retrospectively imposed 
on behaviours. There may be a gap between how decisions and actions are 
described, and what actually happened and why. Respondents may provide 
different answers depending on their moods and recent experiences (Berg, 
2009), or had they been asked the questions differently (Cresswell, 2007) or 
through different methods (Presser and Blair, 1994). They may unintentionally 
make inaccurate remarks if they cannot remember exact details, confuse different 
cases, or report their own assumptions regarding the motivations of others. 
Equally, respondents may be motivated to distort the truth, neglecting to describe 
accurately situations which reflect a mistake or skills deficit on their part, in which 
they deviate from organisational policies or norms, or which they fear the 
researcher might see as socially unacceptable (Sapsford, 2007). For example, 
some respondent may omit cases where they diverted repeat offenders, which 
they may perceive to be a politically sensitive decision. 
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Some researchers (e.g. Bayley and Bittner, 1984) are dismissive of police 
anecdotes on the basis that they reflect mythology, rather than reality. Yet, while 
expressed beliefs and reported actions may not always be entirely accurate, self-
narratives can be useful predictors of behaviour (Maruna, 2001). Furthermore, 
Shearing and Ericson (1991) exhorted researchers to take the police’s accounts 
seriously, as they can be used to understand the principles which underpin their 
decisions. As Lipsky (2010) noted, the police are among the frontline practitioners 
whose behaviour is self-reinforcing, as their cognitive processes are moulded by 
their previous experiences into new heuristics. Thus, the reasoning implicit in 
police ‘stories’ may reflect both their views on what is important and legitimate, 
and provide some indication as to their past and future actions (Shearing and 
Ericson, 1991; Reiner, 2010). In the context of this debate, the following sections 
describe the processes by which the data were collected. 
 
 
4.4 Research design and data generation 
 
This section explains and justifies the empirical research design. It begins 
by considering the benefits and limitations of using multiple case studies in 
organisational research and describing the selected cases. It then discusses the 
processes by which access was requested and secondary data were collected, 
before outlining the samples of respondents and their characteristics, explaining 
the interview schedule design and addressing the omission of other data sources. 
 
 
4.4.1 Using and selecting multiple case studies 
 
The case study approach is commonly adopted in organisational research 
(Crompton and Jones, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 1990). This is for two main 
reasons: firstly, it is conducive to the collection of rich and detailed data regarding 
an organisation’s operations (Berg, 2009); secondly, it enables the researcher to 
identify activities or perceptions which are especially prevalent within a given 
organisation, and which may pertain to the specific object of the study (Thomas, 
2011; Yin, 2014). The use of multiple case studies, moreover, allows the 
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researcher to assess the significance of any likenesses and differences between 
similar organisations, and to consider the influence of local contexts (Dion, 1998). 
For example, the study of multiple courts by Ostrom, et al. (2007) allowed them 
to observe an association between court efficiency and staff relationships. In the 
current study, the investigation of two forces allowed the researcher to connect 
different strategies to leadership priorities. 
Multiple case study methods are commonly used to research localised 
justice agencies, whose policies, cultures and operations often differ across a 
jurisdiction (Barton, 2003b; Maxfield and Babbie, 2014). They are appropriate in 
restorative policing because force leaders have discretion to set local strategies 
and policies on the subject (Home Office, 2013). The use of multiple case studies 
enables researchers to ‘zoom in’ on specific areas to see how national 
frameworks are interpreted and applied locally, and to identify the possible 
causes and consequences of similarities and differences between areas. For 
example, the motivations to enact RJ may differ between forces (Clamp and 
Paterson, 2017), while, as Chapter 2 explained, different force cultures may be 
more or less favourable to its different forms. 
The primary limitation of this approach relates to the generalisability of its 
findings (Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2014). First of all, the English police differ from their 
equivalents in other countries. In England, police officers tend to have much more 
discretion to divert cases and to use RJ without prosecutorial approval, than in 
civil law jurisdictions (Moor, et al., 2009). Secondly, Durham and Gloucestershire 
Constabularies are not necessarily representative of all English forces. They are 
geographically large and rural with low population densities. Consequently, 
compared to larger, metropolitan forces, they likely have different organisational 
cultures and crime problems, maintain different relationships with the 
communities they serve, and use informal resolutions and diversion in different 
ways and for different purposes (Jones and Levi, 1983; Carrington and 
Schulenberg, 2003). Forces also differ with respect to their inclination towards 
innovation, and in relation to the impact of austerity in recent years (HMIC, 2011, 
2012; National Audit Office, 2015). These factors might influence the likelihood 
that RJ is adopted, or the motivations behind certain approaches to its use. 
Yet, there are also important similarities in the cultures, pressures and crime 
problems in different areas. Police forces across England have the same 
fundamental role, and are subject to the same national policies and legal 
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constraints (Reiner, 2010). Questions relating to when to divert young or low-level 
offenders and how to deal effectively with neighbourhood conflicts and other non-
crime, high-volume issues, are applicable throughout England and in similar 
jurisdictions (Shapland, 2009). More specifically, English forces are all equally in 
need of an evidence-based approach to the development and use of community 
resolutions and RJ (Neyroud and Slothower, 2015; Strang and Sherman, 2015). 
Thus, these findings will be at least partially transferrable (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985) and can help develop theories that apply across functionally equivalent 
organisations (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Policy transfer requires research findings to be 
examined, from which the extent of their applicability under different conditions 
and in different contexts might be discerned (Jones and Newburn, 2007). Much 
as research from other forces and countries informed this study, it undoubtedly 
has implications for almost any force or jurisdiction which wishes to implement or 
improve their use of RJ. Additionally, the accumulation of case studies contributes 
to the increased accuracy of future generalisation and theoretical developments 
(Bulmer, 1988). That this study includes two cases improves its robustness and 
generalisability, and enables a comparative element to the analysis. 
Durham and Gloucestershire Constabularies were selected purposively 
because their RJ programmes were relatively advanced and embedded, but 
differently organised. Preliminary conversations with managers from both areas 
suggested that all frontline officers had been trained in some form of RJ, that 
street RJ and conferencing were often used, that both forces required all 
community resolutions to be delivered ‘restoratively’, that both had a relationship 
with the local RJ Hub, and that both were engaging in experimental uses of RJ. 
While several studies have explored the period during which a police force 
implements RJ (e.g. Strang, et al., 1999; Hoyle, et al., 2002; O’Mahony, et al., 
2002; Rix, et al., 2011; Meadows, et al., 2012; Stockdale, 2015, 2015b), fewer 
have examined forces where RJ is more entrenched (Cutress, 2015). Stockdale 
(2015b) showed that Durham’s RJ project was remarkable, with hundreds of 
officers trained in conferencing, and all other staff trained in RJ principles. 
Conversations with managers in Gloucestershire suggested that it was a suitable 
comparator because it had invested substantially in RJ, but approached it 
differently than Durham. As a result, both forces were ‘critical cases’, in the sense 
that they had ‘strategic importance in relation to the general problem’ (Flyvbjerg, 
2006: 229) which was being examined by this study. 
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Durham and Gloucestershire were also suitable cases because, at the time 
that the research began, the most recent studies on restorative policing in 
England were from larger, urban areas (Meadows, et al., 2012; Parker, 2013). 
Other studies in smaller, rural forces were ongoing, including one in Devon and 
Cornwall (Walters, 2014) and the aforementioned study of the implementation 
process in Durham (Stockdale, 2015b). The restorative field should be especially 
interested in the development of RJ in rural forces, which may be more amenable 
to innovation and likely to utilise community policing and diversion, compared with 
urban forces (Wilson, 1968; Carrington and Schulenberg, 2003). 
Finally, these forces were also selected for pragmatic reasons. Preliminary 
conversations suggested that, in both areas, there was a willingness to engage 
with researchers, that high-quality access was achievable, and that any learning 
which emerged from the research might be heeded. A third site was also formally 
contacted and expressed an interest in participating. However, an ongoing 
restructuring of that force created delays which precluded its participation. 
Table 4.1 illustrates the forces’ comparability in terms of size. According to 
HMIC (2016), in 2014/15, Durham was the 14th largest out of 43 forces in terms 
of police officers per 1000 population, while Gloucestershire ranked 18th. In terms 
of PCSOs per 1000 population, Durham and Gloucestershire ranked 12th and 
27th, respectively, suggesting a higher reliance on PCSOs in the former. 
 
 Durham Gloucestershire 
Population served 
(2011 Census) 
513,242 596,984 
 
March 
2015 
March 
2010 
% 
reduction 
March 
2015 
March 
2010 
% 
reduction  
# Police officers 1131 1486 23.9 1123 1291 13.0 
# PCSOs 157 175 10.3 128 148 13.5 
# Police staff 731 881 17.0 582 729 20.2 
# Special Constables 110 n/a n/a 115 n/a n/a 
Table 4.1: Comparison of the forces' personnel (Home Office, 2017) 
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These figures show that the forces served broadly comparable populations, had 
similar numbers of officers (although Durham faced a greater reduction in officer 
numbers than Gloucestershire during the period of austerity) and relatively similar 
PCSO and police staff numbers, following comparable reductions. Regarding 
their budgets, the National Audit Office (2015) found that, between the 2010-11 
and 2015-16 financial years, Durham and Gloucestershire faced real-terms 
reductions of 20% and 15%, respectively, which may explain why officer numbers 
fell more in the former than in the latter. These cuts might also have informed 
both forces’ emphasis on demand management (HMIC, 2011, 2012). 
Table 4.2 shows the rates of recorded crime and ASB in the twelve months 
to December 2014 in the two areas: 
 
 Durham Gloucestershire 
Crime Rates (v. 2012) 53.70 (57.40) 48.67 (58.52) 
Ranking 21st 35th 
ASB Rates (v. 2012) 47.38 (67.57) 42.35 (47.25) 
Ranking 8th  12th  
Table 4.2: Comparison of crime and ASB rates (per 1000 population) and 
overall rankings, year to December 2014 (HMIC, 2016) 
 
These data show that recorded crime and ASB rates were higher (around five 
incidents each, per 1000 population) in Durham than in Gloucestershire. They 
also suggest that the two forces ranked among the highest in the country for 
recorded ASB per 1000 population. Both forces recorded lower rates of crime 
and ASB in 2014 than in 2012, although Gloucestershire’s reduction in crime rate 
was about twice that of Durham’s, and Durham’s ASB rate declined about four 
times more than Gloucestershire’s. Notwithstanding the possibility that the forces 
used different recording practices (Harries, 2003), they can be said to have had 
relatively similar rates of crime and ASB around the period of data collection. 
The senior leaders and PCCs in each area are discussed in Chapter 5. The 
final point to be made here relates to national assessments of each force, which 
are displayed in Table 4.3. In 2015, Durham was assessed as the best force in 
the country, being the only one to receive two out of three ‘outstanding’ marks in 
relation to its efficiency and effectiveness (only one force, Kent, received a mark 
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of ‘outstanding’ for its legitimacy). That Durham was held in such high regard by 
HMIC during the period of data collection, further justifies its selection as a case 
study for this research. Gloucestershire, in contrast, was marked as ‘good’ for its 
legitimacy and efficiency, and as ‘requiring improvement’ for its effectiveness. 
Slightly different metrics were used in the previous year’s assessment, although 
they point to a relatively similar difference between the forces.  
 
 Durham Gloucestershire 
2015 (HMIC, 2016b) 
Efficiency  Outstanding Requiring improvement 
Effectiveness  Outstanding Good 
Legitimacy Good Good 
2013/14 (HMIC, 2014b) 
Crime investigation Outstanding Requiring improvement 
Responding to ASB Outstanding Good 
Reducing crime and 
preventing reoffending 
Outstanding Good 
Efficiency Good Good 
Fairness and legitimacy ‘Most of the practices’ ‘Some of the practices’ 
Table 4.3: HMIC annual force assessments  
 
While the 2015 assessment did not mention RJ or community resolution with 
respect to either force (or, indeed, any force), Durham’s 2013/14 assessment 
stated that HMIC were: 
 
Particularly impressed with the force’s victim-centred approach and how it 
makes extensive use of outcomes other than prosecution to deliver what 
the victim wants. The use of restorative justice and community resolution is 
both widespread and innovative. […] Durham’s innovative approaches to 
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problem-solving, including the use of restorative justice, are a recurring 
theme. (HMIC, 2014b: 142) 
 
That Durham was congratulated for its use of problem-solving approaches is 
significant, as this was also among the characteristics of the police in Wagga 
Wagga which were perceived to be conducive to the implementation of RJ in that 
force (Clamp and Paterson, 2017). In Gloucestershire, however, while HMIC 
found that ‘time and resource have been invested to improve the response to 
victims and their families’, it also stated that: 
 
Victim satisfaction levels are among the lowest of all forces and there was 
limited recorded evidence of victims being informed or updated of the no-
crime disposal. (HMIC, 2014b: 148) 
 
Whether HMIC’s findings influenced the ways in which either force used RJ is not 
clear. However, as Chapter 5 illustrates, victim satisfaction was among the most 
cited motivations for using RJ by policymakers/managers in both areas.  
 
 
4.4.2 Obtaining access 
 
Contact was made with Gloucestershire Constabulary via a former 
colleague from Restorative Solutions which was consulting for Restorative 
Gloucestershire at that time. Following conversations with the force’s RJ Manager 
and the manager of Restorative Gloucestershire, an official request for 
collaboration was sent (see Appendix A). In Durham, access was requested 
through a Chief Superintendent whom the researcher met at a conference and 
who forwarded the same request for collaboration to other senior leaders. 
At no point in the process of gaining access did the researcher feel that he 
was met with suspicion, in contrast with experiences reported by some police 
researchers (Weatheritt, 1986; Fielding, 2006; Lynn and Lea, 2012). Moreover, 
the researcher was consistently honest with all parties and made a conscious 
effort to build social capital, and to create and maintain a rapport with as many 
contacts as possible in both areas. Successful rapport building and trust enabled 
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the researcher to negotiate enhanced access (i.e. to certain persons and 
documents) on an ad hoc basis during the research. However, distributed 
gatekeeping also meant that the researcher failed to access certain sources of 
data relating primarily to performance management. This experience was akin to 
that described by Fielding (2006: 281), who stated that ‘the organisational 
complexity [of modern police forces] amplifies a characteristic of fieldwork, that 
access is not negotiated once-and-for-all but continually.’  
 
 
4.4.3 Collecting documentary and statistical evidence 
 
This research involved the collection and analysis of secondary data in the 
form of policy documents and other documents and statistics relating to the use 
of RJ locally. Forty-two documents were collected from Durham and 52 from 
Gloucestershire (see Appendix B for a full list of collected documents). These 
data provided an understanding of the policy framework within which the police 
used RJ, and illustrated how RJ was interpreted and framed by policymakers. 
Descriptive statistics were also collected from the police forces and RJ Hubs, to 
evidence the number of facilitators trained and the extent to which RJ was used 
(or, at least, recorded) at each site. 
As a result of the manner of their collection, the nature of the documents 
varies considerably within and between the areas. Among the most important 
documents collected were the forces’ internal guidance on their officers’ use of 
RJ (docs. D8, 9; G28, 29), which outline some of the ways in which the forces 
attempted to structure police facilitators’ discretion. These and other documents 
were collected by making direct requests to managers and other persons from 
both forces, RJ Hubs and PCC offices to supply the researcher with any 
documents they held which related to RJ. This request was intentionally broad to 
incentivise the release of as much material as possible. Other documents, such 
as the recording form for street RJ in Gloucestershire (docs. G10, 11) and the 
facilitation scripts (docs. D32, 33, 34, 35; G49, 50) were collected during 
interviews with police officers. Others, still, were picked up within buildings (e.g. 
doc. D28, a leaflet for victims of youth crime) or downloaded from the internet 
(e.g. doc. D29, a transcript of a promotional video for RJ). Each document was 
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either used to evidence the policies of the studied organisations, or helped the 
researcher to contextualise the police’s involvement in RJ. The only document to 
which the researcher was formally denied access was an internal report on the 
use of RJ in Durham Constabulary, which was completed shortly following the 
period of data collection. However, both forces provided the researcher with 
similar internal reports from 2014 (docs. D11; G24). 
 
 
4.4.4 Conducting interviews: Sampling 
 
The study is primarily concerned with investigating the experiences of those 
who were personally involved in setting RJ strategies and policies and delivering 
RJ in practice. Consequently, the researcher requested to interview at least 15 
police facilitators from each site. This number was selected because 20 to 30 
respondents is often cited as a suitable sample for studies of this kind (Baker and 
Edwards, 2012). Guest, et al. (2006) contended that at least twelve individuals 
are required when one is studying the perceptions and experiences of relatively 
homogeneous groups. The researcher also asked to interview three persons from 
each force with experience of developing RJ strategies or policies. In addition, 
the researcher requested to interview RJ Hub staff and around five volunteer 
facilitators; at the time of the study’s design, the intention was to include a greater 
focus on the role of the RJ Hubs than has ultimately occurred.  
The only requirement for facilitator participation was to have delivered RJ at 
least once in the previous twelve months. This criterion aimed to ensure that 
participants had recent experience of delivery, and to minimise the risk that they 
would be unable to remember details of their cases (Brewer, 2000; Foddy, 2001). 
The terms ‘facilitation’ and ‘restorative justice’ were left undefined to avoid 
imposing an external definition on the sampling process, which might have 
disguised the breadth of understanding of RJ among the police.  
With respect to the qualifying populations, Restorative Gloucestershire 
reported that 13 of their volunteer facilitators had delivered one or more RJ 
processes in the previous year (email communication, RJ Hub administrator). 
Neither force, nor DNR, could provide equivalent data, meaning that the 
qualifying facilitator populations in those three organisations is unknown. 
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However, doc. G24 (dated February 2015) stated that, in Gloucestershire 
Constabulary, 227 (or 38%) of those trained to Level 1 had used it at least once, 
86 of whom had used it more than once. Similarly, doc. G26 stated that, of those 
trained to Level 2, around half had used it at least once (23/43), while 13 officers 
had used it at least five times. 
For police respondents, participant selection and interview timetabling were 
mostly administered by the police forces. In Durham, the RJ Manager sent an 
email to all frontline officers, while in Gloucestershire, the RJ Administrator sent 
one to all officers who had used RJ at least once. Both emails included the 
participation criterion and asked suitable persons to volunteer. A small number of 
participants reported having been asked directly to participate; it is not known 
how many participants volunteered and how many were asked personally. Both 
RJ Hubs emailed a request to all their facilitators to ask for interviewees. The 
researcher undertook no further sampling at this stage – all police and volunteer 
facilitators who presented themselves to the researcher having agreed to 
participate, were interviewed. 
The samples of police facilitators in both areas were likely biased by self-
selection, or selection by others. Consequently, they may not have reflected the 
makeup of the forces by role, location, length of service, gender or facilitation 
experience, inter alia. Sampling processes were not all communicated precisely 
to the researcher, and some respondents may have been selected on the basis 
that they would show the force in a positive light. In retrospect, the researcher 
should have asserted more control over sampling, or at least provided additional 
requirements relating to respondents’ roles and locations. 
Table 4.4 provides a breakdown of respondents by role and organisation: 
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 Durham Gloucestershire Totals 
Police 
facilitators 
16 ➜ 
- 9 PCSOs 
- 4 NPT PCs 
- 3 Others 
16 ➜ 
- 2 PCSOs 
- 8 NPT PCs 
- 6 Others 
32 
Lay volunteer 
facilitators 
7   4 11 
Police 
policymakers 
and managers 
6 ➜ 
- 3 senior leaders 
- 2 middle managers 
- 1 police staff 
6 ➜ 
- 4 senior leaders 
- 1 middle manager 
- 1 police staff 
12 
RJ Hub staff 3 2 5 
PCC staff 4 3 7 
Others 0 
4 ➜ 
- 3 Restorative 
Gloucestershire 
steering group 
members 
- 1 associated 
facilitator 
4 
Totals 36 35 71 
Table 4.4: Breakdown of respondents by organisation and role 
 
This table shows that 16 police facilitators from each force were interviewed. 
PCSOs were overrepresented in Durham, while Police Constables (PCs) from 
NPTs were overrepresented in Gloucestershire. This means that the two samples 
were neither representative of their organisations, nor directly comparable. These 
differences may have contributed to some of the differences in practices identified 
between the forces (see Chapters 5 and 7). That said, the proportion of males 
and females within the police facilitator samples were similar: eleven males and 
five females in Durham, and nine males and seven females in Gloucestershire. 
One police policymaker/manager from Durham, and two from Gloucestershire, 
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were female; the rest were male. Finally, two police respondents from Durham 
identified as mixed race; the other 42 police respondents all identified as white. 
More police policymakers/managers were interviewed than was planned because 
some such respondents provided the researcher with the contact details of other 
relevant persons, enabling snowball sampling to take place. That so many senior 
leaders – defined as Superintendent or higher – were interviewed (n=7) is 
perhaps one of the study’s key strengths, as it revealed a wealth of information 
about force strategies and policy decisions. 
Key staff from both RJ Hubs were interviewed and put the researcher in 
touch with their local PCC offices, enabling persons from those organisations who 
had some involvement in RJ also to be interviewed. Several lay volunteer 
facilitators from each RJ Hub were interviewed (numbering seven in Durham and 
four in Gloucestershire). Finally, three members of Restorative Gloucestershire’s 
steering group, all of whom were employed by local public services, were also 
interviewed, as was a facilitator from one of those organisations. All respondents 
described in this paragraph were white, apart from one volunteer facilitator who 
was mixed race. Among the volunteer facilitators, six were male and five were 
female. Among the remaining interviewees (those labelled ‘RJ Hub staff’, ‘PCC 
staff’ and ‘Others’), eleven were male and five were female. Such a wide-ranging 
dataset was collected because the focus of the thesis was initially broader. Still, 
even though few quotations from some of these individuals are presented in the 
analysis chapters, the data they provided were used to contextualise the analysis 
and to understand the history and operation of restorative policing in each area. 
The necessity to maintain respondents’ anonymity precludes some participants’ 
characteristics from being detailed further, and requires some interviewees to be 
grouped (e.g. the Police policymakers/managers, and ‘Other’ police officers who 
were neither PCSOs nor NPT PCs). Anonymity and other ethical issues relating 
to sampling are discussed later in the chapter. 
Finally, it is important to describe the sample in terms of interviewees’ self-
reported involvement in delivering RJ in the previous twelve months. Almost all 
interviewed facilitators reported delivering practices which they considered to 
qualify as RJ within this time period. The only exception was one officer from 
Gloucestershire who expressed uncertainty regarding whether their last case was 
within twelve months. However, many could not provide exact figures for their 
use of RJ. Some used ranges (e.g. ‘between five and ten’), approximations (e.g. 
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‘about six’), or expressed their involvement non-numerically (e.g. ‘all the time’). 
Table 4.5 attempts to collate the figures reported: 
 
 Police RJ Hubs 
Durham Gloucs. DNR 
Restorative 
Gloucs. 
Number of 
Level 1 
cases 
163-184  
+ ‘all the time’  
+ ‘regularly, but 
it depends on 
what counts’  
74-76 n/a n/a 
Number of 
Level 2 
cases 
43, inc. one 
ongoing 
40-42, inc. 2 
ongoing and 
6 ‘mediations’ 
with RJ script 
30-32 (18-20 
conferences) 
18-20 (16-18 
conferences) 
Table 4.5: RJ delivered by interviewees, previous twelve months (self-reported) 
 
These figures suggest that respondents from Durham used Level 1 RJ more often 
than those in Gloucestershire. However, one officer from Durham reported 
delivering 90 Level 1 processes in the previous year as part of a secondment. 
Excluding this respondent, officers from the two areas reported much closer 
levels of Level 1 RJ usage, although it was still higher in Durham. Respondents 
from the two areas also reported delivering similar numbers of Level 2 processes, 
although eleven out of 16 from Gloucestershire were conferencing specialists, 
relative to less than 5% in the general population in that force. This suggests that 
these data were unlikely to reflect the overall use of Level 2 RJ in Gloucestershire. 
These figures also suggest that around 20% of cases which respondents from 
Durham reported delivering in the previous year, were at Level 2; this rose to 
around 35% in Gloucestershire. No officers from either force explicitly reported 
delivering Level 3 (i.e. post-sentence) RJ. 
Difficulties in distinguishing between the ‘levels’ of RJ further complicate the 
figures: the anomalous officer from Durham stated that many of their Level 1 
cases amounted to shuttle mediation (which may qualify as Level 2), while one 
officer from Gloucestershire described six cases as mediation but using the 
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restorative script. Several officers, mostly from Durham, also reported using 
quasi-dialogic processes at Level 1 (see Chapter 7).  
Finally, with respect to range, excluding the anomalous officer in Durham, 
reported cases of Level 1 RJ delivered by each respondent in the previous year 
ranged from zero to 20 in both areas. Reported conferences, meanwhile, ranged 
from zero to ten in Durham, and zero to twelve in Gloucestershire. Thus, while 
the precise distribution of facilitation work within the forces cannot be discerned 
from these data, it seems that this work was not distributed evenly. 
 
 
4.4.5 Conducting interviews: Designing the interview schedules 
 
Four similar, qualitative, semi-structured interview schedules were designed 
(police facilitators; volunteer facilitators; police policymakers/managers; and RJ 
Hub staff) on the basis that respondents in different roles and organisations would 
be able to provide information on different aspects of the development and use 
of RJ (see Appendix C). For example, police policymakers/managers could 
discuss their experiences of setting strategies and making policies, while police 
officers could describe their experiences of delivering RJ in practice. These 
schedules were adapted on an ad hoc basis for unplanned interviews (e.g. PCC 
staff and Restorative Gloucestershire steering group members). 
The interview schedules were divided into sections, as shown in Table 4.6: 
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Police 
officers 
Lay volunteer 
facilitators 
Police 
policymakers, 
managers 
RJ Hub staff 
Section 
1 
Personal 
information 
and cases 
Personal 
information 
and cases 
Personal 
information 
and role 
Personal 
information 
and role 
Section 
2 
Meaning and 
purpose of RJ 
Meaning and 
purpose of RJ 
Meaning and 
purpose of RJ 
Meaning and 
purpose of RJ 
Section 
3 
Involvement in 
facilitation 
Involvement in 
facilitation 
RJ policy and 
strategy 
RJ policy and 
strategy 
Section 
4 
RJ and the 
force 
Models of 
delivery 
Force policies 
RJ Hub 
policies 
Section 
5 
Models of 
delivery 
n/a 
Models of 
delivery 
Models of 
delivery 
Table 4.6: Interview schedule design 
 
All interviews began with a short questionnaire in which participants were asked 
to provide personal information about themselves and their roles, including either 
the number of RJ processes they had delivered in the last year, or their role in RJ 
policymaking and implementation. All interviewees were then asked to describe 
their understanding of the meaning and purpose of RJ, before a third section 
asked them to discuss their experiences of facilitating RJ, or of setting strategies 
and making policies. Next, police facilitators were asked about their experiences 
of RJ implementation within their force (including their colleagues’ attitudes 
towards it), while policymakers/managers and Hub staff were asked to describe 
the rationales behind various strategies and policies, and their experience of 
making and implementing them. All interviews finished by asking respondents 
about their attitudes towards different models of delivery (i.e. the relative merits 
of police-led and volunteer-led RJ). RJ Hub staff and volunteers were also asked 
about their experience of working with the police at this point. 
The interview schedule for police facilitators, on which the other three 
schedules were based, was piloted with a police officer from another force who 
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met the participation criterion. The pilot used cognitive interviewing techniques 
(Belson, 1981; Tourangeau, 1984; Willis, 1999; 2004), whereby the questions 
were discussed at the same time as they were asked and answered. This helped 
to ensure that the questions were clear, not repetitive and likely to be interpreted 
as intended (D'Ardenne, 2015).  
The researcher sought to phrase questions in such a way as to minimise the 
likelihood of acquiescence bias (Watson, 1992). For example, police facilitators 
were asked: ‘Do you find it easy or difficult to communicate the voluntary nature 
of the process of participants?’, rather than a potentially more leading question 
about the importance they placed on voluntariness. This and other questions on 
restorative principles were intentionally framed to invoke a discussion of 
respondents’ practices, during which it was (correctly) assumed that respondents 
would discuss their general attitudes towards each restorative principle. Most 
other questions were designed to be more open in nature.  
Interviews ranged from around 30 minutes in length to over two hours. The 
majority lasted between 50 minutes and one hour and ten minutes. Most were 
conducted in the offices and stations used by the police forces, PCCs or RJ Hubs; 
a small number of volunteers were interviewed in their homes.  
Finally, 65 of the 71 participants were interviewed individually, while six were 
interviewed as pairs. In two cases – one from each site – volunteer facilitators 
were interviewed at the same time. In one, an interviewee ran into another 
volunteer on the way to the interview, and brought them along. In the other case, 
the researcher attended a meeting of volunteer facilitators, two of whom offered 
to undertake a joint interview as neither were able to wait. The third case involved 
a Restorative Gloucestershire steering group member and a facilitator from their 
organisation, who asked to be interviewed simultaneously. 
 
 
4.4.6 Omitted sources of data 
 
Various potential sources of data were omitted. Firstly, police actors who 
were not directly involved in RJ policymaking or implementation, or who had not 
facilitated a case in the previous twelve months, were excluded. Some of these 
persons might have been able to provide useful or different information. For 
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example, frontline officers who had not used RJ may have been able to explain 
why not, while policymakers and managers without direct involvement may have 
been able to provide more detached assessments of policies. Nonetheless, the 
decision to exclude these persons was taken because it was necessary to keep 
the study manageable in scope and scale, and to avoid diluting the insight of 
those with direct personal experience of RJ. 
Secondly, participants in police-led RJ (such as victims and offenders) were 
excluded. Clearly, the way that these policies and practices were received by 
citizens is important. Yet, given that participant research still significantly 
outweighs research with practitioners and policymakers/managers in this field, it 
was decided to focus the study on the latter groups. 
Thirdly, observations of practice were not conducted. Researchers often 
use observations to explore the dramaturgical, experiential, emotional, and 
relational aspects of RJ (Rossner, 2011, 2013), or to study the gap between what 
practitioners say and what they do (Lynn and Lea, 2012). Consequently, some 
restorative policing researchers have observed police-led RJ processes (e.g. 
Hoyle, et al., 2002; Walters, 2014; Cutress, 2015). In this case, it was decided 
not to conduct observations for a combination of practical and ethical reasons. 
Preliminary conversations indicated that such a request might not be granted, as 
it may have been more difficult to arrange. Potential barriers to observation 
related to the researcher’s safety, the obtention of informed consent, and the risk 
that the researcher’s presence might affect the dynamics of the observed 
practices. Another issue was that the time required to undertake and analyse 
observations in both areas, in addition to the other methods used, might have 
been prohibitive. Finally, while observational data could have been used to 
triangulate descriptions of practice, facilitators may have acted differently under 
observation than they would have done normally. Thus, it was decided that, on 
balance, the focus on police actors’ experiences of policymaking, implementation 
and delivery was sufficient for this study. For similar reasons, records of practice 
were omitted, though they may have been useful for the quantitative study of 
police-led RJ. Retrospectively, however, the researcher should have included 
some of these data sources in the study, instead of conducting some of the other, 
ultimately less relevant, interviews. 
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4.5 Data analysis 
 
This section explains the approach taken towards organising, coding and 
analysing the collected data. Before their analysis, all the collected documents 
were organised into an electronic database. Documents for which only paper 
copies were obtained, were scanned. Then, all the interviews were transcribed 
verbatim from digital recordings; no participants declined to be recorded. 
Notes were taken throughout the data collection and organising process, 
that is, during interviews, after interviews and during transcription, all of which 
informed the analysis (Liamputtong, 2009). Prior to coding, all of the interview 
recordings were listened to twice in order to ensure the accuracy of the transcripts 
and enable the researcher to familiarise himself with the data (Ritchie and 
Spencer, 2002). NVivo was then used to code the data, after which thematic 
content analysis was used to identify patterns and relationships within the data, 
to determine which parts of the data were most important, and to plan the findings 
chapters (Thorne, 2000; Cresswell, 2007).  
The researcher utilised a combination of what Hsieh and Shannon (2005) 
referred to as ‘conventional’ and ‘directed’ content analysis. Conventional content 
analysis refers to an inductive process whereby the researcher creates codes 
and identifies themes based on the data collected, rather than on hypotheses. 
One such code, entitled ‘Something we’ve always done’, related to the fact that 
some officers compared street RJ to longstanding approaches to informal case 
resolution. In contrast, directed content analysis refers to a deductive process 
whereby the researcher creates codes and identifies themes based on existing 
theory. For example, some of the questions asked in this research related to the 
realisation of voluntariness and other restorative principles. Thus, some 
theoretically-driven codes and themes were selected to identify data which 
related to these principles. This combination of approaches enabled a flexible 
data analysis process which suited this research. It reflected the fact that virtually 
all social research both builds and tests theory (Thomas, 2011), and combines 
inductive and deductive reasoning (Berg, 2009). 
Specific care was taken when investigating differences between the forces. 
As mentioned, discrepancies between the samples of police facilitators means 
that those data are not conducive to a fully comparative analysis. However, the 
documents and statistics collected, and the policymakers/managers interviewed 
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at each force, allowed for a comparative analysis of reported strategies, priorities 
and policies. Moreover, the differences between samples of police facilitators 
were not so substantial as to preclude their comparison altogether. Thus, some 
(tentative) comparative analysis also took place with these data. 
Throughout, the researcher was cognisant of the need to be reflexive and 
to avoid imposing preconceived ideas on the analytical process. This was 
especially necessary having previously worked in the field of RJ, and because of 
the absence of opportunities for analytical triangulation. There was a risk of 
presuming that the findings from previous studies or the researcher’s initial 
observations would be reflected throughout the data, thereby masking other, 
potentially more important, points of analysis. These risks were mitigated 
primarily by maintaining a constant awareness of their potential occurrence, and 
by discussing the findings with other social researchers and criminal justice 
practitioners in what Lincoln and Guba refer to as ‘peer debriefing’ (1985: 308).  
 
 
4.6 Ethical considerations 
 
Though none were prohibitive to this study, various ethical issues within its 
methods warranted attention and mitigation. This was necessary to protect the 
rights, ensure the welfare and respect the dignity of participants. This section 
delineates the researcher’s approach towards confidentiality, anonymity and data 
handling, and obtaining free, informed and ongoing consent 
 
 
4.6.1 Confidentiality, anonymity and data handling 
 
This study involved the collection, transport and storage of data from human 
subjects. This creates legal and ethical obligations to ensure that these data are 
treated according to the wishes and best interests of their providers.  
All the statistical data obtained were already aggregated and anonymised, 
and no previously unpublished documentary evidence which referred to an 
individual by name, has been reproduced. The risk of a specific quotation being 
tied to a person has been mitigated in several ways to protect participants’ 
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anonymity. Most importantly, respondents are only described in this thesis using 
codes. These relate to the respondents’ organisation and, where possible, to their 
role within that organisation. Examples of these codes are shown in Table 4.7. 
 
 Durham Gloucestershire 
Police facilitator, PCSO PCSOD1 PCSOG1 
Police facilitator, NPT PCNPTD1 PCNPTG1 
Police facilitator, other POD1 POG1 
Police policymakers  
and managers 
PPMMD1 PPMMG1 
RJ Hub staff RJHSD1 RJHSG1 
RJ Hub facilitators RJHFD1 RJHFG1 
PCC staff PCCD1 PCCG1 
Restorative Gloucs.  
steering group 
n/a SG1 
Table 4.7: Examples of anonymity codes for respondents by force and position 
 
As the table shows, some respondents – including police facilitators who were 
neither PCSOs nor NPT officers and police policymakers/managers – have been 
grouped to prevent their identification. The numbers affixed to the codes do not 
reflect the order in which interviews took place. While it was useful to have been 
given explicit permission to name both forces, this presented challenges in 
reporting the data in a way which ensured participant anonymity. Consequently, 
personal pronouns in some quotations have been altered, and some quotations 
which might have been informative, have been withheld on the basis that they 
related to a specific event which might identify a respondent. 
While confidentiality has been ensured – aside from in the three, two-person 
focus groups – anonymity was compromised by the sampling process. The use 
of snowball sampling meant that some respondents knew who else had been 
interviewed. Moreover, the process by which facilitators were selected meant that 
their managers knew who had been interviewed. Finally, some interviews were 
scheduled directly before and after each other, meaning that some respondents 
knew which of their colleagues had participated, as they saw each other entering 
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or exiting the room. These issues illustrate the difficulty with ensuring anonymity 
in organisational research, especially as sampling was reliant on gatekeepers. 
All data were transported and held securely. Digital recordings, transcripts 
and other files containing personal data were moved onto the university server at 
the earliest possible opportunity, and held there exclusively thereafter. The 
device used to record the interviews encrypted the files at the point of recording, 
and required a code to be played. Files were also only compatible with a single, 
password protected software package. The only paper documentation which 
could be used to identify participants – the consent forms – were kept in a secured 
area of the School of Law, accessible only by the researcher. All data will be 
destroyed two years following the completion of the thesis in order ensure that 
enough time is allowed to publish the research thoroughly. 
 
 
4.6.2 Free, informed and ongoing consent 
 
The researcher sought to enable respondents to withhold or withdraw their 
consent, and to ensure that any consent given was fully informed. There was no 
deception at any point in the research: the aims were explained in full on the 
information sheets and consent forms (see Appendices D and E), and verbally at 
the start of the interview. The information sheet also explained that interviewees 
were under no obligation to be recorded. Each participant was given the 
researcher’s contact details, and told that they could withdraw their data at a later 
stage if they so desired; none opted to do so.  
The issue of consent was again complicated by the sampling process. 
Specifically, the hierarchical and disciplined nature of police forces meant that a 
request (particularly if directed at a specific individual) from a ranking officer to 
participate in this study, may have been a command or interpreted as such (Miller 
and Boulton, 2007). Indeed, one participant stated: ‘Once that I saw that the 
request came from [a superior], I was hardly going to refuse’ (POG4). Prior to all 
interviews, the researcher stressed that the prospective respondent was under 
no obligation to participate, and that their superiors would not be informed if they 
opted not to do so. In practice, all respondents communicated to the researcher 
a willingness to participate, irrespective of whether they were asked to do so 
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directly by their managers. Nonetheless, the consent which was obtained, while 
informed, might not have been entirely free for all participants. 
 
 
4.7 Personal reflections on the research process 
 
This section reflects on three key challenges which were faced during the 
research. Specifically, it discusses the risks of relinquishing control over the 
sampling process, the role of social capital in facilitating the research and the 
benefits and challenges involved in collecting, managing and analysing large 
datasets as part of an inductive research strategy. 
Firstly, as described previously, the researcher largely relinquished control 
over the sampling processes for frontline police officers. The only criterion which 
gatekeepers were given was that officers must have delivered at least one RJ 
process in the previous twelve months. As a result of this lack of direction, the 
samples of police officers were not directly comparable with respect to their roles 
and other characteristics. Moreover, it is not known whether some officers were 
intentionally selected or rejected in order to portray the force’s RJ practices in a 
certain light. This issue stemmed largely from the researcher’s own anxieties in 
relation to the amount of work he was willing to ask his gatekeepers to undertake. 
Retrospectively, it would probably have been possible to request, say, a certain 
proportion of PCSOs, female officers or new recruits. At the time, however, the 
researcher felt wary of giving lengthy instructions to those who held power over 
the research. Researchers must strike a balance between maintaining favour and 
social capital, and ensuring that their study is structured and conducted according 
to strict methodological standards (Bulmer, 1988; Bartlett, et al., 2001). It is not 
to question the validity of this study to observe that it reflects perhaps too much 
emphasis on the former consideration, and that this resulted in limitations in the 
reliability and comparability of certain parts of the collected data. 
Relatedly, this illustrates how the research process can be complicated by 
the need (and, indeed, the desire) to build and maintain social capital with key 
decision-makers and gatekeepers. In each location, the researcher was keen to 
develop positive, trusting relationships with decision-makers and gatekeepers (so 
as to have the highest probability of both completing the research successfully 
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and being listened to in the dissemination process) and with interviewees (so as 
to build a rapport which maximised the chances of truthful responses). These 
aims were largely achieved, as evidenced by ongoing dissemination and by the 
seemingly frank answers provided by many interviewees. At the same time, the 
relationships developed with persons from each area played on the mind of the 
researcher when analysing the data and writing up the thesis. Consideration was 
given both to the desire to be sufficiently critical, and the desire not to be overly 
critical to compensate for the risk of not being critical enough. Ultimately, nothing 
has been consciously excluded or exaggerated at any point in the thesis on these 
grounds. Nonetheless, the point is that there are risks (as well as benefits) of 
developing friendships as part of the qualitative research process (see Bryman, 
2012, on the broader concept of ‘going native’ in research). 
Finally, this study presented challenges in relation to the volume of data 
accumulated. Initially, the researcher cast a wide net in the two case study areas, 
collecting documents and conducting interviews with a variety of persons from 
potentially relevant organisations. The purpose of this was to enable an inductive 
analytical approach: to generate descriptive theories based on the most important 
learnings within the data. Accordingly, the scope of the research later narrowed 
to focus on the work of the police, from which descriptive theories were proposed 
(see Chapter 8). Still, this process was challenging for two reasons: firstly, the 
sheer volume of data collected meant that transcription and coding were lengthy 
processes; secondly, this meant that it was difficult to identify an overall thread 
running through the data, and to retrieve specific data points during the writing 
process. On reflection, it seems that there was a tension between, on one hand, 
the need in inductive research to gather as much data as possible and, on the 
other hand, the need to begin with a clearer research focus so as to avoid over-
exerting oneself when collecting and analysing data.  
 
 
4.8 Dissemination 
 
This research has been disseminated in many ways. Firstly, the researcher 
has informally provided information on the research findings to several persons 
from both sites and from other force areas, on multiple occasions. In late 2015, 
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the researcher gave formal presentations, at each site, to senior leaders from the 
police forces and staff from PCC offices and RJ Hubs, in which preliminary 
findings were discussed and observations for each site’s future development of 
RJ were offered. Discussions with senior leaders continued throughout 2016 and 
2017. The findings were also presented at a number of international conferences 
(including in Leeds, Tel Aviv, Leiden, Porto and Leuven), and the researcher 
organised several meetings and conversations with national stakeholders and 
policymakers in order to discuss the implications of his findings for their work. 
 
 
4.9 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter outlined the underpinning assumptions of the research, and 
explained and justified the decisions made while designing and conducting the 
study. Many important lessons were learned regarding the role of social capital, 
the difficulties of managing and analysing large datasets, and the need to be more 
assertive with respect to control over sampling processes. Nonetheless, as the 
following chapters demonstrate, a considerable volume of high-quality data was 
collected, enabling inferences to be made with respect to the strategies, policies 
and practices which represented restorative policing in practice. 
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Chapter 5 – Assessing organisational strategies and goals 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The remaining chapters seek to address the study’s research questions by 
presenting and discussing its empirical findings. They explore and problematise 
the models of restorative policing which emerged from the data, identifying 
connections between the institutional context in which restorative policing took 
place, and the forces’ strategies, policies and reported practices. These chapters 
consider the ways in which RJ was interpreted and used, the reasons why it may 
have been framed, understood and delivered in certain ways, and the potential 
consequences for those who participated in police-led RJ processes. It is argued 
that RJ was understood and delivered in ways which reflected police-defined 
goals, although the discretion afforded frontline police officers when facilitating 
RJ enabled them to determine, on a case-by-case basis, the extent to which they 
would use the process to empower citizens. 
Chapter 5 starts by exploring the RJ implementation strategies in Durham 
and Gloucestershire Constabularies. It contends that the concept and practice of 
RJ, in various forms, had largely been mainstreamed in both forces. Moreover, it 
suggests that the forces’ RJ strategies reflected both national pressures and local 
goals, understandings and priorities, as expressed by policymakers/managers. 
These findings indicate a role for each of these factors in shaping restorative 
policing within forces, and contextualise the remainder of the analysis. 
This chapter begins by outlining and comparing each force’s implementation 
strategies. Next, it considers the statistics pertaining to the recorded use of RJ, 
and the qualitative data relating to its unrecorded use. The final sections examine 
the relationship between force strategies and the goals which were expressed by 
policymaker/manager respondents. They present documentary and interview 
data, illustrating how both forces seemingly aimed to use RJ to manage demand 
and improve the service which they provided for victims, although cultural change 
was also an explicit goal of RJ implementation in Durham. 
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5.2 Restorative policing in Durham 
 
Durham Constabulary’s involvement in RJ began in 2007. As part of the 
drive among many forces to reduce first-time entrants around that time, it 
partnered with the local Youth Offending Service (YOS) to introduce a ‘pre-
reprimand disposal’ for young offenders (Creaney and Smith, 2014). According 
to Stockdale, ‘a few officers’ (2015b: 102) who worked with the YOS received 
some form of RJ training. Shortly thereafter, several nearby schools (Kokotsaki, 
2013) and children’s care homes (C4EO, 2009) introduced RJ internally. 
RJ was first implemented as an explicit strategy within the force on the 
arrival of a new Assistant Chief Constable (ACC), Mike Barton, in 2008. Having 
led on RJ in his previous role in Lancashire Constabulary (Greaves, 2008), Barton 
came to Durham with a vision to create a ‘restorative county’ (Stockdale, 2015b: 
103). In 2009/10, 128 officers received RJ training, around 100 of whom attended 
a one-day, street RJ course with Restorative Solutions. Nineteen attended a five-
day course in ‘restorative approach mediation’ with trainers from Durham County 
Council, and eleven attended a two-day restorative conferencing training with an 
unstated provider (Stockdale, 2015b: 106-7). In 2010, Restorative Solutions 
(2017) also trained an unknown number of officers from Integrated Offender 
Management (IOM) to deliver post-sentence RJ as part of a project called 
Restorative Approaches for Persistent and Prolific Offenders. In 2011, a half-day 
course on RJ was developed internally, with the intention that it would be 
delivered to all frontline officers (Stockdale, 2015b). 
This latter training programme was discontinued before completion when, 
in 2012, Barton was promoted to Chief Constable. At this point, he instigated a 
new RJ strategy under the revised nomenclature of ‘Restorative Approaches’ 
(RA). According to an internal review from 2014, this strategy aimed to ‘embed 
an RA culture within the organisation’ (doc. D11: 2). It also corresponded with a 
drive to become more ‘victim-focused’. According to one policymaker/manager, 
this included ‘mapping out the victim’s journey’ and introducing ‘processes where 
Sergeants ring victims after seven days to find out what their service was like’ 
(PPMMD2). The development of RJ, as this chapter later shows, was seen as part 
of the enhanced service provided for victims. 
The new RJ strategy involved an internally-delivered training programme 
and the formulation of new policies and guidance. A one-day, Level 1 training 
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course was compulsory for all employees (n=2079). To the researcher’s 
knowledge, Durham remains, at the time of writing, the only criminal justice 
agency in the UK to have trained every member of its staff in RJ. In addition, 428 
officers – including ‘256 individuals from Neighbourhood and Partnerships, 84 
from Response and 66 from Crime and Justice’ (doc. D11: 3) – were given an 
additional day of training on restorative conferencing. All 16 officer respondents 
from Durham were trained in conferencing at that time. Subsequently, all officers 
received a letter from the Chief stating that everyone who was trained in 
conferencing was ‘expected to undertake, or observe, a restorative conference 
within a few months’ (Stockdale, 2015b: 121).  
The scale of the force’s investment and commitment to RJ was further 
underscored by two aspects of the strategy: the breadth of the situations in which 
RJ could be used, and the level of staffing which was put in place to support it. 
With respect to its application, RJ was fully integrated into the community 
resolution disposal, which was subsequently denoted ‘RA Only’. This meant that 
all community resolutions had to be delivered according to the standards of either 
street RJ or conferencing; in all cases, victims were supposed to be offered the 
opportunity to communicate with the offender (doc. D8). The requirement that all 
informal disposals had to be delivered restoratively, alongside the fact that all 
members of staff were trained in RJ, seemed to be among the the primary 
mechanisms through which the force aimed to mainstream RJ.  
Officers could also offer and deliver RJ at any stage of the justice process, 
that is, alongside any OOCD or charge. In fact, Durham’s internal guidance stated 
that RJ was ‘to be considered for every incident, provided it is in the interests of 
the victim and the broader community’ (doc. D8: 1). To incentivise this, officers 
were required to record their reasons for not using RJ in every situation where it 
was not used. In cases ‘where an offender has been sentenced and is either in 
prison or being monitored by Probation Services’, internal guidance suggested – 
but did not seem to require – that officers contact IOM so that an officer with 
advanced training could ‘assist in these more complex cases’ (doc. D8: 4). In 
addition, authorisation by a specific senior or thematic manager was needed prior 
to the use of RJ with domestic abuse, hate crime, or if the offence ‘relates to a 
vulnerable adult or child abuse enquiry’ (doc. D9). Otherwise, there were no 
restrictions on when officers could choose to deliver RJ. This is indicative of a 
desire to encourage officers to consider, offer and use RJ as often as possible. 
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Indeed, the force’s approach exceeded national policies which discouraged the 
police from using RJ with domestic abuse (Westmarland, et al., 2017). 
Further efforts were made to normalise RJ and to integrate it into the force’s 
activities. Level 2 training was provided to all new frontline recruits, and 
restorative conferencing was introduced for staff-on-staff conflicts and public 
complaints against officers. There were also attempts to change the language 
used within the force. Officers were encouraged to utilise the terms ‘harmer’ and 
‘harmed’ in place of ‘offender’ and ‘victim’, and supervisory ‘accountability 
meetings’ became ‘performance conversations’ to frame them as more 
supportive encounters (doc. D11: 5). In mid-2015, the staff officer to the Chief 
Constable contacted the researcher to discuss how the force might use RJ in 
response to organised crime, which led to their secondment to the University of 
Sheffield to undertake exploratory research in this area. This further illustrates 
the importance placed on developing RJ within the force.  
This willingness to experiment, innovate and engage with evidence was 
mirrored in other force policies. For example, Durham was the first English force 
to utilise ‘shooting galleries’ for heroin addicts (Siddique, 2017) and to announce 
that it would not actively target small-scale cannabis growers (Gayle, 2015). The 
force also designed, with support from researchers, a desistance-focused 
intervention called Checkpoint, offering intensive alternatives to prosecution for 
adult offenders with a moderate risk of reoffending (Routledge, 2015). The 
inclination to innovate was also identified by several respondents, one of whom 
stated: ‘We realise that we’ve gotta be different, we’ve gotta be creative, we’ve 
gotta be innovative and think differently’ (PPMMD4). 
The level of staffing which was in place to support the use of RJ in Durham 
Constabulary, serves further to underscore the force’s commitment to its 
implementation. An unknown number of police facilitators – including one of the 
16 interviewed – were designated ‘RA Champions’, whom other officers could 
contact for advice or assistance with delivering RJ (doc. D8). A steering group 
‘comprised of officers representing all commands and including specialist units’ 
(Stockdale, 2015b: 179) was brought together to formulate specific policies on IT, 
communications, accountability and leadership, and to drive implementation. This 
was chaired by a Superintendent who was also designated RJ Strategic Lead. 
He was responsible for engaging other local agencies on the use of RJ and for 
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performance managing the police’s RJ delivery, analysing a stratified sample of 
practice records on a monthly basis and providing feedback to officers.  
In addition, an RJ Hub was launched in 2013 in Darlington, one of Durham’s 
four police areas. This was funded by a government performance grant for 
Darlington YOS to reward their own successes in using RJ: they had, for many 
years, assessed all cases for RJ suitability. This new organisation, Darlington 
Neighbourhood Resolution (DNR), was run by a manager and RJ facilitator who 
was seconded from Darlington YOS. In its second year (2014/15), the scheme 
received additional funding from both Darlington Borough Council and the PCC 
for Durham, which DNR used to hire a case supervisor and an administrator on 
part-time contracts. 
DNR recruited and trained volunteer facilitators to deliver conferences and 
shuttle mediation in response to low-level crimes and neighbourhood conflicts 
referred by the police and other agencies (doc. D39). By the period of data 
collection, DNR had trained 120 volunteers, approximately 70 of which were 
reportedly still active (email communication, DNR manager). All cases were 
jointly delivered by two volunteers, although DNR staff occasionally co-facilitated 
with volunteers in particularly complex or sensitive cases. Its staff were co-located 
with the YOS and with various council services, and had access to police 
databases and other systems for the purpose of risk assessment. 
Two months prior to the period of data collection, the PCC agreed to fund 
DNR entirely for the 2015/16 financial year. Its manager became RJ Coordinator 
for Darlington, and another YOS manager from Durham was seconded to the 
position of RJ Coordinator for Durham, covering the remaining three police areas. 
They were tasked with determing how to create a consistent approach to RJ 
across the area. Ultimately, the PCC funded the expansion of DNR to the rest of 
Durham, and the scheme was relaunched in May 2016 as the Restorative Hub 
(Copeland, 2016). The two coordinators were given responsibility for recruiting 
120 further volunteers, and the other staff were given full-time contracts. This 
reflects the PCC’s personal support for RJ: the number one intended outcome in 
his Police and Crime Plan for 2013-17 was ‘Making local communities and the 
victims of crime feel empowered’ (OPCC Durham, 2013: 4). His Police and Crime 
Plan also endorsed and reproduced the Constabulary’s ‘Plan on a Page’ strategy 
document, which included the aim to ‘maximise opportunities for restorative 
approaches’ (OPCC Durham, 2013: 25). Finally, the PCC listed, as one of his 
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three priorities, an ‘increase in levels of victim satisfaction’ with the police (OPCC 
Durham, 2013: 22). Upon being reelected in 2016, he changed his title to ‘PCVC’, 
with the ‘V’ standing for ‘Victims’. The relaunch of DNR as the Restorative Hub 
followed the period of data collection, and is not covered by this thesis.  
DNR followed two previous attempts to develop similar schemes elsewhere 
in the force area. In 2013, Restorative Solutions was awarded £1.3m from the 
Underwood Trust to develop around 100 Neighbourhood Justice Panels (NJPs) 
across England and Wales. Forty of these were reported as operational in their 
2013/14 Social Audit, including two in Durham (Restorative Solutions, 2014). 
However, these two schemes were not sustained, according to one respondent 
from the PCC’s office, because they lacked the requisite staffing: 
 
There wasn’t a dedicated coordinator to push [Scheme A]. […] You lost the 
volunteers, and then when the numbers started to come through, there were 
no volunteers to deliver, and it just waned and fell by the wayside. […] The 
coordinator [for Scheme B] was tasked with a different piece of work. […] 
So, it kind of fritted. (PCCD2) 
 
This accorded with the experience of another respondent to this study who had 
previously coordinated one of Restorative Solutions’ NJPs in another force area. 
Their indentifier is being withheld in order to ensure their anonymity: 
 
I had the experience of recruiting volunteers, setting up a scheme. That 
didn’t take off, partly because I think subsequent research has shown that 
those schemes are not successful unless you have at least one member of 
staff, and this was an add-on to quite a full role that I already had. […] It was 
just a strand that I didn’t have the energy to put into. (Respondent X) 
 
These data illustrate the importance of dedicated staff in building and sustaining 
RJ Hubs. They are consistent with the MoJ’s process evaluation of NJPs, which 
found that ‘having a dedicated Coodinator was critical to optimal NJP delivery’ 
(Turley, et al., 2014: 37). Similarly, reports by the Restorative Justice Council 
(2016) and Why Me? (2015) on multi-agency RJ partnerships found that the best 
developed examples had dedicated staffing. That Durham’s PCC and Chief 
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Constable were willing to invest in staffing is indicative of their dedication to RJ, 
and may prove crucial to the sustainablity of these projects. 
 
 
5.3 Restorative policing in Gloucestershire 
 
RJ was also a mainstream disposal in Gloucestershire Constabulary by the 
period of data collection, although its strategies were less ambitious than those 
of its Northern counterpart. Like Durham, the force launched RJ twice. The first 
time, in 2009/10, involved some NPT officers – 24, according to one of three 
respondents trained at that time – being trained in conferencing by Restorative 
Solutions. Unlike in Durham, however, street RJ was not introduced. Instead, the 
force implemented a more flexible informal disposal called Community Oriented 
Policing Solutions (COPS). This allowed officers to impose conditional, informal 
resolutions without victims’ consent. As one policymaker/manager stated: 
‘[COPS] wasn’t victim-focused, so the police could go along and impose a 
solution, and the victim didn’t have to agree to it’ (PPMMG1). This disposal 
typified the highly discretionary informal disposals which were being introduced 
by many forces around this time (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2011, 2012; 
Rix, et al., 2011), as described in Section 3.3. 
An internal review of COPS in 2013 recommended its abolition in favour of 
street RJ. This was deemed to be more victim-focused and less likely to be used 
inappropriately, which the review of the transition to street RJ (doc. G24) implicitly 
defined as its use with repeat offenders. The proposed reform was approved by 
senior leaders and, starting in October 2013, the force trained to Level 1 ‘all public 
facing uniformed officers who were likely to use RJ’ (doc. G24: 2). This included 
515 PCs (mostly from NPTs and response) and 110 PCSOs, as well as 77 
Sergeants and 23 Inspectors; dog handling and traffic units were among those 
who were not trained. In late 2014, the COPS disposal was abolished and, like in 
Durham, all community resolutions had to be delivered as street RJ or as 
restorative conferences. Again, it was this requirement which, alongside officer 
training, meant that RJ was mainstreamed within the force. Unlike in Durham, 
however, police staff and senior officers did not receive any formal input on RJ, 
and Level 1 training (rather than Level 2) was introduced for new frontline recruits. 
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Concurrently, the force increased the number of officers trained in 
conferencing to 46 (doc. G25), thereby maintaining the strategy of having 
specialist conference facilitators to whom other officers could refer cases. These 
officers attended a three-day training programme which was delivered by the 
force’s RJ Manager. Eleven of the 16 police facilitators interviewed were among 
those trained to Level 2, meaning that these specialist officers were substantially 
over-represented in the sample of officers from Gloucestershire.  
The specialists included 37 frontline officers spread across the six police 
areas, as well as the force’s RJ Manager and officers stationed within the YOS, 
IOM and elsewhere. According to the force’s training database (doc. G25), 
however, by June 2015, one specialist had retired and six others had moved to 
roles where they could not facilitate RJ. Several policymakers/managers reported 
that, following an ongoing restructuring of the force, its conferencing capacity 
would be mapped and additional persons would be trained, if necessary: 
 
We’ll do a scoping exercise. We already have lists of the officers trained to 
Level 1 and 2 [and] where they are. […] We’ll just repeat that afterwards to 
see where people are moved, and then if they need training. (PPMMG1) 
 
This restructuring, through which the force’s six police areas were being merged 
into one, was not completed by the end of the data collection, and so no data 
were collected on any subsequent training activity. However, Wigzell and Hough 
(2015) found that organisational restructuring often led to practitioners and 
managers who were trained or supportive of RJ, being lost or moved to positions 
which precluded their involvement. That the restructuring in Gloucestershire 
removed geographical divisions may also be significant, as their introduction was 
found to be an enabler of community policing elsewhere (Chan, 1996). 
The differences in training between Durham and Gloucestershire suggest 
that the latter placed less importance, firstly, on the use of RJ for cultural change 
and, secondly, on the use of dialogic approaches. This illustrates the discretion 
of senior leaders to determine the scope of their officers’ involvement in delivering 
RJ. Most officers in Gloucestershire were not trained in conferencing, preventing 
them from employing these skills in their day-to-day activities, or when delivering 
street RJ. Moreover, conferencing could only take place if officers referred cases 
to specialists, or if specialists detected suitable cases themselves. Internal 
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guidance stated that referrals could be made in cases where the ‘issue cannot be 
resolved immediately’ through street RJ, or where there were ‘persistent 
problems’, a need to ‘seek long term solutions’ or a need to ‘address reoffending 
habits’ (doc. G28: 1). However, there was no requirement or administrative 
incentive to make referrals, meaning that the use of conferencing relied on 
officers proactively identifying and referring suitable cases.  
This approach might be expected to lead to less conferencing taking place 
than in Durham, as the police have been found to be easily deterred from making 
discretionary referrals by the bureaucracy involved (Dorn, 1994). On the other 
hand, the use of specialist facilitators has been advocated by some researchers 
on the basis that training and experience are more concentrated, resulting in a 
higher quality of service (Hoyle, 2009; Shapland, 2009). In Durham, officers who 
were expected to deliver conferences only had one additional day of training, 
which some have suggested is insufficient to ensure quality (Gavrielides, 2013; 
Strang, et al., 2013). Furthermore, the scale of the training programme in Durham 
meant that, in order to conserve resources, it was delivered by the internal 
training department, rather than by specialist RJ trainers. This illustrates the 
possible tension between the goal of changing organisational cultures, and the 
cost implications of reform (Skogan, 2008). In Durham, the desire to mainstream 
conferencing conflicted with the force’s ability to resource in-depth training for 
officers who were expected to deliver it (Laxminarayan, 2014). 
Another difference between the forces related to their officers’ discretion to 
decide when to use RJ, which was lower in Gloucestershire than in Durham. First 
of all, police officers in Gloucestershire could only deliver RJ with community 
resolutions, and not with charges or higher OOCDs. Secondly, the authorisation 
of an Inspector was required for its use with offences with an ‘ACPO gravity matrix 
score’ higher than 2 (doc. G28: 1). Force guidance stated that this included sexual 
offences, domestic violence not involving partners or ex-partners, racially 
aggravated offences, violence against the person at the level of Actual Bodily 
Harm (ABH) or above, burglary, offences involving a weapon, and drugs offences 
(doc. G29). By implication, other types of offences – such as domestic violence 
involving partners or ex-partners – were not eligible. The guidance also stated 
that cases should not ‘normally be dealt with by RJ’ (doc. G29: 5) where the 
offender had unspent convictions or cautions, or where they had received an RJ 
disposal in the previous twelve months. An RJ disposal older than twelve months 
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did not make an offender ineligible, but required the permission of a line manager. 
These policies represented additional hurdles to the use of RJ which did not exist 
in Durham. In Gloucestershire, the need to obtain authorisation might have 
deterred officers from using RJ, potentially precluding its use with, for example, 
relatively low-level violent offences (e.g. ABH), for which research suggests that 
it may be especially suitable (Strang and Sherman, 2015). 
In theory, officers could refer virtually any case to the RJ Hub, Restorative 
Gloucestershire, ‘if a victim is still interested in RJ but the offender does not meet 
the criteria, is being dealt with another way and has admitted the offence’ (doc. 
G29: 4). However, the data indicate that referrals were rare (see Section 5.5). 
Nine officer respondents were not aware of the RJ Hub, while five knew it existed, 
but were specialists who either preferred to deliver their own conferences or did 
not realise they could make referrals. Only two respondents reported ever having 
referred a case to the Hub, neither of which were in the last year. In contrast, six 
of the seven officers interviewed in Darlington reported having referred one or 
more cases to DNR in the previous year, usually neighbourhood disputes which 
were perceived to be resource-intensive to resolve. 
With respect to staffing, the roles of strategic oversight and implementation 
were divided between an ACC and an Inspector. The ACC reportedly played a 
role in lobbying for the transition from COPS to RJ, and oversaw this reform. She 
was due to retire shortly following the data collection, at which point her post was 
to be discontinued as part of a drive to reduce management salaries. Her RJ 
responsibilities were to be divided among the remaining ACC who would become 
Senior Responsible Officer for RJ, and the Superintendent for Community Harm 
Reduction who would become Strategic Lead. In addition, Gloucestershire 
Constabulary did not have an internal RJ steering group. Instead, the RJ 
Manager, an Inspector, undertook almost all aspects of implementation, writing 
policy documents, developing internal processes, acting as a single-point-of-
contact for officers with questions about RJ, scrutinising all RJ records and 
providing feedback to officers. He, too, was due to retire shortly following the data 
collection, at which point a Sergeant was to be designated RJ Manager.  
The collected data say little about the impact of these managerial changes, 
as they had not yet taken place. As explained in Chapter 2, however, studies 
have shown the challenges inherent in mitigating their impact (Skogan, 2008; 
Hoyle, 2009). Reallocating management positions to lower ranking officers is a 
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common streamlining approach in times of austerity (Rogers and Gravelle, 2012; 
Huey et al., 2016). Yet, this also seems to reflect the lower priority afforded RJ 
relative to Durham, where responsibility for RJ was kept at the Superintendent 
level. One respondent in Gloucestershire justified giving the management role to 
a Sergeant on the basis that RJ had become ‘mainstream business as usual […] 
I think we’ve reached that tipping point now, so it just needs sustaining’ 
(PPMMG3). This illustrates another difference with Durham Constabulary, where 
there was an explicit aspiration to become a ‘restorative force’, and where RJ 
implementation was typically described as an ongoing rather than completed 
process (see Section 5.8). 
Gloucestershire’s PCC was perhaps more publicly explicit in his support for 
RJ than his counterpart in Durham, stating in the very first paragraph of his 68-
page Police and Crime Plan for 2013-17 that: 
 
In Gloucestershire, we already work on the principle of ‘Restorative Justice’ 
where the needs of victims are taken into account and offenders must take 
responsibility for their actions. I support Restorative Justice and its aims to 
stop people re-offending.” (doc. G47: 4) 
 
While this suggests that the PCC was supportive of RJ, it is indicative of how 
support for RJ from within the system can be contingent on the concept being 
interpreted in a way which reflects existing assumptions and approaches. In this 
statement, as in the ACPO guidelines on RJ (see Chapter 3), the focus is on 
offender accountability and on the state retaining ultimate control; victims’ needs 
must only be ‘taken into account’. The suggestion that no transformation would 
be needed in order to work restoratively – the PCC argued that Gloucestershire 
‘already work[ed]’ according to these principles – further suggests that the term 
was being interpreted quite loosely. 
The Plan later describes some of the evidence on the effectiveness of RJ 
with reference to a report by Sherman and Strang (2007), before noting: 
 
The existing evidence shows that RJ practices are effective in crime 
reduction and also help to provide the opportunity for healing for the victim, 
hold the offender accountable and increase the offender’s awareness of the 
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harm done. Therefore, the Police and PCC have made the use of RJ by the 
police an organisational priority. (doc. G47: 12) 
 
This also seems to reflect support for RJ and an awareness of the evidence-base 
surrounding its use. However, it is actually appealing to research on the efficacy 
of conferencing to support Gloucestershire Constabulary’s use of RJ which, as 
the next section shows, mostly involved street RJ. As the authors of the report 
which was cited within the Plan recently argued, to use evidence on conferencing 
to support street RJ is to overestimate grossly the applicability of that evidence 
(Strang and Sherman, 2015),  
With respect to the local RJ Hub, there were several parallels with DNR. 
Restorative Gloucestershire also recruited and trained volunteer facilitators to 
deliver RJ in cases referred by local agencies, and existed prior to PCC funding 
for RJ. Like DNR, it transitioned into an RJ Hub using PCC funding, its manager 
became the county’s RJ Coordinator, and it employed a part-time administrator.4 
However, there were several differences between the two Hubs, many of which 
related to their relationship with the forces. Firstly, Restorative Gloucestershire’s 
employees were police staff. They were co-located with the police (with IOM and 
Harm Reduction) and worked closely with Gloucestershire Constabulary’s RJ 
Manager who wrote and delivered most of the training which the Hub provided its 
volunteers and partner organisations. This included an RJ awareness course, 
delivered to over 100 staff in partner agencies in 2015 (doc. G6).  
Secondly, while most referrals to DNR were low-level offences and 
neighbourhood conflicts, referrals to Restorative Gloucestershire were mostly 
serious, post-sentence cases. It originated as a project within HMP Gloucester in 
which serious cases were co-facilitated between one volunteer and one staff 
member (Jewkes, 2013). This focus and approach had continued following its 
transition to a PCC-funded RJ Hub: most of its cases were post-sentence, and 
were co-delivered by one volunteer and one of ten trained probation officers from 
the local Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC).5 
                                            
4 Shortly following the period of data collection, the PCC provided funding for Restorative 
Gloucestershire to employ a Volunteer Coordinator, who took on case supervision responsibilities 
from its manager.  
 
5 Following the period of data collection, the PCC funded one of the CRC’s facilitators to act as a 
specialist, part-time co-facilitator with Restorative Gloucestershire volunteers. 
121 
 
Another key difference between the two Hubs was that Restorative 
Gloucestershire was also a county-wide, multi-agency partnership which sought 
to coordinate and develop RJ across sectors. Its steering group met quarterly, 
and included staff from various justice, public and third sector agencies (docs. 
G35, G38, G41). The partnership was open to any local organisation, if it signed 
an information sharing agreement and submitted data on its use of RJ. In 
exchange, partners could attend the steering group, refer cases and access free 
conferencing or RJ awareness training. They could also apply for funding from 
the PCC’s RJ fund. For example, 2015 saw two approved applications from 
partners: one from a local charity to deliver a project on RJ and one from the 
University of Gloucestershire to evaluate this project (docs. G35, G38). 
Finally, whereas the ‘restorative county’ vision in Durham emanated from 
the force, the RJ Hub provided this vision in Gloucestershire. Restorative 
Gloucestershire, like Durham Constabulary, actively engaged local agencies to 
normalise and develop RJ in the area, and drove innovations in its use. For 
example, like in Durham, RJ was introduced in Gloucestershire for public 
complaints against the police. Unlike in Durham, however, this only materialised 
due to lobbying from the Hub which also delivered these cases. Moreover, the 
aforementioned PCC-funded project was initiated via the Hub, even though it 
involved the police: it used circle processes to build relationships between police 
officers and young people (Payne, et al., 2016). That Durham Constabulary had 
a somewhat broader vision and greater ambition for RJ than Gloucestershire 
Constabulary, is reflected within the collected statistics on the use of RJ.  
 
 
5.4 Recorded use of restorative justice 
 
This section outlines the collected data pertaining to the recorded use of RJ 
by each force and Hub. These data show that, in both areas, the overwhelming 
majority of activities which were recorded as restorative were delivered by the 
police alongside community resolutions. There are many barriers, however, to 
the reliable comparison and interpretation of these statistics. 
Both forces provided data covering different time periods, overlapping only 
for an eleven-month period: September 2014-July 2015, inclusive. Figures for 
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these months are presented to maximise their comparability. In this period, 
Durham recorded using RJ 4.16 times more often than Gloucestershire: 2796 
cases in the former (doc. D10) and 672 cases in the latter (doc. G40). Table 5.1 
presents the additional information provided by Durham on offender ages and the 
recording outcomes alongside which RJ was used. It shows that around 90% of 
recorded RJ took place with OOCDs, and that almost 80% was with community 
resolutions. It also shows that almost two-thirds of recorded RJ was with adult 
offenders, contrasting with the tendency among other forces to use RJ mostly 
with young offenders (Clamp and Paterson, 2017).  
 
Outcome Cases involving RJ % overall RJ 
RA only (community 
resolution) 
2208 
(982 youth, 1226 adult) 
78.96% 
Charge, summons or taken 
into consideration 
264 9.44% 
Penalty notice for disorder 49 1.75% 
Adult caution 191 6.83% 
Adult conditional caution 22 0.79% 
Youth caution 16 0.57% 
Youth conditional caution 11 0.39% 
Youth pre-caution 35 1.25% 
Total recorded RJ use 2796 100% 
Total youth RJ 1044 37.34% 
Total adult RJ 1752 62.66% 
Table 5.1: Durham Constabulary's recorded use of RJ, Sept. 2014-Jul. 2015 
 
Unfortunately, the statistics collected from Durham Constabulary do not 
state, nor is there a reliable way to estimate, the relative proportion of cases at 
Level 1 and Level 2. Police facilitator respondents from Durham reported that 
about 20% of the RJ they had delivered in the previous year involved conferences 
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(see Section 4.4.4), but there is no way of knowing whether this reflected the 
distribution of conferencing activity across the force. It is also noteworthy that, in 
their study on the use of community resolution-level RJ with domestic abuse, 
Westmarland, et al. (2017) found that many cases which were recorded as Level 
2 more closely resembled Level 1 RJ. In contrast, Meadows, et al. (2012) found 
that street RJ sometimes involved some form of dialogue between the parties. As 
Chapter 7 later shows, the line between Level 1 and Level 2 RJ was blurred.  
Still, statistical data which conflate dialogic and non-dialogic approaches are 
problematic, as they are difficult to interpret by researchers and lend themselves 
to simplistic interpretations by central government and the media. As Shapland, 
et al. noted (2017: 70), this kind of conflation may create, exacerbate or reinforce 
confusion or misunderstandings among justice professionals and the public. This 
may decrease social support for RJ (Pali and Pelikan, 2010); indeed, RJ is 
already widely equated with diversion by media organisations which are hostile 
to such approaches (Restorative Justice Council, 2014), potentially reducing the 
legitimacy of RJ and police diversion within the public sphere. 
The statistics obtained from Gloucestershire show that all recorded cases 
took place alongside community resolutions, but did not distinguish between the 
use of RJ with young or adult offenders. Unlike Durham’s figures, however, they 
did distinguish between Levels 1 and 2: 614 (91.5%) cases in the eleven-month 
period were recorded as Level 1, while 58 (8.5%) were recorded as Level 2 (doc. 
G40). This is comparable with earlier British studies of restorative cautioning, 
which found that 14% (Hoyle, et al., 2002) and 7% (O’Mahony and Doak, 2004) 
of cases involved conferences. More recent studies mostly do not report the 
proportion of conferences, although Meadows, et al. stated that ‘there have been 
relatively few restorative conferences undertaken’ (2012: 22), and Cutress (2015) 
similarly found that conferencing was rare. In another study, 13 of 14 cases were 
street RJ, with only one involving a conference (Walters, 2014).  
Questions also remain as to the number of cases in which RJ was used with 
non-crime incidents. In Durham, the recorded figures from Table 5.1 seemingly 
referr only to cases which were ‘crimed’. As Stockdale explained of their system: 
 
Restorative justice has also been used for large numbers of [non-crime] 
incidents but it is not possible to systematically retrieve the data. […] [There 
are] two separate databases – one for incidents, one for crimes. The yes/no 
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restorative approach tick box is only available on the crime system, not the 
incident system. (2015b: 106) 
 
This system reportedly still existed when these data were collected, meaning that 
it was not possible to collect statistics from Durham on the use of RJ with incidents 
which were not recorded as crime. Of course, not all incidents which were ‘crimed’ 
necessarily constituted an offence under the criminal law, and vice versa. The 
police notoriously have discretion with respect to their recording of crime and non-
crime incidents in this regard (McConville, et al., 1991). One previous analysis of 
street RJ found that almost 5% of cases recorded as offences were not actually 
crimes (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012).  
A further breakdown of Gloucestershire Constabulary’s RJ use in this period 
was later provided by their RJ Administrator (email communication). This showed 
that, of the 672 cases, 16 Level 1 and seven Level 2 cases were recorded as 
‘Non-Crime Cases’. This likely reflected the fact that officers were not required to 
report their use of RJ with non-crime incidents to the RJ Administrator, but some 
chose to do so voluntarily (email communication, RJ Coordinator). Overall, it 
seems likely that the statistics collected from both areas do not fully reflect the 
use of RJ in cases which were not recorded as offences. 
Excluding the 23 cases from Gloucestershire which were recorded as not 
being criminal offences, the data suggest that RJ was actually recorded as being 
used with crime in Durham at a rate 4.31 times higher than in Gloucestershire. 
These figures may mask differences in how often RJ was offered between the 
forces, or differences in its use within the forces. Yet, given that there were only 
9.8% more offences recorded in Durham (32,617) than in Gloucestershire 
(29,700) in the twelve months to June 2015 (ONS, 2017), the figures may indicate 
a higher propensity to use RJ (or, at least, to record RJ as being used) with crime 
in the former than in the latter. 
The RJ Hubs also supplied statistical data on their RJ practices (email 
communications, RJ Administrators). DNR provided figures for the 2014 calendar 
year, showing that they delivered 26 conferences involving 72 participants. 
Restorative Gloucestershire reported being referred 33 cases in the eleven 
months to July 2015: ten resulted in conferences, 19 were discontinued, and four 
were expected to go to conference imminently. This suggests that DNR delivered 
over twice as many conferences as Restorative Gloucestershire in an average 
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month, even though it served a population of around 1/6th the size.6 This could 
reflect differences in the quantity of referrals, the delivery capacity within each 
Hub, and/or the complexity of the cases. These data also suggest that the number 
of cases delivered by each Hub were relatively small, compared to the police’s 
own recorded use of RJ. 
Both Hubs also provided data on their referrals. DNR were referred 81 
cases in the eleven months to July 2015, 38 of which were from the police. The 
remaining cases were referred by the council, Darlington College, councillors, 
charities, or by a prospective participant (i.e. self-referrals) (doc. D39). Of the 33 
cases referred to Restorative Gloucestershire in this time, 19 were referred by 
the CRC, three were from police officers (although none of these resulted in 
conferences) and two were from the police’s Professional Standards Department, 
one of which led to a conference. The remaining cases were self-referred or 
referred by local prisons, housing associations, councils, the YOS or the PCC’s 
office (email communication, RJ Administrator). 
DNR also provided data about the types of incidents which were referred to 
them in this period (see Table 5.2). These data confirm that their cases were 
mostly low-level offences and neighbourhood disputes: 
 
Incident type Number of cases 
Crime 
19 ➜ 
- common assault (8) 
- criminal damage (4) 
- theft (4) 
- hate crime (2) 
- intimidating behaviour (1) 
Neighbourly disputes 41 
Conflict resolution 6 
Unspecified 15 
Total referred cases 81 
Table 5.2: Referrals to DNR by incident type, Sept. 2014-Jul. 2015 
                                            
6 The census from 2011 shows that Darlington Borough Council encompassed 106,000 residents, 
compared to almost 600,000 in Gloucestershire.  
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Again, the imprecise nature of these data is a barrier to their analysis. Although 
only 19 of DNR’s referrals were recorded as offences, neighbourhood conflicts 
often involve unrecorded offences (Bursik and Grasmick, 2001), while it is not 
clear what was meant by the crime of ‘intimidating behaviour’. What is clear, 
however, is that DNR received many more police referrals than Restorative 
Gloucestershire. 
 
 
5.5 Unrecorded use of restorative justice 
 
In both forces, many police respondents reported delivering RJ without 
recording it in a way that would have been reflected in the collected statistics. 
These data point to the existence of a ‘dark figure’ of police-led RJ.  
First of all, street RJ was often described as being used in response to 
incidents which did not seem to be ‘crimed’. This means that these practices 
might not have been encompassed within the data presented in the previous 
section. One respondent from Durham, for example, recounted a case in which 
young children had thrown objects at an elderly person’s house: 
 
I took them to one side, took all the details down, gave them a real good 
talking to. […] I said: ‘How would you feel if someone was doing that to your 
nana?’ […] Because they were actually so apologetic I said: ‘Right, come 
on, let's go and say sorry to the lady’. […] Apologies were given and 
accepted, and the matter was resolved, no further action needed. 
(PCSOD6) 
 
The officer cited this case when asked about their use of street RJ, although their 
description of its recording seems to suggest that the incident was not ‘crimed’. 
Many such practices, usually in response to similarly low-level incidents, anti-
social behaviour or neighbourhood conflicts, were described by officers from both 
areas, although they were more commonly reported in Durham. This could reflect 
one or more of three factors: a higher propensity in Durham to engage in these 
practices; a greater tendency among officers in Durham to understand, and 
therefore report, these practices as RJ; and/or the higher representation of 
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PCSOs, whose work disproportionately involves low-level conflict and youth 
deviance (O’Neill, 2014), in the sample of officers from Durham.  
While the quoted officer reported recording the offenders’ details, many 
police respondents did not always state how or if they recorded similar incidents 
with which they used comparable processes. Thus, it is possible that some such 
practices also took place without being recorded at all. As Padfield, et al. noted, 
the police often deliver ‘informal, “off the record” cautions’ (2012: 959) without 
recording the incident. Similarly, the police’s ‘peacekeeping’ activities – whereby 
they maintain order ‘by means of small and frequent interventions’ (Moor, et al., 
2009: 8) without invoking their legal powers – often go unrecorded (Banton, 1964; 
Wilson, 1968; Muir, 1977; Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Bittner, 1990; Skogan, 
2006; Meyer, et al., 2009). Given the speed and informality with which many 
street RJ processes were described by respondents (see Section 7.3), it is 
possible that some would have taken place entirely ‘off-the-record’. 
This also raises questions regarding what kind of police actions should 
constitute RJ. In the case of the elderly person’s house, as in many other cases 
of street RJ found by this and previous studies (see Chapters 3 and 7), the officer 
did not report facilitating a dialogic process. In fact, this respondent had earlier 
conflated RJ with informal resolutions, defining RJ as ‘putting the situation right 
without involving anybody in the criminal justice system’ (PCSOD6). Several 
other respondents seemed to understand RJ in a similar way, as encompassing 
almost any informal, diversionary practice. As was implicit in the recent studies 
described in Chapter 3, it seems that the concept of street RJ had blurred the 
boundary between RJ and informal police actions, and that many officers now 
understood certain peacekeeping activities as having been subsumed within a 
broad restorative framework (see Chapter 7 for more on this finding). 
Second of all, a smaller number of respondents also described organising 
and delivering conference-like practices without necessarily recording them. One 
example from Gloucestershire related to the loan and sale of a possession (which 
will not be disclosed to ensure the respondent’s anonymity): 
 
PCNPTG8: I did do one RJ which is completely off the criminal scale. […] I 
was contacted by somebody who had [x] on loan, who was having trouble 
getting it back or communicating with the person she’d lent it to. So, 
although it isn’t part of my role, I agreed for both of them to come in. They 
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both wanted to talk about the incident. […] When the lady had initially lent 
[x], she’d given the other person the indication that she could buy it off her. 
[Eventually] she did sell it to her. Last week they came in and signed an 
agreement. So, I did get that one sorted out. 
IDM: Did that get recorded as a Level 2? 
PCNPTG8: Not really, no. I didn’t create an incident. It wasn’t a crime. To 
be honest, it’s civil, but I wanted to help them out.  
 
Another officer reported using, but not recording, both street RJ and conferences: 
 
PCNPTG2: I use Level 2 and Level 1, and also informally with younger 
people at schools. 
IDM: The informal ones, are those recorded as community resolutions? 
PCNPTG2: No. […] For example, if there is an issue with the students that 
hasn't been reported as a crime or an incident, but the teachers want me to 
speak to them, I basically use the restorative justice script to speak to the 
students. […] The ones that happen in schools are more like pupil 
disagreements in the playground, or students that start to get on each 
other's nerves and they just wanna chat. That's it, it does work. […] The only 
Level 2 that I’ve done recently was a student-staff issue. It was just so they 
could facilitate having the two of them together to express their views and 
how it affected them in different ways. […] Basically, it could go down as an 
RJ 2, but not as a crime or incident. 
 
These data suggest either that some of these officers’ informal, day-to-day 
activities were shaped by the principles and processes of RJ, or, at the very least, 
that these activities were now understood as restorative. Without baseline data, 
we cannot know the extent to which the introduction of RJ had changed the way 
that the police negotiated order and resolved disputes and low-level cases. It may 
only be that these data indicate a shift in what Chan (1996: 113) referred to as 
‘dictionary knowledge, which provides definitions and labels of things and events 
in an organisation’ (emphasis in original). However, the above officers were not 
the only ones to suggest that they actively used their RJ training or the script to 
structure their response to these kinds of incidents. These data do seem to 
suggest that the introduction of RJ had both permeated the consciousnesses and 
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structured the informal activities of some officers in both areas. In this sense, 
these findings may also indicate a shift in ‘recipe knowledge, which prescribes 
what should or should not be done in specific situations’ (Chan, 1996: 113). 
Finally, one policymaker/manager from each force reported facilitating 
conference-style practices in response to conflicts among their colleagues. The 
details of these cases are mostly being withheld to ensure the respondents’ 
anonymity. It can be said, however, that the parties in one case were a senior 
officer and a member of police staff, and in the other case were a police officer 
and their line manager at an agency to which they were seconded. In both cases, 
the respondent described instigating and facilitating a dialogic process in 
accordance with their knowledge of RJ, with the aim of repairing strained 
relationships between the participants. As with the frontline officers quoted 
above, both these respondents expressed the view that their knowledge of RJ, 
gained primarily as a result of its implementation in their forces, shaped the way 
in which they had responded to these conflicts.  
 
 
5.6 The strategic goals of restorative policing 
 
All police policymakers/managers were asked about their organisations’ 
strategic goals with respect to implementing RJ. Overwhelmingly, their responses 
stressed two aims: to manage demand and to improve the service provided for 
victims. These correspond closely with national pressures, identified in Chapters 
2 and 3, relating to the police’s declining budgets and the growing expectations 
on the police to focus on victims’ needs. Moreover, these goals were expressed 
differently between the forces in ways which mirrored their implementation 
strategies. This section explores how these goals were understood and framed, 
and considers the possible tensions between them. 
In both forces, all policymakers/managers expressed a need to manage the 
demand on their services because of staff cuts. One from Durham stated: 
 
We’ve reduced our staff by a third, but the demand is still there. We’ve 
reduced our demand a little bit – crime has gone down year on year – but 
other things have changed, so we deal with a lot more concern for safety now 
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and other things. As other agencies are cut, [the public] call upon us more. 
(PPMMD2) 
 
Similarly, one respondent from Gloucestershire said: ‘We’ll probably be one-fifth 
lighter in resources in the next few years. We’ll have to look at all opportunities to 
reduce our demand’ (PPMMG3). Policymaker/manager respondents generally 
saw the implementation of RJ as an investment which would help their force 
respond to this pressure. They reported two main ways in which they believed that 
RJ could assist with demand management. Firstly, it could be used to resolve low-
level cases quickly and to avoid more resource-intensive processes (such as 
arrest). This reasoning more prominently featured within responses from 
Gloucestershire, where one policymaker/manager said: 
 
The big win from the police view is that a lot less police time is used. […] 
We’ve seen some quite significant drops in our custody usage [which] is 
quite expensive and labour intensive. (PPMMG3)  
 
Secondly, policymakers/managers argued that the effectiveness of RJ in reducing 
reoffending and resolving ongoing conflicts would reduce demand. This was more 
commonly argued in Durham, where one respondent asserted: 
 
If we target people who have had long running disputes and who repeatedly 
call on us, then that can be stemmed in maybe one or two meetings. Perhaps 
a lot of preparatory work before that and some work after the intervention, 
too, but I see a real role in terms of demand management. (PPMMD5) 
 
Another police policymaker/manager from Durham suggested that the savings 
which would flow from RJ implementation, lay partially in reducing reoffending: 
 
There’s strong evidence to say this works. It’s very difficult, with reducing 
budgets, for chiefs to say: ‘This is a thing I’m gonna push’. But if you 
implement it right and you use it to chip away and change the organisational 
culture, you can reduce some of your demand because you’ll have less 
victims. That means your cops are less busy, so there’s financial implications 
at the other end. (PPMMD1) 
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Both arguments in relation to the nature of demand management were made by 
policymakers/managers in both forces: in Durham, some lauded the speed of 
street RJ, while some in Gloucestershire hoped that RJ would diminish future 
demand by reducing reoffending or resolving conflicts. However, those in Durham 
tended to concentrate more on its effectiveness than those in Gloucestershire, 
where processing speed was more often highlighted. This finding reflected a 
stronger focus on conferencing in Durham’s implementation strategy, relative to 
that in Gloucestershire, where the greater emphasis on street RJ within the 
force’s strategy indicated the prioritisation of quick processing. It also supports 
an argument made in Chapter 3, namely that austerity may have helped to 
consolidate a trend towards the police’s use of informal disposals which were (or, 
at least, which were seen to be) restorative in nature. 
Policymakers/managers from both forces also stressed that the purpose of 
implementing RJ was to help victims. Again, this mirrored a general pressure on 
the police which existed across the jurisdiction, to be seen to improve the service 
which they provided for victims. Several respondents from Durham described this 
goal at length, framing it primarily in terms of the better outcomes which can be 
achieved for victims if they are enabled to participate: 
 
It’s to give the victim the opportunity to have their say, that’s at the heart of 
everything we do. […] [RJ] provides a much better process for the victim 
rather than going through the courts, the courts can be quite antiquated, quite 
strict. It’s an unfamiliar place. Whereas you can do RJ anywhere, we can do 
it in a fairly neutral venue, wherever they feel comfortable. I think that provides 
a much better outcome. (PPMMD2) 
 
Another policymaker/manager respondent from Durham reflected on RJ in terms 
of victim empowerment: 
 
It gives victims the voice that they’ve always deserved, to have an element of 
control when some feel that they haven’t had that voice in the criminal justice 
system. So, it’s empowered them to have a greater say. They are paramount 
in my opinion, and also in our vision for policing locally. (PPMMD4) 
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The desire to use RJ to improve the service for victims was also stated by 
respondents in Gloucestershire, albeit in terms which less explicitly indicated that 
this was tied to victim empowerment via their participation. One said: 
 
[RJ] is the right thing to do. The whole business about it being victim-centred 
has got to be the right thing to do. That to me has always been the driver, that 
we don’t impose things on people. (PPMMG1) 
 
Another described the notion of ‘victim focus’ in quite general terms, stating: 
 
The important thing is about working with victims and putting the focus on the 
victims of crime. For me, that’s where RJ should be, it should be focused on 
victims. […] It sounds a bit trite sometimes, but I think the main goal is about 
putting the victims at the heart of what we do. It’s as simple and as 
complicated as that. (PPMMG6) 
 
These findings build on research by Stockdale (2015: 222) who, having studied 
Durham Constabulary herself, hypothesised that police leaders may hold ‘nuanced 
understandings of the concept and philosophy of restorative justice’. Yet, the 
current study suggests that the extent to which this is true may differ between 
forces. While policymakers/managers in both forces expressed a normative 
attraction to RJ, those in Gloucestershire were less likely than those in Durham to 
contrast RJ, at a conceptual level, with traditional justice mechanisms. In Durham, 
these respondents discussed the victim’s ‘voice’ and ‘empowerment’ and the 
limitations of criminal justice; in Gloucestershire, they were more likely to talk in 
general and practical terms about the need for their existing work to be more 
‘victim-focused’. This means that senior leaders in Durham may have been 
anomalous in terms of their degree of understanding of the victim’s relative place 
in restorative and criminal justice. This finding also correlates with HMIC findings 
(2016) on victim satisfaction in each area. In the twelve months to December 2014, 
Durham was found to be the third best performing force in the country on this 
metric; Gloucestershire placed 37th out of 43.  
Furthermore, that managing demand and providing an improved service for 
victims were described as the two main strategic goals in both area is significant, 
as there may be something of a tension between them. Providing a responsive 
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service for victims by enabling their participation in discussions and decision-
making, may require an investment in time and resources which reduces the 
potential for short-term efficiency gains. Correspondingly, efforts to manage the 
demand on police time – especially through rapid case processing – may inhibit 
the police from meeting the needs of many victims.  
With this in mind, both forces’ strategies could be interpreted as an effort to 
balance (or, perhaps, to be seen to balance) these goals. Given the shrinking 
budgets in both areas and the role which community resolutions could play in 
demand management, the forces might have maximised their flexibility, as 
Gloucestershire did at first through the COPS disposal. Eventually, however, both 
forces required all community resolutions to be delivered ‘restoratively’. This may 
indicate a normative willingness to sacrifice some of the short-term efficiency gains 
of informal disposals in favour of enhancing victim participation. Alternatively, it 
may suggest that victims were being used to legitimise informal disposals, some 
of which, as Chapter 7 shows, may have deviated substantially from restorative 
principles and evidence-based processes.  
This latter interpretation would be consistent with the historic manipulation of 
victims by the police and other justice agencies, who sometimes use the veneer of 
helping victims to legitimise efforts to achieve other goals (Ashworth, 2000; 
Vynckier, 2009). Victims might be used ‘in the service of system efficiency’ 
(Crawford, 2000: 292), with the rhetoric of RJ intended to give the impression that 
‘something is being done for victims’ (Warner and Gawlik, 2003: 73) while, in 
practice, street RJ provides officers the discretion to shape processes, impose 
outcomes, and restrict victims’ participation to the extent which the officer sees fit 
(Cutress, 2015). Indeed, as noted in Chapter 3, the presence of conflicting goals 
which are not explicitly ranked, inherently affords frontline officers the discretion to 
determine what to prioritise in practice (Sanders, et al., 2010). At least in Durham, 
however, the strong promotion of dialogic approaches also seemed to be part of a 
broader drive to create a ‘restorative organisation’ which aimed to prioritise victims’ 
needs on largely normative grounds.  
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5.7 Using restorative justice to change force culture 
 
The data suggest that, at the instigation of its Chief Constable, restorative 
policing was implemented in Durham with the intention of changing the force’s 
culture. This contrasted with Gloucestershire, the data from which indicate that 
the desired cultural change was limited to providing victims with some input in 
informal disposals. This research lacks directly comparable baseline data, and 
thus cannot attest to whether either force’s culture had changed. However, by 
analysing the way(s) in which the prospects for cultural change were framed, it is 
possible further to gauge the differences between these forces’ strategies. 
The data indicate that, in Durham, the goal of using RJ to underpin cultural 
change was explicit, driven personally by the Chief Constable, and linked to the 
force’s expansive strategy. For example, a training syllabus stated that Barton 
personally determined the scale of the training programme in order ‘to promote 
Durham Constabulary becoming a Restorative Force’ (doc. D5: 11). He also 
reportedly decided that officers would be able to use RJ at all stages of the justice 
process as part of a broader push for cultural change throughout the area: 
 
The Chief had his vision to make County Durham and Darlington a totally 
restorative county. Throughout the victim’s journey, they would have access 
to an RJ intervention if they wished. (PPMMD1) 
 
Barton’s actions serve to highlight, as explained in Chapter 2, that a moral 
entrepreneur who occupies a senior leadership position within a police force can 
have significant influence over its strategies and policies. In this case, there 
seemed to be a direct relationship between the scope of the RJ project and 
Barton’s personal attraction and commitment to the concept.  
In fact, most respondents from Durham Constabulary, when asked for the 
main drivers of RJ in their force, mentioned Barton first. One officer, whose views 
were typical of their colleagues, stated: ‘It's the Chief, he's totally committed to 
[RJ], and I think that is a driving force for us. […] It's part of us now’ (PCSOD2). 
Likewise, another officer declared: 
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If you’ve been here more than a minute, you’ll know that we’ve got a very, 
very visible, vocal Chief Constable who, anything like this, he’s all over. He’s 
all about different thinking and challenging the way things are done. (POD3) 
 
This view was also held by policymakers/managers, one of whom responded to 
that question by stating: ‘Our Chief Constable would be the easy answer to that 
[laughter]. His passion is restorative approaches’ (PPMMD3). Similarly, another 
policymaker/manager said of Barton: 
 
He’s a very strong advocate of RA and, since coming to the county, I think 
he’s been a big voice internally and with our partners. I’d say he was the 
biggest driver behind it. (PPMMD5) 
 
Barton’s support for RJ was both strong and public. In a newspaper interview, for 
example, he claimed that, prior to the development of RJ, he would have been 
reluctant to advise a family member to contact the police if they were victimised 
(Morris, 2013; Northern Echo, 2014). In her study of Durham Constabulary, 
Stockdale acquired a copy of a letter from the Chief Constable to all members of 
staff which stated: ‘The reason we are taking so much care over restorative 
approaches is because it is so important to our vision’ (2015b: 120). Several 
frontline respondents to this study also reported personally observing his 
championing of RJ, including one who stated: 
 
There was a presentation given by the Chief Constable [about RJ], like a 
workshop. I think there were a few over a couple of years. It was good, he 
came about it in a good manner. […] I remember it was fun, because he 
made it, not fun, but easy to understand and remember. (PCSOD8) 
 
Barton’s actions in this regard accord with the evidence on how to achieve 
organisational change. This literature often suggests that visible support among 
senior leaders can help to minimise resistance to change (Bass, 1990; Watkins, 
2001), and that, in order to make change happen, leaders must communicate 
their vision to their organisation (Kotter, 2012). Kotter (2012) also notes that 
organisational change requires staff to be enabled to act upon the leadership’s 
vision – in this case, all officers in Durham were trained in RJ and barriers to its 
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use were minimised. The police literature also suggests that cultural change can 
emerge via the organisational priorities signified by senior leaders (Jones and 
Levi, 1983). As argued in Section 2.5, leadership priorities can represent the 
force’s ‘axiomatic knowledge’ (Chan, 1996: 113), providing a framework within 
which reform efforts can be interpreted, understood and acted upon. Similarly, a 
review of the empirical literature on Chief Constables found ‘creating a shared 
vision’ to be one of their key roles (Pearson-Goff and Herrington, 2014). In 
Gloucestershire, by comparison, the Chief Constable was only mentioned by two 
respondents who, in passing, stated that she was supportive of RJ. 
In Durham, the new axiomatic knowledge seemed to state, broadly 
speaking, that officers should prioritise victims’ needs and empower stakeholders 
to participate in problem-solving approaches. This is illustrated by Figure 5.1, 
taken from a slideshow which was used for Level 1 RJ training (doc. D2). The 
lesson plan for that session also referred to this diagram, stating: 
 
Trainer to explain that in essence Durham Constabulary is moving towards a 
restorative organisation and refer back to the circular diagram to reinforce the 
learning. Effectively this means that the principles of restorative approaches 
should be considered in everything we now do. (doc. D5: 13) 
 
The diagram explains the four main principles which the concept of a ‘restorative 
organisation’ was considered to encompass: 
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Figure 5.1 ‘A restorative organisation’ (doc. D2) 
 
Two aspects of this model require further analysis. Firstly, it includes problem-
solving – defined as ‘working with those involved to find solutions and reduce 
demand’ – as one of the four core features of a restorative organisation. This 
corresponds with the model of restorative policing developed by Weitekamp, et 
al. (2003) who framed stakeholder involvement in problem-solving as its central 
tenet (see also Bazemore and Boba, 2010). However, Weitekamp et al. (2003) 
also emphasised the proactive co-development of strategies for crime prevention. 
By stating that one should work with ‘those involved’ to ‘find solutions’, Durham’s 
model seems to imply that problem-solving would remain primarily reactive. This 
reflects how attempts to introduce problem-oriented policing more broadly tend 
to neglect the proactive elements of its original formulation (Boba and Crank, 
2008). As noted, the situational and cultural pressures on operational policing to 
focus on reactive activities, shapes the way that concepts like problem-solving 
and restorative policing are interpreted and applied in practice. 
Secondly, the model cites ‘victim focus’ as another core feature of a 
restorative organisation, defining this as ‘based on the victim’s need for 
answers/closure’. This suggests that dialogue with the offender may be the best 
way to meet victims’ needs, and frames those needs (i.e. for ‘answers/closure’) 
in a manner which broadly accords with the evidence on victim satisfaction with 
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RJ, as outlined in Chapter 3. However, this emphasis also reflects the politicised 
notion of RJ as a service for victims, as was also described in Chapter 3. Later 
chapters show that this idea pervaded both areas, and that this emphasis may 
have contributed to attitudes and practices which led to offenders’ needs and 
rights being neglected (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
In contrast to Durham, no documents from Gloucestershire Constabulary 
spoke of creating a ‘restorative organisation’, nor did any respondents make 
comments along those lines. This reflected Gloucestershire’s less ambitious 
strategy, in the sense that officers could only deliver RJ alongside community 
resolutions, non-operational staff were not trained in RJ, and much fewer officers 
were trained in conferencing than in Durham. At the strategic level, RJ seemed 
to be framed within Gloucestershire Constabulary exclusively as a policing ‘tool’, 
rather than as a normative framework with which to underpin cultural change. For 
example, in the foreword to their internal RJ guidelines, written by the Chief 
Constable, the first line states: ‘We have a duty to keep people safe from harm 
and to prevent and detect crime. Restorative Justice enables us to realise those 
aims’ (doc. G29: 2). This foreword – which was the only written indication of the 
Chief’s vision for RJ seen by the researcher – contrasted markedly with the 
rhetoric in Durham. It framed RJ as a mechanism through which their existing 
objectives could be fulfilled, rather than as a philosophy which could help to 
reframe the force’s understanding of its objectives. 
In fact, culture change was only discussed by policymakers/managers in 
Gloucestershire Constabulary with reference to the existing culture being a 
barrier to a more victim-focused approach. As one stated: 
 
The police are very good at knowing, in inverted commas, what’s right for 
the victim and then imposing that knowledge on the victim. It’s what we’ve 
always done. I think it’s a huge change of culture to actually ask victims what 
they want. (PPMMG6) 
 
Similarly, when asked about the challenges to RJ implementation, another 
respondent stated: 
 
I think there are some cultural issues because we, as a service, can be 
considered part of this big criminal justice machine. So, you become 
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institutionalised, process driven, and not looking at the humanity involved 
and the experience of the victim or perpetrator. (PPMMG5) 
 
In contrast, policymakers/managers in Durham spoke of an active effort to 
integrate RJ into the organisational culture. One stated: ‘To really, really bed it in, 
it’s a bit like lifting a carpet, you’ve got to have it as a foundation, which I think the 
Chief is aspiring to do’ (PPMMD5). Another stated of RJ: 
 
We try and get it engrained in the culture. […] It’s not a case of just 
implementing, it’s a constant implementation which goes on and on and on. 
So, you’ve gotta be tenacious, it never goes away. You just have to keep 
plugging away at it. (PPMMD1) 
 
The different priorities signified by these data further reflect the much higher 
aspiration for RJ in Durham, relative to the more modest approach found in 
Gloucestershire. In Gloucestershire, RJ was essentially framed as a marginal 
improvement on existing methods; in Durham, it was hoped that RJ could underpin 
a much broader organisational change. 
Questions remain, however, as to how likely Durham’s approach was to result 
in cultural change. Mastrofski (2004) believed that police cultures and working 
practices can change if a leader motivates their officers to act in accordance with 
a set of organisational values, rather than according to the self-interest which 
motivates employees under performance cultures. However, the ‘top-down’ 
imposition of RJ may inspire resistance or disengagement among officers who are 
disinclined towards the concept, who did not feel included in the change process, 
or who otherwise consider the leadership or strategy to be illegitimate (Braithwaite, 
2009; Clamp and Paterson, 2013). Moreover, a force’s leadership can only have 
so much impact on practices, as its strategies do not affect the setting in which 
policework takes place (Cockcroft, 2014). To the extent that the police’s ways of 
working emerge from the social context in which operational policing takes place 
(i.e. its ‘field’), changes to strategies may have a limited impact on practices (Chan, 
1996). Indeed, the ‘field’ of policing may create and inform cultures and agendas 
among frontline officers, which are not shared by senior leaders (Paoline, 2003; 
Marks, 2007). These factors may result in a ‘loose coupling’ of strategies, policies 
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and practices (Maguire and Katz, 2002: 504) – the relationship between which 
can only be determined through the empirical analysis of all three. 
 
 
5.8 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter explored the contours and detail of each force’s RJ strategies. 
In both areas, the statistics on the police’s training and use of RJ, the prominence 
afforded RJ strategies, and the way in which RJ had been integrated into police 
disposals (and, seemingly, frontline officers’ peacekeeping activities), all suggest 
that RJ had been largely mainstreamed. This is not to say that strategies, policies 
and practices necessarily adhered to RJ principles and processes, as defined by 
researchers. Rather, it is to assert that, in one form or another, the concept and 
practice of RJ was well-established and embedded in each force.  
This is significant if, as Oliver argued in relation to community policing, 
‘when the policy becomes normed, it is considered to be an institutionalised 
policy’ (2000: 374). The data presented so far suggest that, as RJ was integrated 
into force strategies, it was interpreted and framed in ways which accorded with 
existing personal and organisational priorities. In both areas, strategies reflected 
national pressures pertaining to managing demand and improving the service 
provided for victims. In Durham, a more holistic understanding of RJ and a 
willingness to innovate among policymakers and managers, seemed to be linked 
to the greater emphasis on dialogic approaches and to the interpretation of RJ as 
a normative framework with which to underpin cultural change. Yet, even this 
strategic model largely emphasised demand management, victim satisfaction 
and reactive policing strategies. These findings build on arguments made in the 
first three chapters, insofar as each force’s RJ strategies reflected some of the 
goals, priorities and rationales which characterised the institutional context in 
which they were set and implemented. The extent of any relationship between 
the institutional context and the interpretation and use of RJ in practice, can be 
further examined by analysing force policies and their possible implications for 
police-led RJ practices.  
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Chapter 6 – Structuring operational discretion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Both forces implemented a series of policies and other mechanisms to enact 
their RJ strategies and structure their officers’ discretion with respect to offering 
and delivering RJ. This included rules on when and how RJ could be offered, 
authorisation and monitoring processes, and scripts and other guidance and 
support which aimed to encourage or prevent certain behaviours and approaches 
to facilitation. These policies seemed to be mostly enabling, flexible and limited 
in their enforceability, especially given the discretion afforded police officers by 
the low visibility of RJ delivery. Still, the data suggest that some of their features 
may have shaped how the police interpreted, framed and used RJ. This chapter 
discusses the ways and the extent to which operational police discretion was 
structured by organisational policies, establishing in particular the implications of 
integrating RJ primarily into the community resolution disposal. 
The first section analyses how RJ was defined in each force’s guidelines. 
Subsequently, the chapter considers force policies in relation to the process by 
which RJ was offered and delivered. The second section examines how the 
decision to offer RJ was regulated. The third and fourth sections ask how the 
forces attempted to structure the processes by which RJ was offered and 
delivered, before the final section considers the guidance in relation to outcome 
agreements. Throughout, the chapter seeks to identify the likely implications of 
these policies for participants, with reference to the empirical police literature.  
 
 
6.2 Defining restorative justice in policy 
 
Both forces’ RJ guidelines began by defining the term (docs. D8; G29). 
Differences therein were largely consistent with each force’s strategies. For 
example, Durham’s guidance portrayed RJ as involving either dialogue between 
the victim and the offender or, at least, their active involvement in the process: 
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An RA intervention is any process in which the victim and the offender 
actively participate together in the resolution of matters arising from harm.  
(doc. D8: 1) 
 
This definition is perhaps not explicitly dialogic, insofar as the term ‘actively 
participate’ does not expressly require the parties to communicate (although it is 
immediately followed by the word ‘together’). Directly underneath this definition, 
however, the guidance provided the explicitly dialogic definition of RJ used by the 
MoJ (see Section 3.3). Below this, it also stated: 
  
The purpose of the RA is not to discuss ‘WHAT’ happened. The purpose 
and focus of the RA is to discuss HOW IT MAKES PEOPLE FEEL – the 
effect on them, their families and the broader community. (doc. D8: 1, 
emphasis in original) 
 
These data suggest that Durham adopted an approach which largely resembled 
what Chapter 1 described as ‘purist’, insofar as RJ was characterised primarily 
by stakeholder dialogue. In contrast, practitioner guidance in Gloucestershire 
portrayed RJ in a much broader way, stating: 
 
Restorative Justice (RJ) provides for a victim focused resolution to a crime 
or non-crime incident, holding offenders directly accountable to their victims. 
(doc. G29: 2) 
 
This, like ACPO’s definition (2011), incorporates notions of ‘direct accountability’ 
and ‘victim-focus’ in lieu of detailing the precise nature of the RJ process. As 
described in Chapter 3, the significance of this approach lies in its political 
implications and in its breadth. With respect to the former, this definition cultivates 
the narrative that RJ is for victims; Durham’s is more balanced in its approach 
towards the participants. With respect to the latter, Gloucestershire’s approach is 
more flexible and could encompass a wider variety of practices which do not 
require the parties to communicate, or otherwise to participate actively. Relative 
to the definition used in Durham, Gloucestershire’s emphasis on RJ being ‘victim 
focused’ is somewhat closer to the ‘maximalist’ characterisation of RJ as the 
repairing of harm, although it does not state this explicitly. 
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These differences are consistent with what Chapter 5 showed to be the 
differing emphasis which each force’s strategy and training placed on dialogic 
approaches. Although Gloucestershire’s guidance later described RJ as ‘face to 
face justice’ (doc. G29: 2), this was not explained in a manner which clearly 
indicated that RJ required stakeholder dialogue. As with ACPO’s guidelines, their 
definition exemplified the flexibility with which the police’s policies are often 
worded (McBarnet, 1981; McConville, et al., 1991) and the tendency for justice 
agencies to define RJ non-dialogically to encompass other practices which they 
wish to frame as ‘restorative’ for other reasons (Warner and Gawlik, 2003; Doolin, 
2007). As Daly (2016) noted, however, the risk is that this dilutes and muddies 
the concept, making it harder to operationalise for empirical study, and enabling 
practitioners to interpret it more or less however they want.  
These definitions also conformed with the understandings of RJ expressed 
by policymakers/managers, all of whom were asked what RJ meant to them. The 
following quotation epitomised responses to this question from Durham: 
 
My understanding of RJ is that it gives empowerment to the victim to outline 
how the particular incident has impacted on their lives, and to share that 
experience with the person who is the harmer, who committed the incident 
or offence. Also, for them to get an understanding of how it has impacted 
on the victim and how they can share the emotions and the actual impact in 
terms of the life changing experience that some people have. Then, for the 
perpetrator or harmer to have an opportunity to make amends in relation to 
the behaviour and to address and learn from it. (PPMMD4) 
 
This emphasis on communication between victims and offenders contrasted with 
equivalent respondents from Gloucestershire, who tended to describe RJ in more 
pragmatic, flexible terms: 
 
I think there’s a couple of ways of looking at it. I suppose the more purist view, 
if you like, is bringing two people or groups of people together to have a 
conversation about repairing harm and some sort of reparation. That works 
really well. But I think we also have to take a pragmatic and realistic view that 
sometimes it isn’t possible to bring people together. We have to look at how 
we can achieve the repairing of the harm in a victim-focused, victim-centred 
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way, but in a more pragmatic, realistic way that can be used by operational 
police. (PPMMG6) 
 
Again, respondents from both forces expressed both views. Some in Durham 
alluded to the need for pragmatic approaches, and some in Gloucestershire, like 
the respondent above, also made reference to dialogic approaches. However, 
policymakers/managers in Durham typically emphasised dialogue to a much 
greater extent than their counterparts in Gloucestershire, mirroring the forces’ 
strategies and written definitions of RJ.  
This congruence between definitions, strategies and the expressed 
understandings and priorities of policymakers/managers, seems to provide a 
relatively clear indication as to what it was hoped that RJ might look like in 
practice in each force. In Durham, it was anticipated that RJ would involve either 
stakeholder dialogue or some other form of active participation in the process. 
Policymakers/managers in Gloucestershire, meanwhile, took a looser view of RJ, 
in which its purpose was largely to obtain something for the victim. However, 
written framings of this kind often represent ideals, rather than necessarily what 
is genuinely expected to take place in practice (Bridgman and Davis, 2004). 
Whether either force’s policies structured police decision-making sufficiently to 
enact these visions, remains to be seen.  
 
 
6.3 Structuring the decision to offer restorative justice 
 
Each force sought to structure their officers’ decision-making with respect 
to when to offer RJ. This section outlines officers’ discretion to determine which 
cases were eligible and suitable. It also considers the implications of these 
policies and their enforceability, given the low visibility of the offering process. 
Firstly, neither force allowed its officers to use RJ unless the suspect 
admitted responsibility. Durham’s guidance stated: 
 
In the case of a crime there must be a clear and reliable admission of guilt. 
[…] In the case of a non-crime incident the offender fully accepts 
responsibility for the offending behaviour. (doc. D8: 2) 
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Gloucestershire’s guidance similarly stated that ‘the offender must fully admit the 
offence’ (doc. G29: 5) for RJ to be used, though it did not specify whether this 
also applied to non-crime incidents. These provisions reflect the fact that police 
disposals cannot legally be imposed on suspects who deny guilt (Padfield, et al., 
2012). This is also a common form of risk management within RJ, based on the 
assumption that secondary victimisation is less likely if the accused party admits 
responsibility (Restorative Justice Council, 2011). 
Yet, the existing research suggests that these rules would not necessarily 
have prevented confessions from being extracted, nor disposals from being 
imposed on those who did not confess. The low visibility of the offering process 
meant that abuses would be both difficult to prevent or to identify retrospectively. 
Frontline respondents from both forces reported that they usually offered RJ to 
suspects on the street, in shops or in their homes – often without anybody else 
present. Consequently, suspects would not have had access to a lawyer, and the 
visibility of the process may have been as low or lower than with other OOCDs. 
Studies have found that the police sometimes coerce false confessions for 
cautions (Sanders, et al., 2010), make illegal threats about the withdrawal of 
diversionary options (McConville and Hodgson, 1993) and caution juvenile 
suspects based on confessions which did not occur (Evans, 1993). Officers’ 
incentives and ability to engage in these kinds of abuses might have been 
particularly acute in the many cases where RJ was being offered as a diversion 
from a lengthier or more resource-intensive process.  
Secondly, the forces provided slightly different evidential tests for the use of 
RJ (which, it must be remembered, was the only community resolution disposal 
in either area). Durham’s guidance stated that an admission of guilt to an offence 
had to be ‘supported by corroborative evidence, secured under the protection of 
PACE’ (doc. D8: 2). This actually exceeds the evidential requirements for a 
charge which, for adult suspects without mental vulnerabilities, can occur based 
on a confession alone (Sanders, et al, 2010). Gloucestershire’s guidance stated 
that the officer ‘must ensure that the points to prove for the offence are covered 
and that the Full Code Test is met’ (doc. G29: 5-6). This cites the legal criteria for 
a charge (i.e. the Full Code Test) directly, in that there must be a ‘realistic 
prospect of conviction’ and prosecution must be ‘in the public interest’ (Crown 
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Prosecution Service, 2013: 6-7). It was not clear if Durham intentionally did not 
require prosecution to be in the public interest in order for their officers to use RJ.  
Again, the low visibility of the decision-making process may have enabled 
deviations from these rules. Although Durham’s guidance required suspects to 
be afforded the protections of PACE, the police can extract information from 
suspects before or without clarifying these rights (Sanders, et al., 2010). 
McConville (1993) found that the police often cease gathering evidence upon a 
suspect’s confession and proceed on that basis alone, while Hoyle, et al. (2002) 
observed that restorative cautions were often delivered in cases where there 
probably was not enough evidence to prosecute. With respect to Penalty Notices 
for Disorder (which, like street RJ, are usually delivered on the street), a review 
discovered ‘a lack of consistency in respect of evidential requirements’ (Kraina 
and Carroll, 2006: 8). Moreover, while Gloucestershire’s Level 1 RJ recording 
form (docs. G10, 11) required officers to provide a written summary of evidence, 
the police can construct records so that practices which did not observe policy 
requirements, appeared to do so (McConville, et al., 1991). All of this suggests 
that adherence to rules of this kind may vary as officers decide how to exercise 
their low visibility discretion. This permits officers to discriminate and to breach or 
withhold suspects’ rights to achieve police-defined goals (McConville, et al., 
1991; Choongh, 1998; Bowling and Phillips, 2007). 
The remaining eligibility criteria at both forces were outlined in Chapter 5. In 
Durham, the police were encouraged to consider offering RJ in response to all 
offence types – irrespective of whether or not charges were brought – although 
they had to request permission from thematic managers to utilise it with certain 
serious offences. Some policymakers/managers in Durham justified this level of 
operational discretion on the basis that they wanted to enable their officers to take 
risks and respond to victims’ needs. One stated: 
 
This has to be centred around the victim, nothing else really matters. It 
doesn’t matter what the situation is. […] I think our policies are loose quite 
rightly, so that it gives our officers that confidence to really go out on a limb in 
the interests of the victim. (PPMMD2) 
 
In Gloucestershire, officers’ discretion to offer RJ was theoretically unrestricted, 
as any case could be referred to Restorative Gloucestershire. As noted, however, 
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few officers were aware of this possibility and referrals were almost non-existent. 
This illustrates how the discretion to offer RJ was structured as much by officers’ 
knowledge of policy, as by its detail. For example, one frontline officer described 
a case in which they thought RJ would be useful, but which was too serious to 
receive a community resolution, the only disposal alongside which the police in 
Gloucestershire could deliver RJ themselves. When asked if they would offer RJ 
in addition to a charge, they stated: 
 
There's no facility at all for me to do that. Who would I suggest that to, the 
magistrates? The Crown Court? The Chief Constable? The head of the CPS 
[Crown Prosecution Service]? It ain't gonna happen. (POG4) 
 
Officers in Gloucestershire could only facilitate RJ if the offence was below a 
particular level of seriousness and if the offender satisfied criteria with respect to 
their offending history. Under certain circumstances (already outlined in Section 
5.3), officers could seek authorisation from a Sergeant or Inspector to use RJ in 
cases which did not satisfy these criteria. These restrictions were linked to the 
fact that RJ could only be used with community resolutions – the lowest outcome 
within the police disposals framework. Previously, officers had been perceived to 
misuse community resolutions by using them with repeat offenders: 
 
What happened was that [officers] think ‘it’s easy, have another one’. It may 
be what that victim wants, they’ve nicked a bottle of vodka or whatever and 
that’s the easy option for everyone at that time. But what about the next victim, 
or the one after that? You have to give some consideration to that I think, 
because we are being victim-focused with the victim at the time, but we also 
have to have an eye on what’s coming down the line. So there has to be a 
framework for officers to apply it, otherwise everyone would just get an RJ 
[i.e. a community resolution]. (PPMMG6) 
 
This illustrates one of the tensions created by the integration of RJ into community 
resolutions. All OOCDs already require police officers to balance the participants’ 
private interests in avoiding court and the broader public interest in prosecuting 
repeat offenders (Bui, 2015). In Durham and Gloucestershire, however, this was 
further complicated because community resolutions technically could not be used 
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without the victim’s consent. In both forces, this meant that an offender whose 
actions warranted an informal disposal was reliant on their victim to consent to 
this outcome. In Gloucestershire, meanwhile, potentially suitable victims might 
not have been able to access RJ if their offender did not qualify for an informal 
disposal. In this sense, the operation of restorative policing was shaped by the 
manner of its integration into the disposals framework. 
The data also suggest that there was some confusion in relation to eligibility 
frameworks, and that this may have acted as a further barrier to the use of RJ. In 
Durham, all interviewees seemingly understood that they could consider using 
RJ in response to any situation. One typical respondent stated: 
 
Obviously, every officer is trained in it now in Durham, so they can utilise that 
as a disposal for adults and juveniles. It doesn’t matter how many convictions 
they’ve got, if it’s appropriate, we can use it. (POD2) 
 
Though no respondents from Durham reported being uncertain in relation to force 
policy, an internal report from October 2014 stated that mixed messages during 
training resulted in ‘much confusion as to when it is appropriate to use RA’ (doc. 
D11: 4). The role of police trainers in potentially reinterpreting or misinterpreting 
force policies within training is well documented (Conti, 2011; Constable and 
Smith, 2015). In Durham, this could have resulted, firstly, in some officers not 
realising the extent of their discretion in relation to instigating RJ and, secondly, 
in victims and offenders being afforded unequal access to the service. 
In Gloucestershire, where the eligibility framework was substantially more 
complicated than in Durham, several police respondents spoke of uncertainty with 
respect to this policy, including one who asked: 
 
At what point can we go down this route of restorative justice because of the 
pre-convictions our harmer has? That's still quite blurred and was blurred at 
the time [of the training]. You know, at what point is he completely excluded 
from an RJ which is related to the area of acquisitive crime? (PCNPTG6) 
 
It may be that the training this officer received had not been especially clear, or 
that the ambiguity within Gloucestershire’s framework had created confusion for 
those who expected there to be clearer rules. Indeed, one policymaker/manager 
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reported that a colleague had observed a discrepancy between what a trainer 
was telling officers and the force’s policies: 
 
The training department, or the particular trainer [was] saying somebody 
would be eligible for RJ if they had previous offending, when it was clearly 
stated that they shouldn’t be in the document. (PPMMG4) 
 
In fact, Gloucestershire’s guidance actually stated that offenders with convictions 
‘should not normally’ be offered RJ, but that ‘in exceptional cases’ this could be 
authorised by an Inspector (doc. G29: 5). This suggests that neither quoted 
respondent had fully grasped the nuances of force policy on this issue. Again, 
this could have had consequences for access to RJ. 
Similarly, managers’ involvement in authorising the use of RJ may have had 
implications for the consistency with which it was made available. For example, 
the need to obtain managerial approval might have deterred officers from using 
RJ by adding an additional stage to the process (Shapland, et al., 2017). That 
being said, these rules might have been largely ‘presentational’ and provided little 
more than the illusion of monitoring (Smith and Gray, 1985: 441-2). Consistent 
with the police management literature discussed in Chapter 2 (Brown, 1988; 
Shearing and Powditch, 1992), little evidence was found to suggest that the 
decision to offer RJ was closely supervised by line managers. Indeed, only one 
officer from Gloucestershire (and none from Durham) reported ever having been 
denied authorisation to use RJ, while some from Gloucestershire suggested that 
cases were not always reviewed closely before being authorised: 
 
It's a little bit embarrassing sometimes, you have to ring up the Sarge and 
say: ‘Hello Sarge, it’s [name], I’ve got a scenario’. ‘It's alright, just get on 
with it, mate.’ ‘Yeah, but I've gotta ask.’ (POG4) 
 
This authorisation process might also have resulted in the inconsistent use of RJ 
if managers differed in their views as to when RJ was and was not appropriate. 
One policymaker/manager stated: ‘You can have five shift Sergeants who all 
have a different opinion on where RJ is appropriate’ (PPMMG4). Similarly, one 
officer stated with respect to the authorisation process: 
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It depends on the supervisor. Some are open to change, others might be a 
year off retirement and can't get their head around [RJ], they think it's a soft 
option. […] Sometimes, you'll go to a Sergeant or an Inspector, and they'll say: 
‘Yeah, RJ is proportionate. Though they've had punishments in the past, I'm 
not gonna prosecute for a 50p Mars bar because it isn't proportionate, it's not 
in the public interest, it costs the taxpayer to take him to court. I'll support you.’ 
But you go through another one, they're old school, and they might say: ‘No, 
throw the book at them. Although it's a 50p Mars bar, theft is theft. They’ve had 
opportunities in the past, they've gone to court before, so we're not going 
backwards, we'll take him to court.’ That's life, that’s just the type of job it is. 
There's a hierarchical system. (POG2) 
 
This illustrates how, under Gloucestershire’s policies, restorative policing could 
also be shaped by managerial discretion. Different Sergeants’ decisions might 
have depended on their working credos, attitudes and other factors, possibly 
affecting citizens’ access to RJ and to informal disposals. 
Of course, the potential for inconsistent decision-making also existed in the 
many cases for which authorisation was not required, and in which officers were 
empowered to determine whether to offer RJ alongside a community resolution 
(or, in Durham, another outcome). In these cases, officers were free to make 
these decisions in accordance with the police’s cultural traits and working rules, 
and their own personal attitudes and values. This may have contributed to 
inconsistencies regarding when RJ was offered. One officer described how 
victims might be seen and treated differently by different officers: 
 
Discretion comes into it, because I get some people ring me up and say: ‘I'm 
a victim of crime, every time I go on Facebook, someone insults me.’ I say: 
‘Well, don’t go on Facebook then!’ […] So, some victims are not really victims 
[laughter] and the organisation would kill me for saying that, but all the time 
we're sorting the chaff from the wheat. That's open to all sorts of 
interpretations because what one officer considers to be a substantive crime, 
another might not. […] You can't legislate for that. It comes down to us being 
human beings. (PCNPTG6) 
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As Chapters 2 and 3 suggested, the discretion to treat victims and offenders 
differently and in accordance with the police’s working rules and subjective 
judgements, may have had implications for fairness with respect to access to RJ 
and informal disposals. Victims may have been more or less likely to be offered 
RJ depending on the nature of their complaint, or the social group to which the 
officer perceived them to belong (McConville, et al., 1991). As the next chapter 
suggests, suspects might have been subjected to the ‘attitude test’ (Warburton, 
et al., 2005: 122), under which perceived disrespect towards the police might 
mean that officers are more likely to escalate cases (see also Worden, et al., 
1996; Carrington and Schulenberg, 2003). Officers’ discretion may also have 
permitted them to use informal disposals or non-dialogic processes in cases 
where a more intensive or formal intervention might have been more suitable. 
Indeed, both forces were castigated in the media for using community resolutions 
in serious cases: an attack on an elderly man in Gloucestershire, which left him 
with broken bones (Dean, 2015), and an incident of domestic violence in Durham, 
in which the offender later murdered the victim (Beckford and Taylor, 2014). 
Nonetheless, low visibility discretion meant that officers could, for the most part, 
determine how and when to use different forms of RJ.  
Finally, both forces attempted to structure the decision to offer RJ through 
record monitoring and feedback. In Durham, the precise nature of any role played 
by the force’s performance management team was not stated within the data. 
However, officers were required to justify, on every crime record, the decision to 
offer RJ or not. One policymaker/manager explained that this was introduced in 
relation to the aim of cultural change: 
 
You have to provide a rationale as to the ‘why not?’ as well as the ‘why?’, 
which is really important, because you’re trying to land a whole philosophy 
about where we're going as an organisation. (PPMMD2) 
 
This reasoning is supported by evidence that recording processes can encourage 
practitioners to reflect on why they make certain decisions (Rosen, et al., 1995; 
McIntosh, et al., 2004). Davis (1996) similarly argued that police discretion could 
be steered by encouraging additional reflection on why certain decisions are or 
should be made. To encourage this kind of reflection, DNR’s volunteer facilitators 
were required to complete personal development portfolios (doc. D16). 
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In Durham, officers’ written rationales were monitored by the RJ Manager 
who, quarterly, reviewed a random sample of 150 records, including some from 
each police area. According to one policymaker/manager, the purpose of this 
exercise was partially to assess officers’ reasoning behind the use of RJ: 
 
Officers [need to] understand the rationale as to why they have done an RA 
and to document that in a simple, straightforward fashion so we can look at 
it, and we can pull off the performance stats around the teams and the 
outliers, the ones that are doing really well and those that aren’t. (PPMMD1) 
  
The guidelines also state that the requirement to record the rationale is ‘not meant 
to be an onerous bureaucracy’, but ‘should’ include information about whether 
‘the victim is fearful of the perpetrator’, the ‘willingness of the victim to engage’, a 
‘summary of research’ and the ‘determination of the suitability fo the RA’ (doc. 
D8: 3). This further indicates that the aim was to encourage officers to reflect on 
why RJ might or might not be suitable in different cases.  
The reasoning behind the retrospective monitoring of this decision seemed 
to differ in Gloucestershire, data from which implied that the priority was to ensure 
that eligibility rules had been adhered to. All electronic crime records were 
reviewed by the Incident Assessment Unit (IAU). Alongside the RJ Manager, who 
reviewed all handwritten RJ records, the IAU monitored adherence to eligibility 
rules. One policymaker/manager described this process: 
 
[The IAU] would say: ‘Don’t forget that needs an Inspector’s authority’, or: 
‘That person has five previous, you shouldn’t be doing that’. Or, in some 
cases: ‘The RJ Manager needs to intervene’. That’s where he has a direct 
intervention with an officer. […] That experience is used to educate the 
officer so that they don’t make the same mistakes again’ (PPMMG6) 
 
The only police facilitator who discussed this process stated: 
 
The form gets sent off, and you only tend to know about it if it's not been 
correct, when you get an email by somebody that says it's not appropriate to 
use RJ here. […] So, you might have an RJ outcome, and gone back and 
gone: ‘Oh no, they've already had two of these before’. (POG5) 
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Gloucestershire did not require the police to record their rationale for using RJ on 
the Level 1 recording form (docs. G10, 11). The guidance (doc. G29) stated that 
a decision rationale was required to refer cases for conferencing, although it was 
not clear from the data either what this required, or whether or by whom this was 
reviewed or for what purpose. It seems that Gloucestershire’s stricter and more 
numerous rules were accompanied by a more quantitative monitoring process, 
informed by the desire to ensure compliance with rules. In Durham, in contrast, 
the decision to use RJ (or not) seemed to be recorded and monitored in a more 
qualitative manner. This aligns with broader force strategies: by training many of 
its officers in conferencing and all its staff in RJ principles, Durham placed more 
emphasis than Gloucestershire on developing a deep understanding of RJ across 
the force. This reflects what McLeod (2003: 364) described as a ‘quality approach 
to public administration’ which focuses on ‘means and principles over rules and 
regulations’. She believed that this approach would characterise police forces 
during the transition from bureaucratic to restorative organisations. 
Questions remain regarding the extent to which these monitoring processes 
structured officers’ discretion in practice. In Gloucestershire, for example, officers 
may have received feedback when they used RJ in cases of repeat offending, in 
which case the crime would not be recorded as having been detected. Whether 
this provided a strong disincentive to breach the policies, however, is unclear. As 
one policymaker/manager stated: ‘I wouldn’t say it’s necessarily acted upon 
because the same things come up time and time again’ (PPMMG4). Another 
noted that an officer could be banned from using RJ, if they breached the rules 
too often. This might represent a ‘big stick sanction’ (McBarnet, 2001: 17) rather 
than just ‘words of advice’, although it was reported that this had never happened. 
In Durham, the consequences of poor performance were described as feedback 
to supervisors and to officers; no specific sanctions were discussed.  
Some of Gloucestershire’s eligibility rules may have been especially difficult 
to enforce. Detecting when RJ was used with someone with a criminal history is 
one thing; detecting its use with an offence which was too serious to qualify would 
be much more difficult, as the police can often select which from several offences 
to record (Westmarland, et al., 2017). Case records, including offence type, can 
be ‘constructed’ to comply with bureaucratic and legal requirements, rather than 
necessarily to reflect what happened (Ericson, 1981; McConville, et al., 1991). 
The police can also disguise their deviations from procedural requirements in 
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relation to arrest (Waddington, 1999b) and stop and search (Delsol and Shiner, 
2006; Miller, 2010; Murray, 2014; Bridges, 2015), which are equally invisible 
processes. Receiving feedback on one’s practice might simply incentivise an 
officer to manipulate future records to avoid being caught, rather than to change 
their practice. As Christie noted, policing ‘leaves little trace on paper, if the police 
so wish [making] control from above close to impossible’ (1982: 86). Ultimately, 
the low visibility of the decision to offer RJ meant that it was mostly discretionary 
– as was the process by which the offer of RJ was made.  
 
 
6.4 Structuring the offering process 
 
Each force attempted to structure the process by which the offer of RJ was 
extended, once the decision had been made to do so. However, the policies 
which were introduced for this purpose were mostly flexible and difficult to 
enforce, given the lack of supervision and the discretion which accompanied the 
low visibility of the process. This section analyses the rules relating to coercing 
participation and informing suspects about the potential for disclosure, and the 
(limited) guidance in relation to which forms of RJ should be offered. 
Both forces’ guidelines outlined specific rules on obtaining participant 
consent. Durham’s stated: 
 
Participation in RA must always be voluntary for all parties and in particular, 
the victim or harmed. The victim or harmed person must never be coerced or 
be involved in this process against their wishes. (doc. D8: 2) 
 
Gloucestershire’s guidance similarly required officers to ensure that victims 
‘should never be (or be made to feel) coerced into agreeing to participate’, while 
the offender ‘must not be coerced or forced into taking part’ (doc. G29: 4-5). 
Although both documents seem to provide an unequivocal right to voluntariness 
for both parties, they both emphasised the victim above the offender. Alongside 
the broader rhetoric around being victim-focused and RJ being for victims, these 
provisions were open to being interpreted as indicating that voluntariness was 
more important for victims than it was for offenders. 
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Nonetheless, data from both areas implied that officers had used coercive 
tactics or pressured victims into participating in RJ. One policymaker/manager 
from Gloucestershire said of case records that they had seen: 
 
In the way that a crime resolution is written up, the underlying tone is that 
we as police officers have gone out and said: ‘We’re going to do this’. 
(PPMMG4) 
 
In Durham, one member of staff from the PCC’s office said that the police had 
been found to coerce victims in situations of shoplifting: 
 
There are examples where it has been done really badly, where store 
managers have seen someone coming in and hammering the place, and 
they’ve just been told: ‘We’re going to do an RA’. (PCCD2) 
 
A small number of police facilitators from both forces also indicated that they had 
coerced or imposed RJ on one or both participants. For example, one implied 
that they had framed RJ so as not to give the offender any choice, stating that 
they would ‘see the harmer, get an admission, and tell them that’s how we’re 
going to deal with it’ (PCNPTD1). This quotation also suggests that, in a further 
violation of force policy, corroborating evidence might not have been collected. 
Another officer claimed to be aware of two cases where victims had been coerced 
by other officers. In one, the respondent felt that the victim had, in their view, been 
‘railroaded’ into accepting a letter of apology (PCSOG2). A third respondent 
implied that they had taken several young children to apologise to an elderly 
person without first obtaining the victim’s consent: 
 
We knocked on the door – you can imagine her horror seeing these three 
kids standing there – and I said: ‘Hang on, it’s ok, they’ve got something 
they want to say to you’. All three boys apologised to her immediately. 
(PCSOD6)  
 
As noted in Chapter 3, these approaches might reduce the potential effectiveness 
of RJ if the process was seen as imposed (Tyler, 2006, 2006b). Furthermore, to 
the extent that voluntariness acts as a safeguard – both to prevent victim 
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(re)traumatisation, and to prevent OOCDs being imposed on suspects who are 
not legally guilty – these findings could be problematic. For example, in the case 
of the elderly woman, the officer seemingly had not spoken to the victim before 
bringing them face-to-face with the offenders. This meant that the officer may not 
have confirmed whether this was a one-off incident or ongoing problem, explored 
the possibility that the offenders were known to the victim, or assessed the 
victim’s emotional state. Though the incident in question was, in theory, relatively 
minor (objects being thrown against a house without causing damage), some 
elderly or vulnerable victims could suffer fear or trauma disproportionate to the 
offence (Davis and Friedman, 1985). This might mean that they are not suitable 
for RJ – or, at least, that sensitive preparation would be needed in advance 
(Chapman, 2012). This officer’s strategy, therefore, was both risky and contrary 
to the principle of voluntariness. That some such cases may not have involved 
direct contact between the parties may reduce the risk of victim retraumatisation, 
albeit while still breaching their right to decline to participate. 
That this process was not supervised, meant that the extent to which RJ 
was presented to prospective participants as voluntary largely depended on how 
officers decided to exercise their discretion when offering it. The discretionary 
nature of this decision meant that the offering process may have been influenced 
by police culture, working rules, and organisational pressures and priorities. For 
example, that all community resolutions had to be delivered as RJ might have 
incentivised the officer to put pressure on the parties to agree, if officers sought 
to process cases quickly. As the next chapter shows, there were cases in which 
officers wanted to use an informal resolution, but the agreement of one or both 
parties was not forthcoming. The use of pressure in these cases would be in line 
with the implicit or explicit wielding of authority to maximise efficiency when 
resolving low-level disputes and offences (Reiner, 2010). Additionally, the officer 
who stated that ‘some victims are not really victims’ (PCNPTG6) might have been 
inclined to put pressure on those who insisted on making a formal complaint, but 
whose cases the officer felt should not be escalated further. This would be 
consistent with the treatment of ‘rubbish’ victims whose complaints are not seen 
as important by the police (Reiner, 2010). Another officer stated:  
 
A lot of the time, where you're dealing with a reasonable person as the victim, 
with balanced and reasonable firmness of mind or character, what they want 
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is not to see someone criminalised at the level of some of the offences we 
are dealing with. (PCNPTG5) 
 
While these quotations might not directly signify a willingness to impose RJ if 
victims ‘unreasonably’ declined informal resolution, they indicated that these 
officers might have gone into some situations with the desire to resolve them 
informally. Thus, a tension emerged as officers could not use informal disposals 
without victims’ consent. This may have created an incentive for them to put 
pressure on citizens to participate in RJ in cases which officers wanted to resolve 
informally, but where victims were unwilling to do so. 
As explained in Chapter 3, the police may also have unintentionally put 
pressure on people to participate. As one policymaker/manager noted: 
 
The police just saying, ‘Will you do something?’ is actually quite powerful 
because we’ve got that authority. […] Most people do whatever you ask 
them to do. […] I think sometimes officers forget that they go over that line 
of persuasion. (PPMMG1) 
 
Police officers might believe that they are presenting something as optional, even 
if their position of authority leads others to interpret their suggestions or requests 
as compulsory. Yet, upon being asked about communicating the voluntary nature 
of RJ, only one officer reported having reflected on this possibility: 
 
Always in your mind, you think, ‘Am I making him do this?’. […] That’s why 
I think you’re always trying to stress that it’s their option, but I guess you 
can’t know what they’re thinking. If they feel pressured, then there’s no way 
of knowing. (PCSOD7) 
 
The other 31 police facilitators interviewed stated or implied the belief that it was 
easy for them to communicate the voluntary nature of the process to prospective 
participants. One simply responded to a question about voluntariness by saying: 
‘Obviously, both people have got to agree to it’ (PCSOD3). Another said: 
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I think that is pretty straightforward, it’s always made clear that it’s a 
voluntary process. Obviously, if one party is unwilling to do it, then it doesn’t 
go ahead. (PCSOD4) 
 
That some officers equated voluntary participation with agreeing to participate is 
significant, as the former has a higher threshold than the latter (see Chapter 3). 
This suggests that these officers did not realise the potential for unintentional 
pressure, which may also mean that they did not take steps to avoid it.  
In addition, both forces compelled officers to inform suspects about the 
disclosure of community resolutions, as part of the offering process. This was not 
written in Durham’s guidelines which, unlike Gloucestershire’s, related to the use 
of RJ with outcomes other than the community resolution. However, this was 
mentioned in Durham’s Level 1 training curriculum (doc. D4) and was also written 
into the police’s Level 1 facilitation script. The latter stated that officers had to 
‘Advise the harmer that this is NOT a criminal record, BUT will show on an 
enhanced CRB [Criminal Records Bureau] check’ (doc. D32).  
Gloucestershire’s RJ guidance, which related exclusively to community 
resolutions, emphasised the need to explain their disclosure to the offender, 
stating: ‘Offenders must be informed that RJ disposals may be disclosed if they 
are subject to an enhanced DBS [Disclosure and Barring Service] check’ (doc. 
G29: 5). In addition, their Level 1 recording form included paragraphs which 
explained the potential for disclosure, directly underneath which offenders were 
required to sign (see Figure 6.1): 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Offender statement, Level 1 RJ form (doc. G10) 
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Still, it cannot be assumed that either force’s approach necessarily resulted in 
suspects understanding the potential for disclosure. As Section 2.7 explained in 
relation to other policies, the low visibility of such a process meant that the police 
could have neglected to explain this, or explained it in a manner which the 
suspect did not understand. Suspects could not be compelled to read the above 
paragraphs before signing the form, much less to comprehend its contents – nor 
did any officers indicate that they would check for comprehension. 
With community resolutions, this problem is exacerbated by the uncertainty 
surrounding their disclosure. Their recording as police information means that 
they are only disclosed on an enhanced criminal records check and, contrary to 
what was stated on Durham’s Level 1 script, only if ‘the chief officer of police 
considers the information to be both current and relevant to the application’ 
(Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board, 2013: 21). Their disclosability in 
future court appearances is also uncertain, although the Sentencing Council 
website (2017) ambiguously states that if one is ‘recent and relevant to the 
offence it may be considered to be an aggravating factor’. This means that the 
police would not have been able to articulate precisely the likelihood of disclosure, 
despite the possible implications for future employment, study or travel (Pager, 
2003; Irving, 2014; Ispa-Landa and Loeffler, 2016). That there is no specific 
process for rescinding a community resolution (Unlock Information Hub, 2017) 
makes it even more important that the decision to accept one is made freely and 
is well informed. Yet, as the next chapter shows, suspects were described as 
accepting disposals quickly and without legal advice, meaning that they may have 
lacked the information or time to make an informed decision. 
Prospective participants might also have lacked information about their 
options, as officers had discretion in deciding what form(s) of RJ to offer. Neither 
force’s policies required their officers to offer a referral to the RJ Hub; the decision 
to do so was entirely discretionary. In fact, neither compelled officers to offer 
conferencing in any situation. Durham’s guidelines did not mention this at all, 
although their Level 2 training syllabus stated that conferencing should be used 
with ‘more complex crime and ASB where a Level 1 RA would be superficial 
and/or unsuitable’ (doc. D6: 2). Gloucestershire’s practitioner guidance stated 
that ‘Level 1 should be used for instant or “on street” disposals where officers use 
restorative skills to resolve issues’, while Level 2 should be used: 
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Where the issue cannot be resolved immediately using Level 1; to tackle 
more serious or persistent problems; [and] to seek long term solutions or to 
address re-offending habits. (doc. G29: 3) 
 
Again, the subjectivity of these terms (e.g. ‘unsuitable’, ‘serious’ and ‘persistent’), 
alongside the low visibility and non-supervision of the offering process, meant 
that the decision of what to offer was highly discretionary in practice. The next 
chapter suggests that organisational pressures to be efficient (particularly in 
certain roles) may have influenced this decision, potentially deterring officers from 
offering more time-intensive processes. Even in cases where officers provided all 
the available options, they might not have explained each process in sufficient 
detail; previous studies have found that RJ often takes place without it having 
been explained to the prospective participants (Gavrielides, 2007). 
Durham had attempted to standardise the offering process by providing its 
officers with leaflets for victims. This explained RJ on its front cover using a 
definition akin to the MoJ’s dialogic definition. The inside of the leaflet, meanwhile, 
stated that the victim could ask for a face-to-face meeting, mediation, electronic 
communication, reparation or a written apology (see Figure 6.2):   
 
161 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Information leaflet for victims, inside-left (doc. D12) 
 
There was no suggestion, however, that the police were (or, indeed, could be) 
compelled to carry or provide victims with the leaflet. Of the 22 respondents from 
Durham Constabulary, only one mentioned it, a police facilitator who stated: 
 
We have RA leaflets that I take with me all the time when I’m on 
appointments. If I think this is applicable for RA, then I will mention it and I 
will leave them the booklet so they can have a read. […] I know a lot of 
people don’t use these leaflets, that should be readdressed. (PCNPTD1) 
 
While one recent study recommended the use of leaflets as a way of helping or 
encouraging the police to offer RJ (Shapland, et al., 2017), the experience in 
Durham suggests that many may choose not to use them. The use of leaflets 
also assumes that victims will be able and inclined to read and understand its 
contents. In addition, by being specifically directed at victims, Durham’s leaflet 
further suggests to all concerned that RJ is a victims’ service. 
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The next chapter examines frontline officers’ experiences of the offering 
process in more detail. For now, it is important to note that, in both areas, internal 
findings of poor performance led to the banning of specific processes which came 
to be seen as ‘easy options’. In Durham, it was found that officers were 
systematically offering letters of apology instead of dialogic approaches. In the 
context of shoplifting, one policymaker/manager stated: 
 
What some of the staff do is, ‘Well, just write a letter of apology to the store’, 
and that’s it. It’s not restorative in any way, some half-baked letter of 
apology, and this person walks free. […] That’s the sort of misunderstanding 
by people because they don’t fully buy into the concept. (PPMMD6) 
 
Towards the end of the data collection, police officers in Durham were banned 
from recording a practice as RJ based solely on a letter of apology. A couple of 
months prior, Gloucestershire had also banned its officers from suggesting that 
a payment to charity, on its own, could constitute RJ (doc. G29). Interestingly, 
these two practices reflected the ‘purist’ and ‘maximalist’ approaches at each site. 
In Durham, the ‘easy option’ involved at least some communication (i.e. a letter), 
while in Gloucestershire, it involved some (indirect) reparation (i.e. a payment to 
charity). Both also reflected the tendency within justice agencies, mentioned in 
earlier chapters, to prioritise task completion over the quality of the work done. 
 
 
6.5 Structuring the process of delivery 
 
The process by which RJ was delivered was also characterised by low 
visibility. Street RJ was delivered in people’s homes, shops and, as the name 
suggests, on the street. Conferences also took place in numerous locations, 
including houses, community centres, shops and police offices. Still, both forces 
tried to encourage facilitation approaches which accorded with how they 
expected RJ to be executed. This section considers the respective roles of 
training, scripts and monitoring in achieving this end. 
As noted, all staff in Durham were given one day of Level 1 training, and 
many officers had an additional day of conferencing training. In Gloucestershire, 
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most frontline officers were given one day of training in Level 1 RJ, and around 
40 received separate, three-day conferencing training. Some officers in both 
forces had also attended longer, externally delivered conferencing courses.  
Upon being asked about their internal training, a small number of officers 
stated that more time should have been spent on preparation (n=3) or on 
facilitation skills (n=1). The remaining respondents all reported that their training 
had sufficiently equipped them to deliver RJ. Yet, one respondent from the PCC’s 
office in Durham noted that the training might not have been enough to ensure 
that officers had sufficient facilitation skills. Consequently, they questioned the 
wisdom of having all officers delivering RJ: 
  
Some people it’s just not in their nature. Within every organisation, you get 
some people who are good at certain things. In the police, you get some 
people who are really good at locking people up, but they see RJ as being a 
little bit more kinda social work-y, and it’s not really their kind of thing. I don’t 
think we should be forcing everyone [to facilitate]. (PCCD2) 
 
One police facilitator from Durham who had received external training, noted that 
the internal training did not teach all the necessary skills: 
 
The [course] with the police was very brief about holding a conference and 
what impact it could have. By the end of it, you would feel equipped to sit 
people down and have a conversation, but I wouldn’t have felt as equipped 
as I do. […] For example, I was trained [externally] to utilise the silence, 
whereas officers I’ve done them with that have just done the police training, 
if there’s a silence for a couple of seconds they’ll jump in and say: ‘Come 
on, how did you feel?’ I just think: ‘there’s a silence for a reason, they’re 
thinking about it, just hang back a minute’. Obviously if it gets too long, step 
in. But the [external] training was definitely a bit more in-depth. (POD2) 
 
A member of staff from DNR described helping to train officers who were unaware 
of their own weaknesses in relation to facilitation skills: 
 
We did role plays and they asked for feedback. One guy was really trying to 
be as warm and empathic as possible. But in fact, he was coming across to 
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me, who played the client, as a really authoritative, powerful figure, quite 
intimidating, which is a presence that they need for a lot of the work that they 
do. He was quite shocked because he thought it was the warmest and most 
empathic he’d ever been. (RJHSD3) 
 
Researchers have also questioned whether the police’s RJ training is sufficient 
to ensure that facilitation practice is of an acceptable quality. Concerns over 
training have been expressed by Wright (2015), and by Gavrielides (2013: 85) 
who argued that: ‘Providing 1-3 day training packages to police officers, probation 
staff and prison guards will not deliver the restorative vision.’ Generally speaking, 
the literature on police training is often unclear as to its impact on their practices. 
Some evaluations have found that trainings on interpersonal communication, 
mental health and disability yielded changes in attitude among some officers 
(Buchanan and Perry, 1985; Bailey, et al., 2001), without indicating how enduring 
this was or whether practices also changed. One study found that training on 
procedural justice increased officers support for its principles in the long-term but, 
again, did not explore its impact on practices (Skogan, et al., 2014). Others have 
argued that training may make the police more liberal, but that this diminishes 
over time (Brown and Willis, 1985; Fielding, 1988). 
Alongside the evidence of variable skills among officers, as described in 
Chapters 2 and 3, the evidence of limited training further highlights the risks of 
expecting all officers to facilitate. Some researchers have suggested using 
specialists to reduce the risks of substandard practice (Shapland, 2009; Hoyle, 
2011). This was the approach taken in Gloucestershire for conferencing, although 
their desire to improve victims’ experiences of informal disposals meant that all 
officers delivered street RJ, mostly with only a single day of RJ training. In 
Durham, meanwhile, virtually all officers were encouraged to deliver conferences 
to support the goal of culture change. Yet, despite ACPO’s suggestion that RJ 
training should be delivered by ‘an accredited training provider with a proven track 
record of delivering RJ’ (2012: 7), the decision to develop shorter, internal training 
was reportedly made on the grounds of cost:  
 
I can’t remember what it [previous external training] was per individual but it 
was a significant cost to the organisation. So that was the initial training, and 
I think about 40-50 were trained initially. What we found was it was too few 
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for what we were trying to do. […] That’s when we all got back round the table 
and we decided we do it internally. (PPMMD2) 
 
That most officers in Durham had at least some conferencing training, meant that 
they could employ those skills at Level 1. This might help to explain why the data 
point to a much greater use of ‘hybrid’ practices in that area (see Section 7.4). 
Still, the decision to deliver condensed training – and to use the internal training 
department to deliver it – illustrates how resource limitations might lead to 
variable training quality (Gavrielides, 2007) and limit the potential of police reform 
(Skogan, 2008). That internal conferencing training was limited to two days 
suggests that senior leaders in Durham made a trade-off between the desire to 
use conferencing experience to change culture, and the need to ensure that 
standards of practice were met. The attitude that the benefits of this strategy 
outweighed its risks, was expressed by several policymakers/managers, one of 
whom stated: ‘The benefits far, far outweigh any of the obstacles that we’ve 
identified’ (PPMMD4). Yet, these policy decisions were made despite limited 
evidence that RJ could change organisational cultures, or that police officers 
could deliver RJ effectively with limited training (Clamp and Paterson, 2017), 
suggesting that something of a gamble was made.  
Indeed, given the low visibility of RJ delivery, there were few ways for forces 
to ensure that officers delivered RJ in a certain way. As noted, supervision was 
minmal and monitoring was retrospective. Moreover, few participants would have 
had a detailed understanding of what the process was supposed to look like, 
making it difficult for them to challenge police practices which did not meet certain 
standards (Daly, 2003). For example, there was little that either the forces or the 
participants could do to guarantee that facilitators engaged in preparation, the 
importance of which was not acknowledged in either force’s guidelines. These 
documents similarly said little about the process by which RJ would take place 
(although, as Section 6.2 noted, Durham’s mentioned that the purpose was to 
discuss feelings). What both forces did introduce, however, were scripts (and, in 
Gloucestershire, a form) to structure facilitation practices.  
As part of its most recent launch of RJ, Durham Constabulary created a 
bespoke script for its officers. This was reportedly based on the Restorative 
Solutions script, which had been initially provided to those trained externally: 
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The script that we use now is different to the one I used from the outset from 
Restorative Solutions. That was longer and took into account a lot of the 
logistics. (POD1) 
 
The new script was simplified and intended to be used both in conferencing and in 
street RJ, encouraging dialogic approaches to the latter. As Durham’s training 
syllabus stated of the two levels: ‘The model is identical’ (doc. D6: 3). This was 
consistent with the interpretation that all RJ should involve some form of dialogue. 
One respondent described the script’s development as follows: 
 
We took the decision internally that [the original script] was too much for a lot 
that we'd be dealing with. We needed a basic framework that provided 
officers the confidence to deliver those Level 1s in the first instance and then 
for their experience to develop their own scripts. (PPMMD1) 
 
One officer allowed the researcher to photograph their script (Figures 6.3 and 6.4): 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Instant script, Durham (inside) (doc. D32) 
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Figure 6.4: Instant script, Durham (front and back) (doc. D33) 
 
This script was relatively similar to a Restorative Solutions-branded script seen 
in Gloucestershire. One respondent, who stated that they used this script when 
delivering conferences, allowed the researcher to photograph it (Figure 6.5): 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Informal script, Gloucestershire (front and back) (docs. G49, 50) 
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The structure of these two scripts is broadly similar: they both begin by asking the 
parties to discuss the incident, before exploring who is affected and how, and 
concluding with the determination of outcomes. Notably, however, they afford 
offenders different opportunities to express their personal thoughts, feelings and 
needs. Gloucestershire’s script, designed by a specialist, independent provider, 
asks both victims and offenders to state what they were thinking and feeling at 
the time of the incident; Durham’s script only asks these questions of victims. 
Moreover, Gloucestershire’s script asks offenders an open question in relation to 
outcomes: ‘What do you think needs to happen?’ In contrast, Durham’s only asks 
the victim what they think the outcomes should be, before asking offenders the 
more leading question: ‘Is that fair and reasonable?’ This imbalance in Durham’s 
script might decrease the likelihood that the process would be experienced by 
offenders as fair and legitimate, and increase the chances of it being perceived 
as degrading (Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994). That offenders’ opportunities to 
express themselves and provide input were cut as the script was shortened, 
further illustrates how the simultaneous prioritisation of victims and efficiency in 
restorative policing can result in the neglect of offenders. 
Although Gloucestershire’s script was entitled ‘Informal Script’, its owner 
implied that they only used it for conferences, as street RJ was not expected to 
involve dialogue between the parties. Instead, Gloucestershire had introduced a 
specific form which officers were required to fill out when delivering Level 1 RJ. 
Most officers interviewed at that force were of the view that this form had replaced 
or was otherwise to be used instead of the script for street RJ. For example, one 
officer said: ‘For Level 2 you do [use the script], but I don’t do Level 2, I just follow 
the form I’ve got when I do it’ (POG6). Another similarly noted: 
 
It's not [the script] anymore. It's different now, it's a long thin book and it just 
gives you positions to write things in. [..] We used to have a little script, 
though. You started with the card, you give time for them to respond. That 
was my first lot of training I did. (POG4) 
 
The form in question was also obtained by the researcher (Figure 6.6): 
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Figure 6.6: Gloucestershire Level 1 form, front and back (docs. G10, 11) 
 
The first point on which to compare the scripts and this form relates to the 
discretion in using them. In Durham, as a previous quotation suggested, officers 
were explicitly authorised to modify or deviate from their scripts. This position was 
endorsed by another policymaker/manager, who stated: 
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We provided everybody with a script. That was really just to get people started 
and to give people a framework to work to. I think as people get more 
experienced, you can see that it becomes a more individualised process. 
People work to it loosely. I think it’s different for every victim. Sometimes if it’s 
too scripted, it feels false and you never get people to really engage. We had 
to provide a framework to get people’s confidence up, because what we didn’t 
want was people just going into a room and going off on a tangent, but 
certainly in recent months, I’ve seen that people have adapted their own, 
which is good. It shows some progression. (PPMMD2) 
 
Similarly, in Gloucestershire, there was also no evidence to suggest that officers 
who delivered conferences were compelled to adhere to their script, although some 
respondents reported doing so. In fact, most police facilitators from both areas 
reported adhering at least to the model implied by the script, if not necessarily 
following it word for word, when delivering dialogic processes. One, for example, 
stated that ‘you tend to go off script quite a bit [but] you remain conscious that 
everyone’s getting their say and you’re touching all the bases’ (PCNPTG1). 
Another said: ‘I think it can be deviated from, but as a whole we would use the 
script as a template for every meeting’ (PCSOD4). Others said that they ‘changed 
it a little bit’ (PCNPTD2), ‘stuck to the rough order of doing things’ (PCSOD7), or 
used it ‘loosely’ (PCSOD9) or ‘as a guide’ (POD3). One reported following the 
language of the script closely when facilitating, stating: ‘I stick to it pretty much 
religiously, because I know it works’ (PCNPTG5). Others reported deviating from 
the language of the script on practical grounds. For example, one officer reported 
varying it according to the capacities of the participants: 
 
You're dealing with people that are vulnerable, that have learning difficulties. 
[…] I tailor it, within reason and within the law obviously, to each individual. 
What they are able to understand? If they don't understand it, it's not gonna 
benefit them. ‘What do you feel now?’ – it doesn’t always work like that, 
sometimes it can, but you just gotta use common sense and be aware of the 
impact it can have on people. (PCSOD2) 
 
Another police officer reported changing the script depending on the number of 
participants: 
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The script that we initially got is more for a one-on-one RJ. But obviously, in 
some RJs, you might have two or three offenders with one victim, so you 
gotta then adapt it. (PCNPTG2) 
 
A small number of officers from Durham suggested that they did not use the script. 
One stated: ‘You just use your common knowledge of the situation and take a 
structured view on the situation that you come across’ (PCSOD8). Another, when 
asked if they used the script, said that they ‘tend not to’ (PCNPTD4), while a third 
responded: 
 
No, I know you can, but for me personally, if I’m worried too much about a 
script and they go off it, I’ll lose track of what’s going on. It comes across 
insincere from my end, because if they know I’m reading something or I’ve 
prepared something in my mind. It will come across as stagnant, so I try to 
be as natural as possible, but stick to the rough order of doing things and hit 
the key points. Like getting the offender to admit it first, then come to the 
victim. (PCSOD7) 
 
These data suggest that the script likely had structured the general approach to 
facilitation used by many officers, even if they did not use it verbatim. However, it 
also seems that, in practice, officers retained the discretion not to use the script, or 
to change or deviate from it as much or as little as they wished (see Chapter 7 for 
more on the extent to which officers described using the script in practice).  
Gloucestershire’s Level 1 form, meanwhile, had to be used while the process 
was being delivered, because the parties had to sign it. All respondents from 
Gloucestershire reported using the form when delivering practices which were 
recorded as Level 1 RJ (although, as noted in Chapter 5, not all cases of street 
RJ may necessarily have been recorded as such, or at all). Importantly, this form 
did not imply a dialogic model of delivery. It required only that the details of each 
party and the offence be recorded, together with the ‘agreed outcome’.  
In contrast, both scripts divide the process according to its past- and future-
focused elements (Crawford, 2015), that is, to the addressing and repairing of 
harm (Roche, 2006). In Durham’s script, for example, the ‘Facts’ and ‘Affect’ 
sections relate to the former, while the ‘Outcome’ section relates to the latter. 
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Similarly, Gloucestershire’s script contains six subheadings; the first three and 
last three related to the addressing and repairing of harm, respectively. The 
design of both scripts clearly indicates that the role of the facilitator is to ask 
questions and allow the parties to communicate their answers to each other 
verbally, thereby encouraging a dialogic approach to RJ delivery. In contrast, 
Gloucestershire’s Level 1 form does not suggest that officers should ask either 
party about the causes or impact of the offence, nor enable them to communicate. 
Instead, it requires the officer only to facilitate an agreement on outcomes. Thus, 
Gloucestershire’s form corresponds with their written definition of RJ and their 
policymakers’/managers’ understanding of the concept, indicating a maximalist 
interpretation of RJ (in that it focuses on outcomes rather than dialogue). 
Gloucestershire’s focus on outcomes also extended to its monitoring, which 
is described in the next section. However, Durham’s focus on dialogic processes 
led to the introduction of additional mechanisms with which to structure officer 
discretion when facilitating communication between the parties. No officers in 
either force suggested that their RJ practices were being routinely supervised 
prospectively, and Durham’s internal review of RJ from 2014 reported finding 
‘little evidence of supervisory interventions to quality assure the process’ (doc. 
D11: 4). Again, this is consistent with the existing evidence that police managers 
seldom supervise operational policing practices in advance of their taking place 
(Brown, 1988; Shearing and Powditch, 1992). In Durham, however, RJ practice 
records were reportedly monitored to establish the quality of delivery, and 
feedback was given to officers and their line managers on this issue: 
 
We’ll check those [records] for the quality and see how we’re doing, try and 
identify good officers, bad officers, problems that we’ve got. […] We give 
feedback to their supervision and feedback to their officer, saying ‘this is 
what we expect, this is what a good one would look like, you need to 
improve, and if you come up again then’… well, we would probably speak 
to them to say, ‘this is unacceptable. This needs to improve’. (PPMMD1) 
 
No respondents in Durham reported receiving this feedback, or being aware of 
their colleagues receiving feedback. Questions remain as to how effective this 
monitoring might be in identifying and addressing poor practice, given the 
absence of sanctions for poor performance, and officers’ ability to construct 
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records in ways which do not necessarily mirror their practices (McConville, et 
al., 1991). The substantial discretion afforded officers in Durham seemed to arise 
as the force held the goal of encouraging officers to use RJ, above the need to 
undertake close monitoring of the police’s practices. Still, the desire to regulate 
performance using qualitative frameworks, again reflects what McLeod (2003) 
argued was indicative of a transition to a restorative organisation. 
To this end, additional facilitation support was introduced in Durham in the 
form of a number of ‘RA Champions’; the number was not communicated to the 
researcher. Officers were reportedly assigned this role based on their facilitation 
experience, and were available to assist other officers in delivering conferences 
if they so desired. The one respondent who had this role described it as follows: 
 
If you had a problem as a PC, you wanted to know how it worked, you 
wanted a bit more guidance on what to do, you have a problem in facilitating 
or you want somebody who's a mediator to come and do it, I can come and 
help out and guide people in the right direction. (POG6) 
 
The creation of these roles was among the recommendations of a recent study 
on the use (or lack thereof) of RJ in three other English forces (Shapland, et al., 
2017). Previously, Shapland, et al. (2011) suggested that co-facilitation could be 
used to reduce the risks of substandard practice. In Durham, however, accessing 
this support was optional, and no respondents reported having ever requested 
assistance from an RA Champion. However, one volunteer facilitator from DNR 
reported being asked to co-facilitate with a police officer: 
 
I hadn’t met either party. As far as I was concerned I was just going to sit in 
the meeting and chip in if need be. I got there and [the officer] said ‘Look, 
I’m not sure what I’m doing, will you run the meeting?’ So that was hard 
because suddenly I was doing a face-to-face meeting without having met 
either party. (RJHFD2) 
 
Given the pressure on officers to deliver conferences in Durham, all those who 
felt unsure may not necessarily have accessed assistance in this way. In 
essence, the force trusted its officers to seek assistance if they felt that it was 
necessary to do so. Again, this is consistent with McLeod’s notion of a ‘restorative 
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agency’ which ‘empowers people to take risks and, if need be, make mistakes.’ 
(2003: 367). Yet, these data may exemplify how, as Ashworth (2002) warned, 
enthusiasm for the potential of RJ can lead to safeguards being overlooked. It is 
also problematic that there were few remedies for citizens who participated in 
substandard practices – especially as the low visibility of the process afforded 
officers the opportunity to exert control over outcome agreements. 
 
 
6.6 Structuring outcome determination 
 
Both forces included in their guidelines some direction with respect to 
outcome agreements. Again, however, the flexibility of this guidance and the low 
visibility of the process meant that the detail and enforcement of outcomes 
depended on how officers decided to exercise their discretion. 
Durham’s guidelines provided some information about the outcomes they 
envisioned might take place (Figure 6.7): 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Guidance on outcomes, Durham (doc. D8: 3) 
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Gloucestershire’s guidance included a comparable section (Figure 6.8): 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Guidance on outcomes, Gloucestershire (doc. G29: 3) 
 
One similarity between these sections lies in the fact that both essentially used 
the term ‘reparation(s)’ as a synonym for ‘outcomes’. This mirrors the tendency 
of the police (and other justice agencies), to focus on more practical (and easily 
quantifiable) outcomes like reparation in lieu of more expressive, educational or 
relational outcomes (Crawford, 2006; Shapland, et al., 2017). 
Still, Durham’s guidance seemed to be more encouraging of the latter types 
of outcomes than Gloucestershire’s. It said that ‘the reparation should not be the 
motivation for engaging’ (doc. D8: 3), distinguishing between the process itself 
and any outcomes which emerged from it. Similarly, its last paragraph began with 
the phrase ‘When reparation is being considered that involves activity or actions 
beyond the conference’ (doc. D8: 3, emphasis added). This indicates that 
participants in Durham were free to decide that the dialogue itself sufficiently 
satisfied their needs (which, as explained in Chapter 3, may often be the case for 
victims). By comparison, Gloucestershire’s guidelines stated that ‘There must be 
some form of reparation’ (doc. G29: 3), before listing a series of options. This 
further illustrates the difference in how the forces conceptualised the purpose of 
the exercise. In Gloucestershire, the outcome agreement was essentially seen 
as synonymous with RJ, indicating a ‘maximalist’ understanding. In Durham, 
reparation could emerge from, but was not seen as integral to (or synonymous 
with), the RJ process, which more closely reflects the ‘purist’ approach. 
Gloucestershire’s guidance did not state the process by which the outcomes 
should be determined. Under the heading ‘procedure’, it listed some of the 
various requirements with respect to the decision to use RJ, before stating only 
176 
 
that ‘RJ outcomes must be meaningful and SMART and should allow offenders 
to make amends for the harm caused’ (doc. G29: 6). The acronym ‘SMART’, 
though not explained therein,7 is commonly used in RJ training in the UK to 
suggest that outcomes should be ‘Specific; Measurable; Achievable; Relevant; 
and Time Related’ (Thames Valley Partnership and Restorative Solutions, 2015). 
In contrast, Durham’s guidance told officers in regard to outcomes: ‘In all cases, 
please be guided by the wishes of the victim’ (doc. D8: 3), after having stated: 
 
The victim should always be consulted when determining which reparation 
would be the most suitable. The victim is at the centre of the process – 
ultimately it is their decision. NOT a police decision. (doc. D8: 2, emphasis 
in original). 
 
This is important, firstly, because it emphasises that the police should play, at 
most, a limited role in outcome determination; there is no equivalent provision in 
Gloucestershire’s guidance. Secondly, by both emphasising the role of the victim 
and omitting the offender from the outcome determination process, it risks being 
interpreted in a way which legitimises the overlooking of offenders’ needs and 
input when determining outcome agreements.  
Ultimately, these policies placed considerable power and responsibility in 
the hands of officers to determine how to balance the public and private interests 
of all relevant stakeholders (Ashworth, 2002; Warner and Gawlik, 2003). In the 
absence of clear remedies and mechanisms through which the police’s discretion 
could be effectively limited, the risk was that the police were empowered to select 
whose rights and wishes to prioritise, and whether and how to influence outcome 
decisions accordingly. Again, this could result in participants being given an 
unequal level of input in accordance with the police’s working rules, attitudes and 
biases (McConville, et al., 1991), or in the police prioritising their own agendas at 
the expense of participants’ needs (Hoyle, et al., 2002).  
In theory, Gloucestershire’s guidance placed some limits on the police’s 
discretion by stating that reparation was compulsory and that it must be ‘agreed 
by the victim and the offender’ (doc. G29: 3). The latter point meant that, 
technically, outcomes could not be imposed without the agreement of the parties. 
                                            
7 In Gloucestershire’s script, however, this acronym is explained – see Figure 6.5. 
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This is important because, as noted earlier, outcomes under the previous COPS 
disposal did not need the victim’s approval. This distinction was mentioned by 
several respondents from Gloucestershire, most of whom noted that there was 
resistance to the change within the force for that reason: 
 
I don't think they [other officers] like the decision being taken out of their 
hands. It's very much victim-led, whereas with COPS, the last process, we 
got to decide what we're gonna do with it. (PCNPTG1) 
 
This officer was typical of their colleagues in terms of their interpretation: they 
believed that, under RJ, outcome determination was supposed to be ‘victim-led’. 
Again, this suggests that offenders may not have been involved in the process, 
and that there may have been a tension between the desire to use informal 
disposals to resolve cases quickly, and the requirement that both parties must 
agree to any outcomes. 
The previous section outlined how quality monitoring in Durham seemed to 
focus on the process by which RJ took place. In contrast, the equivalent 
monitoring process (i.e. that which was undertaken by the thematic RJ Manager, 
and which did not relate to the decision to offer RJ) in Gloucestershire seemed to 
focus primarily on the detail of the outcomes: 
 
Standards are maintained through the quality assurance process that the 
RJ Manager does. He checks each outcome and prepares a report based 
on that for the Chief Inspector for operational and uniform policing on a 
monthly basis. […] That process allows us to make sure that we are 
maintaining the quality of service we should be. (PPMMG6) 
 
Again, this is consistent with the idea that RJ was seen within Gloucestershire as 
characterised by, and synonymous with, its outcomes. It also suggests that there 
was at least some form of monitoring in place which, in theory, could have limited 
the police’s discretion to allow or impose disproportionate outcomes. The fact that 
the process was retrospective, however, meant that it could not stop these 
outcomes from being imposed in the first place. It was also dependent on how 
the RJ Manager elected to exercise their own discretion in this regard; the 
monitoring process may have been shaped by their own working credos and 
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attitudes, inter alia. Moreover, the Level 1 form did not give the RJ Manager much 
to work with in relation to monitoring outcome agreements. Figure 6.9 shows the 
‘agreed outcomes’ section of the form they received: 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Agreed outcomes, Level 1 RJ form, Gloucestershire (doc. G10) 
 
The lack of detail required by this form may have afforded officers the discretion 
to record outcomes in a manner which disguised how punitive or limited they 
might have been. As a previous study of street RJ noted, there are inherent 
limitations to quality assurance procedures which ‘focus on the quality of the 
reports, rather than on feedback from victims’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 
2012: 28). Overall, there is little within the data to suggest that Gloucestershire’s 
outcome monitoring process would have prevented police abuses. 
The final point to make at this stage pertains to the enforcement of outcome 
agreements. The guidelines in relation to this seemed to be quite complex, 
affording officers considerable discretion in practice. With respect to ‘RA Only’ 
(i.e. community resolutions), Durham’s guidance stated:  
 
If an RA fails because the offender has failed to complete the process or 
reparation agreed, an alternative disposal method should be considered.  
Checks should be made to ensure that the RA has been undertaken. (doc. 
D8:4) 
 
The slideshow for Durham’s Level 1 training similarly stated that ‘failure to 
complete the reparation’ gave the officer the ‘option to invoke normal crime 
proceedings’ (doc. D2: 21). This seems to imply that it was at the discretion of 
the officer whether to revoke the community resolution, if the agreement was not 
adhered to. This was contradicted in the lesson plan for the Level 1 training, which 
stated that, if the offender did not complete the outcome agreement, then: 
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The following will happen: […] invoke proceedings as per normal for a criminal 
investigation. i.e. arrest/voluntary attend the harmer as you would in normal 
criminal proceedings. (doc. D4: 11) 
 
However, if the offender failed to complete an outcome agreement where RJ took 
place alongside another disposal: 
 
Then ultimately there is nothing more that can be done. […] This should be 
viewed as you would for failure of conditional cautions where CPS would 
consider if it’s worth running the case back to court. (doc. D4: 12) 
 
The same document also states that, with respect to unpaid financial reparation, 
‘we are not here to be debt collectors, and if monetary reparation does not get paid, 
then we cannot use any force or legislation to get money out of people’ (doc. D4: 
10). Overall, this represents a somewhat confusing series of instructions in relation 
to outcome enforcement. As the next chapter shows, the complexity of this policy, 
alongside the low visibility of the process, meant that the police were largely free to 
determine how to exercise their discretion in this regard.  
In Gloucestershire, where RJ could only be used with community resolutions, 
the guidance stated simply that RJ outcomes ‘must be followed up by the OIC 
[officer in charge]’ (doc. G29: 6) who ‘is responsible for ensuring that agreed 
outcomes are complied with’ (doc. G29: 8). The force’s RJ flowchart adds to this by 
stating that ‘OICs [are] to monitor and ensure outcome complied with within 1 
month [for Level 1] [or] 3 months [for Level 2]’ (doc. G28: 1). This did not specify 
what would happen in cases of non-compliance. Again, given the low visibility of 
the process, this may have afforded officers the discretion to determine whether 
to suggest to the parties that outcomes were enforceable, and what to do in cases 
of non-compliance. Both forces also seemed to allow officers to judge when an 
offender was to be considered not to have complied. Overall, officers retained 
considerable power and discretion in relation to outcomes due to the flexibility of 
these policies. This meant that participants were at risk of being treated 
differently, depending on a given officer’s attitudes towards the offence or the 
victim and offender, as well as their inclination to be interventionist when 
determining outcomes, and lenient or stringent when enforcing them. 
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6.7 Concluding comments 
 
In both forces, policy frameworks reinforced the ‘purist’ and ‘maximalist’ 
framings of RJ, previously identified as being implicit in force strategies. However, 
force policies also left individual officers to make many of the pertinent decisions 
in relation to RJ relatively autonomously. In practice, internal rules and guidelines 
were mostly flexible, the support provided officers was optional, accountability 
mechanisms were easily evaded, and the (generally on-street) environment in 
which RJ took place was characterised by low visibility. This meant that officers 
were not precluded from acting in ways which were arguably undesirable, or 
which force policies were designed to avoid.  
Affording facilitators discretion is seen as vital within RJ, as it enables them 
to respond to the unique needs and interests of participants (Braithwaite, 2002b; 
Schiff, 2007). In the police context, however, the risk is that this discretion permits 
officers to deliver RJ in accordance with institutional, organisational and personal 
rationales, goals and priorities, many of which may not accord with the research 
evidence on effective RJ facilitation practices, or with restorative or due process 
principles. Some force policies even seemed to encourage officers to prioritise 
victim satisfaction and demand management over other goals. As with policework 
in general, the extent to which any such risks materialised, ultimately depended 
on how officers opted to exercise their discretion in practice. 
Moreover, that each force implemented RJ primarily within community 
resolutions, had implications for how RJ could be used and how officers’ 
discretion was structured. Many of the tensions and risks identified in this chapter 
– such as those created by the requirement that victims consent to informal 
disposals – seemed to flow directly from this decision, as they might not have 
existed (or would have existed differently) had RJ been integrated differently into 
the OOCD framework. In these ways, police policies were both shaped by the 
institutional context in which they were designed, and likely acted to shape the 
execution of restorative policing in practice. 
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Chapter 7 – Exploring the use of restorative justice by the 
police in practice 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The last two chapters examined both forces’ RJ strategies and policies. 
They suggested that conflicting and unranked goals, flexible rules and guidance, 
and low visibility, meant that RJ delivery was highly discretionary. This chapter 
examines frontline officers’ explanations of how and why they elected to exercise 
this discretion in practice. Based on officers’ stated experiences of offering and 
delivering RJ, the chapter assesses patterns and variations in their reported 
approaches to facilitation, and in the implicit or explicit reasoning which informed 
their decision-making. These data indicate that officers were largely free to use 
RJ according to what they considered to be an appropriate response to each case 
in which the concept was invoked. Their decisions in this regard seemed to be 
shaped by a number of factors, including organisational pressures and priorities, 
situational demands, officers’ own motivations for using RJ, and other features of 
the institutional context in which restorative policing took place. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explores officers’ 
motivations for using RJ, while the second investigates the processes by which 
RJ was offered to prospective participants. The third section then describes and 
analyses reported practices, before the fourth explores the detail of outcome 
agreements and the processes through which they were made. Each section 
considers the factors which seemed to shape officers’ decisions and behaviours, 
identifying the implications of different approaches and comparing officers from 
different forces and roles where possible. 
 
 
7.2 Motivations for using restorative justice 
 
This section analyses how police officers expressed and framed their 
motivations for using RJ. From this, their priorities with respect to when and how 
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to use RJ, and the possible implications for those who might or might not qualify 
as participants, are inferred. This section begins by outlining the types of cases 
in which respondents reported using RJ, before considering their motivations for 
doing so and the implications for practice. Frontline officers’ motivations for using 
RJ fell into five main categories which related to diverting low-level offenders, 
reducing reoffending, closing cases quickly, satisfying victims, and resolving 
complex disputes. The section ends by noting the pressure which some officers 
from Durham felt to use RJ as often as possible. 
Police facilitators described using RJ with an array of different offences and 
non-crime incidents. Officers in all roles reported delivering RJ in response to 
low-level offences committed by young and adult offenders, such as shoplifting, 
minor assaults and low value criminal damage. PCs within NPTs and PCSOs 
were most likely to report using RJ in relation to youth ASB and other incidents 
which they described as non-criminal, including verbal abuse and harassment, 
excessive noise and disturbing property without causing damage (e.g. by littering 
a garden, drawing on property with chalk, or throwing or kicking objects against 
houses). Some PCs and PCSOs also used RJ in cases which they labelled as 
neighbour disputes. A smaller number of PCs from each area reported using RJ 
with potentially more serious offences, such as hate crime, violence, higher value 
criminal damage, and acquisitive crime with individual (rather than corporate) 
victims. These cases – where offenders may have been on the cusp of a higher 
sanction – were, alongside neighbourhood disputes and incidents without clear 
victims and offenders, the most likely to involve conferencing. 
Restorative policing was generally banal, as most cases in which RJ was 
reportedly used were exceptionally low level. This reflects the breadth of the 
practices which respondents considered to qualify as restorative. As Chapter 5 
argued, some officers saw their peacekeeping activities as falling within their use 
of RJ. It also reflects the roles held by interviewees, in that PCSOs and NPT 
officers rarely investigate serious crime (O’Neill, 2014; Longstaff, et al., 2015), 
and were overrepresented among respondents in this study (13/16 in Durham; 
10/16 in Gloucestershire). The data also suggest that, when police respondents 
used RJ with recorded offences, it took place without arrest and alongside a 
community resolution disposal. Only one case (a theft in Durham) was described 
as involving an arrest, and no officers explicitly reported delivering post-sentence 
RJ. It was also not always clear how non-crime incidents were recorded, although 
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no officers implied that they had used RJ alongside a civil injunction or other 
formal ASB power. Rather, non-crime cases seemed either to be documented as 
police information, or not recorded at all. 
What virtually all the described cases had in common, therefore, was that 
officers perceived them to be suitable for informal resolution. Indeed, that both 
forces required all community resolutions to be delivered as RJ, meant that the 
police’s decision to utilise the latter was almost always linked to the decision to 
use the former. As a result, when police respondents reported their motivations 
for using RJ, they also typically spoke about diversion in general.  
Accordingly, several officers from both forces reported being motivated to 
use RJ on the basis that they wanted to divert young or first-time offenders from 
criminalisation. For example, one officer stated: 
 
I deal with a lot of people that are first-time offenders, doing things that are 
stupid and they don’t realise the consequences. Rather than popping them 
through the criminal justice system, [RJ] gives me a chance to deal with them 
in a different manner. (PCNPTD2) 
 
A second officer similarly espoused RJ as a diversionary approach: 
 
I think it's good not to criminalise people, so if we've got the opportunity to 
use restorative justice to help somebody and find other ways, that's a good 
thing. (POG5) 
 
Likewise, another officer maintained that RJ could allow them not to criminalise 
young offenders: 
 
I realise that when I was a youngster, I made lots of mistakes. Kids do make 
mistakes, so I don't think you should criminalise children for those mistakes. 
For me personally, RJ is for not criminalising youngsters, but giving them an 
opportunity to see how their behaviour affects other people. (PCNPTG1) 
 
Had this study focused on the use of RJ in prisons or by probation, this motivation 
could not have existed. Rather, it emerged as a result of RJ being used by the 
police and, more specifically, being integrated into the police disposals framework 
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at the lowest level of OOCD. This illustrates how the purpose of RJ can depend 
on the manner of its incorporation into specific institutional contexts. 
These data raise two further issues in relation to community resolutions. 
Firstly, the Home Office categorised them as ‘informal disposals’ (2013: 13) on 
the basis that they did not create a criminal record which could be disclosed on a 
standard records check. Yet, they were still documented as police information, 
and thus could be disclosed on enhanced checks under certain circumstances 
(Mason, 2010; Home Office, 2015). The suggestion that these disposals were 
entirely diversionary, therefore, is imprecise, as a comprehensive diversion would 
leave no disclosable record. In cases where offenders would otherwise have 
been charged, summonsed or offered a higher disposal, the use of RJ, alongside 
a community resolution, may have been diversionary, insofar as it would have 
been less disclosable than the alternative. However, it is also possible that, in the 
absence of community resolutions, some cases would have been discontinued 
for lack of evidence or resolved without their recording. In such cases, community 
resolutions might have resulted in ‘mesh-thinning’, in that offenders who would 
otherwise have been filtered out of the system altogether, would instead have 
had their actions and details documented by police (Cohen, 1979). Community 
resolutions rank alongside the Penalty Notice for Disorder as one of a number of 
on-street disposals which seek to increase system efficiency by encouraging 
suspects to surrender their due process rights (i.e. to legal advice and trial), in 
exchange for (at least, theoretically) limiting the potential severity of the outcome 
(Ashworth and Zedner, 2008; Bui, 2015; Fair Trials, 2017). 
Secondly, the discretionary and low visibility nature of the decision to offer 
a community resolution, might have enabled officers to use or withhold them in 
an inconsistent or discriminatory manner. For example, the offer of a community 
resolution may have depended on whether the responding officer was inclined to 
interpret the offender’s remorse as genuine, among other subjective questions. 
Consider the following case, in which an officer described their motivations for 
using community resolution-level RJ in relation to the theft of a handbag by an 
offender who already had a criminal record:   
 
Initially, I was just gonna arrest him […] but when I eventually caught up with 
the offender, he was really, really sorry that he'd done it. […] His best friend 
had died just a few days before, and that particular night, he went out and got 
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absolutely wasted, and was so stupid that he nicked this girl’s handbag and 
stole the phone. All she really wanted was her phone back. So, you're up 
against, he's got a little bit of previous, he should really be getting arrested 
and sent to court, up against a victim who doesn't really want to go to court. 
I've got an offender who's really sorry for what he's done, he's got quite sad 
circumstances which led him to being really stupid that night, and she's a nice 
girl who only wants her phone back. (PCNPTG4) 
 
In this case, the decision to offer a community resolution seemed to be closely 
related to the officer’s willingness to divert an offender with an existing record, 
and to their judgement of both parties’ characters: they considered the victim’s 
desire to avoid court to be important, and accepted the offender’s remorse and 
explanation for their actions. Similarly, consider the following case in which 
several young persons were accused of harassment: 
 
[Following street RJ] there's gonna be no further action because I believed 
that the apology was sincere. […] It was really dealing with an incident right 
there and then, a minor incident, mischief as opposed to crime. (PCSOD6) 
 
Here, the decision not to escalate the case seemed to be underpinned by the 
belief that the ‘apology was sincere’ and that the incident was merely ‘mischief’. 
This illustrates the subjective, discretionary nature of the decision to utilise 
community resolutions, raising the possibility that their use might depend on an 
officer’s attitudes towards diversion and their interpretation of expressions of 
remorse. Consequently, officers who imbibe the cultural police biases outlined in 
Chapter 2, might withhold the offer of a community resolution on the basis of their 
suspicions or prejudices in relation to offenders from certain social and ethnic 
groups (McConville, et al., 1991). One officer insinuated that the decision to offer 
RJ was informed by offenders’ attitudes towards them: 
 
Generally, you can apply the attitude test because, from what I've seen, if 
people are all right with you, although they might not realise their actions, 
once they speak with the victim, it just changes things. (PCSOD5) 
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Suspects may hold or express anti-police attitudes for reasons which are not 
indicative of their remorse, nor relevant to their suitability for RJ or diversion, such 
as previous experiences of police maltreatment (Koenig, 1980). This might mean 
that offenders are denied access to an informal disposal, and that both victims 
and offenders are excluded from RJ, solely on the basis of perceived disrespect 
for officers (Alarid and Montemayor, 2012). More than this, the use of the so-
called ‘attitude test’ (Warburton, et al., 2005: 122) to determine suitability for RJ, 
might be discriminatory: officers are more likely to misinterpret civilians’ attitudes 
as anti-police if they come from less ‘respectable’ backgrounds (Chan, 1996: 119) 
or from an ethnic group against which the officer is prejudiced (McConville, et al., 
1991; Bowling and Phillips, 2002; Payne, et al., 2016). One study found that 
officers believed RJ to be ‘especially suitable for those coming from a “good 
background” and less suitable for those who are “dragged up”’ (Shapland, et al., 
2017: 71-2), implying a class bias. That the decision to use RJ seemed usually 
to be made quickly, may increase the likelihood that it was based on intuitive 
biases, rather than on a thorough consideration of case suitability (Kahneman, 
2011). Furthermore, that this decision was often also the decision to divert an 
offender from a more disclosable record, raises questions about the fairness of 
the process through which criminal records are obtained. 
The second motivation for using RJ which officers expressed, related to 
reducing recidivism. Recent years have seen the police play a growing role in 
rehabilitation and offender management through IOM and other approaches 
(Mawby, et al., 2006; Routledge, 2015). In line with findings by Hoyle, et al. (2002) 
that using RJ encouraged rehabilitative thinking among police, several officers 
discussed the desire to use RJ to foster desistance. One stated that RJ ‘gives me 
a chance to deal with them in a different manner which might have a better effect 
on them reoffending’ (PCNPTD2). Another described speaking to the parents of 
two young girls who had harassed and verbally abused a disabled person: 
  
I said: ‘This is what's gonna happen. Rather than make it more difficult to 
them and more serious, I want to try and educate the girls. I’m gonna speak 
to the lady in question, the victim, and if she’s happy about it, I’d like the girls 
to meet her, because I think they need to be educated’. (PCSOD2) 
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These and other officers reported being motivated to offer RJ for the purpose of 
rehabilitation. However, other respondents were sceptical about the impact of RJ 
on some types of offenders. For example, one expressed doubt that RJ might 
help serious violent offenders to desist: 
 
I don’t think restorative justice would be good for everything. Serious assaults, 
that type of thing, I don't think it would be wise, because I don't think that you 
can change somebody who's prepared to stab or slash or do something along 
those lines. (PCNPTG3) 
 
This suggests that offender rehabilitation was among this officer’s motivations for 
using RJ, but that they might not offer it in serious cases because of the belief 
that it would not achieve this goal. The implication is that the officer might have 
failed to consider the possible benefits of RJ for victims of serious crime (Daly, 
2005b, 2006; Shapland, et al., 2011), or that they saw these as insufficient to 
justify delivering the process. Similarly, one PCSO from Durham reported that 
they did not perceive RJ to be effective with shoplifting: 
 
For shoplifting, I’d say it’s not fantastic. I don’t think the offenders sit back 
and think: ‘Well, I won’t do it again’. […] We would get the offender to meet 
with the management, they’d pay for the goods that they’d stolen, they might 
exchange a letter of apology and the management would tell the offender 
the impact on the store, but in my experience, it hasn’t stopped the offender 
doing it again. (PCSOD9) 
 
This officer said that they used RJ with shoplifting anyway, suggesting that they 
may have done so for other reasons. Still, those who saw rehabilitation as a core 
motivation for offering RJ, may have been less likely to do so in cases where they 
felt that it would not influence future offending. This builds on previous findings 
that some officers are largely offender-focused in how they understand the 
purpose of RJ, potentially resulting in victims’ needs being neglected (Hoyle, et 
al., 2002; O’Mahony, et al., 2002). 
The third and fourth motivations to use RJ, as expressed by officers, were 
the processing speed which it enabled and the possibility of using the process to 
help victims. Depending on a victim’s needs and desires, these two priorities may 
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have been possible to satisfy simultaneously if, for example, some victims only 
wanted an apology or compensation. As previous chapters mentioned, however, 
these two priorities may have been in tension, insofar as enabling the victim to 
participate in dialogue or decision-making is often more resource intensive than 
excluding the victim from the process altogether.  
It is significant, therefore, that these priorities seemed to be weighted 
differently by officers from the two forces. Most respondents in each area reported 
that both concerns motivated them to use RJ. However, officers in Durham were 
more likely than those in Gloucestershire to discuss victim satisfaction as their 
primary concern. For example, one described RJ as ‘a way of the victim getting 
more satisfaction than they would probably get if it went down normal routes’ 
(PCSOD4), while another stated: ‘Whether it's Level 1 or 2, it's all about the 
satisfaction of the victim’ (PCSOD2). By comparison, officers in Gloucestershire 
were more likely to suggest that the desire to be efficient and to conserve resources 
was their primary concern, although they sometimes also noted that RJ could 
impact positively on its participants. One officer said: ‘[RJ] reduces paperwork and, 
in the long run, rules out having to go to court. So, it's sort of swift justice, really, 
which helps everybody’ (POG3), while another stated: 
 
It's an easier out, a better way, it's an easier system, and more people benefit 
from it. So obviously, with the jobs that we do and the length of time, and you 
know that it’s gonna have a better outcome, you're gonna do this system 
rather than go through custody. (PCNPTG8) 
 
Although these sentiments were also expressed in Durham, respondents from 
that force were generally less likely than those from Gloucestershire to imply that 
they elevated the goal of speed above victims’ needs. These differences were 
subtle, and might have been partially rhetorical. Yet, they correlated with the more 
sophisticated representation of victims’ needs within Durham’s strategies and by 
policymakers/managers, and with the higher levels of victim satisfaction achieved 
by that force. These data might indicate, therefore, that respondents from Durham 
had internalised the strategic goal of prioritising victims’ needs. Notably, Level 2-
trained officers in Gloucestershire were less likely to emphasise processing 
speed than those who were trained only to Level 1. Thus, there may have been 
a relationship between the receipt of conferencing training and/or the experience 
189 
 
of facilitation, and the prioritisation of victims’ needs over processing speed. If so, 
this might have influenced the overall use of RJ in both forces: in Gloucestershire, 
only around 40 officers (<5%) had received conferencing training – figures which, 
in Durham, were greater by a factor of ten.  
This is not to say that victim satisfaction was necessarily an exclusively 
normative goal for frontline officers. Indeed, many officers from both forces 
seemed to equate victim satisfaction with the victim’s willingness to sign off on an 
RJ disposal. It may be that, by requiring the victim’s consent for a community 
resolution, both forces had made it so that officers saw victim satisfaction as a 
means to an end – the end being the efficient closing of cases. Consider the 
following statement from an officer in Durham: 
 
Closure for the victim is one of the outcomes, closure for us as a police force 
to have that crime solved, and a bit of closure for the person who's carried 
out the offence as well. That's making sure that all three parties are satisfied 
with it. It's no good just saying: ‘Right, it's satisfied your needs, it hasn't 
satisfied mine. I just got that incident opened on my incident log, on my 
crime system. I need to have it closed in that respect’. But a bit of closure 
for the victim, really that's the main thing. (PCNPTD4) 
 
This officer, while implying that the victim was their primary concern, referred also 
to their own workload in a manner which suggests that they were at least partially 
motivated to satisfy victims because it was a bureaucratic requirement. In both 
forces, the integration of RJ into the community resolution essentially turned 
‘victim satisfaction’ into a bureaucratic outcome, measured as the victim’s 
willingness to consent to a community resolution. On one hand, this might have 
incentivised officers to put pressure on victims to participate, or otherwise to 
obtain victim consent and complete the RJ process as quickly as possible. This 
incentive structure might have led to the exploitation of victims ‘in the service of 
system efficiency’ (Crawford, 2000: 292). On the other hand, if officers internalised 
the priorities implicit within recording requirements (Ericson, 1981; McConville, et 
al., 1991), this could have resulted in a genuinely enhanced focus on victims’ 
needs, in parallel to the desire to resolve cases quickly.  
The fifth motivation which officers expressed in relation to their use of RJ, 
was the perceived ability of dialogic practices to resolve (and therefore close) 
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cases which did not have a clear victim or offender. This included neighbourhood 
conflicts in which it was not apparent if either party could be held ultimately 
responsible. For example, one officer described a case as follows:  
 
I just tried to use my RA training. I didn’t have somebody quite clearly 
admitting to the harm, but I had two parties who couldn’t come to a solution 
about a problem and both blaming each other. Touch wood, it worked. Not 
had any more problems at that address. (PCNPTD1) 
 
Similarly, some officers reported running conferences in response to one-off 
incidents for which they believed that responsibility was shared, most notably in 
fights between young people. One officer described a case of this kind: 
 
I gave [conferencing] a go, and both parties went away and thought, ‘Right, 
yeah, we’ve been stupid’. It wasn’t so much a victim. It was mainly two 
offenders to be honest. They weren’t cautioned. They were young people, 
and they went away thinking they were absolutely stupid and they hadn’t 
realised what they were doing. As far as I’m aware, there have been no 
recurrences of the behaviour. (PCNPTD2) 
 
Another officer discussed a comparable example: 
 
I went to meet the person reporting the potential assault, who said: ‘Yeah, he 
pushed me over, I fell against the wall, I cut my leg’. We go and see the 
[suspect]: ‘Yes, I did push him over because him and his friends were bagging 
up bags of urine and one of them hit me’. […] So, back to the victim: ‘Ah well, 
yeah, we did’. So, obviously we need to get everyone together. Obviously, 
nothing was crimed. […] It was more of an exchange of what’s happened, 
and I think everyone went away thinking: ‘Well, it’s just been an unfortunate 
situation that’s occurred, and no one really is at fault’. […] It’s very, very 
difficult when you get the call. It may spell out, one person is causing all the 
hassle, but then when you get people together that’s not the case. (PCSOD8) 
 
McConville, et al. (1991: 12) argued that blunt, dichotomous legal categories often 
require the police to ‘render down the complex to the simple’ in ways which ‘deny 
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ambiguities of real world experience’. The quoted officers perceived that the legal 
categories of ‘victim’ and ‘offender’ were not easily applicable to their cases, 
motivating them to use conferencing on the basis that it could resolve the conflict 
without requiring the officer to impose these labels. This is consistent with the 
common presumption that RJ has the ‘capacity for dealing with muddy, confusing 
situations that may not have a clear victim and offender’ (Stuart and Pranis, 2006: 
127; see also Young, 2000). 
Notably, these cases were all in Durham. Officers from Gloucestershire 
seemed to be much less likely to entertain the use of RJ in cases which did not 
have clear victims and offenders. One officer suggested that cases of this kind 
required mediation instead: 
 
When you have two parties and you don’t have a clear offender, I don’t think 
RJ should be used under those circumstances. [You could use] mediation, 
which is apparently quite a different approach. I’m not trained in that but I 
wouldn’t mind being. (PCSOG1) 
 
Another drew a similar distinction between RJ and mediation: 
 
Sometimes, people say to me: ‘I need a RJ’, and what it is, is mediation. It's 
not the same thing. […] Mediation, is six of one, half a dozen of the other, 
often. RJ is where you've got a clear offence and somebody's at fault. 
(PCNPTG6) 
 
A third suggested that RJ was more difficult to administer in such cases: 
 
For RJ to work, a lot of the time, you really need to have somebody who will 
admit responsibility for what's happened. But, unfortunately, in neighbourly 
disputes, you don't really get that. (PCNPTG4) 
 
There may not have been much difference between how these cases were 
resolved in the two areas. In Durham, officers reported variable adherence to the 
script in these cases, while one officer in Gloucestershire suggested that they had 
done ‘one true RJ’, but that ‘all the other [cases] have been mediation, but with RJ 
as a framework’ (PCSOG2). The point is that the extent to which a given practice 
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is informed by restorative principles, is a different question as to whether or not that 
practice is labelled as RJ (Gavrielides, 2007). Still, respondents in Gloucestershire 
seemed to be much more reluctant than those in Durham to locate their more 
complex dispute resolution activities within a broad restorative framework. This 
reflected Durham’s promotion of RJ as a philosophy with which to underpin policing 
in general, and the fact that officers in Durham were encouraged to take risks with 
it. In fact, their Level 1 training slideshow said, in capital letters: ‘DO NOT BE RISK 
AVERSE’ (doc. D2: 20). Accordingly, officers in Durham reported applying RJ more 
broadly than their counterparts in Gloucestershire. 
That RJ was promoted so strongly within Durham, might have led to another, 
more perverse motivation behind its use: to alleviate managerial pressure to be 
seen to comply with the RJ strategy. No officers in Gloucestershire reported ever 
having felt under pressure from their organisation or managers to use RJ. In 
Durham, however, two officers, who were not from the same division, reported that 
there was pressure on officers to use RJ more often. One argued that this could 
lead to its use in cases for which it was not appropriate: 
 
I think we’re under pressure to use it as often as possible, which dilutes its 
effectiveness. […] You can try and force it to happen because you might get 
asked the question, ‘How many RAs have you done?’, and if it’s not many 
compared to someone else, you feel the need to get them up, or some might 
feel the need to get them up. It should be applied when it’s needed, not 
because you think I should get them up. (PCSOD7) 
 
Another officer described how middle managers might exert pressure on frontline 
officers in order to be seen to be implementing the RJ strategy in their areas: 
 
Probably for internal, political reasons, I think everybody’s kind of thinking 
about it all the time, because there is a lot of pressure on people to be seen 
to be using this. […] I am a big fan of a lot of what Mr. Barton’s done for this 
force, but probably two levels below him carry his message, or what they 
claim to be his message, and often it’s not necessarily the case. I don’t know 
if it’s for fear of being held to account or anything, but they’ll really drive that 
forward and certainly RJ was no different. Examples being, ‘right, 
everybody’s got to have an RJ once a month’. […] What I know is still 
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happening is that people just use it in situations where it shouldn’t be used. 
[…] I bet I couldn’t find it written down, but I bet I could find you ten people 
who had it said to them: ‘I want to see one every month.’ […] Some people 
know what the difficulties are around it, but that doesn’t change the fact that 
they’re gonna tell you to do it because someone’s told them they’ve gotta 
tell you to do it, and that’s not exclusive to this. (POD3) 
 
While no documents or policymakers/managers alluded explicitly to the existence 
of a target, an HMIC report on Durham stated: ‘Senior leaders promote the use 
of restorative approaches, with an expectation that officers will carry out at least 
one restorative approach per month’ (2014c: 22). Such a target might be 
problematic if, as noted in Chapters 2 and 3, its introduction led to ‘gaming’, that 
is, to the proliferation of measured activities which aimed to meet the target, 
rather than to be socially useful. Stockdale (2015b), whose research explored the 
implementation of RJ in Durham, asked whether ‘a facilitator acting under duress 
[might] undermine the process’ (Stockdale, 2015b: 197) by engaging in poor 
quality delivery. This question was addressed directly by a Durham Constabulary 
internal report from late 2014, which hypothesised that officers were ‘chas[ing] 
those numbers to avoid being held to account’, and that this may help to explain 
the ‘mechanistic’ use of compensation and letters of apology (doc. D11: 4). 
Plausibly, the strong promotion of RJ within Durham (whether through informal 
targets or otherwise), incentivised officers to maximise the number of cases 
processed through RJ at the expense of each practice’s quality. 
The internal report was careful to state that it had not identified a causal 
relationship between managerial pressure and the inappropriate use of RJ, as 
there is no objective standard for when RJ should or should not be used, or for 
what it should look like in each case. Moreover, other officers explicitly said that 
they were encouraged only to use it when appropriate, including one who stated: 
 
I think it was good that it had come down from higher officers and the chief 
officer that it wasn’t to be seen as a quick fix, it was only to be used if it was 
applicable and if it was the right thing to do. (PCNPTD1) 
 
These data may indicate that officers had received different messages. Some 
managers might have been more performance-oriented than others, or different 
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local teams could have come under different levels of pressure from senior 
officers to increase their use of RJ. Alternatively, individual officers may have 
been put under pressure to use RJ more often because they were defying the RJ 
strategy by refusing to offer or deliver it. Indeed, the officers who reported 
experiencing this pressure, were also among those who expressed the most 
scepticism about its applicability to their work.  
The extent to which these motivations for using RJ informed the way in which 
RJ was offered and delivered, can be considered further by investigating how 
officers explained their use of RJ in practice.  
 
 
7.3 The offering process 
 
Chapter 3 explained that RJ should optimally take place with the free and 
informed consent of the participants. However, the low visibility of the offering 
process afforded officers the discretion to determine, on a case by case basis, 
what to offer and how to do so. This section explores the police’s explanations of 
how they offered RJ in practice. It considers both what was reportedly offered, 
and whether pressure might have been used to encourage participation. 
Most descriptions of the offering process fell into one of two types: those 
which portrayed RJ as dialogic, and those in which victims were offered the 
opportunity to propose outcomes. While both approaches were reported in both 
areas, the former was reportedly used more systematically in Durham, where 
most officers implied that they typically framed RJ as dialogic: 
 
I just basically go down the lines of […] ‘there's a new scheme which Durham 
police brought in, called restorative approach, whereby both people, in a 
nutshell, get in a room and we discuss our differences. […] It's a discussion 
to try and solve the problem, so that we're both in a mutual environment, and 
it gets sorted there and then.’ That's generally how I go about it. (PCSOD5) 
 
Another officer from Durham stated: ‘It’s offered all the time, they don’t all involve 
face-to-face meetings, [but] the victims are always offered that’ (POD2). By 
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comparison, those in Gloucestershire were more likely to report describing RJ to 
victims as their chance to propose outcomes. One officer said: 
 
[Victims] look at you blankly, because they've never heard of it. […] So, you 
explain. ‘Well, how do you want it dealt with? One extreme is nothing, one 
is words of advice, one is restorative justice, or the other end is an arrest, if 
I deem it suitable’. […] If they say ‘restorative justice’, you say: ‘Ideally then, 
how do you want it to be dealt with, what are you looking for?’ (POG2) 
 
Another officer from Gloucestershire stated: ‘You just ask [the victim]: what do you 
want from this?’ (PCSOG1), while a third said: 
 
I usually sit down with [the victim] and say: ‘What’s the best outcome for you? 
What would you like to see happen? What do you want?’ Because the bulk 
of the stuff that I deal with is shoplifting, the shop is normally quite happy as 
long as the goods are paid for. (POG6) 
 
The significance of these differences lies in the fact that most prospective 
participants would not already have an understanding of RJ. Consequently, the 
police had the discretion to offer it in a manner of their choosing, and the parties 
may not have been able to challenge their proposals (Daly, 2003; Laxminarayan, 
2014). Recent polling shows that most people in England have never heard of RJ 
(Restorative Justice Council, 2016b). In this study, only two officers reported 
encountering one victim each who had heard of RJ, while another reported that 
some shops in their area knew about it through previous experience. Most other 
facilitators reported that nobody they interacted with had heard of the concept. 
As one volunteer facilitator asserted, this meant that they were required to explain 
it to prospective participants, and that they might do so on the basis of their own 
understanding of how the process should work: 
 
Every time that you mention it, you also have to be prepared to explain to 
whoever it is that you’re talking to what restorative justice means, and when 
you do that, you’re giving your version of what you think restorative justice 
means rather than there being a textbook version of it. (RJHFD4) 
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This meant that victims and offenders who were not offered the opportunity to 
speak to each other, might not have realised that this was an option. Participants 
might also have had different expectations of the process, depending on how it 
was described to them (Van Camp and Wemmers, 2013; Laxminarayan, 2014; 
Vanfraechem, 2015): a victim who is offered the chance to share their feelings 
with the offender may have different expectations than a victim who is only asked 
to propose outcomes without speaking to the offender. 
One possible explanation for these different approaches lies in how officers 
understood RJ. All respondents were asked what the term RJ meant to them, at 
which point the two officers from Durham who were just quoted as offering it 
dialogically, defined it dialogically. Similarly, one officer from Durham who defined 
RJ non-dialogically – as ‘empowering the victim to have a say in what punishment 
or what outcome that an offender has’ (PCNPTD2) – also described offering RJ 
without necessarily raising the possibility of dialogue: 
 
I explain RA: ‘We could go down RA and we can sit and ask you once we’ve 
spoken to [the offender] and maybe interviewed them, then we can come 
back to you and sit down and decide how you would like it to go, what would 
you like to be done about it’. (PCNPTD2) 
 
This officer, like those quoted from Gloucestershire, reported portraying RJ as the 
victim’s opportunity to propose outcomes. This suggests not only that officers in 
Durham had the discretion not to offer dialogue, but that whether they did or not 
might have depended on how they understood RJ. This correlation broke down in 
Gloucestershire, however, where officers who understood RJ dialogically and 
delivered conferences, also reported offering mostly non-dialogic processes at 
Level 1. This suggests that the offering process was shaped by each force’s RJ 
strategies and policies: in Durham, officers were trained and expected to offer 
dialogue at Level 1, while the reverse was true in Gloucestershire. 
The data also suggest that the time and resources it took to deliver a formal 
conference, might have informed the decision of whether or not to offer one. In 
Durham, several officers reflected on this point, with one stating: 
 
Quick-time ones, the on-street ones, can be done instantly. […] The 
mediation level takes a bit of time to go back and speak to the person, get an 
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agreement for that to happen, a time for a meeting to take place and find a 
venue. All that can be time consuming. (PCNPTD4) 
 
Another officer noted that both time and the identification of a location were 
among the barriers to conferencing: 
 
You've got to find a mutual venue, which can be [the station] but you've gotta 
book it out. Although it was worth it in the end, it is time-consuming, and that's 
the only downside to it. (PCSOD5) 
 
While many officers from Durham noted this difference between street RJ and 
conferencing, none explicitly stated that it deterred them from offering dialogic 
approaches. In Gloucestershire, however, some officers made this connection. 
One stated that conferencing was ‘just not on the radar for most people’ because 
of the difficulties in ‘arranging for all the parties to be here when [the conferencing 
specialist] is around’ (PCNPTG6). Another officer, who was trained to Level 2 but 
who had not delivered a conference in the previous year, explained: 
 
We’ve got less and less police stations. Plus, they're not secured for 
individuals to be coming in and out of them, and we don't have designated 
RJ conference rooms, so that's hard. If I’m arranging a meeting, I would have 
to think very hard about where I would hold that. (POG4) 
 
Given that most respondents lauded RJ for its ability to increase efficiency, these 
pressures may not have deterred the police from using RJ per se, but rather 
informed the types of RJ which were offered, with dialogic approaches – or, at 
least, formal conferences – being neglected in favour of quicker, less structured 
and less planned processes. 
 Similarly, the propensity to offer conferencing might have depended on an 
officer’s role, with those in neighbourhood policing – especially PCSOs – given 
more time to undertake proactive work, than those in mostly reactive roles. For 
example, one respondent from Gloucestershire, who was not in neighbourhood 
policing, suggested that they rarely had time to use even street RJ: 
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Time is always what we would like to have more of. A lot of officers will tell 
you they'd probably like to sit down and talk to people, but unfortunately from 
the department that we work in, it's really difficult for us to do that. That's one 
of the constraints. (POG5) 
 
Similarly, a PCSO from Durham suggested that their role enabled them to use 
conferencing more often than others: 
 
From a neighbourhood perspective, it's easier because you do have that little 
bit extra time, whereas if you maybe speak to somebody from response who's 
going from job to job to job, it's more difficult because they've got a lot of other 
things to do as well. […] With stuff like this, especially Level 2 – and I 
mentioned it takes a lot of time – [managers] will allow time to facilitate and 
to discuss it. (PCSOD5).  
 
That neighbourhood officers might have had a greater ability to deliver 
conferences than officers in other roles, has been noted elsewhere in the 
literature (Bazemore and Griffiths, 2003; Cutress, 2015; Clamp and Paterson, 
2017; Shapland, et al., 2017). Still, each officer had to make a conscious choice 
to offer a dialogic process, knowing that, if they could get the victim to consent to 
a non-dialogic process, this could satisfy their bureaucratic requirements quicker. 
This might help explain why several studies, including this one, have found that 
the police use street RJ much more often than conferencing (Cutress, 2015; 
Shapland, et al., 2017; Westmarland, et al., 2017). The combination of low 
visibility discretion and the pressure to resolve cases quickly and efficiently, might 
incentivise the police to prioritise processing speed over other goals, and 
encourage officers to limit the choices they make available to prospective 
participants (Cutress, 2015). Additionally, the reframing of some peacekeeping 
activities as RJ, might have increased the proportion of police activities which 
were labelled as restorative, without involving formal dialogic processes. 
The data also indicate that respondents went to different lengths to 
communicate the voluntariness of the process to prospective participants. 
Previous quotations suggested that some officers described RJ to victims as one 
of several options from which they could freely select. However, several officers 
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described ‘selling’ RJ to victims in ways which may have resulted in victims 
feeling under pressure to participate. For example, one officer stated: 
 
It's no good going into someone's room who's never heard of it before and 
saying: ‘We've got this thing called restorative approaches’. […] It's how you 
as a police officer sell that to that person. ‘This is what we can do, it's not a 
soft option, it can run concurrent to a criminal conviction, it gives you a bit 
of closure, it might give you a bit of time to meet them, find out why they've 
done that’. (PCNPTD4) 
 
Several other officers also reported actively trying to convince victims to 
participate in RJ by making reference to what they might gain from doing so. 
Another remarked: ‘When I’m trying to sell it to the victim, I would always give 
examples of good cases that we’ve had’ (POD2). Similarly, another commented: 
‘A lot of it is us selling the concept and what can be achieved’ (PCNPTG1). 
Officers justified this approach on the basis that victims were initially unable to 
grasp the benefits of participating. Still, as explained in Chapter 3, they risked 
giving the impression that RJ was their preferred outcome, meaning that some 
parties might have consented primarily because of the officer’s authoritative 
position (Delsol, 2006; Nadler and Trout, 2012). 
A small number of officers, all of whom were from Gloucestershire, reported 
using rather more threatening approaches in an attempt to convince sceptical 
victims to participate. For example, one said that they emphasised the hassle it 
might cause for the victim if they chose not to do so: 
 
The victim is told: ‘You don't have to make a complaint, no one is gonna 
force you, but if you do want to make a formal complaint, it could end up in 
court and you could be compelled to go to court. If the judge decides they're 
gonna call you, you could be summonsed and a warrant issued’. (POG2) 
 
Another officer reportedly suggested to victims that they might be partially 
responsible for future offending if they refused to participate in RJ: 
 
You can, not persuade the victim to get involved in the RJ process, but you 
can explain to them why it would be good if that person is involved in RJ. 
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Sometimes, it takes you to explain to them: ‘You’re happy to leave this, it 
was only minor damage, you’re not too bothered. But what happens if it 
goes up the scale, you knew about it and you didn’t want anything done?’ 
But it’s not being sort of horrible and nasty to a victim, saying: ‘Well, you’ve 
got the guilt on your mind if it happens again’. It’s just saying: ‘Look, you can 
help this person.’ (PCNPTG2)  
 
These approaches may have been even more likely to be interpreted by victims 
as pressure, than the more positive ‘sales pitches’ discussed previously. Further, 
they reflect the varying motivations for using RJ described earlier. Some quoted 
officers may have encouraged participation based on the belief that the victim 
would benefit, while the last quoted officer seemed motivated to ‘sell’ RJ to victims 
on the basis that it might reduce reoffending. Others, still, implied that their 
offering process might be informed by the desire to resolve cases quickly. For 
example, one officer from Gloucestershire, in a potential Freudian slip, suggested 
that they might ‘impose’ RJ to avoid having to make an arrest: 
 
We're located at [place], so to have RJ as an alternative means of disposal, 
means that we don't have to go to cells. […] It's such a drive, and when you 
get there, the whole world seems to stop turning, and it takes you out for the 
whole day. Whereas if RJ can be imposed or [pause] dealt with there and 
then, it's brilliant. So, it's saving time. (POG3) 
 
This further illustrates how the presence of unranked policy goals – in this case, 
victim satisfaction, reoffending reduction, resource conservation and voluntary 
participation – can enhance discretion by enabling officers to determine what to 
prioritise in a given case (Sanders, et al., 2010). Consequently, voluntariness may 
be sacrificed if it is perceived to conflict with other goals.   
In fact, several officers from Gloucestershire argued that the principle of 
voluntariness was problematic because it was in tension with their ability to 
resolve cases to their own liking. In this regard, many compared RJ to the 
previous, more discretionary, COPS disposal. One stated: 
 
Because we’d used COPS for quite a while, and because it was changing 
and becoming more victim-focused, I know a lot of people were dreading it. 
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We were turning up to things and telling people ‘this is how we’re going to 
deal with it’, whether they liked it or not, to put it bluntly. Then it was becoming 
more, the victim’s got to go along with it. If they don’t want it, then you’re a bit 
stuck really. (POG6) 
 
Officers from Gloucestershire often lamented this loss of discretion on the basis 
that victims did not always consent to informal disposals in cases where, in the 
officer’s view, this was the most proportionate outcome. One stated that their ability 
to use informal disposals was restricted by victims who ‘wouldn't be happy unless 
they got blood’ (PCNPTG1), suggesting that a victim’s desires might be in conflict 
with the principle of proportionality. Another made a similar point: 
 
There are times that, although it's not voluntary, it's the common-sense 
approach for it to happen. […]. Some officers will think it should be more 
police-led than victim-led. ‘Right, this is a job, a minor incident compared with 
what we deal with day-in day-out. For me to go down the criminal route on 
this incident is not in the public interest, I think it should be dealt with by, you 
shake each other's hand, say sorry, and that's the end of it.’ (POG1) 
 
This officer went on to describe this issue in relation to shoplifting: 
 
Some stores [say], ‘we've detained them, we want them arrested’. Well it's £5 
shoplifting, they've never been in trouble before, we should be able to make 
that decision. ‘Right, what's gonna happen is, you're gonna get the product 
back so you're not out of pocket, they're gonna be banned from your store so 
they can't come in here again. They’re gonna be dealt with by restorative 
justice, with those outcomes agreed. If they get caught again, they won't get 
another chance after that’. But that still has to be victim-led. (POG1) 
 
That there was perceived to be a tension between victims’ desires on one hand, 
and the offender’s and broader public’s interest in having a proportionate and 
efficient justice process on the other, reflects the dual role that officers played in 
both facilitating RJ and making policing decisions. They did not, as an independent 
RJ service might, get referred cases for which all pertinent legal decisions have 
already been made. Rather, they were required to balance public and private 
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interests in determining whether a given outcome or disposal was appropriate and, 
concordantly, what should happen in cases where community resolution/RJ could 
not be used. This illustrates how officers’ decisions on RJ can be shaped by their 
responsibility to balance the needs and interests of various stakeholders, including, 
but not limited to, the direct victim and offender in a given case. In this case, the 
overlap between RJ and community resolutions may have created an incentive to 
impose RJ on victims who were felt to be unjustifiably insisting on prosecution. In 
this sense, the use of RJ may have been informed by the (perceived) necessities 
of the operational policing role, and by the manner of its integration in the police 
disposals framework. 
Some officers may also have put pressure on offenders to participate, 
whether intentionally or not. Only one officer – who, in the previous chapter, was 
described as uniquely cognisant of the possibility that this might happen 
unintentionally – reported being especially careful to avoid this. On offering a 
conference, they stated: ‘I spoke to the young lad, laid out the options, can’t steer 
him in any particular way. I just laid out the options’ (PCSOD7). Some other 
officers, mostly from Gloucestershire, implied that they might offer RJ to offenders 
alongside a specific threat in relation to what would happen if they declined. One 
suggested that they might frame the offer as a direct choice between RJ or court:  
 
If I ever had anybody that refused to take part in the RJ, then, obviously, the 
carrot or the stick. The stick is: ‘Ok, you get arrested or, at least, I report you 
and you go to court. It’s up to you. This is actually your opportunity, if you 
want to take your chance in court, then by all means.’ (POG4) 
 
Similarly, another reported framing the offer as a choice between RJ or arrest: 
 
I usually kind of sell it, well, not sell it. It sounds bad, doesn’t it? You’re kind 
of saying to them: ‘look, these are your options, you can be arrested or you 
can pay a bit of money, apologise’, etc. I kind of sell it more to the offender 
so they’ll go along with it. (POG6) 
 
The second quotation in particular implies that the officer made the offer with the 
express intent of securing consent. A third respondent similarly remarked that 
they had ‘been able to talk round’ some reluctant offenders (PCNPTG1). These 
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comments are consistent with research findings that the police may ‘behave in 
ways which dissuade many suspects from exercising their rights’ (Sanders, et al., 
2010: 252), such as by persuading them to consent to OOCDs. This may even 
happen in cases where there is not enough evidence to charge, or where there 
are legal defences (Sanders, et al., 1989). Thus, not only might officers use these 
threats as ‘ploys’ to ensure participation by magnifying the underlying pressure 
on offenders to participate for fear of a worse alternative, but they might even 
engage in deception when doing so. 
Perhaps the highest pressure practice described in Durham, was by one 
officer who used the threat of arrest to encourage a teenage offender not to leave 
a conference with their grandmother, from whom they had stolen cash: 
 
Both were crying. He actually got up and walked out, and I went after him and 
said: ‘We need to deal with this. If you walk out the door I will arrest you 
because we need to get this sorted and this was the agreement we had’. 
(PCNPTD1) 
 
Another officer from Durham stated that their desire to be victim-focused meant 
that they wished they could put pressure on offenders to participate: 
 
A couple of times I wanted to deal with the restorative approach, and either 
I couldn't, or I didn't get the outcome that I wanted for the victim, and I felt 
that we could do things a little differently. Maybe, not force people's hands, 
but a bit more pressure on offenders to engage in a restorative approach. 
Sometimes they don’t wanna engage in it and I think, being victim-focused, 
I feel like I’ve let the victim down. (PCNPTD3) 
 
This might reflect Reiner’s suggestion that ‘much police wrongdoing can be 
attributed to the misguided pursuit of a “noble cause”’ (Reiner, 2010: 120). In the 
latter case, the officer seemed to believe that pressuring offenders into 
participating might be a legitimate tactic because it could help victims. This may 
be one manifestation of how the ‘victim-focused’ rhetoric might have shaped 
some officers’ understandings of the purpose of RJ. 
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7.4 Enabling stakeholders to communicate 
 
All officers were asked to describe any communication which they enabled 
between the parties when delivering RJ. Their responses suggested that this 
varied considerably, both between and within the categories of Level 1/street RJ 
and Level 2/conferencing. This section considers each of these ‘types’ of RJ in 
turn, assessing the extent and nature of any communication which reportedly took 
place, and the possible implications for those who participated.  
Procedurally, Level 1 practices were described as varying substantially. 
That being said, only one case was explicitly portrayed as involving no direct or 
indirect communication whatsoever between a victim and an offender. In fact, this 
case had no victim, in the conventional sense of the term: 
 
We had a 16-year-old who was found in possession of cannabis. […] I felt 
that educating him was more a restorative way forward than just 
criminalising him. […] The education that he received was dealt with through 
a psychiatric nurse who understands the harms of drug abuse, understands 
the mental health side of cannabis. […] I don't think there was a restorative 
side as in for a victim but, with his age, I think the victim was the young 
person himself anyway, not understanding what he is doing and what the 
consequences were, should he continue. (PCNPTG3) 
 
The acceptance of non-dialogic practices as RJ, may have enabled officers to 
exercise their discretion creatively under the guise of RJ, and to utilise practices 
and outcomes which reflected their own understanding of the term. In this case, 
the officer may have believed that offender education, in the absence of a victim, 
was restorative. Alternatively, they may have believed that this was simply the 
most appropriate response to the case, but had no choice but to label the disposal 
as RJ, and therefore described it as such. 
Many officers described other Level 1 practices which involved only very 
limited, often indirect, communication between the parties. This is exemplified by 
the approaches described earlier, in which victim participation was restricted to 
being asked to provide input in outcome decisions, the result of which was then 
communicated to the offender by the officer. The following description of practice 
typified much of the street RJ reported in Gloucestershire: 
205 
 
 
I would normally sit down with both parties, separately usually. We’ve got a 
booklet, so I fill out the form with them and have a chat with the shop or the 
victim, see what they’re happy with of the different options. Then I go to the 
offender and say, ‘right, this is the option we’ve got, you can either pay and 
write a letter of apology or whatever, or be arrested and go to court’. (POG6) 
 
In these cases – which, in Gloucestershire, were often structured according to 
the Level 1 form (see Figure 6.6 earlier) – communication between the parties 
was usually indirect and limited to the officer informing each party of the other’s 
willingness to resolve the case informally and/or of the nature or acceptance of 
any conditions. The parties may have then communicated directly if one outcome 
was a letter of apology, although respondents suggested that these were usually 
quite narrow in scope. One officer, for example, stated: ‘Normally they just write 
out a standard ‘Really sorry for what I did’. It’s very basic, [we] don’t expect much 
from them’ (POG6). The parties may also have communicated directly if the 
offender personally handed compensation to the victim. One officer said that, in 
cases involving compensation, the parties tended to ‘deal with it amongst 
themselves’ (PCNPTG7) – although it was not specified how much, or how often, 
the parties would speak at that point.  
To the extent that victims could propose or suggest outcomes, they may 
have experienced these practices as empowering, as defined in Chapter 1, 
because of their participation in decision-making. The next section discusses the 
inclusion or exclusion of one or both parties from the outcome determination 
process. For now, it is important to note that such practices precluded the parties 
from being empowered via participating in a dialogue in relation to the causes 
and impact of the offence or incident.  
Dialogic practices, explained Crawford (2015: 175), are ‘janus-faced’ and 
‘look backwards and forwards across time’. In theory, the backwards-looking 
element empowers the parties by enabling them to express themselves directly 
to other stakeholders, to ask and answer questions and to reflect on the causes 
and impact of the incident (Roche, 2006; Zinsstag, et al, 2011). This ‘emotional 
exchange’ (McCold and Wachtel, 2002: 115) is designed to address harm ‘at the 
micro level’ (Bazemore and Umbreit, 1995: 302). As Chapter 3 explained, this 
may generate empathetic responses from both parties and lead to more relational 
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outcomes (Rossner, 2013). Chapter 3 also noted that this form of participation is 
widely seen as crucial to the empowerment of stakeholders within RJ, as well as 
being linked to the perceived fairness of the process and its effectiveness at 
reducing reoffending, satisfying victims and aiding in victim recovery. Yet, as 
previous studies also found (Meadows et al., 2012; Walters, 2014; Cutress, 2015; 
Westmarland, et al., 2017), participants in street RJ were often not enabled to 
address harm through dialogue. 
As noted, their discretion meant that officers could offer mechanistically 
(written or spoken) apologies or (direct or indirect) compensation in order to close 
cases quickly. For example, one policymaker/manager from Durham said that 
some officers used face-to-face apologies to achieve this goal: 
 
It’s very easy for me as a cop, particularly at a shoplifting, to say ‘Just 
apologise’, ‘I’m sorry’, ‘Right, you’re barred from the shop, I’ll put that down 
as a RA’. No, it’s not an RA in the true sense, that’s cuffing it. (PPMMD1) 
 
The concept of ‘cuffing’ has been used elsewhere to refer to non-recording of 
offences to avoid paperwork or other more time-consuming work (Pepinsky, 
1987; Patrick, 2009, 2011; Myhill and Johnson, 2016). In this context, one 
policymaker/manager defined ‘cuffing’ as ‘tak[ing] the easy option, rather than 
taking the right option’ (PPMMG3), while an officer described it as ‘getting rid of 
a job without doing it properly’ (PCSOD7). For example, one officer reported a 
case of assault which they perceived to have been ‘cuffed’ on the basis that the 
officer who delivered it had failed to offer conferencing, despite the suitability of 
the case for that process: 
 
I think it could have been a really good opportunity to have done a proper 
RJ and drilled down and got to the basis of why it was all happening, which 
culminated in the neighbour slapping the neighbour. But instead of us 
exploring that option, the officer just said, ‘I'm gonna get them to write a 
letter of apology’, which ended up being one line. We could have had a full-
blown conference around that, and that might have resolved the underlying 
issue. I thought there was an opportunity missed. (PCSOG2) 
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Officers who ‘cuffed’ cases by prioritising less time-consuming (and less dialogic) 
forms of street RJ, might represent the ‘avoider’ cultural group identified by 
Mastrofski, et al. (2002) as passively resisting change by doing as little work as 
possible to implement it. However, identifying a ‘cuffed’ practice retrospectively 
is complicated by the lack of an objective standard for when dialogue is needed. 
On one hand, it might be argued that officers should have offered conferencing 
in all cases, leaving it up to the prospective participants to determine whether 
they wanted to engage in it. On the other hand, the integration of RJ into police 
peacekeeping meant that RJ, in the broad sense of the term, was being used 
regularly with minor incidents in which conferencing might have been excessive. 
This may illustrate another tension between the policing and facilitation roles: 
while police officers are expected to use professional judgement to determine the 
most efficient method of negotiating order, facilitators are expected to enable 
stakeholders to determine this for themselves. Police officers, when delivering 
RJ, must balance their responsibilities to their organisation, the state and wider 
society (i.e. to be efficient and to achieve just outcomes) with their responsibilities 
under RJ to enable stakeholders to participate and make decisions. 
It is significant, therefore, that many cases of street RJ – mostly in Durham – 
were reported to involve some form of dialogue. In these cases, officers described 
bringing the parties together more or less immediately for an impromptu, face-to-
face meeting. One PCSO stated:   
 
The majority of my RAs are the on-street ones where you literally got the 
kids who have been a nuisance, you say ‘right, what are you gonna do?’. 
So, straight away we can always do the easy one of going to the door and 
speaking with the person who's called the police. (PCSOD1) 
 
Another recounted a case where young people had damaged a garden wall: 
 
I said [to the victim], ‘I'll give you a few options. You can go down the ASB 
route, look at getting them on curfew and all that. […] Or, a dry-stone wall, 
doesn’t need cement or anything like that and there's not a great deal of it 
gone. If I speak with them in front of the parents, and the parents agree, [they 
could] rebuild the wall? They can come and say sorry obviously’, I also 
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express the process to them, ‘and you can tell them the effect it's had on you 
[…] and [they can] tell you why they've done it’. (PCSOD3) 
 
A third officer from Durham stated that all their ‘six or seven’ cases of street RJ in 
the previous year had involved face-to-face communication between the victim and 
offender. They noted that one of these cases involved shoplifting and was ‘sort of 
Level 2’ (PCSOD4), explaining: 
 
The person agreed to apologise directly to the shop manager for what he'd 
done. He was then made aware of how it affected the shop manager and the 
staff in the store and the business, and the shop manager was able to speak 
directly to the offender to find out why he'd targeted their business. (PCSOD4) 
 
In Gloucestershire, much fewer officers reported delivering practices of this kind, 
although one policymaker/manager implied that they often took place, stating: ‘A 
lot of Level 1s are of a standard where you could look at them and be happy with 
that as a Level 2’ (PPMMG6). These data echo what Meadows, et al. (2012: 22) 
discussed in their report on restorative policing in South Yorkshire: 
 
What seems to have emerged in practice is a continuum of RJ approaches 
which incorporates Instant/Street RJ and conferencing but also includes 
hybrid approaches which fall somewhere between the two. 
 
The current study provides further evidence for the existence of ‘hybrid’ practices 
which afforded the parties an opportunity to address harm through an impromptu 
dialogue. Though these practices lacked in structure, preparation and follow-up, 
they may represent a way for the police to balance their need for convenient, 
efficient peacekeeping methods, against their need as RJ facilitators to enable 
stakeholder dialogue. 
Again, this raises the possibility that (street) RJ had become a framework 
with which to structure (or, at least, label) various peacekeeping activities which 
may have involved some form of informal negotiation and resolution anyway. All 
officers were asked whether they saw RJ as a new way of working for the police, 
and some suggested that it was analogous to what they did previously. For 
example, one officer stated: ‘If you look at Level 1, taking people to apologise and 
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speak to the victim, that would be sort of the norm in sort of the years gone by’ 
(PCSOD4). Another similarly argued that RJ was ‘a lot of getting the neighbours to 
talk to each other, which is just good old-fashioned policing really’ (PCNPTG7). 
These data suggest that these officers’ informal practices might not necessarily 
have changed much, aside from being relabelled as RJ. However, many officers 
responded to this question by contending that, while street RJ was similar to what 
they might have done anyway, they had modified their practices in accordance 
with one or more elements of their RJ training. For example, one officer said that 
they would not previously have brought the two parties together, asserting: ‘A lot 
of us did it anyway. […] But now it's a more formalised process and also getting 
two parties involved as well, so it takes it to the next step’ (PCNPTD3). Another 
officer reported using scripted questions to structure their informal negotiations in 
order to elicit more emotive responses: 
 
You're facilitating RJs left, right and centre without even knowing it. It's just 
that there is a more formal process in place to assist the officer in going down 
the correct way of asking questions and how to look at people, so we're trying 
to get true feelings out of those people. (PCNPTG2) 
 
These two were among several officers from both forces who commented that 
street RJ was akin to their existing peacekeeping activities, but represented ‘a 
more formatted way of doing it’ (POG4) or was ‘a bit more structured’ (PCSOD8). 
These data do not necessarily suggest that these practices were deeply informed 
by restorative principles and processes. Still, they lend credence to the argument 
that restorative principles and processes might shape, structure or encourage a 
strategic approach to peacekeeping (Bazemore and Griffiths, 2003; Weitekamp, 
et al., 2003; Meyer, et al., 2009; Clamp and Paterson, 2017). Questions remain 
as to whether these practices could be made to include safeguards at the same 
level as might be expected of conferences. Yet, as was found in the research on 
referral orders (Newburn, et al., 2002) and restorative cautions (Hoyle, et al., 
2002), these data imply that something at least partially restorative can take place 
alongside non-restorative priorities and frameworks. 
With respect to Level 2 RJ, all such cases described by officers seemed to 
involve some form of dialogue between, at least, a victim and an offender. Only 
one officer from each force described having delivered shuttle mediation, involving 
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two-way communication which focused on the transmission of information beyond 
the outcome agreement. One officer from Durham stated: 
 
Shuttle mediation, if the victim doesn’t want to take part in a face-to-face but 
there are things that they want to know, we can get them to write down what 
it is they want to know. We then take it to the offender, and get them to 
answer the questions and take it back, and if there’s any clarification, we 
take it back. (POD2) 
 
An officer from Gloucestershire, who was trained in conferencing, described one 
practice they had delivered as follows: 
 
I got the victim to write a letter first. She wrote this really lovely, long letter, 
saying: ‘Do you understand the impact this has had on me?’ […] I said to 
[the offender], ‘Well, I'm really sorry, but she doesn't want to meet you, but 
can you write her something back? Here is what she’s written to you first.’ 
He then responded to it. I've done letters a few times, but the two times 
when I've got the victim to write first, I've ended up with a much better letter 
from my offender because they've had a basis to start from and see the 
impact […] That works really well, and we don't get trained to do that. 
(PCNPTG4) 
 
Recent research has suggested that these practices, while not as effective as face-
to-face processes, may still reduce reoffending (Bouffard, et al., 2017). However, 
that such practices were so rare, suggests that they only took place on the initiative 
of officers who were willing to exercise their discretion creatively in these ways. As 
the latter officer stated, they had not been trained (nor, seemingly, encouraged) to 
do this; the former officer, meanwhile, only learned about this technique on an 
external training programme.  
Most officers from both forces who had been trained in conferencing (16/16 
in Durham; 11/16 in Gloucestershire), also reported having delivered at least one 
conference in the previous year (12/16 in Durham; 10/11 in Gloucestershire). 
These practices were characterised by being scheduled for a later date, and took 
place in a variety of settings, including victims’ homes, police stations and offices, 
the offices of other public agencies, shops, churches and community centres. 
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Relative to street RJ, they were more often used in response to more serious or 
complex issues, such as more serious assaults and criminal damage, hate crime 
and longstanding neighbourhood disputes. Moreover, unlike most street RJ, 
some conferences also included indirect stakeholders, usually the parents or 
other family members of one or both parties. In one case, a young offender’s 
football coach attended a conference as their supporter. 
As Section 6.5 explained, all respondents who were trained in conferencing 
were given scripts, although these were not always used. Some officers reported 
not using their script at all, including one who said: ‘I didn't use any script at all, I 
just winged it and went through what felt natural’ (PCNPTD3). However, this officer 
also implied that they adhered at least to the structure of the script by asking 
questions which allowed the parties to address the harm done: 
 
I asked the boys, ‘How do you think that the members of the congregation 
felt? What do you think the impact would have been?’ Then I got the members 
of the congregation to tell them how it impacted on them. (PCNPTD3) 
 
Reportedly, the parties then agreed that the offenders would undertake some 
reparative work. While the officer might not have used the script, their practice 
still adhered to its structure by including backward- and forward-looking elements 
(Crawford, 2015). Similar practices were described by several other officers who 
reported that they had delivered conferences without adhering closely to the 
script, but which had included both backwards- and forwards-looking elements. 
Thus, it may be that at least the structure of the script, if not necessarily its 
language, had shaped these officers’ facilitation practices.  
Indeed, officers were free to determine what kind of language to use when 
facilitating. Some said that they followed the script’s questions closely: 
 
We would sit down and ask the questions to the harmer in red, and the blue 
ones to the harmed. Some of the questions may get answered, so you just 
omit that one and follow the flow. (PCNPTD1) 
 
The colours refer to the scripted questions which were directed at each party (see 
Figure 6.3). The suggestion is that this officer delivered conferences by asking 
the questions directly from the script. To the extent that Durham’s modified script 
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gave victims more opportunities to express themselves and provide input than it 
did offenders, this may have resulted in processes which failed to empower the 
offender or to treat them and the victim equally. Still, the use of the script may 
have reduced the likelihood that police facilitators dominated practices (Walker, 
2002); as another officer said of the script: ‘You can see I like talking. I had to learn 
to shut up in RJ. [The script] is a good prompt’ (PCNPTG6).  
Moreover, scripts which were designed with a greater level of participant 
equality in mind, may have reminded the facilitator to treat all the parties equally in 
terms of the questions they asked. For one volunteer facilitator, the script ensured 
that they ‘don't ask superfluous questions to one [party] that you don't ask the other’ 
(RJHFD7). Similarly, one officer argued that it reminded them to give both parties 
at least some opportunities to speak: 
 
If you stick to that script, you will be speaking to each one, which means you 
wouldn’t be just aiming your conversation at the harmed and asking him ‘what 
have you done, what have you…’, because you go back to the other one. […] 
It’s got a flow to it and you involve both parties. (PCNPTD1) 
 
Moreover, scripts may also have discouraged the use of judgemental language by 
providing short, open questions which encouraged the officer to ask people how 
they felt, rather than to use investigative language or to apportion blame. In fact, 
some officers who reported deviating from the script implied that they might have 
used more direct, pointed or personal language as a result. One said: 
 
I try to let it flow naturally. They know what they wanna say, it's just getting 
that chance to say it. […] I find it's always easier if you've got the two in the 
room, if you just say to the victim ‘Go!’, so to speak, and they just go: ‘Right, 
you knocked my wall down. This is what I feel like’, and all the rest of it. Then 
it's: ‘Have you anything to say to that?’, especially with the kids, you have to 
be a bit more sort of firmer with them, you know, ‘Have you got anything you 
want to say then?’, and they go: ‘Sorry, I done it’, ‘So why did you do it? How 
did you feel when you done it?’ So, I prompt it a little bit. I have my own way 
that I like to go about it without breaking out of the structure. (PCSOD3) 
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Although this description broadly fitted within the structure of the script, the idea 
that the officer might be ‘firm’ with the young person might suggest that deviation 
from the script could result in offenders being questioned more harshly. This is 
also important because officers reported varying in their ability to conceal their 
partiality. When asked if they found it easy or difficult to treat all the parties equally, 
some claimed to be proficient in this: 
 
I always remain impartial. I never, ever take sides with anybody. Even the 
boys [offenders in a conference], I made sure that they understood that they 
could approach me at any time. (PCNPTD3) 
 
Another officer similarly reported having both the capacity and the inclination to 
remain impartial when delivering RJ: 
 
I find that very easy because I do not take sides, exactly the same way as I 
do as a police officer. I'm supposed to be impartial in all this, and I'm not there 
to take sides with either of them, I'm there to facilitate a conversation between 
them, and hopefully find a solution that is agreeable to both sides. 
(PCNPTG3) 
 
Several other officers, however, implied that they or their colleagues found it 
difficult, at least in some cases, to treat the parties equally. One stated: 
 
When you know someone's done something and they've admitted it to you 
prior to this meeting, or you've got CCTV of them, and they have a bit of an 
attitude on them, you find it hard not to sort of lean towards the victim and get 
a bit snappy. (PCSOD3) 
 
Another officer responded that ‘it depends on their attitudes. […] It can be tricky to 
view people independently’ (POG5). A third added: 
 
I’ve had to explain to my colleagues the neutrality of it all. It's not an interview, 
you're not questioning an offender about an offence. You’re there to be totally 
neutral and everyone gets a say. I think, as police, we tend to side more with 
the victim, and that's why RJ is something quite different. (PCNPTG1) 
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As Chapter 3 explained, practices in which the officer dominated discussions, 
was overtly partial or used judgemental language, may have been less likely to 
be perceived by participants as procedurally fair. Previous studies of scripted, 
police-led RJ similarly found substantial deviations from the script, resulting in the 
stigmatisation of young offenders (Hoyle, et al., 2002). In lieu of a professional 
level of facilitation training, adherence to a restorative script – depending on its 
design – might help to limit the police’s interventions and maximise the chances 
they act in a procedurally fair manner (Sherman, et al., 2015).  
This is not to say that deviation from the script is always undesirable. 
Chapter 6 noted that some modifications were necessary to be responsive to 
different situations. Indeed, some researchers have argued that scripts are too 
restrictive, and that questions may need to be reordered, rephrased or removed, 
depending on the context (Cook, 2006; Vanfraechem, 2006, in Zinsstag, et al., 
2011; Turley, et al., 2014). Additionally, O’Reilly (2017: 173) contended that scripts 
encourage an unnatural ‘performance’, making conferences less ‘passionate’ than 
they otherwise might be by repressing emotions and preventing the parties from 
expressing themselves at a pace and in a manner of their own choosing. That 
facilitators need to ‘think on their feet’ means that the script may not be a perfect 
substitute for specialist training and experience (Pranis, et al., 2003). Still, this 
study’s findings suggest that it may have helped to structure the discretion of those 
who used it when facitating, in ways which enhanced the likelihood that some 
restorative principles were realised. 
 
 
7.5 Determining outcomes 
 
Some aspects of outcome determination have already been discussed, as 
street RJ was often described as involving little more than this process. This 
section analyses further the detail and implications of the outcomes which were 
achieved and the processes through which they were selected. It begins by 
exploring the recorded and unrecorded outcomes which police facilitators 
reported, before considering how outcome decisions were made. 
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Officers reported a variety of outcomes to their RJ processes. As noted, 
symbolic reparation was ubiquitous among descriptions of street RJ. In many 
cases of low-level ASB or crime, a verbal or written apology was the only formally 
agreed outcome. As one officer stated of such cases: ‘Normally the apology has 
been enough’ (PCNPTG4). These findings echo other recent studies which found 
symbolic reparation to be the most commonly recorded outcome in street RJ 
(Meadows, et al., 2012; Cutress, 2015).  
Material reparation, in the form of compensation or labour, was reported as 
a formal outcome in a substantial proportion of the cases involving acquisitive 
offences or property damage. This was often set at a level which directly mirrored 
the loss or damage. Shoplifters paid for or returned the stolen goods: as one 
officer said: ‘Usually all [the shop] wants is the goods paid for, so they’re not out 
of pocket’ (POG6). Similarly, property damage often involved some material 
reparation through payment or, less often, labour: some offenders fixed what they 
had damaged (such as the children described earlier who rebuilt a garden wall) 
or cleaned graffiti for which they were responsible. 
Cases where monetary payments directly corresponded to the loss 
incurred, essentially amounted to reimbursement. Several officers, mostly from 
Gloucestershire, reported delivering street RJ in the following manner: 
 
[The victim] might turn around and say ‘That’s cost me £200 mate, so I want 
£200.’ So, we go back to the offender and say, ‘Right, you owe him £200, 
ok? Get £200 by such and such a date.’ Here you go, job’s a good ‘un, the 
victim’s happy, the offender might not be happy, but he’s paying for the 
damage he caused and he’s not getting a criminal conviction. (POG4) 
 
This ‘compensatory justice’ (Christie, 1982: 95) may represent what Swan (2016: 
966) referred to as the ‘tortification’ of criminal offences. By facilitating the transfer 
of monetary restitution from the offender to the victim, officers essentially applied 
civil law principles to diversion. Braithwaite and Pettit (1990) similarly cited tort 
law as a framework which could be used to respond to offending without resorting 
to criminalisation. In Christie’s terms (1977), this may allow victims to retain 
ownership over the conflict, insofar as the state’s withholding of fines is one 
manifestation of its ‘theft’ of a conflict from the victim. 
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Christie (1982) later noted one problematic assumption inherent in this 
approach, namely that compensation can be given. In other words, one’s access 
to diversion from criminalisation may depend on one’s ability (or the ability and 
inclination of one’s parents) to pay, further entrenching inequalities (Zhang and 
Xie, 2010; McMahon, 2013). Ashworth similarly raised the possibility of ‘middle 
class mitigation’ (2000b: 15) as a risk to fairness and consistency in the context 
of informal justice processes, while Delgado, et al. (1985: 1372) argued that 
negotiated justice can amplify existing inequalities, making it ‘no safe haven for 
the poor and powerless’ (see also Waldman, 1999). These risks are especially 
pertinent given the lack of transparency, appeals processes and accountability 
mechanisms in police-led RJ. Indeed, there was little to ensure that the process 
could not be abused by victims (whose costings of loss often did not seem to be 
verified by the police) or by officers who could impose or suggest compensation, 
and decide whether to agree to compensatory requests.  
In some cases, officers reported that reparation did not directly mirror the 
losses incurred. In one case, two children had stolen some petrol from a church’s 
generator and undertook some gardening on the church’s grounds. In another 
case, a young person returned a stolen chocolate to a small shop and undertook 
one hour of unpaid labour, clearing boxes from its storeroom. Another officer 
reported that some offenders would compensate victims by ‘helping around the 
house, doing the garden and stuff like that’ (POG5). This raises issues around 
proportionality, insofar as the amount of work which is proportionate to a given 
offence, is a subjective question. Indeed, how much a person’s labour was worth, 
was seemingly determined on a case-by-case basis. Still, in cases where the 
alternative option would have involved a more disclosable criminal record (which 
was not necessarily always the case), it seems probable that such outcomes 
would have been net-beneficial for participating offenders. 
Payments to charity, which were only reported in Gloucestershire, also often 
did not correspond to the value of any loss. Instead, amounts were set during the 
outcome determination process, often following an officer’s suggestion. As noted, 
this approach had been banned in Gloucestershire shortly prior to the data 
collection. According to one policymaker/manager: 
 
Officers were telling offenders, ‘You’re going to pay £20 to whatever the 
charity was’. Which, in effect, is a fine. There’s nothing wrong with paying 
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for goods stolen or paying for damage caused, but when you start talking 
about fining people or compensation, that’s not the police’s role. We don’t 
have a mandate for deciding on that, that’s what court’s there for. It’s taken 
a long time to re-educate officers that that isn’t acceptable. (PPMMG6) 
 
Several officers from Gloucestershire reported that, prior to this policy change, 
they had often asked offenders to put £10 or £20 into the charity tin of the store 
from which they had shoplifted. One officer described a different type of case 
involving a dog which bit two joggers, for which the dog’s owner paid £200 to an 
animal charity. The officer in this case said that they had suggested this amount 
because they ‘took a look at [their] property and I thought: “You can afford that” 
[laughter]’ (PCNPTG8). Only one officer reported an agreement in which the 
offender was to pay money to the victim beyond the level of damage or loss. In 
this case, that decision was based on the officer’s own suggestion: 
 
The damage really, in monetary value, was probably about £10, it was the 
pain-in-the-ass value that made it 20. So, he came over, and I had sort of 
discussed it with the victim before, and I said ‘Well, ok, it cost £10, but I think 
he should give you £20.’ (PCNPTG6) 
 
Incidentally, the victim in the above case reportedly declined the additional £10 
upon being handed it by the offender. Still, the low visibility of the process allowed 
officers to propose different levels of compensation, depending on their own 
judgement as to what was reasonable. This raises the possibility of inconsistent 
or punitive approaches, essentially allowing officers to ‘sentence’ offenders. 
Other officers reported that more relational and psychological outcomes 
sometimes emerged from dialogue, although they were not necessarily recorded 
in outcome agreements. Many conferences were described as resulting in 
expressions of forgiveness, embraces or regards for the future. Such ‘conciliatory 
gestures’ (Ristovski and Wertheim, 2005: 63) or ‘reintegrative gestures’ (Hoyle, 
2011: 803) were more common in cases where emotions had been expressed, 
or where the participants already knew each other. One officer stated that ‘the 
main [outcome] is the emotional connection’ (PCSOD7), while another officer 
described the (unrecorded) outcomes of a long-running neighbourhood dispute: 
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After that hour and a half, that was it, they were getting on absolutely brilliant 
and hugging. Now they have barbecues, while previously they both wanted 
to move. (PCNPTG7) 
 
Another officer stated: ‘Quite often, by the time they leave the conference, they’re 
talking and saying, “I hope you do well at college”’ (POD2), while a fourth said: ‘A 
lot of times I've left conferences and they've ended up having a cup of tea 
together, shaking each other's hand and everything's been really good’ (POG1). 
Many officers also reported that dialogic practices allowed the parties to express 
their feelings and communicate information in ways which led to victims feeling 
relieved. One officer remarked that the main outcome of a restorative conference 
might be that the victim is educated as to the circumstances of the offence, or 
informed of the offenders’ contrition:  
 
The RJ conference is an outcome in itself. There's a massive barrier that 
gets dragged down as soon as the victim and offender start talking, because 
they go ‘Ah! He didn't mean it’ or ‘She's sorry, I can see that’. (POG1) 
 
Another officer implied that victim expression might be seen as an outcome: 
 
A lot of the face-to-face I’ve done wasn't really around reparations in terms 
of a monetary reparation or painting the fence, it was really about an 
opportunity for the victim to say how they felt. (POD1) 
 
A further officer also noted that how victims felt after the conference was an 
important outcome, although it was not always recognised as such: 
 
The real outcome, which I'm always concerned maybe we miss because it’s 
too blindly obvious, is the peace of mind. […] The best outcome, taking away 
what’s documented on paper, is the fact that the victim had their chance to 
ask the questions and get the answers. That's more valuable than any letter 
of apology, money repayment or whatever happens. (PCNPTG5) 
 
While these data relate only to officers’ perceptions of how victims felt, they are 
consistent with the research evidence outlined in Chapter 3 in relation to the 
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importance of information and expression to victims. As Sherman and Strang 
(2015) argued, one of the problems with street RJ is that it is assumed to have 
similar benefits as conferencing, despite the differences in the two procedures. 
Overall, these data lend further credence to a relationship between dialogic 
processes and relational and psychological outcomes (Rossner, 2013), and to 
the suggestion that non-dialogic, street RJ processes may be less likely to have 
these results (Cutress, 2015; Shapland, et al., 2017). 
The data also indicate that outcome determination processes varied. A 
small number of officers described conferences in which the outcomes were 
determined collectively by the participants. One officer, for example, stated: 
‘Quite often [the participants] sort of do decide amongst themselves what is an 
achievable outcome’ (PCNPTG7). Another officer described a specific case: 
 
[The offender] was adamant that she wanted to pay this money back, and I 
said, ‘look, I’m not gonna sit here and force you to do it’. But between them, 
in this meeting, they agreed she was gonna pay some money back when 
she could on certain dates that she got some money in, and it would go 
through a third party that they knew. […] So, they just totally, amongst 
themselves, decided what they were gonna do. (POD3) 
 
A third described a similar conference they had delivered:  
 
There was an agreement drawn up to say that [the offender] would get a 
part-time job or pay at least some towards the missing tooth. I didn’t set that 
condition, they agreed it between them. (PCSOG1) 
 
A fourth officer outlined how they took a particularly non-interventionist approach 
to the process of outcome determination during conferences: 
 
There is a moment [on the script], where you say, ‘Is there anything that 
they can do to make this situation any better for you?’ So, I do throw that in 
there, and if the victim doesn't come up with anything, then I leave it at that. 
(PCNPTG4) 
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This ‘transference of responsibility from professionals to lay people’ is a key 
characteristic of ‘fully’ restorative processes (Hoyle and Rosenblatt, 2016: 43). 
Some commentators believe that, if the parties do not have specific outcomes in 
mind, it is not the role of the facilitator to make suggestions (Karp, 2015; Zellerer, 
2016). As explained in Chapter 3, processes in which the officer does not 
interpose themselves in outcome decisions, may most likely be experienced by 
the parties as fair, legitimate and empowering. 
However, most officers implied that they did not always relinquish control 
entirely during outcome determination. Although no officers explicitly described 
imposing outcomes without at least consulting the parties, several reported being 
aware of their colleagues doing so, as per the earlier description of a victim being 
‘railroaded’ (PCSOG2) into accepting a letter. As described in Chapter 6, letters 
of apology and payments to charity were banned in Durham and Gloucestershire, 
respectively, partially because there was fear among senior leaders that they 
were being imposed. The imposition of an outcome on victims and offenders 
without even consulting them, is anathema to their empowerment, insofar as this 
requires stakeholders to participate in such a way that they influence the process 
and its outcomes (Zimmerman, 1995; Richards, 2011). 
Significantly, many outcome agreements reportedly emerged following a 
negotiation between the victim and the police officer. As noted earlier, some 
officers described discussing outcomes with victims, before bringing that 
agreement to offenders as a ‘take it or leave it’ plea offer for an informal disposal. 
This seemed to be most common in Gloucestershire, where one typical officer 
described street RJ as allowing the victim to ‘coordinate what they would like to 
happen and we can try to facilitate that’ (POG5). Some conferences were even 
described in these terms. For example, in the aforementioned case of theft from 
a church in Durham, the officer reported that they had ‘already agreed with the 
members of the church that the boys were gonna do some work in the church to 
help’ (PCNPTD3), prior to the restorative conference taking place. When asked 
if the offenders had also agreed to that, the officer stated: ‘Kind of, yeah. It was 
mentioned to them certainly, and then it was formally agreed and accepted within 
the face-to-face’ (PCNPTD3). 
This might have been more empowering for victims than restorative 
cautioning which, by focusing on reintegrative shaming, often overlooked victim 
input (Strang, 2001; Hoyle, et al., 2002; O'Mahony, et al., 2002). By excluding the 
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offender from the decision-making process, however, the approaches reported in 
the current study may have allowed outcome decisions to be dominated by 
victims and officers, potentially making it less likely that offenders’ needs would 
be expressed and met. Offender input at this stage may also act as a safeguard 
against disproportionate outcomes (Fattah, 1998) and increase the legitimacy of 
the process and the police in their eyes, making compliance with the agreement 
more likely (Sherman and Barnes, 1997; Tyler, 2006, 2013). Yet, the twin goals 
of increasing processing speed and enhancing the focus on victims, seemingly 
legitimised offenders’ exclusion from these decisions and created a power 
imbalance between them and the victim. Especially in the absence of the 
empathy which might have been induced by a dialogic process, this approach 
might have increased the risk of punitive outcomes (Christie, 2010).  
This also meant that police officers were largely responsible for promoting 
the offender’s rights and interests during outcome negotiations with victims. In 
many cases, officers reported vetoing victims’ suggestions which they felt were 
disproportionate or unrealistic. One stated: 
 
You have to sit down and say: ‘Look, what you’re wanting to do, for whatever 
reason, totally isn’t feasible. They’re juveniles, I can’t make them work that 
time’. […] I say: ‘Well, does that actually fit the offence? I agree, it is a 
punishment and a humiliation for them, and it is a benefit to somebody, but 
it doesn’t actually fit what they’ve done. So, shall we think about something 
else?’ We tend to lead them. (PCNPTD2) 
 
Another officer stated: ‘Some victims want the moon on a stick [and] need to be 
led by police, so it can't wholly be victim-centred’ (POG3), while a third said: 
 
They might be way off and say, ‘I want this or that.’ You might say ‘I don't 
think that's proportionate, but we'll see what we can do. I agree that they 
need to pay something towards that’. You coach them a little bit regarding 
what is proportionate, what you’re ok with and what’s sensible. (POG2) 
 
These and other officers reported being motivated to exert control over the 
outcome determination process to ensure that outcomes fairly balanced the rights 
and interests of victims and offenders. This intervention might have helped to 
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ensure that this balance was not threatened by punitively-minded victims. Yet, 
this also meant that any persons who offended against victims of this disposition, 
were largely at the mercy of whether the officer opted to exercise their discretion 
to negotiate the proposed outcomes on their behalf. Officers were responsible for 
determining which outcomes were proportionate or realistic, giving them 
substantial powers to allow, block, impose or suggest outcomes. 
In fact, several officers, most of whom were from Gloucestershire, reported 
exercising their discretion to make suggestions without necessarily being asked 
to do so. For example, the officer who delivered the case in which a payment was 
made to a dog charity implied that the outcome was their idea: 
 
Probably my suggestion, yeah, but with the victim’s agreement. When I go 
to the victim, I ask them what they want to do, and they kind of say, ‘I don't 
want to go to court, I don't want the dog seized and put down.’ So, you kind 
of give them ideas of what we can do. (PCNPTG8) 
 
Another officer similarly implied that, although they tried to relinquish control over 
outcomes decisions, it was still their role to make suggestions because of their 
knowledge about what might be possible: 
 
Sometimes, you make a suggestion because you're obviously the expert, 
they've probably never been in that situation before. […] As much as you 
can, you let it be their ideas and outcomes. (POG1) 
 
Again, the problem with the officer making suggestions lies in the power it affords 
them, and in the authoritative position of the officer. The point of the court system 
is to ensure that outcome decision-making is consistent and transparent (Daly, 
2005). RJ tends to prioritise responsiveness and participation over consistency, 
but does not always include mechanisms to prevent facilitators from abusing the 
power inherent in this flexibility (Ashworth, 2002, 2004; von Hirsch, et al., 2003). 
In addition, the police’s authority may mean that victims and offenders agree to 
anything the officer suggests, or with anything which the officer indicates (or is 
perceived to indicate) as their preference for how a case should be resolved. 
Consequently, on the basis of an officer’s suggestion, outcomes may be imposed 
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or agreed to, which neither party wanted, are in neither party’s interests or are 
perhaps even harmful to one party. 
This might be especially problematic if officers are culturally predisposed 
towards certain outcomes which do not necessarily reflect stakeholders’ needs. 
Chapter 3 outlined research which suggested that state-dominated RJ processes 
often neglect relational outcomes in favour of more quantifiable and easily-
achieved outcomes, such as reparation. Some officers in Gloucestershire 
insinuated that their colleagues were particularly biased in favour of cash 
transfers, with one stating: 
 
A lot of officers go into an RJ with this expectation that the victim always 
wants something. Police officers are trained in thinking that everybody has 
a price to pay. From a victim's perspective, most of the time all they want is 
an apology. […] It will be the police officer, at the end, that will be trying like 
to get some sort of compensation or something at the end to repay the 
victim. (PCNPTG4) 
 
One police policymaker/manager from Gloucestershire similarly stated: 
 
One of the big hang-ups officers have had is, there’s a crime, there must be 
a punishment. Actually, they need to accept that if the victim doesn’t want a 
punishment, if they want an apology, then that’s an acceptable outcome for 
that victim because it’s what that victim wants. (PPMMG6) 
 
These findings are consistent with other recent studies which found that officers 
may both suggest or impose outcomes (Meadows, et al., 2012; Cutress, 2015) 
and be biased towards compensation when doing so (Shapland, et al., 2017). A 
study of restorative cautioning similarly found that officers might ‘overstep their 
remit by pursuing their own reparative agenda’ (Hoyle and Rosenblatt, 2016: 7). 
As previously, whether this happens or not in a given case, seemingly depends 
primarily on how individual officers elect to exercise their discretion in practice.  
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7.6 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter explored officers’ experiences of facilitation. It identified several 
patterns and variations in what motivated them to offer and deliver RJ, and in how 
they reported exercising their discretion when doing so. It also highlighted some of 
the tensions between their policing and facilitation roles.  
The data suggest that officers’ decisions and practices were shaped by the 
need to balance and achieve competing goals. They were asked to satisfy victims’ 
needs and enable victim participation in decision-making, while also ensuring that 
their policework was efficient and that justice was done. This meant that practices 
partially mirrored organisational strategies and policies, but that they ultimately 
depended on what officers opted to prioritise in any given case. Moreover, the 
tensions between these goals limited the extent to which officers could adhere to 
restorative principles and processes when facilitating, a finding which is consistent 
with the existing literature pertaining to the institutionalisation of RJ (Daly, 2003; 
Blad, 2006; Crawford, 2006; O’Mahony and Doak, 2017). Drawing on Skolnick’s 
(1966) seminal remarks, there was pressure on the police to be efficient rather 
than restorative when the two norms were in conflict. 
Practices were also shaped by the ways in which RJ had been integrated into 
operational policing. Street RJ largely overlapped with the police’s peacekeeping 
responsibilities, with officers expected to negotiate order both restoratively and 
efficiently. That all community resolutions had to be delivered as RJ created further 
tensions between pragmatism and stakeholder participation. Additionally, the low 
visibility of the process meant that officers were largely free to determine what to 
offer and how to offer it, the extent and nature of any communication between the 
parties, and the extent to which they would relinquish control over outcomes. Thus, 
how RJ was executed in practice was ultimately up to individual officers, as they 
decided how to balance the various pressures and incentives which contextualised 
their involvement in facilitation. As a result of these and other factors, reported 
practices partially reflected restorative principles and processes, and partially 
reflected the police’s existing priorities, rationales and goals. 
From an RJ perspective, many described practices deviated substantially 
from restorative principles and evidence-based processes. This might be seen as 
a failure by those who expect the use of RJ to remain faithful to its theoretical roots 
and to best practice guidelines. However, Daly has cautioned against using a strict 
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theoretical framework ‘as the benchmark for what is practical and achievable’ 
through RJ (2003: 234). Indeed, from a police perspective, it might be said that 
officers’ reticence systematically to devolve control to citizens or utilise more 
resource-intensive processes, simply reflects the necessities of the operational 
policing role. Clamp and Paterson noted of restorative policing that ‘organisational 
demands and an emphasis upon law enforcement can seep into the logic of 
restorative practice’ (2017: 107). The current study’s findings suggest that it may 
be worth considering this relationship in the opposite direction: implementing RJ in 
the police may result in its principles and processes seeping into – without entirely 
transforming – existing police practices.
226 
 
227 
 
 
Chapter 8 – Institutionalised restorative policing in Durham and 
Gloucestershire 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The last three chapters presented this study’s empirical findings in relation to 
the RJ strategies, policies and reported practices in Durham and Gloucestershire 
Constabularies. These findings suggest that both forces made substantial efforts 
to mainstream RJ within their organisations as a concept and practice, although it 
was understood and used in ways which reflected the institutional context in which 
operational policing took place. The purpose of this chapter is to develop several 
features of the models of restorative policing which emerged from the data in both 
sites. It argues that what police-led RJ looked like in practice, largely depended on 
how frontline officers exercised their discretion when deciding how to interpret and 
balance their (oft-conflicting) responsibilities towards victims and offenders, their 
own organisations and wider society. 
This chapter examines three ideas in turn: that restorative policing was victim-
focused; that the police used RJ as a tool with which to manage the demand on 
their time; and that officers managed the empowerment of those who participated 
in police-led RJ in an attempt to strike a balance between the competing needs 
and interests of the various stakeholders in their work. The chapter considers the 
implications of each theme for participants in police-led RJ and for the development 
of restorative policing more broadly. 
 
 
8.2 Restorative policing as victim-focused 
 
Respondents from all levels and at both forces expressed the view that the 
purpose of RJ was largely to satisfy victims, and suggested that they were 
motivated to implement and use RJ in order to achieve this goal. This section 
examines in more detail the possible implications of this interpretation of RJ for 
those who participated in police-led practices. 
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This study’s findings suggest that RJ was understood by respondents in both 
areas as a victim-focused theory and practice. This interpretation of the concept 
manifested in various ways. In Chapters 5 and 6, it was argued that strategies and 
policies in both forces largely framed RJ as being primarily for victims. For example, 
Durham’s training stated that ‘victim focus’ was one of four tenets of a ‘restorative 
organisation’ (doc. D2) and its redesigned script primarily enabled victim rather 
than offender expression, while Gloucestershire’s practitioner guidance explicitly 
defined RJ as a ‘victim focused resolution’ (doc. G29: 2). Additionally, in Chapters 
5 and 7, police policymakers/managers and officers from both areas expressed 
that the desire to satisfy victims was one of the primary impetuses behind the 
implementation or use of RJ. At the level of practice, officers reported that victims 
were given many more opportunities than offenders to express their needs and 
provide input into outcome decisions at both Levels 1 and 2. 
Preliminary conversations with contacts from both forces indicated that they 
largely justified their development of RJ on the basis of its benefits for victims. 
Shortly beforehand, the government had designated RJ as a service for victims 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013) and created a right to information about RJ in the Victims’ 
Code (Ministry of Justice, 2015). Officers were therefore asked several questions 
which sought to explore the relative position of victims and offenders within 
restorative policing, and the vast majority of their answers implied that they saw 
the satisfaction of victims’ needs as more important than that of offenders’ needs 
within RJ. For example, one officer from Durham said: 
 
I get that the offender is wholly part of that situation, and there will probably 
be some realisation and some learning for the offender, and that potentially 
reduces their offending going forward, but, fundamentally, it starts with the 
victim. Everything else is secondary or tertiary to that, in my view. (POD1) 
 
Another officer from Durham similarly rationalised their approach to delivering RJ 
with reference to the prioritisation of victim satisfaction: 
 
I think the main priority is that the victim comes away from that thinking that 
the police have taken action. […] If a crime has been committed, I think the 
victim is the person that is most affected, the person that we give our premium 
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service to, that they walk away thinking we’re working for them. We are out 
there to get a result for them. (PCNPTD2) 
 
A third similarly spoke of the belief that RJ was and should be focused primarily, or 
even ‘purely’, on satisfying victims: 
 
From my understanding of it, it's set up for the victim, and I think it should be 
purely victim-focused. At the end of the day, it's them who are having to come 
face-to-face with someone that's potentially done them a lot of harm. […] I’ve 
watched videos where [offenders] who have done it said, ‘it's one of the 
hardest things I've done, blah, blah’, but I think for the victim it's potentially 
life-changing to see who's done it and why, and to get their feelings across. I 
think it should be purely, purely victim. (PCSOD3) 
 
Officers from Gloucestershire reported holding similar views, although, in line with 
the more outcome-focused approach within strategies and practices in that force, 
this was more often expressed in relation to victims’ control over, or satisfaction 
with, outcome decisions. One stated: ‘Potentially both parties get something out of 
it, but, ideally, the victim is pleased with the outcome and has got the justice they 
want’ (PCNPTG1). Another said of victims: ‘At the end of the day, they’re the 
people that have been wronged, so to speak, so I think really it should be mostly 
their decision’ (POG6). A third officer also expressed the idea that victims should 
be in control of outcome decisions: 
 
‘You have someone that’s lost something as a result of somebody else’s 
actions, and it gives them the opportunity to take control over how the 
offender is dealt with’ (POG4) 
 
While, as noted in Chapter 7, some officers discussed reducing reoffending as an 
important motivation for using RJ, only one officer articulated the belief that this 
should take priority over victim satisfaction – and even then, only to ensure that 
victims remained satisfied in the future: 
 
I think the key thing is – I know it’s about the victim – the key thing is how 
much has it worked for the offender. Because what good is it, if he goes and 
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does it again? The victim is gonna lose faith in the process, in the criminal 
justice system, in me and in the organisation. So, strangely enough, my 
priority is: has it worked for the offender? (PCSOD7) 
 
Three other officers were ambivalent on the question of who RJ was ‘for’, stating 
that RJ was or should be about both parties equally, but also that, in practice, it did 
or should focus more on victims. One said: 
 
It has to be victim-centred, because we have to agree with what they want to 
do. But then also the offender's got to agree, because if both parties don’t 
agree, it's not gonna go anywhere. So, it's 50-50 really, but obviously we ask 
the victims first what they would like. (PCNPTG8) 
 
Another officer began by suggesting that RJ was about both parties equally, before 
expressing a rather contradictory viewpoint: 
 
It's got to be 50-50. Yes, it's primarily about getting the answer for the victim 
that they're looking for, right? But it's not gonna work if the offender isn't up 
for it. So, your ultimate result has got to be for the victim, obviously, right? 
Because, I don't know if I should say this or not, do we really care how the 
offender feels at the end of if? (PCSOD6) 
 
Several other police respondents, all of whom agreed with the idea that RJ should 
be centred on victims, noted that it could still be mutually beneficial for both parties. 
For example, one said: ‘I see this becoming more and more an area where we 
need to be using it because it is best for everyone’ (PCSOD8). Another said that 
RJ was ‘better for everyone’ (POG5), while a third said: ‘When you see one work, 
you do start to think, yeah, this is better for everyone involved than putting them in 
front of a courtroom’ (POD2). Implicit across the interview data, however, was the 
impression that RJ necessarily has to prioritise the victim, otherwise it risks 
prioritising the offender. One officer articulated the idea that control in RJ might be 
a zero-sum game by stating: 
 
Somebody has been a victim of crime, and they should be leading what they 
want to do in conjunction with the police. If you switched around and it was 
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the suspect or the offender who was the lead role, then I don't think that would 
really work. (PCSOD5) 
 
The idea that RJ could or should be a zero-sum game between victims and 
offenders, reflects the tensions inherent to its integration into criminal justice. Many 
advocates of dialogic practices argued that they can afford direct stakeholders an 
equal opportunity to participate, to be treated fairly, to provide input, and to express 
their needs and have them met (Braithwaite, 2002; Pranis, et al., 2003; Chapman, 
2012; Zellerer, 2016). As Chapter 3 delineated, the idea that victims and offenders 
should be treated and enabled to participate equally, is central to many theoretical 
restorative frameworks. Yet, existing systems are characterised by imbalances 
which may shape the implementation of RJ and make it difficult for this principle to 
be realised in practice. Christie (1977) argued that Anglo-American justice systems 
are inherently professional- and state-centric, and that they disempower victims, 
offenders and communities despite their direct stake in the resolution of specific 
incidents. Moreover, the fact that criminal justice focuses primarily on retribution, 
rehabilitation, deterrence and incapacitation, means that justice processes tend to 
ask only what the outcome should be for offenders, and neglect to identify and 
meet victims’ needs (Zehr, 1990).  
Recent years have seen various attempts to enhance the role of reparation 
and the focus on victims’ needs within the police, and across criminal justice more 
broadly (Hoyle, 2011). Yet, these efforts have come up against deeply embedded 
rationales within criminal justice systems and agencies, in that offenders are 
expected passively to accept the (often, punitive) obligations imposed on them, 
while deep engagement with victims is seen by justice agencies as an optional 
luxury (Blad, 2006; Crawford, 2006). These assumptions also informed previous 
attempts to institutionalise RJ in the UK, which often focused on deterring or 
rehabilitating offenders at the expense of victim participation and direct reparation 
(Hoyle, et al., 2002; Newburn, et al., 2002; O’Mahony, et al., 2002). More recent 
studies found that expediency and other system-focused goals continue largely to 
outweigh any desire to enable victim participation or satisfy victims’ broader needs 
within RJ (Walters, 2014; Barnes, 2015; Cutress, 2015; Rosenblatt, 2015). 
It is significant, therefore, that the current study found such a substantial 
foregrounding of victims among force strategies and policies, expressed beliefs 
and reported practices. The data on strategies and expressed beliefs may be 
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explained partially by the politicisation of the topic, while there may also be a gap 
between attitudes, intentions and reported practices on one hand, and actual 
practices on the other. Moreover, baseline, quantitative data would be necessary 
to determine the extent of any cultural change which RJ implementation caused. 
Still, the study’s findings seem to indicate that RJ had been integrated into each 
force’s activities in a manner which may have enhanced, informed or reinforced 
the idea that policing in general, and informal disposals in particular, should involve 
victim engagement and aim to satisfy victims’ needs. In particular, RJ training, 
combined with the requirement on officers to obtain victim consent in order to use 
community resolutions, may have enabled and encouraged officers to undertake 
actions to achieve this goal. The data suggest that only some victims were offered 
the opportunity to express their feelings, questions and needs directly to the 
offender. Yet, even non- or less-dialogic practices may have been experienced 
positively by victims whose ability to participate in outcome decisions and receive 
reparation might have provided them with more gratification than had their 
offenders been cautioned or prosecuted instead. 
That at least some practices reflected the restorative principles of victim 
participation and reparation, may represent a shift towards (or the consolidation of) 
a more victim-focused approach to policing in these areas. However, without a 
corresponding reconsideration of the position of offenders, this may have created 
or heightened an imbalance between the two parties. Most police respondents 
described victims as having – and as being justified in having – more opportunities 
than offenders to express themselves and to provide input into outcome decisions. 
This mirrors the existing assumption that justice processes need not address 
harms suffered by offenders, nor contextualise offending in a way which enables 
wider social obligations to be recognised (Pali, 2015). Rather, descriptions of 
practice suggest that RJ was often used to individualise crimes in isolation of their 
social context – what Karstedt (2011) labelled as the salient risk of using RJ in 
neoliberal systems (see also Richards, 2011). Although some officers expressed 
the belief that diversion was normatively desirable, their focus on offenders tended 
to be actuarial – in terms of reducing the risk of reoffending – rather than 
necessarily reintegrative or supportive. Again, this reflects the broader ideological 
context within which RJ is often seen as ‘an effective means of securing order in 
the future’ (O’Malley, 2006: 222), rather than as a way to build social capital or 
meet stakeholders’ needs. 
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At the case-level, this created specific risks for offenders who may have been 
used in the service of victim satisfaction. Offenders might still have benefitted if 
they were diverted from a more disclosable record, as long as the RJ process and 
its outcome(s) were not so onerous as to cause hardship in excess of that which 
would have happened otherwise. Still, they often played only a passive role in 
practices which were dominated by others and which typically prioritised victims’ 
participation and needs over their own – often, in response to incidents which might 
not have been chargeable. Processes and outcomes which provided support for 
offenders were seldom reported, while outcomes in which the victim benefitted or 
was empowered at the expense of the offender were prevalent. 
Practices were often described as lacking the safeguards for offenders which 
were identified in Chapter 3. In many cases, the victim and police officer simply 
negotiated an outcome agreement without the offender’s input, and without direct 
contact between the victim and offender. This creates risks for offenders because, 
as dialogue and offender input are sacrificed, outcomes may also become more 
punitive and disproportionate (Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994), while offenders’ 
needs may remain unidentified and unsatisfied (Schiff, 2007).  
It was noted in Chapter 2 that police culture already encourages officers to 
feel limited concern for offenders whose rights and behaviours may be seen as 
barriers to the preservation of a social order with which officers identify (Reiner, 
2010). If a victim-focused model of restorative policing changes attitudes towards 
victims without changing attitudes towards offenders, this may help to create or 
consolidate the assumption that there is necessarily a trade-off between the two, 
and that it is justifiable to neglect the rights and needs of the latter, in order to satisfy 
those of the former. As Christie noted, ‘victim power amplified with state power 
would indeed become a strong driving force towards a more punitive society’ 
(2010: 118). Advocates of restorative policing must ask not just how the use of 
RJ by the police can be increased, but how they can ‘accomplish a greater extent 
of participatory justice, without losing important protective devices within our 
recent system’ (Christie, 1982: 110; see also Ashworth, 2004; O’Mahony and 
Doak, 2004; Christie, 2010). 
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8.3 Restorative policing as demand management 
 
The second key feature of restorative policing which was common to both 
forces, was the notion that RJ was a ‘tool’ which could be used to manage the 
demand on the police’s resources. The integration of RJ into informal disposals – 
and thus into the police’s peacekeeping, diversion and order maintenance activities 
– meant that officers had, as RJ facilitators, to balance the requirement that they 
enable stakeholder participation against the pressures on them to be quick and 
efficient in executing these tasks. This section elaborates on the nature and 
implications of the tensions between these responsibilities. 
Chapters 5 and 7 presented data which suggested that respondents at all 
levels of both forces saw RJ as a mechanism with which to manage the demand 
on frontline officers’ time. Chapters 6 and 7, moreover, noted that officers had near-
total discretion to determine the extent to which they would enable the parties to 
engage in dialogue when using RJ. This meant that, when invoking the concept of 
RJ, officers could choose whether to manage the demand on their time by resolving 
underlying problems or closing cases quickly.  
With respect to the former, many officers, most of whom were from Durham, 
reported using conferencing with longstanding or complex neighbourhood conflicts 
to resolve underlying issues. They believed that this would save them time in the 
long-term by reducing calls to the police. One officer described such a case: 
 
It had been going on for years and we'd never tried the restorative approach 
Level 2. […] The desired outcome was that we don't get further calls, 
although you might not want to speak with each other at all, at least we've 
solved the problems now and that will be that. (PCSOD5) 
 
Another said of RJ in general: 
 
It is a means to an end, to sorting out problems. I know that our force is big 
on ‘if you can solve the problem, then it will reduce the call on resources to 
the police and the other emergency services’. […]. We can't keep going back 
and back and back and back and back to the same address. […] Certainly, 
in Neighbourhoods, RJ is a means to problem-solving. (PCSOD6) 
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The framing of RJ as a way of managing demand might have incentivised officers 
to use it in the manner just described, if they believed it to be an effective solution 
to these problems. This suggests that restorative policing could develop as a 
mechanism through which some of the aims of problem-oriented policing could be 
realised (Weitekamp, et al., 2003; Bazemore and Boba, 2010), and that dialogic 
practices could be promoted within the police as an investment in time in the short-
term which might save police time in the long-term (Shewan, 2010). 
To a degree, the use of conferencing in this way aligns with early conceptions 
of problem-oriented policing: it implies a change of approach from processing 
individual incidents, towards identifying and resolving underlying problems which 
cause multiple incidents to occur over time (Goldstein, 1990). However, it still 
involved reacting to specific problems at the micro-level, rather than assessing and 
proactively working to resolve tensions and problems at a community- or societal-
level. As Boba and Crank (2008) noted, this kind of gap between theory and 
practice is common across efforts to implement problem-oriented policing, which 
are shaped by pressures on the police to focus on responding to individual cases. 
Still, there have been few experiments in which RJ has been used directly to target 
neighbourhood conflicts and other conflicts or harms without clear victims and 
offenders (Turley, et al., 2014), despite the fact that such cases tend to consume 
a substantial proportion of the police’s resources (Sykes and Brent, 1983; Skogan, 
et al., 1999). Developing RJ in this way may also help fill a gap identified by O’Neill 
(2014), who found that PCSOs often negotiated neighbourhood disputes, but were 
seldom highly trained or skilled in doing so. 
More often, as Chapter 7 explained, officers seemed to use non-dialogic 
forms of street RJ to close cases quickly. In other words, officers were enabled, 
and often elected, to prioritise processing speed at the expense of restorative 
principles, safeguards and evidence-based practices. The data suggest that many 
outcomes were determined without direct contact between the parties, while some 
involved impromptu, face-to-face meetings for which the parties had not been 
prepared. Many officers reported that time constraints inhibited their ability to 
prepare for, or follow up on, RJ. As one officer stated with respect to follow-up: 
 
I don't follow up because I'm too busy. It's left to [the parties] to contact me if 
they feel they need to. […] There's such a strain on the constable role at the 
minute, we just don't ever stop. (PCNPTG5) 
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The risks of failing to prepare or follow-up in RJ may have been limited in the many 
cases which involved low-level harm and little or no communication between the 
parties. Still, this reflects a broader issue in which the pressure to be efficient can 
override other goals, often to the detriment of more resource-intensive, but 
potentially more beneficial, processes. This is not to say that conferencing was 
needed in every case; rather, it is to note that many officers in this and other recent 
studies (e.g. Walters, 2014; Cutress, 2015; Strang and Sherman, 2015; Shapland, 
et al., 2017; Westmarland, et al., 2017) reported exercising their discretion to offer 
or impose symbolic reparation or compensation at Level 1, seemingly without 
exploring whether the parties might desire dialogue or benefit from conferencing. 
Evaluations of RJ implementation across other British justice agencies have also 
found that processing speed often takes precedence over preparation, dialogue, 
collective decision-making and relational outcomes, when RJ is mainstreamed as 
a criminal justice process (Hoyle, et al., 2002; Newburn, et al., 2002; Daly, 2003; 
Barnes, 2015; Wigzell and Hough, 2015).  
As with many other public services, RJ asks practitioners to provide their 
clients with bespoke assistance. In fact, RJ goes further than most other activities 
undertaken by the police and other justice agencies, as it also asks practitioners 
to empower citizens by enabling their participation in discussions and decision-
making. Yet, the desire to deliver RJ and other public services in a participatory, 
personalised manner is in tension with the contemporary management of 
(corporatised) public services – or ‘New Public Management’ – which tends to 
prioritise efficiency above these goals (Stohl and Cheney, 2001; Crawford, 2006; 
D’Enbeau and Kunkel, 2013). This management style not only incentivises the 
provision of generic, routinised services, it encourages practitioners to use their 
discretion to control clients and to determine the content, timing and pace of any 
interactions in order to maximise processing efficiency (Lipsky, 2010).  
In RJ, this may manifest in what Bazemore and Boba (2010: 260) called the 
‘casework model’ of delivery, in which a formulaic approach to RJ is used to the 
detriment of more inclusive or emotive practices. Similarly, in a reflection on her 
previous research, Daly (2003: 231) identified ‘the containment of justice ideals 
by organisational routines’ as a barrier to realising restorative principles. She 
argued that practitioners may be attracted to quick RJ processes and reparation 
because they are easier to achieve than more relational or emotional processes 
and outcomes, and because their work is often assessed quantitatively (see also 
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Stockdale, 2015b). Daly (2003: 232) concluded that ‘shortcuts are inevitable […] 
if jurisdictions want to introduce conferencing as a high-volume activity’. The 
current research suggests that, not only might these shortcuts be inevitable, but, 
as with the implementation of community and problem-oriented policing (Clamp 
and Paterson, 2017), they may be built directly into restorative policing, as RJ is 
(re)interpreted and used in a manner which helps to achieve existing goals. 
This raises questions as to why officers might have enabled victim 
participation to the extent implied by the data. It may be that this reflected a 
cultural shift in which, whether for normative or political reasons, officers were 
inclined to engage (or to report engaging) with victims. However, this may also 
have stemmed from the integration of RJ into street policing, alongside the 
requirement on the police to obtain the victim’s consent in order to use community 
resolutions. Victim consent and engagement were not technically required for 
restorative cautions, referral orders or post-sentence RJ, all of which ultimately 
achieved relatively low levels of victim participation (Hoyle, et al., 2002; Newburn, 
et al., 2002; O’Mahony and Doak, 2002; Rosenblatt, 2015; Wigzell and Hough, 
2015). In contrast, respondents in this study reported at least speaking to victims 
(and, usually, consulting them as to their desired outcomes) in virtually every 
case. That officers had the option to offer and deliver RJ immediately following 
the response to an incident may have made it easier for them to use RJ, as they 
usually had to speak to victims at that point anyway. Moreover, the requirement 
that victims sign off on community resolutions may have created an incentive for 
officers at least to try to identify and satisfy victims’ needs (of desires), without 
necessarily needing to be normatively inclined to do so.  
The requirement that victims had to provide their consent for community 
resolutions to take place, essentially turned victim satisfaction into a bureaucratic 
outcome. That this inhibited the police’s discretion to use informal disposals, 
means that it may also have created perverse incentives on officers to pressure 
victims into consenting or to offer compensation as a ‘carrot’ for victims to 
encourage them quickly to consent. Indeed, many officers implicitly or explicitly 
described the purpose of RJ as being to obtain something for victims so that they 
would agree to resolve cases informally. This would be consistent with research 
on recording frameworks, which suggests that they can incentivise officers to do 
only the minimum which is needed to satisfy the criteria on paper (McConville, et 
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al., 1991). That is, this requirement may be have led to victims also being used ‘in 
the service of system efficiency’ (Crawford, 2000: 292). 
At the same time, officers who wished to utilise community resolutions and 
abide by force policies on their use, were strongly incentivised at least to inquire 
into victims’ wishes when they wanted to use community resolutions. To the extent 
that enhancing victim engagement is a goal of RJ, the fact that RJ was broadly 
defined and highly discretionary at both forces may have been more conducive to 
its achievement than had RJ been defined only as conferencing (McCold and 
Wachtel, 2001; Alarid and Montemayor, 2012). In other words, officers’ ability to 
undertake quick, on-street practices under the guise of RJ, may have encouraged 
them to apply some restorative principles in low-level cases which they may have 
resolved informally anyway (Hines and Bazemore, 2003). Moreover, as O’Mahony 
and Doak (2013) argued, adopting a broad definition of RJ in policing allows police 
reformers to identify and promote instances where restorative principles are 
realised in police practices, while also making it seem more practical and attractive 
to frontline officers. These findings illustrate how the implementation of RJ within 
existing systems can involve some of its principles being sacrificed in favour of 
others (Blad, 2006; Crawford, 2006). Still, the findings suggest that efforts to 
integrate RJ into policework in a manner which elided police, victim and offender 
needs, limited the empowerment of the latter two parties in practice. 
 
 
8.4 Restorative policing as managed empowerment 
 
Chapters 1 and 3 defined ‘empowerment’ within RJ as stakeholders’ ability 
to participate in discussions and decision-making in a manner which provides 
them with some level of control over the process and its outcomes (Zimmerman, 
1995; Barton, 2000, 2003; Richards, 2011). This study’s findings suggest that, 
when delivering RJ, officers could exercise their discretion in ways which largely 
determined the extent to which participants would be empowered. This section 
considers how officers described relinquishing and maintaining control over RJ 
processes and outcomes, before exploring whether Davey’s framework (2015) of 
‘managed empowerment’ might help to interpret these data. 
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In the first instance, officers could maintain or relinquish control by deciding 
whether or not to offer RJ at all. Chapter 7 noted that some officers were willing 
to propose RJ based on the belief that it would result in the best outcome for one 
or both parties, despite some cases lying outside of their formal responsibilities, 
or being unusual, difficult to administer, or on the cusp of requiring a more serious 
response. Other officers, in contrast, expressed the belief that RJ was usually 
unnecessary or should not be used at all with certain types of offences, or with 
offenders who exhibited certain attitudes. As one respondent stated of the 
(perceived) need not to enable RJ in certain cases: 
 
A big-time drug addict, gang member, violent and hates everybody, it is 
pointless to try and get him to come and say ‘sorry’. […] That victim may want 
that, but they need to be kept in check. […] So, I think we do need to have a 
little bit of control. (POG4) 
 
The findings suggest that stakeholders’ ability to shape processes and outcomes, 
depended wholly on how officers exercised their discretion in deciding whether 
or not to offer RJ. Moreover, the lack of awareness of RJ among the public means 
that the decision not to offer RJ would probably go unchallenged in most cases. 
This is one example of how officers retained ultimate control, as they were not 
obliged to defer to citizens’ wishes, nor provide them with the full range of options, 
if their professional judgement dictated that they should do otherwise. 
When officers did decide to use RJ, they could maintain control by only 
offering indirect, street RJ processes. This permitted officers to regulate the flow 
of (and, potentially, distort or selectively report) information between the parties 
(Erez, 1999), and afforded victims and offenders few opportunities to shape the 
process according to their own needs. When discussing indirect street RJ 
practices, many officers described using their intermediary position to focus on 
outcome determination, without allowing the parties to share their views and 
feelings or ask questions in relation to the causes or impact of the offence. 
Though victims may still have had some input over outcomes, this approach still 
partially reflects the way that stakeholders are disempowered by courts, insofar 
as the professionals determined what was important (i.e. quickly finding an 
outcome to which the victim would consent) and directed the process accordingly 
(Christie, 1977). At the same time, some officers, mostly from Durham, reported 
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delivering indirect processes which were followed by an impromptu face-to-face 
meeting. These ‘hybrid’ processes usually seemed to represent an attempt by the 
officers who delivered them, to enable some form of stakeholder dialogue, albeit 
while still prioritising swift case processing. 
Chapter 7 suggested that the pressure on officers to be efficient may have 
incentivised them to withhold the option of direct dialogue to achieve this goal, if 
they believed that it would be possible to reach an appropriate resolution more 
quickly without it. Similarly, officers might have been disinclined to include indirect 
stakeholders in their RJ processes in order to maximise control and efficiency. 
As one officer from Durham argued in relation to their use of conferencing: 
 
I think the more things you bring in, the more complicated it gets. Already, it’s 
like herding cats trying to get everything together. […] Do I want to get it done 
or not? If the answer is yes, include as few people as possible. (PCSOD7) 
 
The exclusion of indirect stakeholders enhanced officers’ control over processes 
by reducing the number of persons who could challenge officers’ authority and 
whose needs, desires and expectations had to be taken into account. This 
exemplifies how officers could use control to achieve the police-defined goal of 
demand management. Again, participants might not have realised that dialogue 
or the inclusion of other persons were technically possible, and thus they might 
have been unable to challenge officers’ decisions to withhold these options. 
Officers also reported exercising their discretion to relinquish or maintain 
control to different degrees when facilitating conferences. Some officers reported 
allowing participants to shape the process entirely; others suggested that they 
used the scripted questions, or otherwise structured the process according to 
what they thought would be most likely to achieve a positive outcome. To this 
end, some might have adopted an especially interventionist or directed approach 
to ensure that the discussions proceeded according to their own expectations. 
For example, some respondents reported attempting to ‘extract’ information from 
one party (usually the offender). One commented that they found it ‘really hard 
sometimes to extract what you need in order to have a satisfactory outcome’ 
(POG5), while another stated: ‘It’s like when we interview offenders in custody: you 
need to tease more out of them’ (PCNPTG4). 
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In other cases, officers reported exerting control to terminate proceedings 
or shut down lines of discussion, usually if they believed that the parties’ 
behaviour was detrimental to the success of the process, or that one party was 
treating another in an unacceptable way. For example, one officer recounted a 
case in which the parties ‘just argued and I had to ask everybody to leave’ 
(PCSOG1). Several others spoke of cases where they felt that they had to 
intervene because the parties were arguing, including one who said: 
 
On occasion, we've had to say: ‘Oi, let's get it real, let's calm down, let's start 
again.’ They need to know who is the adjudicator, the referee, the umpire, 
there needs to be someone there to be prepared to manage it. (POG4) 
 
Another officer described intervening in processes to prevent young participants 
from being abused by participating adults: 
 
I’ve had them where parents in a child-on-child assault have started to have 
a go at the child. You can see that that child is shrinking in front of you and 
finding it very awkward, then I would step in. (POD2) 
 
As Chapters 2 and 3 noted, facilitators require a certain combination of skills and 
knowledge to understand when and how to intervene in RJ processes (Shapland, 
2009). When delivering conferences, there is a fine line between, on one hand, 
the need to structure, direct and even stop discussions if necessary, and, on the 
other hand, the need to avoid dominating the process, giving the impression of 
bias, or unduly restricting the parameters of the discussions (Restorative Justice 
Council, 2011; Chapman, 2012). This thesis provides three reasons why police 
practices might have been problematic in this regard: firstly, as one respondent 
warned earlier, officers’ training might have been insufficient to ensure that their 
interventions were benign and optimal (Gavrielides, 2013; Strang, et al., 2013); 
secondly, certain aspects of the police culture, as outlined in Chapter 2, may have 
meant that some officers were predisposed to intervene excessively or 
deleteriously; thirdly, the data presented in Chapters 6 and 7 indicated that some 
officers may have been inclined towards excessive or degrading interventions. 
The comment made above in relation to interviewing in custody, for example, may 
indicate an approach to RJ facilitation which was especially disempowering for 
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offenders (Young, 2001; Hoyle, et al., 2002). Again, whether participants 
experienced their conferences as empowering, may have depended on how 
officers exercised their discretion when facilitating. 
Finally, in relation to outcomes, officers reported maintaining or relinquishing 
control as they decided who would be allowed to participate in deliberations, and 
whether to exert their authority over outcome decisions. This is significant 
because, as previous chapters explained, there may have been implications for 
perceived fairness and legitimacy, and for whether selected outcomes satisfied 
each party’s needs (Braithwaite, 2002; Tyler, 2006; Crawford, 2010). 
The data presented in Chapter 7 suggested that outcome agreements, 
rather than being determined collectively among stakeholders, were often 
negotiated between victims and officers, before being put to offenders as the 
conditions of an informal disposal to which they could agree or not. It was also 
reported that some officers in both forces imposed outcomes without consulting 
either party, or that they made outcome suggestions which the parties may have 
seen as orders or as the only option for an informal resolution, whether or not 
officers intended this. These findings suggest that officers might have exercised 
their discretion to achieve both of their main priorities: by enabling victim 
participation or suggesting reparation, they might have expected to satisfy 
victims; by imposing, suggesting or negotiating outcomes in the absence of 
dialogue or offender involvement, they seemingly hoped to achieve speedy 
resolutions to these cases. In other cases, officers reported exerting control over 
outcome agreements by overruling victims where their suggestions or desires 
were perceived to be disproportionate or unrealistic. This might reflect a 
combination of normative and instrumental reasoning, as officers reported 
wanting the outcome agreements they oversaw to be both fair and practical. 
Again, participant empowerment was largely in the hands of the officer, as they 
retained ultimate control over both the process by which outcomes were 
determined, and the detail of outcome agreements. 
Overall, these findings echo those of previous research by McConville, et 
al. (1991) and Choongh (1998): in the former, officers were observed reproducing 
situations which allowed them to maximise their own discretion and control; in the 
latter, officers often used their discretion and authority to achieve police-defined 
goals, rather than to enforce the law or promote ‘due process’ or ‘crime control’ 
values. Likewise, officers in this study reported exercising their discretion in ways 
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which allowed them to control situations and achieve police-defined goals – most 
notably, to achieve quick resolutions to which victims consented. Yet, the findings 
also suggest that many officers used their discretion to promote normative goals, 
including fairness, proportionality and stakeholder participation. This reflects how 
Garland (1997) described the modern administration of criminal justice, in that 
different approaches to RJ facilitation seemed to be variously informed by 
instrumental and moral imperatives. Indeed, the findings suggest that officers 
could maintain or relinquish control over different parts of the process so as to 
achieve what they saw as an appropriate balance between these (sometimes 
conflicting) goals. The willingness to enable hybrid (i.e. quasi-dialogic) practices 
and to prevent disproportionate outcomes, were examples of how the tension 
between the need to empower participants and the desire to maintain control 
manifested when officers delivered RJ in practice. 
This is not to say that control and empowerment were necessarily always 
opposing forces. Indeed, RJ facilitation inherently requires practitioners to retain 
some level of control over the proceedings. Barton argued that, in RJ, participant 
empowerment is both ‘bounded’ (2000: 2) and ‘directed’ (2000: 4), as facilitators 
are responsible for delivering practices which adhere to shared social norms and 
achieve restorative outcomes. To this end, he contended, participant agency is 
necessarily constrained within RJ processes, as facilitators act to structure and 
administer them in accordance with social and restorative values. This can be 
seen within the current study’s findings, as officers sometimes intervened on 
behalf of those who might otherwise have felt degraded, unheard or punished 
disproportionately. In other words, some level of facilitator control can help ensure 
a fair balance or enable an overall increase in levels of stakeholder empowerment 
(Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990; Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994). 
Implicit in Barton’s analysis (2000; see also Barton, 2003), however, is the 
assumption that those who deliver RJ will necessarily understand and act in 
accordance with a predefined set of social and restorative values. Barton’s 
hypothetical facilitator seems to circumscribe participant empowerment only to 
the extent which is necessary to ensure that these values are adhered to. Yet, 
this ignores the fact that facilitators may interpret and use RJ in ways which are 
shaped by the norms, rationales, goals and priorities which characterise the 
institutions in which they work and the broader systems and structures within 
which RJ is implemented (Blad, 2006). As Chapter 2 explained, operational 
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policing emerges as the social and political setting in which it takes place, 
interacts with the power and authority which characterise the role, the legal 
framework, the hierarchies within police organisations, and a variety of further 
pressures and expectations on frontline officers as they exercise their low visibility 
discretion to respond urgently to a wide array of situations. Thus, it should be 
anticipated that these factors will influence and be reflected in the police’s 
facilitation work. Despite the requirement that officers empower victims and 
offenders when facilitating, they were still expected to satisfy the needs of other 
parties to whom they were responsible, most notably their own organisations and 
the broader public interest. To this end, officers usually did not enable or deny 
participant empowerment entirely. More often, it seemed that this was managed 
by officers, as they attempted to balance the varied, and sometimes competing, 
needs and interests of all those who had a stake in their work. 
The notion of ‘managed empowerment’ appears elsewhere in the research 
literature on attempts to encourage public professionals to devolve control to 
citizens. Notably, Davey (2015: Chapter 6), in her study on the role of healthcare 
professionals in empowering patients to make their own treatment decisions, 
developed a three-pronged framework of ‘managed empowerment’ which can be 
applied to this study. Davey (2015: 228) argued that patient empowerment was 
never absolute, because of the role which healthcare professionals necessarily 
played as ‘knowledge brokers’, ‘ethical agents’, and ‘enablers’. As ‘knowledge 
brokers’, they acted as gatekeepers to information and to the various options 
available to patients. As ‘ethical agents’, they remained responsible for ensuring 
fair and equitable outcomes which maximised patient wellbeing. As ‘enablers’, 
they were tasked with providing patients with support and resources, and 
facilitating informed consent. This framework illustrated how, despite efforts to 
deprofessionalise decision-making, the power imbalances between healthcare 
professionals and patients were intrinsic and structural – they arose from the 
nature of the relationships between the parties and the institutional context in 
which healthcare services were provided. 
In theory, this framework could be applied to virtually any situation in which 
the state enlists public professionals to devolve control to citizens over matters in 
which power would otherwise be vested entirely in those professionals. Attempts 
to deprofessionalise decision-making require practitioners to empower citizens to 
act autonomously and make their own decisions, while also ensuring that 
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processes and outcomes accord with practitioners’ own expertise and legal, 
organisational and professional responsibilities (Gill and O’Berry, 1999; Stohl and 
Cheney, 2001; McDermott, et al., 2008; D’Enbeau and Kunkel, 2013; Collins, 
2015; Davey, 2015). ‘Managed empowerment’ arises as practitioners are asked 
to empower citizens, while remaining under pressure and being afforded the 
discretion to restrict this empowerment, so as to ensure that processes and 
outcomes are consistent with the norms and values of their profession. In Davey’s 
research, healthcare professionals: 
 
Adopt[ed] managed empowerment as an expedient means to enable the 
patient to make ‘any kind’ of choice as long as it aligns with (or is pre-
sanctioned by) the [healthcare professional]. (2015: 261-2)  
 
In the context of restorative policing, for citizens’ choices to align with the norms 
and preferences of the relevant professional (i.e. frontline police officers), they 
had to strike what the officer believed to be an appropriate balance between the 
needs and interests of the victim and offender in a given case, the goals and 
priorities of their own organisation, and the broader public interest in ensuring 
that justice was administered in a fair and efficient manner.  
The competing nature of these varied interests underpinned many police 
respondents’ arguments as to why it was often not possible, necessary or 
desirable for them to relinquish control entirely. Consider, for example, the 
imposition of RJ on victims without their consent. As noted, the decision to use 
RJ was intertwined with the decision to use community resolutions. This created 
a tension in cases where victims wanted offenders to be prosecuted, but officers 
believed that this was not in the interests of justice, either because it was 
disproportionately harsh, or that it would not be a sensible allocation of time and 
resources. Many respondents believed, for example, that they should be able to 
impose reparative outcomes in cases of low-level shoplifting because it was not 
in the public interest to expend time and resources in arresting and prosecuting 
these offenders. This was one example of how officers ‘read in’ the public interest 
when making decisions around their use of RJ. In the context of conferencing, 
several writers have discussed the role of the facilitator in acting ‘on behalf of any 
public interest beyond the set of private interests assembled for the conference’ 
(Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994: 147; see also Young, 2000; Vynckier, 2009). In 
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addition, Lipsky (2010) argued that this was part of the role of all frontline public 
professionals, whose work requires them to make a judgement as to the nature 
of the ‘public interest’ and to balance this against the rights and interests of their 
‘clients’. In this research, the way in which RJ had been integrated into informal 
disposals meant that officers had to consider the public interest when deciding 
both how to use RJ and whether or not to do so in the first place. 
Similarly, some officers suggested that the tension between victims’ desires 
and offenders’ interests informed the decision of whether or not to impose RJ on 
unwilling victims. For example, one stated: 
 
[The offender] chucked a stone at his mate, but missed and smashed a 
window. He's not been in trouble with the police before, but the victim wants 
[the offender] hung up or locked up in prison. Well, that's not gonna happen, 
that's not justifiable. Now, if [the offender]’s mum and dad say ‘sorry’ and offer 
£100 to pay for the damage, I think, even if the victim is not happy with that, 
there should be a line where police use common sense and go: ‘This is the 
right outcome’. (POG1) 
 
Again, this tension only arose because of the overlap between RJ and community 
resolutions. If community resolutions did not have to be ‘restorative’, then the 
officer could have imposed the same outcome without invoking the concept of 
RJ. In both forces, however, all such disposals had to be delivered restoratively, 
limiting officers’ ability to resolve cases informally without the victim’s consent. 
This was discussed more often in Gloucestershire than in Durham as, in the 
former, officers had more recently lost their ability to impose informal disposals 
via the ‘COPS’ disposal. One policymaker/manager described their officers’ 
continued imposition of informal disposals (i.e. RJ) as follows: 
 
I know that sometimes they have used RJ a bit like COPS, where victims 
haven’t consented [but] would you want to criminalise a 14-year old for a quite 
minor offence, just because the victim is jumping up and down to criminalise 
that person? Is that right for society? So, I appreciate that will always be at 
odds. [If] they insist on prosecuting where it’s totally inappropriate, in those 
cases we have to make decisions on behalf of the public, rather than just that 
individual victim. (PPMMG3) 
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RJ delivery was shaped by the fact that, when deciding whether or not to use it 
alongside informal disposals, officers were also making judgements as to how 
best to distribute resources and administer justice. Thus, despite the pressure on 
them to relinquish control to victims, they still had to ‘read in’ the interests of wider 
society (and, indeed, the offender, who was not necessarily present) when 
making these decisions. In doing so, officers were afforded a substantial level of 
discretion and a considerable amount of responsibility to determine what ‘justice’, 
‘fairness’ and ‘proportionality’ should look like in any given case.  
This responsibility was particularly conspicuous in relation to outcome 
decisions. Many officers reported being acutely aware of their responsibility to 
ensure that outcomes were proportionate and fair to offenders, and noted that 
they would sometimes deny victims the power to select outcomes as a result. For 
example, one officer argued: 
 
Sometimes the victims have become almost obsessed with the power they 
might have and start demanding unrealistic outcomes. I think that's wrong. 
[…] We can't dress people up in yellow suits saying: ‘I'm a criminal’, and get 
them to walk down the streets. There's some people who'll want that, so we 
have to be very careful that that's not done. (POG4) 
 
Another officer similarly described the limitations to victim empowerment: 
 
I’m all for giving the victims a voice and getting them to steer the procedure, 
but sometimes what the victim wants, I don’t feel is right ethically or 
proportionate to what’s happening. […] You’ve got to try and rein it back in 
and that can lead to friction between you and the victim because they say: ‘I 
thought it was all about me’. (PCOSD7) 
 
In this sense, the control which officers reported exerting over practices and 
participants, reflected the ways in which they managed the limitations of RJ 
theory. Cuneen (2010: 132) explained that RJ theory ‘places great expectations 
on [victims and offenders] to do certain things, exhibit certain emotions and 
behave in certain ways’. Notably, it assumes that, through RJ, these persons will 
necessarily arrive at just outcomes. This fails to account for the strong, punitive 
undercurrent in contemporary societies, and for the fact that RJ represents a new 
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‘justice script’ (Daly, 2003: 232) with which citizens may be unfamiliar. It also 
ignores the stake held by criminal justice professionals in the day-to-day work 
that they do. As police officers and public professionals, it is incumbent on them 
to act in accordance with organisational priorities, while they also retain a general 
duty to society to inject the public interest into their work, and to balance the need 
to be responsive and fair in individual cases, against that to oversee an equitable 
distribution of resources and justice outcomes (Lipsky, 2010). 
If these conflicting responsibilities contributed to an innate power imbalance 
between police officers and citizens, then it is logical to apply Davey’s framework 
(2015: 228) of managed empowerment when interpreting this study’s findings. As 
‘knowledge brokers’, for example, officers acted as gatekeepers to the various 
options available to citizens, enabling them to withhold information (e.g. that RJ 
was voluntary, or that it could involve dialogue or certain outcomes) or resources 
(e.g. those required for formal processing) depending on what they judged to be 
the most appropriate process and outcome in a given case. As ‘ethical agents’, 
they could exercise their discretion to ensure that outcomes and processes were 
(at least, in their eyes) fair and just (e.g. by blocking or suggesting outcomes or 
intervening in dialogic processes). Finally, as ‘enablers’, officers could choose 
when and how to provide the resources and to facilitate the consent required for 
stakeholders to participate in discussions and influence outcomes. The extent to 
which an officer utilised the facilitation role to empower participants, depended 
largely on how they opted to balance the wide array of instrumental and normative 
motivations which informed their work. Restorative policing was simply whatever 
the police decided to do when seeking to strike this balance in a given case – as 
long as their selected option was understood to be restorative, or was recorded 
as such within their force’s bureaucratic framework. 
 
 
8.5 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter expanded on what the data suggested were the three key 
elements of restorative policing in both forces. It elaborated on the tensions 
inherent in the police’s use of RJ, as officers navigated organisational pressures 
and situational exigencies, while balancing the conflicting needs and interests of 
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a wider variety of stakeholders than RJ theory necessarily presumes to exist. The 
result – namely, the models of restorative policing which emerged from the data 
– might best be understood as the products of the institutionalisation of RJ within 
Durham and Gloucestershire Constabularies. 
The findings suggest that restorative policing was generally oriented 
towards achieving the police’s existing goals of victim satisfaction and demand 
management. This is consistent with research which suggests that the police can 
exercise their discretion to achieve police-defined goals (Choongh, 1998), as well 
as with recent studies which have found that RJ has been reinterpreted by the 
police as being equivalent to informal resolutions (Walters, 2014; Cutress, 2015; 
Westmarland, et al., 2017). However, the findings depart from these studies, and 
from previous studies of restorative cautioning (Hoyle, et al., 2002; O’Mahony, et 
al., 2002), in identifying a series of incentives and motivations to help and engage 
with victims. This illustrates how the contemporary politicisation of the victim has 
permeated RJ implementation, and how the implementation of abstract concepts 
within the police enables police forces to give precedence, within their strategies, 
policies and practices, to whichever features of those concepts might overlap with 
existing police priorities. In the context of RJ, this created risks for participants, 
as safeguards were discounted in favour of police-defined goals, and as officers 
were afforded extensive discretion and power to interpret the purpose of RJ and 
to shape processes and outcomes accordingly. 
Measured against the idealism inherent in many presentations of RJ theory, 
these findings suggest that the police empowered victims and offenders in only a 
limited manner. However, this research gives further credence to the argument 
that the absolute, almost mythical form of empowerment promoted by some 
advocates of RJ, might not be an appropriate benchmark against which to 
measure efforts at RJ implementation (Daly, 2003). Far from deprofessionalising 
decision-making entirely, RJ, and street RJ in particular, gave officers substantial 
powers to decide when and how to afford participants autonomy, and to select 
the conditions within which participants were permitted to exercise their (limited) 
freedom of choice. The police retained an ultimate monopoly over decision-
making power; participant empowerment was structured, partial and reversible. 
At the same time, police-led RJ may have created a more empowering (and 
restorative) platform for (some) victims and offenders than might have been 
possible under previous or other existing enforcement options. Indeed, to the 
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extent that Davey’s framework (2015) can be applied to the deprofessionalisation 
of decision-making more broadly, it may be that all state-led RJ practices should 
be considered as forms of managed empowerment. As Walgrave argued, those 
who can invoke the criminal law retain the ‘implicit eventuality of coercion, even 
at the level of voluntary deliberation’ (2015: 289). Ultimately, this structural reality, 
alongside other entrenched and contemporary features of the institutional context 
in which operational policing took place, seemed to shape how the police 
understood and used RJ in practice. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis analysed empirically the ways in which RJ was understood and 
delivered within two English police forces. It asked how the police explained their 
use of RJ, aimed to discover the ways in which restorative policing was shaped 
by the institutional context in which it was implemented, and sought to identify its 
risks and consequences for its participants. This chapter draws out the salient 
themes and findings from the thesis, considers their wider implications and makes 
suggestions in relation to the development and study of restorative policing. 
The first section reflects on the study’s findings. It discusses what they tell 
us about the models of restorative policing used in Durham and Gloucestershire, 
and the broader issues in relation to integrating RJ into the police institution and 
policework. The second section reflects on the manner of the study’s execution, 
while the third section identifies the implications of its findings for how restorative 
policing theory, policy, practice and research might progress. The thesis then 
finishes with some final thoughts on the project. 
 
 
9.2 Reflections on the findings 
 
Overall, the study’s findings suggest that the institutional context in which 
restorative policing was implemented and delivered, shaped the way(s) in which 
it was understood and used. In both forces, strategies, policies and reported 
practices reflected national pressures, organisational priorities and the functions 
and demands of the operational policing role. Decisions made with respect to the 
integration of RJ into police disposals, underpinned how it was interpreted and 
applied by the frontline. Similarly, organisational goals – most notably, to manage 
demand and satisfy victims, especially in relation to low-level offences and 
disputes – were echoed in descriptions of practice and expressed by respondents 
at all levels and from both forces as motivations for policing restoratively. Within 
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these structures, officers were still afforded enough discretion to determine, on a 
case-by-case basis, the extent to which they would use the RJ process to control 
or empower participants. Thus, on each occasion in which the concept of RJ was 
invoked, its meaning depended largely on how officers elected to balance their 
various (often competing) goals and responsibilities. 
As part of the process through which RJ was institutionalised in both forces, 
police actors at all levels were enabled (or, perhaps, required) to adopt, adapt or 
reject features of its underpinning philosophical framework, in accordance with 
what they perceived to be its most desirable, useful and viable features in the 
context of their work. Consequently, the police’s strategies, policies and practices 
reflected only the partial integration of restorative principles into policework. The 
findings suggest that many outcomes were determined through negotiation and 
that harm-focused dialogue sometimes took place. At the same time, indirect 
stakeholders were often excluded entirely, efficient approaches were usually 
prioritised over relational outcomes, and police officers (and, in some cases, 
victims) were permitted largely to dominate nominally restorative processes. This 
created issues around quality and safeguarding, as preparation, evidence-based 
processes and offenders’ needs were often neglected.   
The precedence afforded victims was consistent with the politicisation of 
that label in contemporary criminal justice discourses (Duggan and Heap, 2014), 
and with the police’s generally dismissive approach towards offenders’ needs and 
rights (McConville, et al., 1991; Reiner, 2010). Moreover, the integration of RJ 
into community resolutions appeared to encourage officers to engage with victims 
by allowing them to do so quickly and instantly, and by requiring some minimum 
level of victim involvement in the process. This may have enabled victims to play 
an enhanced role in decision-making and to request and receive symbolic and 
material reparation which might not otherwise have been forthcoming.  
Some participating offenders – most notably, those who may have escaped 
a more disclosable record – might also have benefitted from the process. At the 
same time, the bureaucratisation of victim satisfaction and the prioritisation of 
demand management seemed to incentivise officers to offer and use processes 
and suggest outcomes which largely excluded offenders, and which may have 
satisfied only the surface-level needs of either party. This is not to say that no 
described practices showed a focus on offenders’ needs, dialogue or relational 
outcomes. However, especially in Gloucestershire, these were only foregrounded 
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in a small minority of the processes which were understood and described as 
restorative. Instead, many reported practices reflected the police’s tendency 
towards pragmatic, reactive approaches to achieving police-defined goals, and 
indicated that harms were individualised in lieu of more inclusive or proactive 
approaches to law enforcement and order maintenance. 
At all levels, the data from Durham reflected a more ‘purist’ interpretation of 
RJ than that from Gloucestershire. In Durham, the aspiration to create a 
‘restorative organisation’ tallied with a stronger emphasis on dialogic approaches, 
a deeper understanding of the concept and a greater willingness to invest time 
and resources in transforming the force’s approach to peacekeeping and low-
level offending. This illustrates the central role which moral entrepreneurs in 
leadership positions can play in driving and shaping change within their own 
organisations. In Gloucestershire, meanwhile, their strategies, understandings, 
policies and practices more closely mirrored what Chapter 1 defined as a 
‘maximalist’ approach to RJ, while achieving broader cultural change did not 
factor highly on the overall agenda. Correspondingly, RJ in Gloucestershire 
tended to be described as more focused on quickly obtaining something for the 
victim, than it was on encouraging and enabling dialogic approaches.  
In both forces, these interpretations of RJ were inculcated in officers through 
training, recording requirements, monitoring processes and the various materials 
which were used to structure RJ delivery. In Gloucestershire, the Level 1 form 
encouraged an outcome-focused approach, whereas officers in Durham were 
expected to administer their street RJ practices according to the structure (if not 
the detail) of the script. This was consistent with how policymakers/managers 
understood RJ, and with force strategies in general. It indicates that training, 
policies and materials could help to encourage the use of dialogic approaches by 
frontline officers. While some differences in the reported practices between the 
forces might have been an artefact of the composition of the samples, the data 
still point to a much more even distribution of conferencing work among officers 
in Durham compared to Gloucestershire. Thus, the differences in strategies and 
policies between the two areas may help explain the differences in reported 
practices. That there were still so many similarities between each force’s model 
of practice, however, suggests that restorative policing was shaped by factors 
which existed across both forces – and which may exist to some extent across 
operational policing (at least, in England and similar jurisdictions). These factors 
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include the exact nature of the operational police role, the design of the national 
disposals framework and the competing desires to be efficient in maintaining 
order and to enhance the service provided for victims. These factors may also 
help explain why practices were so heterogeneous within the forces. 
Some of these findings depart from the existing research on restorative 
policing in England. That RJ was used ‘on the street’ and required victim consent, 
meant that Durham and Gloucestershire’s models of delivery were much more 
conducive to victim involvement than previous attempts to use RJ alongside 
cautions (Hoyle, et al., 2002). Some have hypothesised that police-led RJ will 
necessarily be offender-focused (McCold, 1996; Kenney and Clairmont, 2009). 
In Durham and Gloucestershire, however, the prevalence of victim-focused 
rhetoric, alongside a supportive bureaucratic structure, corresponded with a 
much stronger focus on victims than had been observed elsewhere. This may 
suggest that both the use of language and managerial frameworks might play a 
role in encouraging greater victim participation or a greater focus on their needs. 
Alternatively, the ease with which victims were contacted at the incident 
investigation stage might help to explain their greater participation in RJ alongside 
community resolutions, than alongside cautions. Either way, care ought to be 
taken to avoid propagating new imbalances between stakeholders, and to ensure 
that the participants are not simply instrumentalised to achieve system-focused 
priorities (Crawford, 2000; Warner and Gawlik, 2003; Blad, 2006). 
The flexibility of street RJ allowed officers to adopt expedient approaches to 
its use. Given the underlying pressures on officers to prioritise speed (Skolnick, 
1966), it should hardly be surprising if they exercised their discretion accordingly. 
However, officers who were trained in conferencing suggested that they were 
often willing either to offer and deliver conferencing, or, as Meadows, et al. (2012) 
also found, to enable impromptu dialogues at Level 1. Indeed, victims were 
reportedly asked to provide input in many of even the most lackadaisical Level 1 
processes. Notwithstanding the possibility that these data might not be truthful or 
generalisable to the whole forces, they seem to suggest a greater willingness 
among many respondents to enable victim participation and/or dialogue, than is 
implied within much of the recent literature (Walters, 2014; Cutress, 2015; Strang 
and Sherman, 2015; Shapland, et al., 2017; Westmarland, et al., 2017). It may 
be that training officers in conferencing would help to maximise stakeholder 
empowerment in the context of street RJ. Equally, forces which previously 
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implemented dialogic practices have been found to drift away from using them 
over time (Cutress, 2015; Clamp and Paterson, 2017; Shapland, et al., 2017). 
Ongoing action may be required to prevent this kind of reversion to form as 
implementation becomes more distant.  
In other ways, the study’s findings mirror the literature on the mainstreaming 
of RJ within existing justice systems. They suggest that bureaucratic processes, 
politicisation and managerial pressures can act as barriers to the realisation of 
justice ideals (Newburn, et al., 2002; Daly, 2003; Crawford, 2006; Barnes, 2015; 
Rosenblatt, 2015). They illustrate how criminal justice agencies and professionals 
can stretch the concept of RJ so widely as to incorporate an array of informal or 
exclusionary approaches which may resemble what they were already doing, or 
wanted to do (Doolin, 2007; Gavrielides, 2007). They lay bare the tendency of 
the police and other agencies, when interpreting and implementing abstract 
philosophies, to adopt only or mostly those features which coincide with existing 
approaches or goals. Overall, they further support the argument that, as RJ is 
mainstreamed within institutions with strongly embedded rationales and ways of 
working, some of its theoretical principles will necessarily be sacrificed, and 
hybrid restorative-traditional practices will emerge (Daly, 2003; Aertsen, et al., 
2006; Blad, 2006; Crawford, 2006; Mackay, 2006; Laxminarayan, 2014).   
The findings suggest that, as RJ was integrated into operational policing, 
the pressures and responsibilities which characterised that role influenced the 
ways in which RJ was used. As Chapter 2 explained, the police are expected to 
respond urgently to an array of ‘things-that-ought-not-to-be-happening’ (Bittner, 
1990: 249) and are uniquely entitled to use force and coercion when doing so 
(Goldstein, 1977). Accounts of operational policing illustrate how frontline officers 
ration these powers, using persuasion, negotiation and the underlying threat of 
coercion to ‘keep the peace’ (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; Muir, 1977; Kemp, et 
al., 1992; Reiner, 2010). Thus, it might be expected that any attempt to implement 
RJ in street policing will be informed by the police’s habitualised responses to 
these ‘situational exigencies’ (Bittner, 1990: 131; see also Lipsky, 2010). 
In general, the discretion afforded police officers in their day-to-day role 
means that they must decide how they will balance the (often competing) needs 
and interests of various stakeholders in their work (Lipsky, 2010). This study’s 
findings indicate that RJ, as a concept and framework which is explicitly focused 
on empowering (non-state) stakeholders (Braithwaite, 2002; Schiff, 2007), brings 
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to the fore any tensions or conflicts between these parties’ needs, interests and 
desires, both in relation to each other, and in relation to police officers and their 
organisations. Theories of restorative policing dictate that the police should de-
emphasise system-focused goals and relinquish control to victims, offenders and 
communities (Weitekamp, et al., 2003; Clamp and Paterson, 2017). Yet, there 
may be limits to this in practice, as officers are asked also to satisfy public, private 
and police interests (Warner and Gawlik, 2003), to ensure that ‘justice’ is done, 
and to empower individuals with whose views they might disagree. 
These tensions seemed to inform the decisions made by officers as they 
opted to maintain some level of control over RJ processes. Many found that they 
could not simultaneously enable dialogue and close cases quickly; others found 
that they could not achieve just outcomes if they transferred decision-making 
power entirely to victims. That some victims will always lean towards revenge and 
antagonism rather than forgiveness (and vice versa), represents a key challenge 
to the development of participatory justice processes (Christie, 1982; Kelly and 
Erez, 1997; Ashworth, 2000), as do the entrenched organisational routines and 
managerial and neoliberal logics which pervade modern justice agencies, and 
which may co-opt any attempt to implement alternative approaches therein (Daly 
and Immarigeon, 1998; Daly, 2003; Karstedt, 2011).  
Many officers reported that they were willing to overrule victims to ensure 
that sanctions and resources were distributed according to (what they saw as) 
the interests of individuals, justice and the wider society. It is precisely this 
responsibility, however, that so concerns those authors who tend to laud the 
consistency, transparency and accountability which (at least, in theory) 
characterise more open, formal justice processes, or which may be more likely to 
be absent from less formal approaches (Delgado, et al., 1985; Ashworth, 2000, 
2002, 2004; von Hirsch, et al., 2003). Their worries relate to the power which 
officers are afforded, when delivering RJ, to shape processes and outcomes, to 
balance conflicting needs, and to determine, in a low visibility environment, what 
‘justice’ should look like in any given case. As Hoyle (2011; 815) observed: 
 
The argument that there should be a separation of powers between the key 
stages of the criminal process is persuasive. It is clearly problematic to have 
one agency having so much power and control over a criminal process, from 
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arrest to punishment, especially when that agency has a strained 
relationship with certain, often disadvantaged, communities. 
 
This thesis sheds some light on the nature and scope of the power which RJ 
afforded officers to direct processes and influence outcomes, and the ways in 
which this power was used in practice. Virtually all officers in both forces were 
expected to deliver RJ in one form or another, often with limited training and no 
supervision. This meant that officers could facilitate RJ in accordance with their 
own beliefs regarding the appropriate response to a given situation, with little to 
prevent them from acting in a discriminatory, degrading or punitive manner if they 
so desired. Yet, this research also indicates that RJ might encourage officers to 
exercise their discretion creatively, inclusively and constructively when resolving 
disputes and low-level offences. ‘No-one’, contended Bittner (1967: 701) over five 
decades ago, ‘can say with any clarity what it means to do a good job of keeping 
the peace’. For those who are attracted to RJ, this thesis should provide some 
hope that its principles and processes might help to answer this question. 
Ultimately, this research suggests that citizen empowerment was usually 
limited in practice, as existing power imbalances between the police and citizens 
acted as a barrier to the deprofessionalising of decision-making processes. By 
applying the concept of ‘managed empowerment’ (Davey, 2015) to the police’s 
use of RJ, we can begin to see how citizens’ autonomy might necessarily be 
circumscribed (or, at least, circumscribable) under any police- or state-led RJ 
process. Public professionals who are asked to devolve control to citizens, retain 
their existing legal and professional duties and organisational responsibilities 
when doing so. They are charged with negotiating an equitable balance between 
the needs of their clients, the preferences and priorities of their institution and the 
interests of wider society. The current study suggests that this balancing act may 
help explain the gap between theory and practice in RJ, when it becomes 
institutionalised within existing systems and agencies. 
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9.3 Reflections on the study’s design and execution  
 
In retrospect, there were benefits and limitations of the way this study was 
conducted. It was substantial in scale, involving an extensive collection of data 
across two study areas at opposite ends of the country. This produced a wealth 
of information from which many inferences could be made about the factors which 
shaped the implementation and use of RJ. For example, that interviews took 
place with policymakers, managers and practitioners, enabled the researcher to 
explore the reasoning behind each force’s strategies and how they might have 
shaped the ways in which frontline officers understood and used RJ. However, 
the volume of data created difficulties with data management and in narrowing 
the scope of the thesis. As a result, some parts of the data, including that which 
was collected from the PCCs and RJ Hubs, were largely excluded – although 
these will form the basis of future research and publications. 
Furthermore, the comparative element of the research allowed similarities 
and differences to be identified among the data from each force. It confirmed the 
importance of moral entrepreneurs in senior leadership positions, illustrated how 
force policies can shape the ways in which officers understand and administer RJ 
in practice, and indicated that similarities between the forces related to factors 
which existed across both. It also meant that the data interpretation process was 
more reliable than had only one force been studied. If Durham was anomalous in 
its depth of commitment to RJ, then it was arguably an important object of study 
in its own right. Additionally, the ability to compare RJ in Durham with a somewhat 
less anomalous force (with respect, at least, to its relationship with RJ) assisted 
in determining just how exceptional Durham was and which features of its 
approach may be more or less transferrable. At the same time, the comparative 
analysis created an equal and opposing need to avoid generalising about each 
force from differing datasets.  
The most significant limitations to this study were inherent in conducting 
interview research within any large, difficult to access organisation. They mostly 
relate to the reliability, validity and representativeness of the data collected from 
police facilitators which, as explained in Chapter 4, limit the study’s accuracy and 
its generalisability within and beyond the studied forces. This could be improved 
in two ways: firstly, by utilising a strategic sampling process with more detailed 
criteria when selecting interviewees; secondly, by using other methods – such as 
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quantitative surveys and observations – to triangulate findings. With respect to 
sampling, the collected data may reflect selection biases which relate specifically 
to the gatekeepers’ control over sampling processes. Thus, it is conceivable that 
the researcher’s experience was being actively controlled (although neither force 
denied him access to any person, nor prevented him from snowball sampling). 
Ideally, therefore, researchers should retain as much control as possible over 
sampling processes. With respect to methodological triangulation, a survey might 
have enabled the researcher to measure officers’ attitudes towards restorative 
principles across the whole of each force, and to identify whether these related 
to age, length of service, role or other characteristics; the forces could also have 
been reliably compared in this respect. In addition, observations could have been 
used to ascertain the extent of any gap between how officers said they facilitated 
and how they facilitated in practice. 
While it is possible that some respondents withheld information or deceived 
the researcher, he felt that his ability to build rapport made respondents inclined 
towards honesty. Certainly, none gave any overt indications of deception. In fact, 
during one interview in Durham, a respondent from earlier that day radioed the 
present interviewee to say: ‘Make sure you tell him the truth, he’s alright’ 
(PCSOD7). While this suggests that a rapport was built, it also implies that the 
first officer suspected that the second might not be entirely truthful. Furthermore, 
the data collected from officers only represent how they interpreted, rationalised 
and described their actions post hoc. In this sense, it is necessary to avoid 
presuming that their decisions were necessarily intentional, rational and strategic 
in nature, rather than simply being intuitive reactions to situational factors. The 
inability of interview research to discover ‘the truth’ highlights the importance of 
methodological triangulation. Still, whether or not police officers’ accounts were 
‘accurate’, they can contribute to our understanding of how police knowledge was 
constructed and the principles and priorities which underpinned their approaches 
(Shearing and Ericson, 1991). 
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9.4 Implications for theory, policy, practice and future research  
 
The fundamental tension within restorative policing is that RJ requires the 
state to devolve control to individual citizens, while policework involves wielding 
power and exercising authority on behalf of the state and wider society. As Clamp 
and Paterson noted, the primary difference between conventional and restorative 
forms of policing lies in ‘the removal of the police officer from their traditional 
sovereign position as the owner of the conflict’ (2017: 168). By applying the 
concept of ‘managed empowerment’ to restorative policing, it is possible to see 
how this tension, and the associated power imbalance between the state and its 
citizens, might shape almost any attempt to use RJ to deprofessionalise decision-
making. Whether in police disposals, schools’ disciplinary processes or prison 
adjudication, it is the state’s representatives who ultimately determine whether 
restorative measures are adopted, how they are administered and whose needs 
to prioritise (Wachtel, 2014; Walgrave, 2015). In doing so, they must also decide 
how to balance the competing needs and interests of the various stakeholders in 
their work – not least, themselves and their own organisations.  
In her reflections on the gap between theory and practice in RJ, Daly argued 
that, when implementing RJ as a mainstream intervention, ‘we should expect to 
see organisational routines, administrative efficiency and professional interests 
trumping justice ideals’ (2003: 231). This echoes Garland’s arguments (1997) in 
relation to the tensions between the normative and instrumental rationales which 
underpin the workings of contemporary criminal justice. Daly (2003) suggests, 
and this research indicates, that the gap between theory and practice in RJ may 
emerge partially from a process through which professionals balance their own 
priorities and those of their organisation against participants’ needs and interests. 
If so, then this reflects the failure of RJ theory to account for the role of the state 
in RJ and the stake which its representatives and agencies hold in the RJ 
processes which they deliver. Theoretical frameworks (e.g. Christie, 1977; Zehr, 
1990) often do not account for the state’s stake in RJ (Crawford, 2002, 2006). 
Rather, they tend intentionally to omit state actors from their models, focusing 
exclusively on victims, offenders and the community (however defined) as the 
stakeholders, and framing RJ as a way in which these real stakeholders might 
reclaim their conflicts from the state (Johnstone, 2008).   
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The least reflective RJ advocates tend to presume that the ‘victim-offender-
community’ framework reflects the full breadth of interests which are represented 
within the RJ process (Ashworth, 2002). Yet, restorative policing epitomises the 
centrality of the state’s role in most of its modern, Western forms. Even in areas 
where RJ is delivered by non-state actors, funding and referrals often derive from 
state agencies which retain a stake in the processes they sanction (Zinsstag, et 
al., 2011). Under restorative policing, state agents remain responsible for virtually 
all activities relating to RJ implementation. It follows that theoretical efforts to 
model restorative policing – and RJ more broadly – must account for the influence 
of the state and its edifice. Bureaucratised agencies and punitive rationales exist 
within modern justice systems; RJ principles and processes may be appended to 
these rigid structures without necessarily replacing them. We are yet to see RJ 
being mainstreamed in a way which disrupts the ultimate authority of the state or 
which does not leave the legal and professional responsibilities of its agencies 
and professionals intact. These facts must be built into the core theoretical 
assumptions which underpin debates and research in relation to RJ.  
Theoretical restorative frameworks might develop by taking into account the 
state’s influence and stake in RJ at three levels: firstly, at the level of the state as 
an overarching political and technocratic system which sets rules and governs 
societies, which is underpinned by entrenched rationales, and which is delegated 
the task of representing the interests of society as a whole; secondly, at the level 
of justice agencies (e.g. police forces) as living organisations with various 
responsibilities towards citizens and with interests in self-preservation, control 
and expansion; thirdly, at the level of state representatives (e.g. police officers) 
who have a personal interest in the tasks and duties which constitute their 
professional lives. The occurrence of crime creates obligations on the state at all 
three levels to develop and implement capacities to prevent or respond to 
offending (Walters, 2014). It could be argued that this fact necessitates the re-
evaluation of the state as a key stakeholder in RJ. 
The utility of this approach lies partially in its implications for how we see 
the police’s role in delivering RJ in practice. Chapter 8 argued that RJ requires 
police officers to devolve power to stakeholders, while also maximising citizen 
wellbeing, achieving equitable outcomes and realising organisational goals and 
priorities. The need to strike a balance between these responsibilities means that 
the officers are not detached observers in the RJ processes they deliver. Rather, 
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they are professionally and personally invested in the outcomes of the incidents 
in which they intervene. Their careers and job satisfaction are shaped by their 
ability to achieve ever-changing and often conflicting measures of success which 
are set by themselves, their organisation, the state and the public (Lipsky, 2010). 
In doing so, they must navigate the tensions between these goals, and between 
the instrumental and normative motivations which underpin their work (Garland, 
1997). They may be affected psychologically and emotionally by their jobs (Miller, 
2006), and they inevitably develop some form of relationship with the individuals 
with whom they interact and the communities in which they work (Clamp and 
Paterson, 2017). The point is that police officers are humans with a need for 
emotional and mental wellbeing and a satisfactory conclusion (however defined) 
to the activities they undertake in their professional lives. A more nuanced and 
realistic debate on RJ in general, and restorative policing in particular, would take 
this into account when considering the relative positions of state and non-state 
actors in RJ. It is not necessary to pass judgement on the appropriate role of the 
state or the police in RJ in general, to observe that its theory is incomplete if it 
does not recognise their current position as a stakeholder in its use. 
The theoretical and empirical insights which emerged from this study could 
inform the development of restorative policing. They also point to areas in which 
further empirical work is needed. The remainder of this section considers how 
policy, practice and empirical research might progress in relation to four themes: 
the integration of RJ into street and neighbourhood policing; safeguards for those 
who participate in police-led RJ practices; the disclosure of informal disposals; 
and the transformative potential of restorative policing. 
Firstly, unlike in Thames Valley (Hoyle, et al., 2002), RJ was integrated into 
the forces studied in this thesis primarily within street and neighbourhood policing. 
Consequently, officers understood RJ to include the resolution of a wide range of 
conflicts, incidents and offences using processes of varying levels of formality. 
The flexibility of street RJ seemed to be critical to its adoption and acceptance in 
each area, and may have encouraged the use of more dialogic, harm-focused 
and inclusive approaches to the resolution of low-level incidents, disputes and 
other peacekeeping activities. Yet, there is a dearth of knowledge about the 
overall effectiveness and use of street RJ across English forces (Strang and 
Sherman, 2015; Westmarland, et al., 2017).  
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Questions remain as to the impact of different forms of RJ, which processes 
should be used under what circumstances, whether it might be possible to 
develop a strategic, targeted approach to offering and using different processes, 
and when it may be necessary, safe or acceptable to sacrifice certain restorative 
principles and elements of best practice, such as preparation, dialogue and 
follow-up. Researchers, whose involvement in RJ implementation has been 
found to improve its use (Schwalbe, et al., 2012), should collaborate with the 
police on experimental and action research which addresses these questions and 
develops policies and practices accordingly. Studies should be conducted in 
which baseline data are collected and, following the introduction of RJ, used to 
investigate the extent of any change in officers’ willingness to use diversion, 
consider other stakeholders’ needs or enable participatory decision-making. In 
addition, researchers should collaborate with the police on a pilot study in which 
RJ is used to resolve cases without clear victims and offenders; an aim of this 
project should be to develop specific guidance and policies for such cases. 
Secondly, researchers and police forces should consider how to design and 
introduce additional safeguards within restorative policing, including clear and 
viable mechanisms of appeal and redress. Researchers may also wish to explore 
the process by which the meaning of RJ and the potential for its disclosure is 
explained to suspects or offenders. Such a study could be used to inform future 
efforts to maximise the likelihood that this is described clearly and understood 
accurately by its target audience; survey research might be used to establish the 
latter. As other mechanisms of regulating street policing proliferate – such as 
informal resolution scrutiny panels and body-worn video cameras – consideration 
should also be given as to if or how these might be used to ensure quality and 
standards within restorative policing. 
Thirdly, empirical research should take place in relation to the disclosure of 
community resolutions in practice. Recent years have seen substantial reforms 
to the system by which police information is disclosed, resulting in the discretion 
of disclosure officers being restructured and constrained (Mason, 2010; Home 
Office, 2015). Yet, there does not appear to be any published research which 
examines how these new procedures are used in practice, nor how the disclosure 
of community resolutions is interpreted by employers. Quantitative studies which 
measure the disclosure of police information, alongside qualitative studies which 
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explore the working credos and practices of disclosure officers, might help to 
establish how these new rules are being interpreted and used in practice. 
Finally, the themes considered so far relate to the use of RJ practices within 
day-to-day policework – that is, to a largely ‘programmatic’ model (Bazemore and 
Griffiths, 2003) of restorative policing. Yet, there may be other forces which, like 
Durham, would be willing to explore the potentially transformative impact of RJ 
on their organisational culture. Ideally, any future attempts to do so would involve 
collaboration between the police and researchers from the start. It is essential to 
collect baseline data on attitudes, practices and other variables in advance of RJ 
being implemented, if we are to establish whether RJ can be used to change the 
culture of a police organisation. This study’s findings indicate that senior leaders 
in Durham were willing to take the risk that some of their officers would deliver 
RJ poorly, in exchange for an assumed longer-term gain brought about by a shift 
in force culture. However, the dearth of research specifically on the use of RJ to 
change organisational culture, meant that the likely extent of any such change 
could not have been reliably predicted. Further attempts to use RJ in this manner 
should be comprehensively evaluated to inform future discussions on whether 
this risk is worth taking and how any challenged can be overcome. Lessons might 
also be learned from ‘whole organisation’ approaches to RJ from education and 
other fields. Notably, often recommend that, to change organisational culture, it 
is necessary also to use restorative approaches proactively within the target 
organisation (Hopkins, 2004; Green, et al., 2014; Acosta, et al., 2016). 
 
 
9.5 Final thoughts 
 
Towards the end of their seminal book on practitioners’ use of discretion to 
construct official narratives of crime, McConville, et al. (1991: 206) claim that: 
 
Changing police culture is not possible on its own, for it derives from the 
policing mandate. […] The issue, therefore, is not just the methods and 
methodologies of policing, but its objectives. (emphasis in original)  
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The despondence which McConville, et al. subsequently articulated is not shared 
by most advocates of restorative policing. To them, the attraction of RJ lies in its 
ability simultaneously to redefine police objectives with fresh ‘principles of 
intervention’ (Bazemore and Griffiths, 2003: 344) and to explicate the methods 
through which those objectives can be achieved. In theory, restorative policing 
represents an attempt to encourage the police to depart from what Clamp and 
Paterson call ‘the “police use of force” paradigm’ (2017: 168), and to inculcate a 
new policing purpose in which citizens are supported to participate in decision-
making, to build social capital and to make use of latent capacities for order 
maintenance. Some see it as a methodology by which the elusive notions of 
community and problem-oriented policing might finally be realised (Weitekamp, 
et al., 2003). In theory, restorative policing both requires (in its objectives) and 
assists (through its methods) police officers to transfer power directly to citizens, 
ideally enabling a benign form of civic participation in preventing and responding 
to crime and conflict (Weitekamp, et al., 2003). Through this, it is argued, the 
police can deliver better outcomes for victims, offenders and communities, and 
move towards a much more progressive, legitimate, responsive and consensual 
policing model (O’Connell, 2000; Lofty, 2002), reversing the managerial trend 
towards being inward looking (Moor, et al., 2009).  
As McConville, et al. (1991) and Chan (1996) pointed out, however, existing 
social and institutional structures act as barriers to reform efforts. When a police 
force implements RJ, those who are responsible for doing so extract what they 
believe to be useful and desirable from the miscellany of ideas, principles and 
practices which underlie the concept. Their decisions in this regard are informed 
by existing rationales, priorities, goals and ways of working within the police, as 
well as by the social and political context within which the police exist and 
policework takes place. At the end of this process, it reforms as something else 
altogether – a ‘restorative policing’ which, as a fusion of RJ and traditional 
policing, is essentially bound to represent a hybridised version of both. This does 
not preclude the possibility that restorative policing might represent a substantial 
improvement on the status quo. It does mean, however, that care must be taken 
to ensure that it is the case. 
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
ABH Actual Bodily Harm 
ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers 
ASB Anti-social Behaviour 
COPS Community Oriented Police Solutions 
CPS Crown Prosecution Service 
CRB Criminal Records Bureau 
CRC Community Rehabilitation Company 
DBS Disclosure and Barring Service (formerly CRB) 
DNR Darlington Neighbourhood Resolution 
doc. Document (see Appendix B for a full list of collected documents) 
EU European Union 
Gloucs. Gloucestershire 
HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
IAU Incident Assessment Unit 
IOM Integrated Offender Management 
MoJ Ministry of Justice 
NCRS National Crime Recording Standard 
NJP Neighbourhood Justice Panel 
NPT Neighbourhood Policing Team 
OBTJ Offences Brought to Justice 
OIC Officer in Charge 
OOCD Out-of-court Disposal 
PACE Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
PC Police Constable 
PCC Police and Crime Commissioner 
PCSO Police Community Support Officer 
RA Restorative Approach(es) (equivalent to RJ in Durham) 
RJ Restorative Justice 
RPSPPP Restorative Problem-solving Police Prevention Programme 
YOT Youth Offender Team 
YRD Youth Restorative Disposal 
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